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UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED NORMS AND THEIR
APPLICATION IN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLISH AND
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW AND THEIR
INTERACTION WITH MODERN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATIONt
STANISLAW POMORSKI*AND KRISTIN DEFERT**
INTRODUCTION
Multinational public international law agreements are being increas-
ingly relied upon to deal with a growing number of economic and social
problems which in the past were either exclusively or largely regulated by
national legislation. Their intended domestic regulatory character distin-
guishes these agreements from the older international treaties.1 Professor
Buergenthal writes convincingly that:
It is therefore readily apparent that in the long run these
agreements can have a significant impact on a given national legal
system. Very little is known, however, about the domestic law con-
sequences of the interaction between these treaties and national
law. The major reason for this is that we are dealing with a rela-
tively recent phenomenon....
What is needed, therefore, is an assessment of the various
ramifications of this development from a comparative law perspec-
tive.
2
This is particularly true with regard to multinational agreements on human
rights, especially those of fundamental importance and long lasting effects,
such as the United Nation's International Covenants on Human Rights (the
Covenant) .3
t The study was prepared under a grant from the Ford Foundation.
* Professor Pomorski received his LL.B., LL.M., and J.S.D. from the University of War-
saw, Poland. He is presently a professor of law at Rutgers-Camden, State University of New
Jersey School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable critique by Professor
George Ginsburgs. Richard Goldberg, Esq., a former Rutgers-Camden Law School student
and George M. Armstrong, a second year student at the same school, have been very helpful in
the research and preparation of footnotes.
**Ms. Defert received her J.D. from Rutgers-Camden, State University of New Jersey
School of Law. She is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. Buergenthal, Interaction of National Law and Modern Intematzmnal Agreements: Some Introduc-
tog, Observations, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233 (1970), and authorities collected therein, at 233 n.1;
Skubiszewski, Pravo PRL a traktaty, RUCH PRAWNIcZY EKONOMICZNY I SOCJOLOGICZNY 4 (No.
3, 1972).
2. See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 233.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by resolu-
tion 2200 (XXI) of the General Assembly, 16 Dec. 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 49-52,
U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
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Such international legislation creates a new situation and perspective in
comparative legal research and imposes new tasks upon scholars of compara-
tive law. First of all, international agreements of the type mentioned above
demonstrate that in spite of social, economic, political, and ideological differ-
ences between various states and groups of states, there are certain univer-
sally recognized values and norms which may and should be observed in the
various national legal systems. This fund of universally shared ideas, values,
and norms indicates that cultural relativism in comparative legal research is
not without limits. It also indicates that judging several national legal sys-
tems by internationally accepted standards has nothing to do with the impo-
sition of the values of one legal and political culture upon another.
Certainly no one should object that his municipal law is evaluated by stan-
dards which he has explicitly accepted and undertaken an obligation to ob-
serve.
Finally, international agreements of the type discussed indicate that the
current official interpretation of Marxist ideas about the class nature of law
and human rights4 is not incompatible with the idea of universal norms es-
sential for every contemporary society in the world and hence generally
binding. This, in turn, proves the fallacy of the view, presented by some
comparative lawyers, that legal systems of the Western and Socialist type are
virtually incomparable.5 The very existence of universally accepted norms
creates the possibility, indeed the practical necessity, of comparison and sup-
plies comparative analysis with meaningful conceptual criteria.
A student of comparative law is thus presented with a new theoretically
exciting and practically significant task: to search for the influence of inter-
nationally accepted norms on particular national legal systems, to find out
whether internationally agreed-upon norms have been implemented in do-
mestic laws, and to discover what the forms of such implementation are and
what kind of conditions are favorable or unfavorable for such a process.
The impact which an international agreement can have on a given na-
tional legal system certainly depends on many factors. One of the most im-
resolution 2200 (XXI) of the General Assembly, 16 Dec. 1966 [hereinafter cited as the Cove-
nant], 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
4. See text accompanying note 20-36 znfra.
5. See Eorsi, Comparative Analysis of Socialist and Capitahst Law, 1964 COEXISTENCE 139.
Although Eorsi concludes that comparative law has a role to play between the legal systems of
the Western and Socialist type, it is de minimis. He sees comparative law as being a means of
peaceful competition between social systems, a route to mutual knowledge and understanding,
or merely to satisfy the practical requirements of international trade. Id. at 146, 151. However,
Eorsi indicates that the systems are virtually incomparable on any substantive level when he
says:
The possibility of comparison arises only where phenomenon to be compared are vari-
ants which can be subsumed-from a certain point of view-under a common pri-
mary category. They have, at the same time, both common and different
characteristics. In the Western world this common primary category is the law of
private property ....
Id. at 141. The only common ground Eorsi finds between the Western and Socialist countries is
a desire for peaceful coexistence and peaceful economic competition. Eorsi's statement that
there is no "direct" common ground for a comparison between the law of West and East, id. at
145, may be refuted by viewing the universally accepted standards on human rights as that
common ground.
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portant is an international system of adjudication of governmental and
private complaints seeking redress for violations of rights guaranteed by an
agreement.6 International adjudication provides not only an immediate
means of pressure for change on a state whose domestic law is challenged,
7
but it may have at least two additional side-effects as well: (1) it represents a
means of indirect pressure on those State Parties which have similarly objec-
tionable legal institutions in their systems; and (2) it establishes an authorita-
tive interpretation of an international instrument and hence makes its
standards clearer and more visible.
None of the aforesaid is present in those cases where an international
system of adjudication does not exist and where the whole machinery for
implementation is weak, as is the case of the U.N. International Covenants
on Human Rights.8 One of the negative effects of such a situation is that the
very meaning of the internationally established standards remains unclear
and hence their violations, if alleged, usually remain unverifiable. Under
such circumstances, studies of comparative law may be of some special prac-
tical service.
6. The experience of the European Convention of Human Rights supports this thesis in
full. Ste Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at
Rome, 4 Nov. 1950; entered into force on 3 Sept. 1953, Council of Europe, European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Collected Texts, sec. 1, doc. 1 (7th ed. Strasbourg, 1971) [hereinafter
cited as the European Convention]. See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 234.
7. Such a direct impact has been demonstrated by several writers on the European Con-
vention. See generally Khol, The Influence of the Human Rights Convention on Austrian Law, 18 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 237 (1970); Velu, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in Belgian Law, 18
AM. J. COMP. L. 259 (1970).
8. The Covenant lacks any provision containing strong compulsory implementation or
policing measures. It provides for a reporting system from the states to the Human Rights
Committee, the prime body for enforcement, whose functions are restricted to receiving the
reports and reporting back facts. The Human Rights Committee maintains no adjudicatory
function. See Korey, The Key to Human Rights-Implementation, 570 INT'L CONCILIATION 1, 54-55
(Nov. 1968).
For those states which have accepted its optional provisions, the Covenant provides for an
exchange of written communications about alleged violations, the possibility of an ad hoc Con-
ciliation Commission to handle interstate complaints, and summary reports to the General As-
sembly. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European
Convention on Human Rights, 43 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 21, 26-27 (1968-69).
All conciliation provisions within the Covenant are optional, and may be withdrawn by the
states. Korey, supra, at 55.
States which ratify the Covenant and satisfy themselves that their law is generally in ac-
cordance with its provisions, need not fear that an international judicial body may decide that
they are guilty of violating their obligations. The Covenant conferred no such power on the
Human Rights Committee or the Conciliation Commission which may be established under
art. 42. In fact, examination of a complaint by the U.N. machinery will result in an exchange of
correspondence between U.N. organs and the foreign ministry of the state concerned. Robert-
son, supra, at 26-27.
One highly authoritative scholar characterized the Covenant provisions for implementa-
tion, as opposed to the European Convention on Human Rights, as "extremely weak."
Humphrey, The Revolution in the International Law of Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 205, 212
(1975). Other writers have found that the system is disappointing, retrogressive, and defective.
Bilder, Rethiking International Human Rights.- Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 171, 207-
12; Korey, supra, at 55; Nanda, lmplementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 271, 317 (1971).
These opinions have been forcefully endorsed by the activities at the Human Rights Com-
mittee, the 18 member body elected by 38 parties to the Covenant on September 23, 1976. See
Mower, Organizig to Implement the UN. Civil and Polittcal Rihts Covenant: First Steps by the Commit-
tee, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 122 (1978).
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It should be their task to reconstruct the meaning of internationally es-
tablished norms, to work out the standards to be met by the State Parties,
and finally to confront them with a given national system of legislative and
enforcement patterns. In a sense, legal writers can become at least a partial
substitute for the presently nonexistent mechanism of adjudication. To ful-
fill this function it is necessary to focus on narrow issues instead of dealing
with broad philosophical and anthropological 'human rights questions.
9
The present project analyzes the Polish and American penal systems
from the point of view of certain selected norms of international legislation
on human rights,' ° primarily those included in the U.N. International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights."'
The criminal law systems seem to be particularly interesting as the sub-
ject matter for such an analysis: Poland codified anew its entire penal law
quite recently (1969-1971),12 and a significant part of the drafting and re-
drafting process took place soon after the adoption of the Covenant by the
U.N. General Assembly in December 1966.13 And intensive process of re-
form and codification of American criminal law has been going on approxi-
mately since the beginning of the 1960s. Several American jurisdictions
have adopted new criminal codes or prepared drafts of new codes.1 4 There-
fore, it seemed quite obvious at the inception of the project that both in
Poland and in the United States the codification and reform process could
be related to, and could have been influenced by, the Covenant.
The systems under consideration are divergent in several respects.
Their special economic, political, and ideological background are different.
They also have different legal traditions and hence show substantial differ-
ences in their legal techniques. In spite of the above mentioned divergencies,
the systems under consideration are supposed to implement certain common
and universally accepted ideals, values, and norms.
Two basic questions have guided our research: First, to what extent, if
any, has the Covenant actually influenced American and Polish penal sys-
tems? Second, to what extent are American and Polish penal systems, in
their present shape, compatible with the standards provided for by the Cove-
nant? So not to spread our efforts thin, we decided to limit the inquiry on
9. Literature on human rights is full of general works whereas specific issues have re-
mained largely neglected. Therefore, as it was correctly pointed out, ". . . one of the most
urgent tasks confronting human rights advocates today is that of formulating and analyzing the
standards prescribed in the Covenant." Hassan, The International Covenants for Human Rights. An
Approach to Interpretation, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 35 (1969-70).
10. This approach is thus markedly more narrow in scope than some recent scholarly at-
tempts at assessing whole national legal systems from the perspective of internationally estab-
lished standards on human rights. See generally M. HAUSER, MENSCHENRECHTE IM
SOWJETSYSTEM (1973); K. MUNGER, BURGERLICHE UND POLITISCHE RECHTE IN WELTPAKT
DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN UND IM SCHWEIZERISCHEN RECHT (1973).
It. See the Covenant, supra note 3.
12. See note 66 in/a and accompanying text.
13. The Covenant, supra note 3.
14. As of April 1979, 36 jurisdictions have revised their penal codes, six completed the
revision which was not yet enacted, and three were in various stages of, or were contemplating,
revision. Six jurisdictions had comp~etd revision which failed to be enacted and two had no
over-all revision planned. The American Law Institute, Annual Report, 56th Annual Meeting,
15 May, 1979.
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the second question to whether the penal systems under consideration are
compatible with the standards established by the Covenant in: article 9
(freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention); and article 14, section 5 (the
right to appeal in criminal cases).
Our research on the first basic question has not established any positive
evidence of the influence the Covenant has had on American penal law re-
form. Several factors may have been responsible for that:
(1) The main responsibility in the area of criminal law is on the
states,15 whereas foreign relations are entirely within the jurisdiction of the
federal government. The distance between those working on criminal law
reforms on the state level and the international instrument on human rights
adopted by the General Assembly is substantial and may have reduced the
concern about adjusting municipal criminal law to requirements of interna-
tional law.
(2) A previous well known reluctance on the part of the U.S. Congress
to undertake international obligations in the area of human rights,' 6 made
15. Status quo recognition of states' responsibility for substantive criminal law legislation
has been recently ably challenged. See Myren, Should the United States Adopt a National Substantive
Crimbhal Code for Serious Ofenses, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 103 (1974).
16. This congressional reluctance has created a long history of American verbal assent and
voting agreement with international human rights obligations, usually resulting in non-ratifica-
tion. Generally, the Congress has "refused . . . international efforts to establish common mini-
mum standards for individual human rights." Henkin, 7he Constitution, Treaties, and International
Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (1968).
Contemporary examples include congressional failure to ratify the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (1954) and the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. The Genocide Convention received wide support, in particular during the
period following the Second World War, from both the American delegate to the General As-
sembly and President Truman who "forwarded it to the Senate, urging it to advise and consent
to ratification." V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMU-
NITY 130 (1970).
Primarily because of strong pressure from the American Bar Association, interest groups,
and a group in the Senate lead by Senator Bricker, "Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
announced in 1953 that the United States would not sign or ratify any covenant on human
rights." Id. See generally Bitker, The Constitutionah'ty of International Agreements on Human Rights, 12
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 279, 290-91 (1972). The Covention on the Political Rights of Women
was also rejected during this period.
Renewed interest, fostered ten years later by the Kennedy administration, met a similar
fate. Both the Convention on the Political Rights of Women on the Convention on the Aboli-
tion of Forced Labor were denied consent to ratification by the Senate. The Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery was the only human rights agreement recently approved by the Senate and formally
ratified by the United States; delayed II years after the time the Convention was approved by
the U.N. General Assembly. V. VAN DYKE, supra, at 131. In spite of American signature on the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratification similarly has
not been forthcoming. Id. at 109-10. In sum, Congress has "attach[ed] little urgency to the
issue" of international human rights. Id. at 245.
When the fear that ratification of such international treaties might establish a basis for
international scrutiny of domestic human rights issues, such as racial discrimination, was dissi-
pated, with the eradication of some of the worst injustices due to the civil rights movement, the
climate for ratification of these multilateral treaties became improved. Weissbrodt, Human
Rights Legislation and US Foreign Poliy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 235-37 n.26 (1977). In
1974, a congressional committee listed 29 human rights conventions which the U.S. had not
ratified and recommended immediate ratification. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMU-
NITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ORGANIZATIONS
AND MOVEMENTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d Congress, 2d Sess. 21, 24
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ratification of the Covenant by the United States by no means certain. 
17
(3) There may be a feeling that American criminal law protects the
rights of the individual so well that its compatibility with, or even its superi-
ority to, internationally established standards may have been taken for
granted.' 8 Whether such a feeling has been justified is quite another ques-
tion which will be dealt with in the later parts of this article.
On the other hand, there is a substantial amount of evidence indicating
(1974) [hereinafter cited as A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP]. In 1976, the Senate ratified two
conventions guaranteeing the political rights of women. Weissbrodt, supra, at 236.
The most significant impact on achieving ratification of human rights conventions has
been the election of President Carter. Committed to making the advancement of human rights
a central part of U.S. foreign policy, the President called for ratification of four important
human rights covenants and conventions. Vance, Human Rights and Foretgn Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 223, 226 (1977). Included in these was the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Address by Jimmy Carter, B'nai B'rith Convention (Sept. 8, 1976). In 1977, President
Carter further committed the U.S. to ratification of the United Nations Human Rights Cove-
nants. See Address by President Carter, Inaugural Address, 123 CONG. REc. S 1131 (daily ed.
Jan. 20, 1977); Address by President Carter, United Nations, reprintedin N.Y. Times, March 18,
1977, at 10, col. 1.
In February 1978, President Carter transmitted to the Senate four treaties pertaining to
human rights "with a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification."
The four treaties included the two U.N. Covenants on Human Rights as well as the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Four Treaties
Pertaining to Human Rights, Message from the President of the United States. U.S. Senate,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Gov't Printing Off., Wash., D.C. 1978 [hereinafter Message from the
President].
17. Recognizing the powerful sources of opposition to U.S. ratification of international
human rights agreements, contemporary writers indicated an almost unanimous belief that rati-
fication of the United Nations Covenant of Civil and Political Rights was, at best, uncertain.
See V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 148, 245; Bitker, Human Rights and Untied States Foreign Policy:
Short Tem Prospects, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 597, 601-06 (1974); Bitker, supra note 16, at 290-91;
Buergenthal, Internatzonal Human Rights: US Policy and.Priorities, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 620-21
(1974); Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014; MacChesney, Should the Untied States Rati the Covenants?
A Question of MAerls, not of Constitutional Law, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 917 (1968).
Historically, strong lobbying forces opposed all contemporary human rights agreements
and attempted to force a general non-ratification policy. See V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 35.
Intermittently, constitutional amendments were proposed to block any future possibility of rati-
fication. Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014. Writers, supporting either ratification or a substantive
analysis of the merits of each provision within the Covenants, agree that there is no question
concerning the constitutionality of international human rights agreements in general. Bitker,
supra note 16, at 279-84; Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014-17; MacChesney, supra, at 915.
In spite of the objection that adherence is an unconstitutional federal invasion of each
state's domestic jurisdiction, traditionally, Congress has exercised the power to enter into agree-
ments containing human rights provisions. V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 131-32; Bitker, supra
note 16, at 279-84; Henkin, supra note 16, at 1014-17, 1020. Authorities challenged the useful-
ness of continued U.S. opposition to major agreements and its effect on American credibility in
the world community.
Disillusionment with the United Nations and uneasiness regarding potential political risks
of ratification were cited as the major reasons underlying this policy. Other authors noted the
advantages of American participation. V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 146-48; Bitker, supra, at
607-14; Buergenthal, supra note I, at 620-21. Comment, The International Human Rights Treaties.
Some Problems of Poly and Interpretation, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 886, 888 (1978).
The election of President Carter, whose administration is committed to obtaining ratifica-
tion of the Covenants, has constituted a major shift in United States policy toward human
rights coventions. See note 16 supra.
18. Henkin, The United States and the Criis In Human Rights, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 653 (1974).
"The United States has seen international human rights as designed for others only. Our re-
spect for human rights, we believe, already surpasses any foreseeable, acceptable international
standard; the need is to bring the blessings of our liberties to others." Id. at 663. See also V. VAN
DYKE, supra note 16, at 120.
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that the recent Polish penal law reform has been to some extent influenced
by the Covenant. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that several specific
changes have been made by the Polish draftsmen with an eye to the specific
provisions of the Covenant.' 9 Whether these changes have been sufficient to
bring the Polish penal system into conformity with the Covenant is still an-
other question. Consequently the present article consists of two parts:
The first part discusses the influence exerted by the Covenant on the
Polish penal law reform. The last part assesses the compatibility of the
American and Polish penal systems with the two specific provisions of the
Covenant listed above. The two parts constitute the main body of the pres-
ent article. But first, a brief discussion of certain general, however closely
related, issues is in order. The remainder of the present introduction is de-
voted to the discussion of these generalities.
Much has been written on various philosophical, ideological, and politi-
cal concepts of, and approaches to, human rights. 20 A Marxist-Leninist view
of the subject matter as represented by socialist 2' countries has repeatedly
been juxtaposed and contrasted with the Western position.22 Since the Po-
lish legal system belongs to "the Marxian socialist group, ' ' 23 this paper will
focus briefly on this issue and ascertain its relevance for further discussion.
The Marxist concept of human rights is consistent with a broader
Marxist approach to the state and the law in general. The state and the
law-according to a standard Marxist position-are parts of a class super-
structure, subject to historical changes, which are conditioned primarily by
changes in the mode of production (economic base or infra-structure). Con-
sequently, Marxism rejects "the law of nature" approach to human rights as
19. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
20. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); A. H. ROB-
ERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1972); DIE MENSCHENRECHTE: ENTWICKLUNG,
STAND, ZUKUNFT (Veiter and Kleineds. 1966); Bystricky, The Unversah'to of Human Ri'ghtr bn a
World of Conlmting Ideologies, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SEVENTH NOBEL SYMP. (1968); Castberg, Natural Law and Human Rights: An Ideo-
Historical Surve, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SEVENTH NOBEL SYMPOSIUM (1968); Szabo, The Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH NOBEL SYMPO-
SIUM (1968); Raphael, The Liberal Western Tradition of Human Rights, 18 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 2
(1966); Borucka-Arctowa, Wspolczesna koncepcja praw czlowieka, in KSIEGA PAMIATKOWA KU CZI
KONSTANTEGO GRZYBOWSKIEGO; Murphy, Ideological Interpretations of Human Rights, 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 286 (1971); Burns, The Rights of Man Since the Reformation, in AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS (F.A. Vallet ed. 1972).
21. By socialist countries we mean those countries which adhere to the social order built
upon the non-private ownership of the means of production. This operative definition is being
employed rather than others which are designed to prejudice the reader for or against a concept,
or are emotionally laden. See P. WILES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 2 (1964).
22. See M. HAUSER, supra note 10; Szabo, Fundamental Questions Conrterning the Theoq and
Hstov of Citiztns'Rights, in SOCIALIST CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1966); Bracht, Die Idee der
Menschenrechte in Staats-und Volkerrechtur-Standnis des Marxismus-Leninismus, DIE MEN-
SCHENRECHTE, supra note 20; Hirszowicz, The Marxist Approach, 18 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 11 (1966);
Murphy, supra note 20; Przetacznik, The Soctalist Concept of Protection of Human Rights, 38 Soc.
RESEARCH 337 (1971).
23. See for a definition of "the Marxian Socialist group," J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND




"idealistic" and "ahistorical. ' '2 4 There is nothing "natural," "inborn," or
"inalienable" about human rights-Marxism claims-all rights are derived
from the will of the state. "Human rights" are not different: they exist only
because the state decided to confer them upon the individual. At this point
the Marxist approach intersects with a positivist approach. The fundamen-
tal difference, claimed by Marxists, 25 however, is that "the will of the state"
is not abstract and arbitrary, but is always historically determined by the
material conditions of social life.
Neither the historical relativism of the Marxist approach nor the class
interpretation of human rights, precludes Marxists from recognizing that
certain ideals and principles are of a universal nature in the contemporary
world.
It is indisputable-according to our views-that such notions
as law, justice, morality, democracy, freedom, etc. are historical
categories, whose content is determined by the conditions of life of
a people and by their social circumstances. As the conditions of life
change, so the content of notions and ideas may change.
The ruling ideas of an age are the ideas of its ruling class. How-
ever, this approach does not deny the existence of ideals, principles,
notions, which have at least to some extent-a universal character
and are a sort of common denominator for everyone within a cer-
tain historical period.
2 6
Today ideological and philosophical disagreements between Marxists
and non-Marxists regarding theoretical foundations of human rights do not
preclude achievement of practical compromises as to desirable legal solu-
tions. It has not been always so, however. It should be noted that the official
attitude of socialist countries toward human rights and their international
protection has undergone a substantial evolution. Legal and political theo-
rists in these countries no longer claim that socialism per se automatically
eradicates conflicts between the individual and the state.
2 7
Indeed, there seems to be a growing recognition that such conflicts do
exist under socialism, and consequently, legal protection of the individual
against oppressive and arbitrary state actions still is, and will be in the fore-
seeable future, an issue of sizeable importance.
28
In short, the legal and political theory of socialist countries seems to
recognize the validity of a human rights issue under the socio-political condi-
24. Bracht, supra note 22, at 325; Szabo, supra note 20, at 35.
25. Szabo, supra note 20, at 40.
26. Bystricky, supra note 20, at 88.
27. Szabo, supra note 20, at 42; A. MICHALSKA, PADSTAWOWE PRAWA CZLOWIEKA W
PRAWIE WEWNETRZNYM A PAKTY PRAW CZLOWIEKA 38 (1976).
28. See Szabo, supra note 22. Blaming the need to elaborate legal safeguards on the nega-
tive experiences gained in the Stalinist period, Szabo indicates that legal protection of the indi-
vidual against the socialist state is an issue:
This period served as proof that, although there is no conflict and, indeed, there can-
not be a conflict between individual and community interests in a socialist society, yet
the occurrence of such incidental conflicts which originate in the shortcomings of the
activity of the government machinery, are not precluded, particularly when the organs
exercising state power superimpose their specific interests upon those of the commu-




tions of these countries.
29
Even more dramatically, socialist countries have changed their attitude
toward human rights in the international forum. Some thirty years ago the
Soviet delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, along with his Eastern Euro-
pean colleagues, abstained from voting for the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 30 Indeed the Declaration was denounced from the floor.
3 1
Today socialist countries not only give their approval to international legis-
lation on human rights, 32 but praise and welcome it as a phenomenon of
great positive political value.
3 3
Indeed all of East European socialist countries, except Albania (notably
the USSR as first of the great powers), formally ratified the Covenants.
34
These evolutionary changes do not mean, of course, that all fundamen-
tal differences between the socialist and non-socialist approach to human
rights have disappeared. The most pronounced practical differences seem to
persist in the area of classical political rights and freedoms. Socialist coun-
tries give to such classical rights as freedom of expression, freedom of assem-
bly and association, an interpretation which, judging by Western standards,
renders them almost worthless.
Many of those living in socialist countries, most notably the intellectu-
als, share the prevailing Western view that Socialist law gives niggardly pro-
tection to political liberty. Several confrontations that have taken place in
recent years between socialist governments and various groups of the popula-
tion have dramatized and made the differences over classical human rights
quite visible.
35
29. See Przetacznik, L Attidue des itats socrnlistes h l'gard de la protection biternationale des drotits
de /'homme, 7 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 175, (1974). See also Szabo, supra note 22, at 18-
19.
30. 3 U.N. GAOR 852 (1948). At the end of the 183rd meeting held on 10 December
1948, the vote was taken on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among the eight
abstaining countries were: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia.
31. See 3 U.N. GAOR 853 (1948). Compare statements by Vyshinsky (USSR), id. at 854
with Katz-Suchy (Poland), id. at 903.
32. Socialist countries actively participated in the preparatory process. They endorsed and
welcomed the covenants being voted by the U.N. General Assembly as "an event of great histor-
ical and political importance." See Arkadiev and Igoriev, 5 Taktp o pravakh cheloveka, SOVET-
SKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, (No. 5, Apr. 1967). 1. OSTROVSKII, OON I PRAVA CHELOVEKA
(1968); Resich, Pako Praw Czlowieka, NOWE PRAWO (No. 3, 1967); Bafia, Ratyfaca Paktow Praw
Cz/owieka w PRL, PANSTWO I PRAWO 3-5 (No. 4, 1977).
33. See, e.g., the discourse of the Czechoslovakian delegate at the General Assembly prior
to the vote on the Covenants, 21 U.N. GAOR 15, A/PV 1495 (1966). See also the discourse of
the Soviet delegate at the General Assembly after voting for the Covenants, 21 U.N. GAOR 13,
A/PV 1496 (1966).
34. Poland became the last of the group to ratify them in March 1977. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1279. None of the East European countries have signed or ratified the Optional Proto-
col to the Covenant. 4 REV. Soc. LAW 85 (1978).
35. For a discussion of how the Soviets view the classical right of freedom of speech and
press, see V. VAN DYKE, supra note 16, at 15. See A. SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE
WORLD (1975), and The Letter of 59 Intellectuals to the Speaker of the Diet of the Polish Peoples Repub-
lic, in 19 A CHRONICLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR 15 (Jan.-Mar. 1976) as illustrative of
differences of interpretation of classical human rights between intellectuals and socialist govern-
ments. See also Sharlet, Dissent and Regression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Changng Pat-
terns Since Knishchev, 33 INTERNATIO NAT'L J. 763 (1978).
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The second area of most pronounced differences is the issue of economic
and social rights. Socialist countries insist on the priority of these rights over
classical civil and political rights.
36
The area which we propose to examine-the area of criminal law and
criminal procedure-is affected by the above mentioned differences only in-
directly. The influence of the ideological and political differences is never-
theless not negligible and will be referred to when it is relevant.
In this last section of the Introduction we will discuss certain legal con-
texts in which interaction between international legislation on human rights
and municipal systems may occur.
There are two levels on which such an interaction may occur. First,
internationally established standards on human rights may function as a fac-
tor motivating national legislatures to act in a certain way or to refrain from
otherwise intended action. 3 7 Such motivation may occur in a variety of le-
gal contexts. First of all an international treaty on human rights, such as the
Covenant, if duly ratified, confers upon a state a formal international obliga-
tion to shape its domestic legislation accordingly. 38 Appropriate changes in
municipal statutory law (or deliberately refraining from making changes)
would be just a discharge of formal treaty obligations. 39 Failure to discharge
a treaty obligation is an international delict and may be sanctioned.
A national legislature may also adjust municipal statutory law in antici-
pation of a future ratification of an international treaty. Changes in munici-
pal law, in such a case, are motivated by international obligations likely to
arise in the future. This variation seems to be close to the case of the Polish
penal law codification: draftsmen of the new codes introduced several provi-
sions and also repealed certain laws in strong anticipation that Poland would
ratify the Covenant in the near future.
Internationally established standards on human rights may, however,
also become binding upon states regardless of formal ratification.
40 Mul-
tinational treaties on human rights, such as the Covenants, may generate
certain practices and consequently become sources of customary interna-
tional law, binding universally, thus also binding upon those states which
36. Przetacznik, supra note 29, at 192-93. Ste note 33 supra, for the speeches of socialist
delegates to U.N.
37. By "national legislatures" we mean of course those who make actual decisions upon
appropriate courses of action or inaction.
38. Przetacznik, supra note 29, at 196. According to socialist doctrine, international protec-
tion of human rights consists of coordinating internal legislation with the obligations accepted
through the Convention. Each state has an obligation to enact legislation so as to assure the
rights agreed upon and to eliminate all areas of their legislation which are contrary to the
Covenant. See also Blishchenko, International Treaties and Their Apphcation on the Territoy of the
USSR, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 820 (1975).
39. This certainly would not have been the case with the Covenant, which has not yet been
ratified by the U.S. but has been ratified only recently by Poland. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.
D/9 p. 101. As of December 31, 1978, 55 countries had ratified including Poland on March 18,
1977. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/12.
40. See Clark & Nevas, The First 25 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rihts--and the
Next, 48 CONN. B. J. 111 (1974). See also A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, supra note 16.
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did not formally accede to the treaties.4 1 Certainly the Covenants, backed
by the authority of the unanimous vote of the General Assembly, the high
number of ratifying states, and the tradition of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and U.N. practices, may aspire to the role of a source of
customary international law. National legislatures may consequently be in-
clined to adjust their statutory law, even though their state fails to ratify the
Covenants.
The second level of interaction may be direct application of interna-
tional law on human rights, especially appropriate treaty provisions, in a
municipal legal order. The question whether such an application is at all
feasible and what its further implications may be is basically a question of
constitutional law of the respective states. Consequently, the question can-
not be resolved in the abstract, but should be considered separately with
respect to a given national legal system.
41. There is no clear answer as to whether the Covenant may become binding on the U.S.
as customary international law. Traditionally, writers have resisted the proposition that treaties
generate customary international law. Professor Baxter, in a well-known article on the subject,
has suggested that a treaty may be accepted as valid evidence of the state of customary interna-
tional law if it purports to be declaratory of customary international law or "codifies" it. See
Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customag International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275,
298 (1965-66). Although the covenant would probably not be regarded as codifying interna-
tional law, Baxter does say that treaties directed toward the protection of human rights have a
wider claim for application than treaties concerned with the purely political and economic in-
terests of states. Id. at 286.
Contrary to this widely held opinion is that one expressed by D'Amato that generalizable
provisions in multilateral treaties generate customary rules of law binding upon all states. A.
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). D'Amato argues that:
What has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature of international law is a
secondary, yet significant, effect of treaties. Not only do they carve out law for the
immediate parties, but they also have a profound impact upon general customary law
for nonparties. For a treaty arguably is a clear record of a binding international com-
mitment that constitutes the "practice of states" and hence is as much a record of
customary behavior as any other state act or restraint. International tribunals have
already recognized this effect of treaties upon customary law, and historically treaties
have a decisive impact upon the content of international law.
Id. at 104.
Under this view the Covenant is a type of treaty which can give rise to a rule of customary
law since it is a multilateral treaty which contains generalizable rules. Id. at 105. See also
Humphrey, The Implementation ofInternational Human Rights Law, 24 N.Y. L. SCH. L.R. 31, 32
(1978). Humphrey argues that the provisions of a treaty may become norms of customary law
solely because the treaty is widely ratified.
If the modern trend towards viewing treaties as sources of customary law continues, the
Covenant would become binding on the U.S. even without ratification. Clark and Nevas indi-
cated that such a trend was strong when they said that an important role might be played by
unratified treaties like the Human Rights Covenants and the Universal Declaration as authori-
tative interpretations of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter or in the development
of international customary law. Clark & Nevas, supra note 40, at 113.
Finally, a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee of Foreign Affairs,
while investigating human rights, noted that "many statesmen and jurists now consider the
Universal Declaration to be an authoritative interpretation of the human rights clauses of the
Charter as well as part of customary international law and therefore legally binding upon
states." A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, supra note 16, at 19. With this in mind, one might
argue that even under a restricted view of international customary law such as Baxter's, the
Covenant would become customary law as it merely delineates or "codifies" that which has
already been accepted as international customary law.
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A. Poland
The legal status of international treaties in Polish municipal law is un-
clear. The 1952 Constitution left a gap here which legal writers have tried to
fill by advancing various theories, not necessarily compatible with each
other. A minority seem to suggest that every international treaty of a nor-
mative nature becomes, by virtue of ratification and official publication, "a
source" of municipal law equal to statutory law. The theory has a very weak
foundation. 42  As has been ably and convincingly argued by Professor
Skubiszewski, 43 there are compelling constitutional reasons to believe that
international treaties, in principle, are not included into the fabric of munic-
ipal statutory law. Nevertheless, the treaties are applicable and binding
upon agencies of internal legal order propro vigore, as rules suigeneris.
4 4
How are possible conflicts resolved between an international treaty rule
and a statutory rule? Skubiszewski suggests that the latter should prevail, 45
but his opinion has not been unanimously shared. 46 Whatever the correct
doctrinal solution, it is highly unlikely that law enforcement agencies would
give priority to a treaty provision over a statutory rule. Thus the Covenant,
even now after its formal ratification, may not repeal or supersede relevant
parts of the Polish statutory law. To this extent Jerzy Bafia is right. To
make the Polish penal system compatible with the Covenant, legislative
changes are necessary; one should not assume any automatic effect given to
the Covenant provision contrary to the statutory rules. 4 7 Hence, the answer
is rather clear in a case of conflict between the Covenant and statutory law.
The answer, however, is not at all obvious in the case of a legal vacuum.
Suppose a matter is not dealt with by Polish statutory law, but is fairly well
settled in the Covenant. Under the theory advanced by Skubiszewski, and
shared by a majority, the appropriate provision of the Covenant would be
"applicable and binding propro vigore" upon the agencies of internal legal
order.4 Such a legal vacuum however, in the area of penal law, is rather
42. Gelberg, Umowyvjoko zrodloprawa PRL, SPRAWY MEIDZYNARODOE 45-46 (No. 4, 1965);
Gelberg, Umowy miedynarodowe w systemiepraownm PRL, NoWE PRAwo (No. 1, 1974). Similarly,
in the Soviet Union the prefered view is that treaties do not automatically become a source of
internal law. Miullerson, Natsional' no pravovaza implementatsiia mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov v SSSR,
VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA 64 (No. 6, 1978). Miullerson notes that some authors
believe that "[ain international agrement in which the Soviet Union participates should be
recognized as a source of internal law." But according to Miullerson, "an international agree-
ment is not a source of national law either in the USSR or generally .... "
43. See note 1 supra; Skubiszewski, The Validity of Treaties in Polsh Minzipal Law, Rapports
polonais pr6sent~s au VI Congress International de Droit Compar6 (1962). [hereinafter the Va-
lidi'ty of Treattes]. The most recent revision of the Constitution has not changed anything in this
regard. W. Sokolewicz, Konstytucia PRL Pozmianion 2 81 (1978).
44. Skubiszewski, supra note 1, at 9; The Validity of Treatys, supra note 43, at 121; Rozmaryn,
Skutecznosc umow miedzynarodowych PRL w stosunkach wewnetrznych, PANSTWO I PRAWO 956 (No. 3,
1962); Michalska, Paky Praow Czlowieka a katalog praow cywaterlskich w PRL, PANSTWO I PRAWO
59, (No. 3, 1973); In more recent Polish literature the issue is still considered as controversial. See
e.g., Resich, Pakty Praow Czlowzeka i ich ratyftactia, NOWE PRAWE 15, 21 (No. 5, 1977).
45. Skubiszewski, supra note 1, at 14.
46. See, e.g., Rozmaryn, supra note 44, at 963.
47. Bafia, Kodyflacya prawa karnego PRL a miedzynarodowy Pakt Prao Obywaterlskich i
Pohicznych, PANSTWO I PRAWO 43 (No. 7, 1969).




B. The Unzied States
In attempting to ascertain whether the provisions of the Covenant are
directly applicable law in the courts of a State Party, one must begin with
the manner in which treaty provisions become domestic law. In the United
States, a treaty which has been approved and duly ratified acquires the sta-
tus of domestic law.49 Whether it then becomes directly applicable law in
the courts depends on whether it is deemed to be self-executing in nature. 50
A self-executing treaty has been defined as "applicable by, or binding
upon, national courts without legislative implementation."' 5' More pre-
cisely, the question of whether the provisions of the Covenant are self-execut-
ing depends upon, "whether they are precise enough and by their intention
destined for immediate and automatic application, or whether they call for
further implementation in domestic law."
'52
In the United States a treaty may be self-executing or non-self-execut-
ing, depending upon a determination by the courts. 53 Chief Justice Mar-
shall, in one of the most quoted statements concerning self-executing treaties
said a treaty is:
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
Legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import
a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform a partic-
ular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the Legislature must execute the contract, before
it can become a rule for the court.
54
This principle was further elaborated in Set Fulii v. Slate.55 In constru-
ing a treaty to determine whether it is self-executing, the courts look to the
intent of the signatory parties through the language of the instrument, and if
that is inconclusive, to the circumstances surrounding its execution.5 6 The
intent of the parties must show that the provision, standing alone, would be
enforceable in the courts.
57
Therefore, for the provisions of the Covenant to be self-executing, they
in socialist legal systems see Ginsburgs, The Vahdiy of Treaties in the Municipal Law of the "Soctalist
States," 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 523, (1965). See notes 60-62 infa and accompanying text.
49. L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1239
(1973) [hereinafter cited as L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL].
50. Id.
51. Schluter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the Unzed Nations Charter, 61
CAL. L. REV. 110, 111 (1973).
52. Council of Europe, Report cf the Committee of Experts on Human Rights to the Com-
mittee of Ministers, Problems Arising from the Co-Existence of the United Nations Covenants
on Human Rights and the European Covention on Human Rights, 13 (Strasbourg, 1970) [here-
inafter cited as Comm. of Experts].
53. Cassidy, The United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the Domestic Law of the United
States, 48 B.U.L. REv. 106, 114 (1968).
54. Foster & Eram v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
55. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).




must create specific obligations for the parties and meet certain standards of
precision.
58
The language of the provisions of the Covenant (ze., article 9 "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention;" article 14 "All persons
shall be equal before the courts and tribunals"), suggests immediate obliga-
tion. It has been stated that: "Standing alone, any provision of the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights could readily be interpreted by a court to
be self-executing if the principles of interpretation suggested above were fol-
lowed."'59 The specificity of the provisions, along with the history of the
Covenant indicating that the civil and political guarantees could be imple-
mented immediately, make a strong case for self-execution.
On the other hand, in an attempt to answer the question whether the
Covenant is self-executing, the Committee of Experts on Human Rights' re-
port to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, focused on
article 2 of the Covenant. 60 The report indicated that article 2 has been
interpreted to mean that the obligations under the Covenant are not imme-
diate and that it calls for progressive implementation. 6 ' However, they
noted that another interpretation of article 2 holds that the obligations are
to be implemented immediately upon ratification.
62
The Committee of Experts was unable to express a preference between
these two interpretations.6 3 Legal writers differ on the subject, and it is an-
ticipated that courts in different countries may reach conflicting conclusions
on whether the same treaty or provision is self-6xecuting.64 Perhaps the best
conclusion is that, "[t]he most that can be concluded from the present state
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is that persuasive arguments
can be advanced to support opposite views: a court could readily conclude
that the provisions are self-executing, yet it could justify characterizing the
provision as non-self-executing." 65' It is thus impossible to make a definitive
statement as to whether the courts in the United States will find the Cove-
nant to be self-executing.
58. Schluter, supra note 51, at 116, 142.
59. Cassidy, supra note 53, at 113.
60. Art. 2 of the Covenant reads in part:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional process and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Convenant.
61. Comm. of Experts, supra note 52, at 13.
62. Id. at 14.
63. See Velu, Le Droit h la liber el h la securitk de lapersonne (Elude comparative de l'arlzle ,5de la
Convention europeene des droits de /'/omme et de l'artz le 9 du Pacte international relalif aux droil civiles et
poitziues.) 49 REVUE DE Dkorr PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 167, 195 (1968).
64. L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 49, at 1239.
65. Cassidy, supra note 53, at 114-15.
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I. INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RECENT
CHANGES IN THE POLISH CRIMINAL LAW
A. Introduction
The entire body of Polish criminal law, i.e., substantive,
66 procedural67
and correctional, 68 as well as so-called administrative-penal law, or law on
petty offenses in principle enforced by administrative agencies, 69 has been
recently codified. The timing of the compilation of the final drafts of the
principal Codes in 1967-68 and their enactment in 1969 is significant, for at
least two reasons, for the purposes of this paper.
First, the U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights had just
been adopted by the General Assembly.70 As mentioned, this fact 7' was
given substantial and laudatory publicity in Eastern European socialist
countries. 72 Moreover, Polish representatives in the U.N. Commission of
Human Rights and in other U.N. bodies dealing with international legisla-
tion on human rights were very active, and allegedly, played an important
role in the preparatory process. 73 This fact made the official Polish attitude,
and particularly, the question of Polish compliance with the principles and
standards of the Covenant, all the more internationally visible.
In addition, Polish responsiveness was probably enhanced because, at
that time, a Polish representative to the U.N. Commission of Human Rights,
Professor Zbigniew Resich, happened to be a trusted member of the then
influential party faction of so-called "Partisans". His loyalty to the faction
elevated him to the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and made
him an internationally visible figure. Mr. Resich's understandable desire to
save face in the international forum might have had some influence on the
drafting process. It counted if he advised the decision makers that certain
changes in Polish criminal legislation were necessary for raisons d' itat.
On the other hand, the general political situation in the country in the
late 1960s was not at all favorable to the promotion of human rights. Quite
the contrary, the faction of Partisans, which for years had been gaining influ-
ence and power, and which may be fairly characterized as anti-liberal, anti-
intellectual, and chauvinistic, was just about at the peak of its success. The
66. Criminal Code, the Law of April 19, 1969 [hereinafter cited as C.C.], (Journal of Laws
of the Polish People's Republic, 1969, No. 13, Item 94) [hereinafter cited as J.L.].
67. Code of Criminal Procedure, the Law of April 19, 1969 (J.L., 1969 No. 13, Item 96)
[hereinafter cited as CCP].
68. Correctional Penal Code, the Law of April 19, 1969 (J.L., 1969, No. 13, Item 98) [here-
inafter cited as CPC]. See also the Penal Treasury Law of October 26, 1971 (J.L., 1971, No. 28,
Item 260) codifying substantive and procedural rules pertaining to tax offenses, offenses involv-
ing foreign currency and securities, as well as to custom duties violations.
69. The Code of Petty Offenses, the Law of May 20, 1971 (J.L., 1971, No. 12, Item 114);
The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses (J.L., 1971, No. 12, Item 116).
70. See note 3 supra.
71. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. I
73. Resich, Polska w obrone praw czlowieka, SPRAwy MEIDZYORODOWE 84 (No. 7-8, 1967);
Resich, Bilanspran ONZw dztiidzineipraw czlowieka, SPRAwy MEIDZYNARODOWE esp. at 37, 39
(No. 8, 1970); Resich, Pakty Praw Cz/owieka i ich ratyfikaga, NowE PRAWO 15 passim (No. 5,
1977); Michalska, Pakty Praw Czlowieka a kalaloc praw obywatelskih w PRL, PANSTWO i PRAWO 48
(No. 3, 1973); J. SYMONIDES, Miedzynarodowe ochrona praw czloweka 175 passin (1977).
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faction, its agents, and supporters controlled almost all the state and party
agencies which exercised coercive functions and thus were close to criminal
law making and administration (z'e., Administrative Department of the Cen-
tral Committee, intelligence, security agencies, regular police, procuracy,
and Ministry of Justice).
Gomulka and his loyal followers in the top leadership (Kliszko,
Spychalski), with their strong anti-liberal, authoritarian inclinations, espe-
cially during the last years in power, were not far from the Partisans in their
conception of the relationships between the individual and the state.7 4 The
invasion of Czechoslovkia in August of 1968 certainly reinforced these anti-
liberal tendencies within the party and state apparatus.
Under the circumstances, one could hardly expect that the new codes
would bring any improvement in the legal situation of the defendant or the
means of legal protection of the individual in general. Indeed, even the pres-
ervation of the status quo ante might not have been the worst of all possible
solutions. As a matter of fact, the status quo was vigorously attacked as too
liberal by the promoters of the Polish "cultural revolution."
Given the circumstances prevailing during the process of codification, it
is remarkable that some changes which improved the legal position of the
defendant were nevertheless introduced into law. It is also remarkable that
some well advanced attempts to introduce changes with clearly anti-liberal
overtones conspicuously failed.
It may seem paradoxical that some "liberal" reforms of the Polish crimi-
nal law, which failed passage in much more "liberal" periods of Polish post-
war history, were ultimately introduced in the most anti-liberal political at-
mosphere of the late 1960s. The apparent paradox can be explained, it is
submitted, by the fact that "most governments, including totalitarian gov-
ernments, are sensitive to world public opinion."' 75 Some specific factors,
mentioned above, no doubt enhanced the sensitivity of Polish authorities to
possible adverse publicity. The public image of the Polish government
abroad in 1968 was at a very low point, 76 so it was felt that it should be
improved or at least not allowed to deteriorate further.
It is our hypothesis, therefore, that several changes introduced in Polish
criminal law in 1969 can be fairly attrributed to a deliberate attempt to
comply with the international legislation on human rights, and particularly
with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is also our hypothesis
that at least one major addition to criminal law was given up because it
would violate international legislation on human rights. 77 The Polish gov-
74. For a general discussion of the political situation in Poland in the late 1960's see: V.
JOHNSON, POLAND: END OF AN ERA, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (1970); W. BIENKOWSKI,
MOTORY I HAMULCE SOCJALIZMU 32 (1969); Bauman, 0 frustracji i kuglarzach, KULTURA
(PARIS) (1968), Szulczynski, Sukcesy iporazki Mtzczyslawa Moczara, KULTURA (PARIS), (Jan-Feb.
1969). For an excellent discussion of the emergence and early Victories of the faction of Par-
tisans see: W. JEDLICKI, KLUB KRZYWEGO KOLA (1963).
75. Humphrey, The Revolution in the International Law of Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS
205, 215 (1975).
76. See documents published in KULTURA (PARIS) 95-109 (June 1968).
77. At the time of codification Poland had not ratified the Covenant, but there was a
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ernment did not want to run that risk.
There are two kinds of evidence to support the above. The first is cir-
cumstantial, .e., a conspicuous concurrence of the merits, and, in some cases,
even the language of the changes introduced fry the new Polish codification
and the Covenant. Given the legislative history of the changes, 78 and the
political situation in the country, 79 the only plausible explanation is a delib-
erate attempt to comply with the Covenant. Second, there are the explicit
statements, official and semi-official, concerning the compatibihiO of the new
Polish codes with international legislation on human rights. Such state-
ments have been made by leading members of the Polish legal establish-
ment, politically responsible for the codification.8 0
They clearly indicate that the Polish authorities were well aware that
the old law had been incompatible with the Covenant and were eager to
demonstrate that the new codes assured compatibility. The statements,
however, would never openly admit that the changes in Polish law were gen-
erated by international law. After emphasizing over and over again full har-
mony between the new Polish criminal law and the Covenant, they never
said that appropriate changes were made in Polish law under the influence of
international law.
Indeed, to admit that Polish lawmakers felt compelled by international
law to afford better treatment to the Polish criminal defendant or the sus-
pect, is to admit much. Such admissions, would be politically and ideologi-
cally unacceptable for several reasons. First, socialist legal systems,
according to a fundamental ideological postulate, are inherently superior to
all other legal systems in the world, including the system of international
law. Admissions that Polish criminal law was influenced by international
law would involve the implication, that, as Professor Ginsburgs wrote, "in-
ternational law might be at a higher stage of development than the corre-
sponding internal law of the 'Socialist' countries and official dogma could
not readily countenance such a conclusion.
'8 1
The claim of inherent superiority of socialist law has been made with
particular emphasis to human rights.8 2 Second, attributing progressive
changes in municipal law to international pressure would be inconceivable
strong expectation that it would be done. See Resich, Pakty Praw Czlowieka ic&h ratfyfaga, note
73 supra.
78. See notes 104-07 and 126-46 infra and accompanying text.
79. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
80. Bafia, Kodyfacja prawa karnego PRL a Miedzynarodowy Paki Praw Obywaterlskch it Po-
tycsnych, PANSTWO l PRAWO (No. 7 1969); Resich, Humantzm prawa polskiego w swielle
miedzynarodowych aktow o ochronte praw cz/owieka, NowE PRAWO 886 (No. 7-8 1974).
See also Prsemcwienie Zenona Kliseki na plenarn)ym posiedzenu Sejmu dnma 18 kwietma 1969 r.,
PANSTWO I PRAWO 960 (No. 6 1969), where Kliszko, then a Politburo member, glorifies judicial
review of pretrial detention, but passes in silence its international law genesis.
Some establishment jurists have been carried by their zeal even further: they explicitly
denied any influence of international law upon CCP. See:'Siewierski et al., Zalozenia i koncepee
nowej kodyftacji poskiego prawa kamego, PROBLEMY NOWEGO PRAWA KARNEGO 149 (1973).
8 1. Ginsburgs, The Validi of Treaties in the Muncipal Law ofthe 'Soc ahi'States, supra note 48,
at 531.
82. See I. OSTROVSKII, OON i PRAVA CHELOVEKA (1968); see aLso for much more balanced
views, Michalska, supra note 32, at 51-53.
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in the atmosphere of chauvinist "socialist" rhetoric prevailing in the late
1960s in Poland. Third, such admissions might have also been politically
embarassing as admissions of weakness and an invitation to exert some inter-
national pressure in the future. Finally, they would implicitly challenge the
penal systems of those socialist countries which had not made analogous ad-
justments in their criminal law, such as the Soviet penal system.
Under the circumstances, it is no surprise that the authoritative writers,
while eager to demonstrate full harmony between the Covenants and the
new codes, become quite evasive and ambiguous about the genesis of the
changes. Jerzy Bafia in his article entitled "Codification of Criminal Law of
the PPR and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights"
8 3
raises the question, "whether the solutions of the new codifications of crimi-
nal law are consistent with the Covenants."'8 4 Having answered the question
in the affirmative, Bafia passes by in silence the genesis of the changes in
Polish criminal law. He suggests that Polish criminal law meets the require-
ments of the Covenant or is even ahead of the Covenant because of its social-
ist and, hence, inherently humane nature.
8 5
Resich 8 6 goes one step further, however timidly; not only does he reiter-
ate the full harmony of the new criminal law codification and the Covenant,
but he also points out that in the process of preparing the new codes the
Covenant was taken into consideration . 7 Such a statement, along with the
changes introduced by the codes and emphasized by Resich,88 come as close
as possible to an admission that the new codes have been influenced by the
Covenant. It should finally be noted that some writers were so eager to dis-
sociate the changes in Polish criminal law from the Covenant that they ex-
plicitly denied any influence by the latter upon the former. Unfortunately,
while so doing they resorted to outright misstatements of well known facts.
89
B. Major Cases of Attempted Compliance with International Legislation
on Human Rights
The changes introduced into Polish criminal law as a response to inter-
national legislation on human rights, particularly in response to the Cove-
nant, may be roughly divided into two categories:
First, there are some changes of a verbal, declaratory nature, which
have not added anything to the contents of law. They have not created new
rights for the individuals nor imposed any new duties upon state agencies.
The category of verbal changes includes, for example, article 3, section 2
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which spells out presumption of inno-
cence. True, the old 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure did not include an
83. See note 47 supra.
84. Id. at 47.
85. Id. at 41.
86. See Resich, supra note 80.
87. Id. at 886. Resich remarks: "In the process of codification, provisions of the draft
codes were compared with the Covenants on Human Rights."
88. Resich points to the new provisions on the death penalty, pretrial detention, and hu-
mane methods of carrying out criminal punishment.
89. See Siewierski, supra note 80.
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analogous provision; nevertheless, presumption of innocence has long been
considered a fundamental principle of Polish criminal procedure.
9 °
To the same category belongs article 7, section 3, of the Correctional
Penal Code (CPC), which declares: "Penalties shall be carried out in a hu-
manitarian manner, and with respect for the human dignity of the sentenced
person." This provision repeats almost verbatim article 10, section 1 of the
Covenant.
There is no need to elaborate further on the changes belonging to this
category. They are mentioned because they also prove some responsiveness
to international legislation; a responsiveness that is low in cost, but high in
visibility.9'
The second category includes changes of a more substantive nature.
We will now focus on them.
1. The Repeal of Summary Procedure
Perhaps one of the most important changes in Polish criminal law intro-
duced in response to the requirements of the Covenant was the repeal 92 of an
infamous summary procedure provided for by the edict of November 16,
1945.
93
The procedure was applicable to a broad range of cases, including com-
mon crimes such as intentional homicide or armed robbery, as well as white-
collar crimes and political offenses. 94 Some of the categories of cases falling
under the summary procedure were defined by the edict in extremely broad
and vague language.9 5 The procedure was always optional; it was made
applicable in a specific case by a motion of the prosecution subject to limited
review by the trial court.9 6 Discretionary decisions of the prosecutor to move
for a trial under the summary procedure were not guided by any ascertain-
able standards.
97
90. S. SLIWINSKI, PROCES KARNY ZASADY OGOLNE 115 (1948); L. SCHAFF, PROCESS
KARNY POLSKI LUDOWEJ 201 (1953); Cieslak, Problem gwarancjii kamo-proceso-wych na tlie nowe"
kodyfitkaji, PALESTRA (No. 3, 1969). Art. 3 § 2 CCP has been introduced as a response to art. 14
§ 2 of the Covenant.
At the level of legal ideology presumption of innocence has never been seriously ques-
tioned. Whether and how it has been actually observed and applied by law enforce-
ment agencies is a different and much more difficult question. Some scholarly
discussions about presumption of innocence in Soviet criminal law seem to have over-
looked this fundamental distinction. Compare Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence in
The SovIet-Union, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1203 (1968) with Berman & Quigley, Comment on
the Presumption of Innocence Under Soviet Law, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1230 (1968).
91. It is not suggested here that the declaratory, verbal changes in criminal law are mean-
ingless. They may play, in the long run, a positive role in the development of legal ideology and
may be used in critical evaluation of criminal legislation and its enforcement.
92. The Law of April 19, 1969, Provisions Introducing Code of Criminal Procedure (J.L.
1969, No. 13, Item 97), art. III, § 3.
93. Edict of November 16, 1945 on Summary Proceedings as amended (J.L. 1949, No. 33,
Item 244).
94. Id. at art. 1.
95. And so art. 1(1) "d" of the Edict, note 93 supra, made the procedure applicable to any
crime "if economic interests of People's Poland were threatened by substantial harm."
96. See Edict of November 16, 1945 on Summary Proceedings as amended (J.L. 1949, No.
33, Item 244), art. 1, § 3.
97. KALINOWSKI & SIEWIERSKI, Kodekspostepowanii kamego, KOMENTARZ 591 (1960).
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The defendant tried under this procedure was put at a tremendous dis-
advantage. Pretrial detention was mandatory98 and the possibility of pre-
paring a defense was drastically curtailed.99 Judgements rendered by the
trial court were final and not subject to appeal. t 00 In all cases tried under
the summary procedure the court, upon conviction, had to impose either the
death sentence, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a period not less
than three years; all of these regardless of the statutory sanction provided for
the specific crime charged.101
The summary procedure outlined above prevailed in the Polish legal
system throughout its post-war history. Even relatively recently, ie., in the
early and middle 1960s it had been quite vigorously applied, especially in
cases of grave economic crimes. 10 2 For example, in 1960 two big cases in-
volving large-scale embezzlements in the leather industry were tried under
the summary procedure. The prosecution in both cases moved for the death
sentence for otherwise non-capital offenses. 1
0 3
In 1965, the case of Wawrzecki el al. was summarily tried in Warsaw.
The case involved a big racketeering ring in the meat industry. Wawrzecki
was sentenced to death and executed soon after, having been charged with a
non-capital crime. Thus, the summary procedure not only remained in the
books but was enforced, with all of its draconian severity and flagrant unfair-
ness, until recently.
The reformers of the Polish criminal law apparently, until the last mo-
ment, did not contemplate abandonment of the summary procedure. The
official draft of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) published as late
as 1967,104 still included a separate chapter on summary procedure essen-
tially similar to the summary procedure outlined above.10 5 It is only the
final official draft of the CCP, published at the end of 1968, which quietly
98. Set, Edict, supra note 93, at art. 8.
99. Id. at art. 11.
100. Id. at art. 13, § 4.
101. Id. at art. 2.
102. The number of cases tried under the summary procedure between 1959-68 were respec-
tively: 1959-47; 1960-64; 1961-49; 1962-61; 1963-57; 1964-79; 1965-54; 1966-84; 1967-57; 1968-
20. ROCZNIK STATYsTYCZNY, 1961-70. The above figures are not high, however they are not
negligible either. In 1966, for example, cases tried under the summary procedure represented
only slightly less than 5 % of the total load of criminal cases tried at the level of provincial courts
(84 out of 1842). One should also keep in mind that summarily tried cases involved quite often
big group trials with a substantial amount of publicity. Characteristically in 1968, when the
decision to abolish the summary procedure was made, the number of summarily tried cases
went down to 20, in 1969, before formal repeal went into effect (Jan. 1, 1970) summary trials
disappeared altogether. One would guess that behind their practical disappearance must have
stood some kind of internal procuracy instruction ordering subordinate procurators not to in-
voke the 1945 edict.
103. In the case of Galicki el al., tried in Warsaw in the summer of 1960, the trial court
imposed life sentences on two of the principal defendants whom the prosecution wanted to be
hanged. In the case of Dedo el al., tried in Kielce in the fall of the same year, two death
sentences were imposed, but later they were commutted to life imprisonment by way of execu-
tive clemency.
104. See KOEMISJA KODYFIKACYJNA PRZY MINISTRZE SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI, PROJEKT
KODEKSU POSTEPOWANIA KARNEGO (1967).
105. Id. at Chapter 44, Postepowanie Dorazne (arts. 480-89). See particularly art. 486, § 2
providing that decisions of the trial court are final and not subject to appellate review. At least
one essential difference between the 1967 draft and the old law should be noted. The draft did
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parted with the idea of summary procedure. ' 0 6 The whole chapter was sim-
ply omitted without a whisper about the change in the attached official com-
ment. 1
0 7
Polish legal writers agree that the summary procedure, ultimately re-
pealed in 1969, would be a flagrant violation of the Covenant.' 0 8 First of all
the denial of the right to appeal the conviction and the sentence would be in
obvious violation of article 14, section 5 of the Covenant. 10 9
Second, defendants tried under the summary procedure were, as we
pointed out before, seriously disadvantaged in comparison with a person in-
dicted for offenses belonging to the same categories but tried according to
the standard procedure. Since the decisions to apply the summary proce-
dure were made without any explicitly stated standard, the procedure would
be objectionable under article 14, section 1 of the Covenant. "0
Finally, imposition of a sentence more severe than the one authorized
by a specific criminal statute would be of very doubtful validity under article
15, section 1, second sentence of the Covenant. I Particularly, the legal
possibility and actual practice of inflicting the death penalty for non-capital
offenses would be a brutal violation of the principle nulla poena sine lege em-
bodied in article 15 of the Covenant.
2. Capital Punishment
Capital punishment is the second area in which the Covenant has had a
visible impact on the new criminal legislation. The Covenant emphatically
declares in article 6, section 2 that "[i]n countries which have not abolished
the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most seri-
ous crimes in accordance with law in force at the time of the commission of
the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant .... "
The obvious intention of the Covenant is to encourage total abolition of
the death penalty, and in those countries which are not ready for total aboli-
tion, to limit its application to exceptionally grievous offenses.'12
The 1969 Criminal Code (CC) consistently with the legislation of all
other socialist countries
1 1
3 has retained the death penalty.' 14
not authorize sentences more severe than the statutory maximum provided for by substantive
criminal statutes.
See generally Projekt kodeksu postepowania karnego oraz przepisow vprowadzajacych
kodeks postepowania karnego, (1968).
106. Id.
107. Seegenerally Uzasadnenieprojeku kodekrupostepowana karnego, supra note 105, at 152-189.
108. See S. WALTOS, POSTEPOWANIA SZCZEGOLNE W PROCESIE KARNYM 34 (1973); Cieslak,
supra note 90, at 38.
109. Art. 14,.§ 5 reads: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction
and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law."
110. Art. 14, § 1, first sentence declares: "All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals."
111. The relevant part of art. 15, § 1 reads: "Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than
the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offense was committed."
112. Landarer, Capital Punihment as Human Rights Issue Before the United Nations, 4 Revue de
Droits de l'Homme 511, 526-28 (1971).
113. 1. ANDREJEW, ZARYS PRAWA KARNEGO PANSTW SOCJALSTYCZNYCH 150 (1975).
114. See C.C., supra note 66, at art. 30, § 2.
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At the same time the CC, echoing article 6, section 2 of the Cove-
nant, 115 adopted a provision which characterizes the death penalty as a
measure of exceptional character provided for the most grave offenses. 116
The provision is no more than a general policy statement which may be
carried out either at the legislative and law enforcement levels or turned
easily into a facade devoid of any practical meaning. As the experience of
recent years has taught, there have been penal systems which have paid lip
service to the same policy while at the same time generously administering
the death penalty. 1 7 After all, how often the exceptions may occur and
what offenses are "the most grave" are political judgments. Hence, the lim-
iting effect of the provision per se is almost nil. A much more interesting
question is how the legislative promise has been implemented at the law-
making and law-enforcement levels.
Thus far there has been at least one attempt by the Supreme Court to
pour some operational meaning into article 30, section 2 of the CC through
construing "the exceptional character" of the death penalty as a guideline
for the sentencing courts. In a decision of March 16, 1971,118 the Court
indicated that the death sentence may be imposed only for acts which distin-
guished themselves from other capital crimes by certain exceptional features.
The death sentence would be justified particularly when the demoralization
of the defendant is so profound that the chances for his rehabilitation are
very poor or nonexistent. The defendant's personality must be such that
even long term imprisonment is unlikely to result in rehabilitation.
Therefore, article 30, section 2 of the CC, echoing the Covenant, trig-
gered a ruling by the Supreme Court, which may have some impact on sen-
tencing practices by the lower courts. As of now, however, it is impossible to
ascertain any impact. The number of death sentences imposed by Polish
courts during the last twenty years has not been very high, but nothing in
this respect changed after the new CC entered into force. 119
On the legislative level the new Polish law reduced the number of capi-
115. Bafia, supra note 47, at 48, explicity indicates that art. 30 § 2 of the C.C. is a direct
response to art. 6, § 2 of the Covenant.
116. See C.C., supra note 66, at art. 30, § 2. The present as well as all the subsequent quota-
tions from the 1969 C.C. are from: Kenney & Sadowski, The Penal Code of the Polish People's
Republic. (The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 19 (1973)).
117. See genrally FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LEGISLATION OF THE USSR
AND THE UNION REPUBLICS, Law of December 25, 1958, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta
SSSR, 1959, No. 1, Item 6, art. 22.
At the same time Soviet criminal legislation is rather generous with the death penalty; see,
for example, RSFSR criminal code providing the penalty for about 35 crimes. The number of
death sentences actually imposed by the Soviet courts-and the number of executions, have not
been officially reported. Sakharov makes an estimate of the number of executions as between
700-1000 per year. A. SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD 43 (1975). The number,
even if exaggerated, is outrageously high.
118. Decision No. I KR 274/70, by an enlarged panel of 7 justices, published in: RUCH
PRAWNICZY EKONOMICZNYI SOCIJOLOGICZNY 345 (No. 1, 1972).
119. The number of death sentences imposed by final judgments during the ten years pre-
ceding the 1969 C.C. has been reported as follows: 1959-8; 1960-11; 1961-14; 1962-6; 1963-8;
1964-6; 1965-3; 1966-9; 1967-4; 1968-5; 1969-6. ROCZNIK STATYSTYCZNY, 1961-70.
Figures for the three years after the Criminal Code entered into force, if anything, show
some increase of the death sentences: 1970-10; 1971-9; 1972-15. Ministerstwo Sprawiedliewosci
Statystyka Sadowa 1972. Zesc III. PROWOMOCNE SKAZANIA OSOB DOROSLYCH 88 (1973).
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tal offenses in three ways: 120
(a) Article 31 of the CC makes the death penalty inapplicable, "to a
person who at the time of the act has not attained the age of 18 years" and
"to a pregnant woman." This provision has been given a liberal construc-
tion. The death penalty has been held inapplicable to a pregnant woman
whether pregnancy existed at the time of the act, at the time of sentencing,
or at the time of execution.
12'
If a person who belongs to a class specified in article 31 has been errone-
ously sentenced to death, or if pregnancy has occurred after the death sen-
tence has been pronounced, the trial court shall re-sentence the defendant to
25 years of imprisonment. 1
22
(b) The repeal of the summary procedure, which carried a possibility
of the death sentence for a broad range of crimes otherwise non-capital, nar-
rowed the scope of capital punishment.
1 23
(c) Finally, the number of capital felonies was somewhat reduced ei-
ther by replacing the death penalty by long term imprisonment 124 or by
more narrow statutory definitions of some capital offenses.'
25
While the changes mentioned under (c) are no doubt in line with the
general policy of limiting the death penalty as stated in article 6, section 2 of
the Covenant, there is no evidence that this substantive political decision was
in any way influenced by international law.
The genesis of the changes mentioned under (a) and (b), however, can
be easily traced to the Covenant. Article 31 of the CC is clearly related' 26 to
Article 6, section 5 of the Covenant. In regard to persons who at the time of
the Act had not attained 18 years of age, the Code adopts almost verbatim
the rule included in the Covenant. ' 27 With respect to pregnant women, the
Code certainly adopted higher standards than the Covenant, not only bar-
ring execution at the time of pregnancy but generally exempting pregnant
women from the death penalty. ' 28 The relationship between the Covenant
and the repeal of the summary procedure has already been discussed.
120. Andrejew, Polskieprawo karne w zarysie 245 (3d ed. 1973).
121. See generally PROJEKT KODEKSU KARNEGO 108 (1968); I. ANDREJEW, W. SWIDA, W.
WOLTER, KODEKS KARNY Z KOMENTARZEM 179 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDREJEW &
SWIDA]; Bafia, Mioduski, & Siewierski, Kodeks karny, KOMENTARZ 121 (1971).
122. &e CPC, supra note 68, at art. 111. S&e also ANDREJEW & SWIDA, supra note 121, at
179, passim; Pawela, Kodeks karny wykonawczy, KOMENTARZ 323 (1972).
123. Andrejew, supra note 120, at 245; Bafia, supra note 47, at 48.
124. Andrejew lists seven such provisions. Andrejew, supra note 120, at 245. There are also
some additions to the list of capital crimes, notably art. 134, § 2 of the Criminal Code.
125. Examples are political terrorism, sabotage and espionage defined formerly in arts. 1, 3,
and 7 of the so called Small criminal code (edict of June 13, 1946, on Crimes Particularly
Dangerous during the Period of State Reconstruction, J.L. 1946, No. 30, Item 192), and now
defined in arts. 124, 126, and 127 of the Criminal Code. See also Andrejew, supra note 120, at
245.
126. Bafia, supra note 47, at 49.
127. Art. 6, § 5 of the Covenant reads: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women."




A major novelty introduced by the new 1969 CCP is judicial review of
pretrial detention of the suspect during preliminary investigation. The issue
of pretrial detention has been of major importance in all Continental Euro-
pean legal systems. It involves deprivation of freedom of an individual who
has not yet been found guilty. Moreover, the very process of adjudication is
likely to be heavily influenced by pretrial detention. In Poland, as well as in
the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, the issue of pretrial
detention has been particularly acute and sensitive for the reasons too well
known to require any further discussion here.
During some twenty years preceding the 1969 codification the law on
pretrial detention in Poland included the following fundamental rules:
(1) The police had power to arrest and detain a person suspected of a crime
for up to forty-eight hours. After forty-eight hours, the detained person had
to be released unless his or her further detention was approved by the prose-
cutor. 129 (2) The power to invoke more prolonged pretrial detention of a
suspect, before a formal indictment was filed with a court, was vested exclu-
sively in the procurator's office.' 30 Procurators of various ranks, including
the Procurator General, had the power to keep a suspect in incommunicado
detention for up to nine months. 13 1 Detention beyond a nine month period
required approval by the Supreme Court. 3 2 (3) The grounds for pretrial
detention were broadly defined and liberally applied in practice.133 A strik-
ing feature of the law prevailing before January 1, 1970, was the virtually
monopolistic power of the prosecution (procuracy) over the personal liberty
of a suspect during preliminary investigation.134 The law has long been sub-
ject to strong criticism by legal scholars. A dominant academic opinion fa-
vored some kind of judicial review of pretrial detention.135 A leading Polish
authority on criminal law, the late Professor Stanislaw Sliwinski, even sug-
gested that the power of pretrial detention be completely taken away from
the procuracy and vested exclusively in the court.'
36
129. CODE OF CRIM. PRO. Law of March 19, 1928, as amended J.L. 1950, No. 40, Item 364
[hereinafter cited as 1928 CCP]. The law on this matter was left virtually unchanged in 1969.
See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 205-08.
130. The Polish procuracy has been patterned since 1950 after the Soviet model. All the
admixtures of ombudsmanship notwithstanding, the hard fact remains that the procurator is
first of all responsible for prosecution of crimes. His responsibilities as investigator and prosecu-
tor by far overshadow all the remaining activities and reponsibilities. On the Soviet concept of
procuracy, see H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 238-47 (2d ed. 1963).
131. See 1928 CCP, supra note 129, at art. 158, §§ 1-3.
132. Id. at art. 158, § 4.
133. Id. at art. 152, § 1.
134. Kaftal, Kontrola sadu had tymczasowym aresztowanezm w swietle orzecznmctwa SN, 1972
PANSTWO I PRAWE (No. 12), at 89-90; A. MURZYNOWSKI, ARESZT TYMCZASOWY 125-27 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as A. MURZYNOWSKI].
135. Haber, Instyluijzazalena wproceste karnyn, 1957 NoWE PRAWO (No. 4), at 23, passn;
Litynski, Murzynowski, Niektoreprawva osobisie obyjwaie/i w swielle art. 74 Konslyiucji PRL oraz waznte
szych ustaw szczegolowych, 1957 NOWE PRAWO (No. 10), at 57; Kaftal & Namiotkiewicz,
Sprawozdanze z sesji naukowej Unwersetu Warszaw skiego, PANSTWO I PRAWO 594, passim (No. 3
(1955)).




All the criticism notwithstanding, the harsh rule giving the procuracy
unfettered power to detain a suspect persisted through out the twenty-year
period of 1950-70. Suprisingly, the rule survived even the relatively "liberal"
time of 1956-57, when pressure for change was particularly strong 137 and
memories of presecutorial and police abuses very fresh and openly admitted.
The advocates of the rule later developed a theory that since the procuracy is
situated outside the system of state administration, its officers are as in-
dependent and impartial as judicial officers.13 8 The fact that procurators
are bound to follow orders from their superiors, and that the procuracy is
above all institutionally interested in the prosecution of crimes, was over-
looked by the supporters of this theory.'
39
Nothing, until the very end of the drafting process of the 1969 CCP,
indicated that change was forthcoming. The 1967 draft of the CCP1 40 left
the status quo ante on pretrial detention virtually untouched.i 4i Again, the
procuracy was given exclusive power to detain a suspect during preliminary
investigation for up to nine months. 142 A breakthrough occurred in 1968;
the draft of the CCPt 43 included new rules giving the judiciary some, how-
ever modest, amount of control over pretrial investigative detention. 144
There is no doubt that the change was generated entirely by the desire to
avoid a flagrant violation of article 9, section 4 of the Covenant.
145
Assertions to the contrary 146 must fail, not only in the face of the quite
unambiguous legislative history, but in view of official admission as well. A
highly authoritative official source, namely "Supporting Reasons of the
Draft Code of Criminal Procedure," ' 14 7 which constitutes an integral part of
the final draft, offers the following comment on the change:
Art. 213, introduces an important change in the present law by ruling that
the complaint from the decision of the procurator on preliminary
detention shall be considered by the court with jurisdiction over
the case . . . . Art. 222 goes in the same direction, it gives the
provincial courts jurisdiction to consider complaints against deci-
sions by the provincial procurators on the extension of preliminary
detention . . . . Thus, the principle of judicial review ofprocuratorial deci-
sions to apply prehminary detention, included in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, has been implemented. 
148
137. See notes 135-36 supra.
138. The theory has been lingering even after the 1969 reform. See Siewierski, supra note 80,
at 150.
139. See A. MURZvNOWSKI, supra note 134, at 126; Haber, supra note 135, at 23. Funda-
mental institutional differences between procurators and judicial officers have been recently
fully acknowledged in Soviet as well as in Polish literature. See M. STROGOVICH, PROBLEMY
SUDEBNOI ETIKI (1974); Smolenski, Ustawa o prokuraturze PRL, KOMENTrARZ 28 (1971).
140. See note 104 supra.
141. Id. at arts. 225-41.
142. Id. at arts. 237, 419.
143. See note 105 supra.
144. Id. at arts. 213, 222.
145. Art. 9, § 4 reads: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest and detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that such court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful."
146. Siewierski, supra note 80, at 149.
147. See note 107 supra.
148. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
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Likewise, Bafia, in more evasive language, admits 149 that the change in the
law on preliminary detention was necessary to make it compatible with arti-
cle 9, section 4 of the Covenant. 150 The above statements amount to an
admission that the law on preliminary detention preceding the reform did
not satisfy internationally established standards and that only the reform
made them compatible.'51 Commentators are even more explicit in this re-
gard.1
52
The relevant portions of the new law may be briefly summarized as
follows: (1) The initial decision on preliminary detention during investiga-
tion is made by the regional procurator; the period of detention may not
exceed three months.' 53 The decision is subject to review by the court with
jurisdiction over the case. 15 4 (2) If preliminary investigation, due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case, cannot be completed within the three
month period, the period of preliminary detention may be extended if neces-
sary:
up to 6 months by a provincial procurator, whose decision in this
matter is subject to review by a provincial court upon complaint of
the suspect; 155 for a period exceeding 6 months by a provincial
court upon a motion by a provincial procurator; a decision of a
provincial court in this matter is reviewable by the Supreme Court
upon complaint by the suspect.
156
(3) The reviewing court makes its decisions, in ex parte proceedings, in
which only a procurator may participate; a hearing is not held; the factual
basis for the decision is evidence gathered by the investigation and submitted
to the court in a dossier.
15 7
The laconic and rather poorly drafted new rules on preliminary deten-
tion left many issues unresolved and hence open to various interpretations.
This is especially true of the provisions on judicial review of preliminary
detention, which became controversial almost immediately after the CCP
was passed into the law.' 58 Conservative writers have tried to take advan-
tage of statutory ambiguity to restrict judicial intervention as much as possi-
ble.'- 9 On the other hand, a dominant scholarly opinion favored a liberal
construction of the ambiguous provisions on judicial review. At least during
the first few years after the CCP was adopted, the Polish Supreme Court was
allied with the latter group on most controversial issues.
149. Bafia, supra note 47, at 50.
150. See note 145 supra.
151. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
152. Cieslak, supra note 90, at 36; Kaftal supra note 134, at 90.
153. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 222, § 1. A regional procurator is a procurator at a basic
level.
154. Id. at art. 212, § 2.
155. A provincial procurator is a procurator at an intermediate level.
156. See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 222, §§ 2, 3.
157. Id. at arts. 88, 299, §§ 1, 2. See also Bafia, Bednarzak, Fleming, Kalinowski, Kempisty
& Siewierski, Kodeks postepowania karnego. KOMENTARZ 268 (1971). For well founded criti-
cism of the present law see Kaftal, supra note 134. Lyczywek, Instytacja aresztu twrczasowego w
projekcie kodeksu posepowania karnego, 1969 Palestra, No. 1; 24.
158. Kaftal, supra note 134.
159. See Bafia, supra note 157.
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Just a few selected examples will illustrate the point. The question
arose relatively early whether a procurator's decisions to extend the origi-
nally assigned period of detention are reviewable by the court. The issue has
not been entirely clear under the language of article 212, section 2 of the
CCP, which provides that decisions "to apply" preliminary detention are
reviewable but says nothing about decisions "to extend" the period of deten-
tion.
"Conservatives" relied on the distinction, arguing further that article
212, section 2, as an exceptional rule, should be strictly construed and hence
judicial review should be ruled out.' 6° But "extension" of the originally as-
signed period of detention, advocates of judicial review argued in re-
sponse,' 6 1 actually means further "application" of preliminary detention to
a suspect already detained. Hence, the distinction relied upon by "conserva-
tives" is purely verbal and irrevelant. The Supreme Court took the same
position and ruled accordingly in a joint resolution of the Criminal and Mili-
tary Chambers. 1
62
The second major subject of controversy has been the options open to
the reviewing court. Is the only choice between setting a suspect free or sus-
taining the detention?'
6 3
Perhaps the reviewing court may elect a third avenue 164 by modifying a
procurator's decisions through reducing the assigned period of detention or
by substituting for detention other less coercive measures of restraint. 165
The Supreme Court, after an initial period of hesitation, ultimately
adopted the latter view which had been supported by the majority of legal
writers. 166 It has been pointed out that such a statutory construction is, on
balance, favorable to a suspect because it gives the reviewing court the possi-
bility of a compromise decision, in cases where outright release is unlikely. 1
67
The CCP explicitly says in article 212, section 3 that a decision of the
reviewing court may not be further appealed by a suspect. Can it, however,
be appealed by the prosecution? The Supreme Court answered in the af-
firmative. 16 The issue again has been controversial among legal writers. 1
69
160. Id. at 268, 541.
161. Kaftal, supra note 134, at 100; Mazur, tektore kwestte zwiazane z zaskarzaniem do sad
postanowien prokuratora o zastosowantu tvmczasowego aresztowama, 1971 NoWE PRAWO No. 5; 38
Ligarzewska, Uprawmniena prokuratora w przedmiocte stosowania tymczasowego aresztowama po deyzJi
sadu, NOWE PRAWO 1492 (No. 11, 1974).
162. Resolution of Criminal and Military Chambers of the Supreme Court of June 18, 1971
(VI KZP28/1970), 1971 USNLK. H No. 10, Item 141.
163. Such a solution was suggested in Bafia, supra note 157, at 256.
164. See Kaftal, supra note 134, at 100.
165. Those include such measures as financial, non-financial surety, or police supervision.
CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 226, 231, 235.
166. See the Supreme Court resolution of June 18, 1971, supra note 162. See also Kaftal,
supra note 134, at 101.
167. Kaftal, supra note 134, at 102.
168. Compare Sup. Ct. Res. June 26, 1970 (enlarged panel of seven justices VI KZP 17/70)
with OSNIKIW, No. 9, Item 100 (1970).
169. Accord, Bafia, supra note 157, at 256. For a well founded criticism of the resolution, see
D. Cieslak, Przeglad orzeczmniwa SAdu Najwyzszego, WoJsKowY PRZEGLAD PRAWNICZY (No. 2
1971) citedin Kaftal, supra note 134.
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The above controversies over judicial review of preliminary detention,
and sharp divisions between advocates and adversaries of the new legal insti-
tution, show how vital the whole issue has become. Liberally minded Polish
writers suggest that, however weak and imperfect the present legal frame-
work for judicial review of pretrial detention, it is much better than the for-
mer law. It represents a potential for better protection of the individual
against arbitrary prosecutorial decisions.
170
How this potential has been used by the judiciary is another question.
The scarce empirical data available would rather suggest that the judiciary
has been either extremely timid to use its newly acquired power or too
prosecutorially minded, or both. The fractional figures from two provinces
(Wroclaw and Kielce) strongly suggest that judges tended to rubber-stamp
prosecutorial decisions on preliminary detention. The record of the
Supreme Court practice has not been better.
171
4. Rise and Fall of the Anti-Parasite Law
The last case which will demonstrate the impact that international leg-
islation on human rights has had upon recent Polish law reforms is different
from the preceding three. Here, we will deal with a law that was never
passed and will discuss a reform carefully planned and well advanced, but
never actually implemented. What follows is the brief history of the rise and
fall of the Polish anti-parasite legislation.
Anti-parasite legislation seems to be a distinctive feature of socialist le-
gal systems. 17 2 It is relatively well known in the West because of the much
publicized Soviet experience. 173 Poland has been, and still is, a conspicuous
exception. She has never had anti-parasite legislation. In the political at-
mosphere prevailing in Poland in the late 1960's,174 it was not at all surpris-
ing that proposals to introduce anti-parasite law became quite audible.
Indeed, anti-parasite legislation seemed to be an ideal vehicle to control
and intimidate dissidents and other non-conformists. It would give the au-
thorities a very broad range of control over undesirables of various kinds,
especially those who in the process of the purges of 1968-69 were fired from
their jobs or expelled from universities. Anti-parasite rhetoric was also useful
as a blame-fixing mechanism in a rather gloomy economic situation. The
170. Cieslak, supra note 90, at 36; Kaftal, supra note 134, at 104.
171. MATERIALY KONFERENCJII POSWIECONEJ PROBLEMATYCE PRAKTYKI WYMIARU
SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI NA TLE ZASAD NOWEJ KODYFIKACJII PRAWNE 173 passim 193 passim (1972),
cited in Kaftal, supra note 134.
172. I. ANDREJEW, supra note 113, at 126-28.
173. H. Berman and J. Spindler, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure 77-81 (2d ed., 1972); Lip-
son, The Future Belongs to. . . Parasites, 12 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, No. 3 (1963); Burford,
Getting the Bugs out of Socialist Legality The Case ofJoseph Brodsky and a Decade of Soviet Anti-Parasite
Legl lation, 22 AM. J.C.L. 465 (1974). Soviet anti-parasite law has been recently amended
again. Compare two edicts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of August 7,
1975 (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSRSR, 1975, No. 33, Items 698, 699). The recent
changes have been most probably a result of international pressure, especially exerted by the
International Labor Organization. See Forced Labor in the USSR, 1975 A Chronicle of Human
Rights in the USSR, No. 15, 15 passin.
174. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
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1970 price increases and their further well known consequence showed that
the country was on the verge of economic disaster.
The first idea was to introduce an anti-parasite provision into the newly
drafted criminal code. The 1968 draft included article 290, which read as
follows:
§ 1 Whoever leads a parasitic way of life, by deriving a perma-
nent source of income from corrupt activity shall be subject to the
penalty of limitation of liberty.
§ 2 In cases of persistence, the perpetrator shall be subject to the
penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years.
175
In the course of discussion of the draft outside the Sejm, especially in
the legal periodicals, the anti-parasite provision was passed over in si-
lence. 176 However, at one of the two conferences devoted to key problems of
the draft, organized by the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy
of Sciences (ILS) on November 22-23, 1968, the anti-parasite provision came
under very heavy fire. 17 7 Virtually no one at the conference, except Jerzy
Bafia,' 378 defended the anti-parasite statute.' 79 The principal arguments
raised against it were its vagueness, its anticipated arbitrariness of enforce-
ment, and its involvement of forced labor. In this context, it was claimed
that the proposed provision violated the internationally approved principle
of legality in criminal law'8 0 as well as international conventions banning
forced labor. 181
A memorandum to this effect was submitted by the Institute of Legal
Sciences to the Administration of Justice Committee of the Sejm. The Com-
mittee decided to delete the anti-parasite provision from the final version of
the draft, and a plenary session of the Sejm, which ultimately passed the
draft into law on April 19, 1969, did not have the provision before it.
The extent to which the opinion of the legal scholars presented in the
ILS memorandum influenced the decision to delete the anti-parasite statute
is virtually impossible to say. The official justification for the deletion was
that social parasitism should be dealt with by a separate statute, remedial
rather than penal in nature.
The idea of an anti-parasite law was thus temporarily tabled. It re-
emerged early in 1971, right after the fall of Gomulka and his team. Why
the idea of a very coercive, anti-liberal law re-emerged in the much im-
175. Komisja Kodyfikacyjna przy Ministrze Sprawiedliwosci, Projekt kodeksu karnego
(1968), art. 290.
176. See generally writings on the 1968 Draft Criminal Code listed in: W. Swida, Prawo kame.
Czesc ogolna, 77 (1971).
177. Dwte konferenqe w Instytucie Nauk Prawnych PAN poswzecone projektowi kodeksu kamego,
PAWSTWO v. PRAWO, 625 (No. 3, 1969) [hereinafter referred to as Dwie konferencqe].
178. Then a political supervisor of criminal law codification, a high official of the Ministry
of Justice, and Professor of Law, now Minister of Justice.
179. Dwi ekonferencje, supra note 177, at 625.
180. The Covenant, supra note 3, at art. 15, § 1.
181. International Labor Organization Conventions: No. 29 of June 28, 1930 and No. 105
of June 25, 1957, both ratified by Poland on June 23, 1958 (Ratification acts published in J.L.
1959 No. 20, Item 122 and No. 39, Item 240).
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proved political atmosphere of early 1971, is difficult to understand. Some
hypotheses should prove useful.
The new leadership, which took over in December 1970, was definitely
interested in building up a new alliance with the masses who were alienated
by Gomulka. Naturally, the main target was the numerous, self-confident,
politically and economically crucial (but dissatisfied and mutinized) indus-
trial proletariat. A sense of social injustice and economic frustration was
very strong among the industrial workers. Hatred for those who contribute
little or nothing at all but get much, those who live "on the blood and sweat"
of the toiling masses, filled the air. There is no doubt that the new leader-
ship was well aware of this bitterness and decided to do something about it.
The repeal in February 1971 of the price increases announced in De-
cember 1970 was a major step in this direction, however reluctantly made.
Official propaganda was full of the rhetoric of "worker's democracy." The
anti-parasite campaign, inaugurated by the Politbureau in February 1971 as
a part of the comprehensive "improvement program," fit the picture rather
well. Readers of newspapers were simply told that the party had decided to
fight "parasitic elements,"' ze., those who do not work but nevertheless live
well.
The targets of the campaign were defined vaguely, in a sloganeering
style, so that everybody could subsume under this concept a type of person-
ality he or she particularly disliked. A pilot sociological survey among work-
ers in the steel industry combine at Nowa Hutta showed, for example, that
party apparatus officers were identified first as parasites.
As a propaganda tool, an anti-parasite campaign seemed to achieve its
goals because it conveyed to the public an idea that the party was "doing
something" to control "socially harmful elements." On the other hand, the
extreme vagueness of the concept of "a parasite" assured the authorities that
the actual enforcement would be entirely discretionary, hence in line with
current notions of expediency. The Ministry of Justice soon drafted, as or-
dered, the statute "On the Prevention and Struggle Against Social Parasit-
ism."
The draftsmen, following the Soviet prototype of anti-parasite law, en-
visioned the statute as "administrative" or "remedial" in nature rather than
penal. In this way they tried to respond to the charges of vagueness and
narrow-minded punitiveness voiced earlier against article 290 of the 1968
Draft CC. Instead of criminal punishment, the 1971 draft provided for
"measures of social pressure" to be applied to social parasites. Thus, the
party once again tried the familiar technique of changing labels to conceal
the coercive nature of the law.
Article 1 of the draft defined social parasitism as follows:
The provisions of the present law shall be applied to persons, who
attained 18 years of age and do not continue their studies, and,
while able-bodied, lead a parasitic way of life in that they persist-
ently avoid socially useful work, and derive their means of support
from sources contrary to the principles of communal life, and thus
represent a threat to the legal order.
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Sanctions provided against such social parasites were three-fold, with
increasing degrees of severity: (1) a warning by a local agency of internal
affairs; (2) "educational supervision" coupled with a compulsory labor as-
signment (to be imposed if the warning was ineffective); and (3) confinement
in a "center for educational labor," i'e., inmore mundane language, depriva-
tion of liberty coupled with forced labor. Measures mentioned under (1)
and (2) were to be applied by administrative agencies, confinement in "a
center for educational labor" by a court of general jurisdiction.
Publication of the draft was followed by public discussion in newspa-
pers, legal periodicals, and at meetings of various "social organizations."
The initial anti-parasite zeal slowly subsided after a few weeks and the tem-
perature of the discussion generally went down. Occasionally, newspapers
would even publish letters to the editor raising objections to the draft, espe-
cially to its vagueness. Publications of such letters per se was an indication
that neither the editors-in-chief nor the censorship personnel had strong in-
structions to protect the draft from criticism.
Nevertheless, the principal decision of the Politbureau was still in force
and the routine legislative process was going on. The draft of the anti-para-
site statute was approved by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the
Sejm. In March 1971, ILS organized a national academic conference on the
draft. The conference was attended not only by legal scholars but also by
sociologists, criminologists, psychiatrists, and experts on labor organization.
Two principal papers were delivered at the conference: one by Dr. Kubicki,
a brilliant legal scholar, another by a distinguished criminologist and psychi-
atrist Professor Batawia.182
The Kubicki paper challenged the very idea of applying state coercion
to individuals who have not violated the law. The paper further attacked
the residual vagueness of the statutory definition of a "parasite" as offensive
to the principle of legality. Such vagueness, the paper reasoned, would nec-
essarily generate highly selective, arbitrary enforcement. The paper also at-
tacked the idea of forced labor, inherent in the anti-parasite law, as
counterproductive and unacceptable under socialist ideology. It was like-
wise emphasized that forced labor is incompatible with two ILO conven-
tions: No. 29 of 1930 and No. 105 of 1957, both ratified by Poland.'
8 3
Professor Batawia presented empirical data concerning persons who
would fall within the definition of "parasites" proposed by the draft.'8 4 The
data strongly suggested that the overwhelming majority of persons without
steady employment, labeled by the police as "persons avoiding socially use-
ful work," were actually socially maladjusted people. The primary causes of
182. Kubicki's paper was never published. Batawia's paper appeared as an article,
Batawia, tAob/ematvka knto/ogtwzna paso.zytntctwa spolecznego, PAWSTO PRAWO (No. 7, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Problema/yka].
As an organizer of the conference I am quite familiar with Dr. Kubicki's paper, and I am
giving a brief summary of it from my memory.
183. See note 181 supra.
184. Problematyka, supra note 182.
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social maladjustment were chronic alcoholism, l8 5 personality disorder, and
mental retardation. 186 Therefore "social parasitism" presented first of all
serious medical problems. The coercive measures proposed by the draft were
a totally inadequate response to complex problems of social maladjust-
ment. 1
87
The lively discussion that followed the two papers attacked the draft
legislation with rare unanimity and vigor. Several discussants pointed out
that the draft was incompatible with international legislation on human
rights. It was specifically noted that the anti-parasite law would violate the
two aforementioned ILO conventions prohibiting forced labor as well as ar-
ticles 8 and 15 of the Covenant.18 8 The organizers of the conference
presented the results in a long and detailed memorandum which was submit-
ted to the Committee of Justice Administration of the Sejm.
The memorandum at once triggered some angry reactions from the sup-
porters of the anti-parasite law. Bafia, in one of his numerous official capaci-
ties, that of the Secretary General of the Association of Polish Jurists,
denounced the memorandum for inflexible legalism.
But the Committee of Justice Administration of the Sejm, probably left
with a fair amount of freedom by the party authorities, took the expression
of collective academic wisdom more seriously. The question of compatibility
of the draft with international law, once raised, generated some further ques-
tions and inquiries. Ultimately, the anti-parasite bill was withdrawn by the
government and the issue ended there. For many people it was a pleasant
surprise.
It appears that one of the principal factors responsible for the fall of the
anti-parasite law in Poland was its incompatibility with international legisla-
tion on human rights, duly brought to the attention of the decision-makers.
This factor, of course, should not be considered in isolation, but within the
context of other circumstances. A circumstance of primary significance was
185. According to Professor Batawia, substantially more than 50% of those labeled by the
police as "avoiding socially useful work" were chronic alcoholics. Id. at 15-22.
186. Id. at 22.
187. Id. at 28.
188. Art. 8, § 3 of the Covenant, supra note 3, reads:
(a) No one shall. be required to perform forced compulsory labour;
(b) The preceding subparagraph shall not be held to preclude in countries where
imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the
performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a
competent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall
not include:
(i) Any work or service not referred to in subparagraph (b) normally required
of a person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a
court, or of a person during conditional release from such detention;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious
objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscien-
tious objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life
or well-being of the community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.
Art. 15, § 1 reads in part: "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or ommission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or interna-
tional law, at the time when it was committed."
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that the political leadership did not press very hard for anti-parasite legisla-
tion at this time. The leadership would most probably have been pleased to
see it passed, but not at too high a price.
Middle-level-party supervisors and high state officials, such as Bafia and
the then Minister of Justice Walczak, supported the draft law to the very
end. It was certainly a much safer course of action to support and advocate
an anti-parasite law than to remain reasonably balanced about it, let alone
to oppose it. Nevertheless, a reasonably free discussion on the draft was al-
lowed. Those interested had a chance to judge the bill on its merits and to
communicate their views. Participants at the conference organized by the
Institute of Legal Sciences were willing to use this opportunity. Those who
drafted the memorandum for the Sejm Committee of Justice Administration
were willing to articulate and to convey these critical views as clearly as
possible.
The unanimity of academic opinion and the broad spectrum of special-
ists participating in the conference also had some significance. After all, the
new party leadership wanted to improve its relations with the intellectual
community. Ignoring strong academic opinion would not have fit well the
recently announced leadership style of "consulting society."' 189
What conclusions can one draw from the foregoing survey of changes in
Polish criminal law generated by international legislation on human rights?
The first reaction may be rather skeptical. The impact of international
law seems to be indeed very insubstantial. The draconian summary proce-
dure has in fact been invoked only in exceptional cases; 190 hence, its repeal
should not be overestimated.
Changes in the area of the death penalty may be seen as more apparent
than real. The number of death sentences has not decreased after January 1,
1970.191 Statutory exemptions for pregnant women and minors are only
decorative because nobody would sentence to death these kinds of defend-
ants anyway.
The most promising phenomenon has been the reform of the law on
pretrial detention. But, as partial data seem to suggest, the reform has re-
mained largely on paper. The judiciary continues to rubber-stamp decisions
made by the prosecutors. Thus, the decision making power which statutorily
shifted, at least in part, from the procuracy to the courts, actually has re-
mained with the procuracy. Deficiencies in the new statutory scheme, espe-
cially the ex parte nature of proceedings before the court in which only the
procurator may participate and the conspicuous lack of judicial hearing,
may explain such results to some extent.
The fall of the anti-parasite legislation is somewhat more tangible; how-
ever, it is difficult to assess the importance of negative legislative facts of this
kind. Following such a skeptical line of reasoning one may say that all the
189. "Discussions and consultations with citizens" has been recently elevated to the rank of
a constitutional principle, See Law of February 10, 1976 On the Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the Polish People's Republic, art. 1, § 42 (J.L. 1976, No. 5, Item 29).
190. S. WALTOS, supra note 108, at 34.
191. See note 119 supra.
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aforecited changes introduced into Polish criminal law have three character-
istic features in common: they are changes of low cost, insubstantial practi-
cality, but high visibility. Actually, one cannot expect more from reluctantly
espoused concessions devised primarily for foreign consumption.
The skeptical view is difficult to dispute; however, that does not account
for all the essential aspects of the story. Now, the focus will shift to the items
left out by the skeptics.
First of all, the changes in Polish criminal law proved once again that,
as Professor Humphrey said, "most governments, including authoritarian
governments, are sensitive to world public opinion."' 192 In the Polish case it
is even more striking because most of the changes were introduced in 1968-
69, ile., during the period least favorable politically for liberal law reforms.
This fact, important per se, is also important because it encourages
those in Poland who support liberal developments in law to press harder and
to rely in their struggle on international law on human rights. The history of
"the rise and fall" of Polish anti-parasite legislation is especially instructive
in this regard.
Second, the changes actually introduced, however modest, should not
be underestimated. They had been deemed important enough by the au-
thorities to be resisted for some twenty years against a stong current of pro-
fessional, especially academic, opinion in Poland. Strikingly, they have been
also deemed important by these liberally minded academic writers, who are
well aware of their deficiencies.1
93
True, until recently, judging from available sources, statutory changes
have not altered law enforcement patterns. Nevertheless, they represent tan-
gible potential for future changes. Assuming that there are spells of political
relaxation, it is quite reasonable to expect that the judiciary will exercise its
newly acquired power in a more independent and mature way.
Moreover, the present law is somewhat less susceptible to the rapid
twists and abusive practices characteristic of "campaigns," one of the period-
ically recurrent plagues of criminal law enforcement in socialist countries. 194
The repeal of the summary procedure and successful blocking of the anti-
parasite legislation seem to be essential to this context. Finally, recent
changes in Polish criminal law represent a challenge to those socialist legal
systems which resist law reforms along similar lines, notwithstanding their
formal international obligations.
Most notably, under Soviet criminal law the defendant is denied the
right to appeal in cases tried by the Supreme Court of the USSR as well as
by the Supreme Courts of the union republics.' 95 Pretrial detention during
192. See Humphrey, supra note 75.
193. See note 157 supra.
194. Juviler, Mass Education and justice in Soviet Courts: The Visiting Sessions, in 18 SOVIET
STUDIEs 494 (1967); Pomorski, Crthinal Law Protectin of Socialist froperty in the USSR, SOVIET
LAW AFrER STALIN 235 (D. Barry et al. eds. 1977); Pomorski, Communists and Their Criminal Law
(unpublished manuscript).
195. Law of the RSFSR On the Issuance of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSRSR,
October 27, 1960, thereafter, CCP RSFSR (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1960, No.
40, Item 592), arts. 38, 325.
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preliminary investigation is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the procuracy:
there is no possibility to challenge it before the court.196 Soviet criminal law
still includes inherently abusive anti-parasite provisions. 
197
II. THE QUESTION OF COMPATIBILITY: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN COMPARISON WITH
POLISH AND AMERICAN MUNICIPAL LAW
A. Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest
1. Interpretation of Article 9 of the Covenant
It is widely believed that article 9 of the Covenant is the basis for all
other rights set forth in the Covenant. The subordination to the rule of law
of all forms of arrest and detention has been called the most fundamental
human right after life itself.'98 If the right to be free from arbitrary arrest
and detention is abused or denied, there is little hope for the enjoyment of
other rights enumerated in the Covenant since arrest destroys privacy, re-
quires separation from family, and curtails freedom of speech, movement,
and association.' 99
In spite of its importance, surprisingly little interpretive work has been
done on article 9. This is also true of the Covenant as a whole, as Hassan
writes: "One of the most urgent tasks confronting human rights advocates
today is that of formulating and analyzing the standards prescribed in the
Covenant.''20° Before one can determine the compatibility of American and
Polish law with article 9, the Covenant's meaning and standards must be
clear.
The task of determining the standards of article 9 is not an impossible
one, although the weak implementation inherent in the Covenant thwarted
the hope that world public opinion and the further growth ofjurisprudence
would determine standards. 20  However, some useful approaches to inter-
pretation are suggested by general principles of law recognized in the princi-
pal legal systems, the concept of freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention
as developed by decisions of the European Commission and the European
Court of Human Rights, and subsequent United Nations studies encompass-
ing article 9.202
Article 9 begins, "Everyone has the right to hberty and security ofperson."
196. Id. at arts. 11, 96-97.
197. Law of the RSFSR on the Issuance of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, October 27,
1960, (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, No. 40 - Item 491), art. 209.
198. J. FAWCETT, APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 57
(1969).
199. P. Hassan, Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest and Detention as a Human Right: A
Study of the Meaning of the Word "Arbitrary" in Article 9 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 7-8 (1969) (unpublished dissertation in Harvard Law School Li-
brary).
200. Hassan, The International Covenants on Human Rights." An Approach to Interpretation, 19 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 35 (1969-70).
201. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
202. P. Hassan, supra note 199, at 259-63.
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An analogous provision opens article 5 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and has been
the subject of some discussion. 20 3 "Security of person" is a concept distinct
from "liberty" and in one view, although the scope is unsettled, probably
intends physical and legal security rather than psychological, economic, or
social.2 0 4 Another view is that liberty means actual freedom of movement of
the person and security is the condition of being protected by law in that
freedom.2 0 5 Guarantees of personal liberty in article 5 of the European Con-
vention probably do not extend to a right to enter or reside within the juris-
diction of a contracting state and, in general, mean "a person's right not be
subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner
that does not admit of legal justification. '20 6 These views would be equally
applicable to the Covenant along with the view, expressed by Hassan, that
the opening sentence of article 9, paragraph 1 controls the other provisions
of the paragraph.
20 7
Article 9, paragraph 1, second sentence: "No one shall be subjected to arbi-
trag arrest or detention."
This provision, perhaps the most important in the Covenant, is also the
most difficult for which to formulate standards. Unaided by interpretations
of the European Convention, which rather incorporates exceptions to a pro-
vision that no one shall be deprived of his liberty, the meaning of "arbitrary"
is crucial. 20 8 In a detailed study, Hassan argues that the term "arbitrary"
was meant to have a special meaning. Arbitrary arrest and detention "im-
plied an arrest or detention which was incompatible with the principles of
justice or with the dignity of the human person irrespective of whether it had
been carried out in conformity with the law."'20 9 "Thus, 'arbitrary' was to
safeguard against not onl'v illegal acts but unjust acts as well."'2 10 Hassan con-
cludes that "[a]rticle 9, as it presently stands, if properly interpreted and
applied, could provide better safeguards against government oppression of
its peoples than any article with a detailed list of limitations."
'2 1 1
The problem raised by this conclusion is how to interpret and apply
article 9 properly. Hassan suggests that the lack of precise definitions in
various constitutions has not prevented those documents from greatly pro-
moting the development of liberty. The draftsmen were not bothered by the
vagueness either, believing that the terms could be interpreted by reference
to generally accepted principles of justice.2 12 However, the success of these
203. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms [hereinafter cited as the European Convention]. Signed at Rome, 4 November 1950; en-
tered into force on 3 September 1953. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human
Rights: Collected Texts, § 1, Doc. 1 (7th ed. 1971).
204. F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 92 (1974).
205. J. FAWCE'r, supra note 198, at 58.
206. Id. at 59-64.
207. P. Hassan, supra note 199, at 249.
208. European Convention, supra note 203, at art. V(l).
209. Hassan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Background and Perspective on
Arti le 9(1), 3 DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 183 (1973).
210. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 185.
212. Id. at 183-84.
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approaches seems to be based on a system of adjudication which does not
exist under the Covenant.
2 13
Later United Nations studies have attempted to define the term "arbi-
trary" more specifically. The United Nations Study of the Right of Every-
one to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, in the Draft
Principles, defined arrest or detention as arbitrary if it is (a) "on grounds or
in accordance with procedures other than those established by law" or (b)
"under the provisions of a law, the purpose of which is incompatible with
respect for the right to liberty and security of person." 2 14 Point (a) is clear as
it sets forth the legality principle; however, point (b) leads us no further in
determining the standards which are to be used to determine incompatibil-
ity. The Study on Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest did set forth definitions
of essential terms of article 9. Arrest is defined thus:
the act of taking a person into custody under the authority of the
law or by compulsion of another kind and includes the period from
the moment he is placed under restraint up to the time he is
brought before an authority competent to order his continuedcusody
or to release him.
2 15
Detention will apply to "the act of confining a person to a certain place,
whether or not in continuation of arrest, and under restraints which prevent
him from living with his family or carrying out his normal occupational and
social activities."
2 16
The definition of "arbitrary arrest" was also undertaken at other United
Nations seminars. The Baguio Seminar adopted the following definitions:
Illegal arrest---curtailment, not authorized by law, either statutory
or customary, of an individual's freedom of movement. Arbitrary
arrest-an arrest authorized by a law which fails adequately to
protect human rights because either (a) the legal right to arrest has
been too widely defined, or (b) the means, circumstances or physi-
cal force attendant on the arrest exceed the reasonable require-
ments of effecting arrest.
2 17
Although the provision against "arbitrary" arrest and detention in arti-
cle 9(1) remains vague and virtually undefined, the article is not necessarily
ineffectual in trying to determine whether a country's domestic laws are in-
compatible. Conceivably, there are some instances where abuse would be so
flagrant that, by reference to generally accepted principles of justice, the
United Nations community could deem it "arbitrary." More specifically,
some of the above definitions, limitations on guarantees of personal liberty in
the European Convention and the Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom
213. See H. LAUTERPACHT, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 331 (1950),
where he suggests that even if rights are not defined in detail, they may be enforceable in the
courts.
214. United Nations, STUDY OF THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRARY
ARREST, DETENTION AND EXILE 205 (1964), [hereinafter cited as STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM
ARBITRARY ARREST].
215. Id. at 206.
216. Id.
217. United Nations, Seminar on the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law and
Procedure, Baguio City, ST/TAA/HR 2 at 9 (Feb., 1958).
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from Arbitrary Arrest, suggest examining domestic legal systems for compli-
ance with the following principles:
(a) The definition of the legal power to arrest should not be too
broad.
(b) Arrest or detention is allowed only if the person to be arrested
or detained is reasonablP suspected of having committed an of-
fense.
(c) The offense should be serious and punishable by a penalty
involving loss of liberty.
(d) There must exist circumstances which justify the need to keep
the suspect in custody. The circumstances are limited to
(1) danger of escape or (2) danger that the suspect would
prejudice the results of the investigation by destroying evi-
dence, conniving with witnesses, etc.
(e) An arrest can be made only on the authority of a written war-
rant issued by a judge or other official authorized by law to
exercise judicial power, except where arrest cannot be safely
delayed for the issuance of a warrant. The warrant must be
supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the issuing officer of
the existence of grounds justifying the proposed arrest.
These principles apply to persons suspected or accused of a criminal
offense. The provisions in article 9 against arbitrary arrest or detention may
apply to arrest or detention on grounds unconnected with criminal law as
well. 218 In brief, the Draft principles of the Study on Freedom from Arbi-
trary Arrest provide (1) for arrest and detention of illegal aliens or an alien
with view to deportation as long as certain safeguards are observed, and
(2) for arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with a lawful court
order, detention of a minor by lawful order of a competent court or author-
ity, detention of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, or drug addicts for the
purpose of treatment, cure or, rehabilitation, and detention of persons for
prevention of the spread of serious infectious diseases.
Safeguards for the above include the necessity of a written order of a
competent court or authority, a hearing with all guarantees necessary for the
protection of the individual's interests, systematic review of detention which
must cease as soon as the reasons which gave rise to it no longer exist.
These principles are specific enough to use in reviewing domestic laws
to determine their compliance with the Covenant.
Article 9, paragraph 1, third sentence: "No one shall be deprived of h's lib-
erty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by
law."
This final sentence of article 9, paragraph 1, requires that arrest or de-
tention be founded in law. While the language of this sentence indicates that
the legality of arrest is determined by the applicable domestic law, Hassan
218. See STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM ARBITARY ARREST, Draft Principles, supra note 214.
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suggests that the paragraph, as a whole, goes beyond that. 219 Because the
first sentence of the paragraph controls the other provisions, the laws re-
ferred to here must not be inconsistent with everyone's right to liberty and
security of person. Also, under article 2 all state parties to the Covenant
agree to adopt such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the Covenant. Thus, the laws referred to in this sentence and
article 2 are the same and must give effect to the right to liberty and security
of person. Finally, article 5 forbids state parties from taking actions aimed at
the destruction of the rights recognized in the Covenant. Therefore, not only
must arrest and detention follow domestic substantive law and procedure,
but these laws must not violate the right to liberty and security of the person
which the Covenant provides.
Article 9, paragraph 2: "Anyone who is arrested shall be tbformed, at the time
of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly tbformed of any charges
against him."
While the intention of this paragraph seems clear, interpretations of a
similar provision in the European Convention may aid our understand-
ing.220 The greatest difference between the two texts is that the Covenant
requires that the person arrested be informed "at the time of his arrest,"
while the European Convention requires that the prisoner be informed
"promptly." 22 1 This difference is minimal as "it appears that the inten-
tion-and the consequential obligation-is much the same, so that the con-
clusion seems justified that these rights are defined in substantially similar
terms."
222
The European Commission has held that there is no obligation under
this provision to present reasons for arrest or for the charge in writing.223 As
to the conditions of form which the oral information must satisfy, it is not
necessary that it be in detail and the obligation does not exist if the circum-
stances are such that the person must know the general nature of the alleged
offense for which he is detained. 224 It is not necessary that technical or pre-
cise language be used, but only that the prisoner knows in substance the
reason for arrest. The Covenant does not include the requirement, as does
the Convention, that this information be given "in a language which he un-
derstands," but this has been found to be clearly implied.
22 5
Article 9, paragraph 3, first sentence: "Anyone arrested or detained on a crim-
inal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other ocer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial wi'thin a reasonable time or to re-
lease. "
219. P. Hassan, supra note 199, at 249.
220. European Convention, supra note 203, at art. 5.
221. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civit and Political Rights and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, [1968-691 43 BRIT. Y.B. INr'L L. 21, 29.
222. Id. at 29.
223. J. FAWCETr, supra note 198, at 90.
224. Id. at 91.
225. Council of Europe. Problems arising from the co-existence of the United Nations Cov-
enants on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, Report of the Com-
mittee of Experts on Human Rights to the Committee of Ministers 29, Strasbourg (Sept. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Commmittee of Experts].
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This first sentence of paragraph 3 of article 9 provides one of the strong-
est safeguards of individual liberty in the law covering arrest. In fact, the
provision deals with two different rights: the right of any individual who is
arrested to have the lawfulness of his arrest verified, and the right of any
individual who is arrested to be judged without delay. These two rights are
neither identical nor complementary, as the wording seems to imply. How-
ever, at drafting, an amendment by Israel to make a clear distinction be-
tween these two rights was rejected.
226
The Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest
tend to separate the provision into two discrete rights.227 As to the right of
an arrested person to have the lawfulness of his arrest verified, the Draft
Principles provide that "promptly" means not later than twenty-four hours
from the time of arrest. 228 If for good reason a longer time is required, the
prescribed period may be extended once for a period not exceeding twenty-
four hours, but only upon written authorization of a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial powers. 229 If these requirements are
not met, the detention is illegal and the arrested person must be released.
230
The judge or other officer before whom the person is brought shall decide to
release him or order his continued custody.
23 1
As to the right of the person arrested to be judged without delay, the
Draft Principles provide that no person may be detained pending investiga-
tion or trial except on written order of a judge or other officer and that
before the order may issue the suspect must be given an opportunity to be
heard. 232 The period of detention must not exceed four weeks, although it
may be extended for a further period, not to exceed four weeks, upon author-
ization by a judge or other officer. In no case shall the period of detention
exceed one-half of the minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for
the offense with which he is charged. 233 To insure that detention is not un-
duly prolonged, a system of review is required.
234
The provisions of the Covenant have their counterpart in the European
Convention, so that the case law of the European Human Rights Institutions
may provide valuable precedents for the interpretation of the Covenant.
235
There are no textual differences between the Covenant and the European
Convention in this provision, aside from the more limited field of application
of the Covenant, which applies only to persons "arrested or detained on a
criminal charge."2 36 Although the guidelines set forth in the Draft Princi-
226. See Comments of Israel, U.N. A/C3/Sr. 863, 10 and AC.3/SR867, 8. For the rejec-
tion of the amendment see A/C.3/SR 866, 41.
227. Se STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, supra note 214, at arts. 10-12, 13-
15.
228. Id. at art. 10.
229. Id.
230. Id. at art. 11.
231. Id. at art. 12.
232. Id. at art. 13.
233. Id. at art. 14.
234. Id. at art. 15.
235. L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 49, at 1150.
236. Committee of Experts, supra note 225, at 29.
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pies seem specific and easy to apply, it is interesting to note the difficulties
encountered in trying to apply the same provision of the European Conven-
tion.
The application of article 5(a) of the European Convention has created
considerable difficulties. 237 The first clause of the sentence, dealing with the
time limit within which a person held in custody on arrest must be brought
before the competent judicial officer, has not been put in issue.2 38 The gen-
eral lines of practice among the contracting states vary, but seldom exceed
forty-eight hours. 239 Periods of extension, when permitted, are usually lim-
ited to the same length as the initial period.24° The application of the sec-
ond clause, requiring trial "within a reasonable time or release," has not
been so easy.
This clause initially raises the question of whether it expresses a right of
the detainee or a duty of the competent authorities. It has been determined
that the provision is a duty and the choice is up to the competent authorities
to either provide the trial within a reasonable time or release the detainee
pending trial.241' Second, there is a question as to when the period of deten-
tion terminates. It has been decided that the period of detention lasts at
least until judgment has been delivered, although there is some division be-
tween the Court and the Commission as to whether the judgment by the
court of first instance or final judgment rendered on appeal is implied by the
provision.
24 2
It is primarily the term "a reasonable time" which has given rise to
dispute.243 The determination of what is a "reasonable" time depends on a
number of elements in the individual case. Therefore, the Commission has
used a list of criteria to be considered. The particular circumstances taken
into account by the Commission are the grounds of detention, the length of
detention, and the character and requirements of the preparation for
trial. 244 On the other hand, the Court has reviewed the decisions of the
domestic courts on the issue of whether the detainee might escape, destroy
evidence, etc. The Court felt that international supervision should consist of
reviewing the decisions of domestic courts with regard to the conditions of
detention. 245 This divergent view of what is relevant for evaluation has led
to different conclusions of the Commission and the Court.2 46 The problems
of interpretation encountered with article 5(3) of the European Convention
would also arise under article 9(3) of the Covenant.
Article 9, paragraph 3, second sentence: "It shall not be the general rule that
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guaran-
237. F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 93.




242. F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 98.
243. Id. at 97.
244. J. FAWCET-r, supra note 198, at 100.
245. F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 100.
246. See Wemhoffv. Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Court H.R. WemhoffCase Series A,
Judgment of 27 June, 1968, part 21-24.
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tees to appear for trial, at any other stage of udcial proceedngs, and, should occasion
arise, for execution of the judgment."
The Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest
provide in article 16 as follows:
1. The arrested person shall be given an opportunity to obtain his
provisional release, with or without financial security or other
conditions when he is brought before the authority competent
to order his continued detention or at any stage of the proceed-
ings thereafter, either on his application or that of his counsel
or relatives or by authorities on their own motion. In case of
denial of provisional release, an immediate appeal or other
speedy recourse shall be available.
2. To ensure that no person shall be denied the possibility of ob-
taining provisional release on account of lack of means, other
forms of provisional release than upon financial security shall
be provided, e.g., release into the custody of a responsible per-
son or organization; release on promise not to leave a specified
address or to reside in a specified area or to appear at regular
intervals before a stated authority; release upon temporary sur-
render of identity papers; release upon an undertaking to ap-
pear before the authorities whenever legally summoned to do
SO.
2 4 7
Although the third paragraph essentially guarantees provision for bail,
the term itself is not mentioned, nor was the term mentioned in the Euro-
pean Convention. Fawcett explains that "[b]ail is not specifically men-
tioned, perhaps because in some contracting states [i1e., Denmark, Italy] it is
frowned on as unduly favoring persons of means, and seldom used." 248
However, article 5(3) of the Convention expressly presupposes this system.
249
The practice of bail is not exempted from supervision of the Commission
and the Court. Although it is primarily up to the domestic courts to fix the
amount of bail, this power may not be exercised arbitrarily and must be
exercised in accordance with the purpose of article 5(3).250 In Neumeister, the
Court criticized the domestic court for setting the bail solely in relation to
the amount of loss the person arrested might have caused.251 The guaran-
tees in article 9(3) of the Covenant and article 5(3) of the Convention are to
secure appearance of the accused for trial, not to secure amount of compen-
sation due.
Article 9, paragraph 4: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that such court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the deten-
tion is not lawful."
In contrast to article 9(3), which concerns arrest or detention on a crimi-
247. STUDY ON FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, supra note 214, Draft Principles, art.
16.
248. J. FAWCETT, supra note 198, at 109.





nal charge, the guarantee in article 9(4) concerns all deprivations of liberty.
This paragraph sets forth the principle ofjudicial control of every arrest and
detention regardless of its form or purpose. Even though paragraph 3 stipu-
lates an appearance before a judicial officer, this paragraph emphasizes that
the court should determine if the arrest or detention is lawful.
Again the precedents interpreting the analogous provision in the Euro-
pean Convention, article 5, section 4, are helpful. The Court of Human
Rights has determined that this right to raise the question of lawfulness
before a court implies that there must always be a competent court involved
in the procedure, but that once this court has acted, no further judicial rem-
edy is required. 252 Thus, if a court originally ordered the deprivation of
liberty (ze., by arrest warrant) no judicial remedy arises after the arrest or
detention. Moreover, the Court found in Neumeister that the procedural re-
quirements for a "fair and public" hearing (article 6) did not apply in deten-
tion cases as it would be inexpedient and because publicity would be
contrary to the detainee's interests. 253 It is sufficient if the decision is given
by an independent and impartial court. Finally, the court in Neumeisler, and
similarly the "travaux preparatories" of the Covenant, explicitly said that a
"court" might be a tribunal which need not necessarily be a court of jus-
tice.
254
The Draft Principles of the Study on Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest
applicable to this provision are found in article 38, and are as follows:
1. Anyone who is arrested or detained contrary to the provisions
set forth in the foregoing articles or is in imminent danger
thereof or who is denied any of the basic rights and guarantees
set forth in these articles shall be entitled to take proceedings
immediately before a judicial authority in order to challenge
the legality of his arrest or detention and obtain his release
without delay if it is unlawful, or to prevent the threatened
injury or enforce his rights.
2. The proceeding before such authority shall be simple, expedi-
tious and free of charge. The aggrieved party, if in custody,
must be produced without delay by the official or other person
detaining him before the judicial authority before which the
recourse is taken. The onus shall be upon the detaining official
or other person to establish affirmatively the legality of his act.
3. The proceedings may be instituted by any person in the inter-
est of the aggrieved party.
255
Article 9, paragraph 5 states that: "Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation."
The Draft Principles provide that:
Anyone who established affirmatively that he has been arrested or
detained in violation of the provisions set forth in the foregoing
articles shall have an enforceable right to compensation. If the per-
252. Id.
253. Id. at 103.
254. Committee of Experts, supra note 225, at 30.




son causing such arrest or detention is a public official or agent of
the government, the state shall be jointly and severally responsible
and compensation shall be payable from public funds.
256
This elaboration of article 9, paragraph 5 contrasts sharply with the
view set forth by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights of the Council
of Europe in comparing the Covenant and the Convention. The Committee
said that although the right to compensation in both instruments seems
alike, the documents differ as to the criterion on which compensation is to be
based. 257 The Covenant, in using "victim of unlawful arrest or detention,"
refers to the domestic law of each State Party, and a claim might be put
forward in case of violation of that law. 258 The Convention bases such a
claim on "a contravention of the provisions of this Article." The Committee
does note, however, that this difference would not be very important in prac-
tice.
259
Therefore, it is not unlikely that article 9, paragraph 5 will be construed
along the same lines as article 5, section 5 of the Convention. Compensation
for damage is dependent on the showing of a loss. Not only material but also
non-material or "moral" damage may be taken into account. 26° A decision
by the Commission gives some support to the idea that the use of the word
"victim" might be read as not giving a right to compensation for technical
errors unless there is proof of some special damage.26 1 It might also mean




With the framework of possible interpretations of article 9 of the Cove-
nant in mind, the next step is to examine its compatibility with American
law. Since American law is the aggregate of the law of a number of jurisdic-
tions, the differences between them will be leveled, technical detail omitted,
and a general overview of existing laws and practices presented. By proceed-
ing through the various stages of arrest, police detention, initial appearance
and beyond, areas incompatible with the Covenant will be noted and ques-
tions will be raised as to suspect areas.
A. Arrest: the decision to take a suspect into custody.
1. Probable Cause
It is generally held under American law that the concept of "probable
cause" demands that an arrest be made for cause, not for suspicion.
263
Therefore, a police officer may make an arrest only if he has a reasonable
belief, based on the facts confronting him, that a crime has been committed
256. Id. at art. 40.
257. Committee of Experts, supra note 225, at 31.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. F. CASTBERG, supra note 204, at 105-06.
261. J. FAWCET, supra note 198, at 117-18.
262. Id.
263. W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 206 (1972).
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and the person to be arrested has committed it. Therefore, the only criterion
for taking a suspect into custody is the likelihood that he has committed a
felony, or in some cases, a misdemeanor.264 As long as a jurisdiction's defini-
tion of probable cause is constitutionally adequate, the constitutional re-
quirement against unreasonable seizures of persons is satisfied.
265
Thus, American law appears to be consistent with the provision against
arbitrary arrest in article 9, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, which states that
the person arrested must be reasonably suspected of having committed an
offense. 266 In the sense that the standard of probable cause in the United
States is seen as preventing the police officer from arresting now and finding
the crime later, it is compatible with the Covenant. 267 The "probable
cause" requirement of evidence, however, is used not only at the arrest stage
but also to define the evidence needed to charge a suspect and hold him for
trial.268 One might assume, therefore, that the requisite evidentiary stan-
dard is the same. Actually, it is current practice in the United States to
arrest in situations where more evidence must be gathered to hold the sus-
pect for trial, and a lawful arrest may be made on the basis of evidence
insufficient to justify charging the person arrested.
26 9
Since, as will be examined later, the judge reviews evidentiary require-
ments necessary for charging but not for arrest, an officer may arrest on
suspicion knowing that he can meet the "probable cause" standard required
for charging later through in-custody investigation. To the extent that this
practice exists, it would circumvent article 9.
2. Arrest Warrants
The problem of probable cause is aggravated by the approach of Amer-
ican law to arrest warrants. To avoid arbitrary arrest, article 9 of the Cove-
nant calls for arrests to be made only on the authority of a written warrant,
issued by a judge or judicial officer, except where the suspect is found in
flagrante delicto or in urgent cases. The warrant must be supported by evi-
dence sufficient to satisfy the issuing officer that grounds exist justifying the
proposed arrest.
The usual rule in the United States is that a police officer may arrest,
without a warrant, one believed by the officer to be guilty of a felony or one
who committed a misdemeanor in his presence. 2 70 In a recent case, the
264. 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 62, 63 (12th ed. 1974). As regu-
lated by statute in many states, a peace officer is allowed to make an arrest, without a warrant,
for a felony even though it was not committed in his presence. Such an arrest may be made
when he has reasonable ground to believe that a felony was committed and reasonable ground
to believe that the person arrested committed the felony. Id. § 62. But set text accompanying
note 274 infia. In the case of a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of an officer, an
arrest warrant must ordinarily be procured. Id. § 63.
265. Id. § 51.
266. For this and subsequent references to interpretations of article 9, see text accompany-
ing notes 214-18 supra.
267. J. CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 13 (1975).
268. W. LA FAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 11 (1965).




United States Supreme Court stated that although maximum protection of
individual rights could best be assured by requiring review by a magistrate
of the factual justification prior to any arrest, the Court would not require
such review because it would intolerably handicap legitimate law enforce-
ment.2 71 The Supreme Court has also noted that when a felony arrest ef-
fected in a public place is questioned, the inquiry is whether there was
probable cause for arrest, not whether there was a warrant or time to get
one.2 72 Until April 1980, the Court has never invalidated an arrest based on
probable cause because officers failed to secure a warrant.
2 73
In requiring an arrest warrant, article 9 assumes that the reviewing judi-
cial officer will bring careful, neutral judgment to the decision. Not only are
arrest warrants seldom used in the United States, but when they are used,
the participation of the judicial officer is generally a formality with little or
no attention given to whether an adequate basis exists for making an ar-
rest.274 Since in the majority of cases the warrant is issued after the arrest
has been made, for use as a charging document, the role of the prosecutor is
important and that of the judicial officer is insignificant.2 75 Only recently,
the Court qualified its current practice on arrest warrants. The Court held
that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
police from making a warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect's
home to make a routine felony arrest.2 76 Apparently, warrentless arrests
made outside a suspect's home are still valid.
3. Need for Custody
Except for the most minor regulatory or traffic violations, the automatic
response of American police acting without a warrant is to formally arrest
the suspect. 2 77 Article 9 of the Covenant presupposes that there are only
certain circumstances which justify physically seizing the accused and keep-
ing him in custody (e.g., danger of escape or danger that the arrestee would
hamper the investigation by destroying evidence or conniving with wit-
nesses). In the United States "[a]lmost no thought is given to the question
whether, in any given case, there is a need for custody or whether, on the
other hand, society's interests might be just as well or better served if the
accused were to be issued a citation. '2 78 Since the sole criterion for arrest
under American law is probable cause, and since no "need for custody" deci-
sion is made, this standard is not met.
2 79
271. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975).
272. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976).
273. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 113.
274. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 8.
275. Id. at 34.
276. Payton v. New York, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980). Recent attempts have been made to estab-
lish standards in this area. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1
(1975) [hereinafter cited as ALl PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE].
277. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRAIL RELEASE 31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS].
278. Id.
279. Teitelbaum, Some Comparative Aspects of Pr-Tn'al Seizure of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 5
REVUE DE DROITS DE L'HOMME 419, 421 (1972).
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The American criminal justice administration has been criticized for
arresting too many persons who would voluntarily appear in court. 280 Still,
few state statutes authorize the police to issue a citation instead of making
the arrest, 281 or allow the magistrate to issue a summons rather than an
arrest warrant. 28 2 Although recent suggestions for reform allow for much
broader use of the citation and summons in an attempt to minimize holding
persons in custody prior to the initial court appearance, 283 implementation
of such reform is questionable as long as the legality of search and seizure or
interrogation is dependent upon making a prior arrest.
284
4. Seriousness of Offense
Article 9 provides further safeguards against arbitrary arrest by permit-
ting arrest only where the offense is serious and punishable by loss of liberty.
Since, in America, voluntary appearance is generally limited to minor viola-
tions of traffic laws or administrative regulations, almost all persons against
whom the criminal process is invoked are taken immediately into custody,
regardless of the seriousness of the offense. The American predeliction to
arrest under most circumstances is contrary to article 9.
Some of the reasons arrest is used, even for minor offenses, were dis-
cussed above. In addition, arrest for minor offenses continues since the
American police: (a) are hesitant to openly exercise their discretion; (b) sel-
dom feel they have enough facts on which to make an informed judgment as
to whether a defendant should be cited or arrested; (c) know that arrest com-
monly serves as the bases for certain kinds of investigatory procedures; and
(d) consider that public safety or physical well-being of the accused often
dictates arrest in relatively minor matters. Attempts at reform in this area
would make a citation mandatory when the total imprisonment for the of-
fense charged may not exceed six months.285 American practice is also con-
trary to article 9 inasmuch as arrest is used for a myriad of other reasons,
such as: minimization of the necessity of future police action; maintenance
of respect for the police and the public image of full enforcement; punish-
ment of a person suspected of other criminal activity; and aiding in the in-
vestigation of another offense or offender.
286
5. Noncriminal Activity
Finally, at the arrest stage, mention should be made of arrests for non-
criminal activity. For example, article 9 allows for arrest and detention of an
alcoholic for the purpose of treatment, cure, or rehabilitation. Such action is
safeguarded by requiring a written court order, a hearing which guarantees
the protection of the individual's interests, and a systematic review of such
280. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 166.
281. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at 31.
282. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 169.
283. See ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 2.1; ALI PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT CODE § 120.2 (commentary), supra note 276.
284. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 168.
285. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 2.2(b).
286. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 144-52.
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detentions. In American practice, drunks are quite often taken into custody
against their will and held at the precinct until sober, usually the next morn-
ing.28 7 Legislatures have seldom addressed themselves to such practices, but
even if it is deemed proper, there is sentiment for requiring that the decision
be made by a judicial officer. 288 Even in circumstances where a judicial
hearing is available, its abbreviated nature probably does not comply with
article 9.
B. Police Detention
1. Reasons for Arrest
After the suspect is arrested in the United States, he is taken to the
station and detained. Article 9, paragraph 2 provides that the arrestee be
informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest. While at com-
mon law no such notification was required, statutes in the United States
changed the common law rule by imposing the duty on the officer arresting
without warrant to make some explanation while arresting, including the
cause of arrest. 289 Although stating the reasons for an arrest is considered a
common requirement under American law,29° there is evidence that it is not
necessarily observed by arresting officers.
29 1
2. Prompt Appearance
Another standard mandated by article 9 is that the arrestee be
promptly informed of any charges against him and promptly brought before
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. Under
American law, it is the judicial officer who informs the suspect of the charges
against him, so the two requirements will be treated together.2 92 In current
practice, the prosecutor indicates his decision to charge by issuing a post-
arrest warrant prior to the first regular appearance of the defendant before a
judicial officer, who then advises him of the charge from the warrant.
293
Since American law does provide for an appearance before a judicial
officer and a reading of the charge, its compatibility with article 9 turns on
the word "promptly." As noted in the interpretation of article 9, the Draft
Principles would restrict the time limit to not later than twenty-four hours
from the time of arrest, unless extended for good reason by a judicial officer;
287. Id. at 439-49.
288. Id.
289. ALl MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1928) [hereinafter cited as ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 128 (1965); 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 189.
290. ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 276, at § 120.8, Comment. The commen-
tary states that it included "[t]he common requirement that the officer inform the arrested
person of the 'cause of arrest' and of 'the authority to make it' . . . since it is desirable that a
person who is subjected to the significant restraint of liberty which an arrest imports should at
the outset know the authority and cause for that restraint." Id.
291. ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 289, at § 120.8.
292. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 1.4. "The term 'first ap-
pearance' describes the proceeding at which the first judicial officer before whom he is brought
advises the defendant of his constitutional rights and the charges against him . Id. at 30.
293. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 308.
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whereas under the European Convention forty-eight hours has been deemed
acceptable.
Although some American jurisdictions provide for a statutory time
limit, most provide that the suspect be presented before a judicial officer
"without unnecessary delay" or some similar requirement. 294 In many cases
the defendant makes his appearance before the magistrate on the day of the
arrest or the next morning. However, where in-custody investigation is
needed, the practice is to detain the suspect for up to seventy-two hours.
2 95
The Supreme Court, in construing a federal statute providing for an appear-
ance "without unnecessary delay," held that the arresting officers are al-
lowed little more leeway than the normal interval between arrest and the
ordinary administrative steps required to bring a suspect before the nearest
available magistrate. 29 6 This interpretation is not binding on states with a
similar statute when their law is not in accord. 29 7 An offender may be
brought to court prior to his scheduled appearance by a writ of habeas
corpus, but it is not usually used.
298
C. The Initial Appearance and Beyond
1. Lawfulness of Arrest
Article 9, paragraph 4 provides that anyone arrested or detained shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court so that the court may decide
on the lawfulness of his arrest and order his release if it is not lawful. In the
United States, the legality of an arrest would depend upon a showing of
probable cause. It might be assumed that this requirement is met when the
defendant is first brought before ajudicial officer. In fact, the initial appear-
ance does not involve a review by the magistrate of the grounds for the war-
rant nor must the prosecutor demonstrate that there are sufficient grounds to
charge the suspect.2 99 The legality of the defendant's seizure is not consid-
ered at the initial appearance.
3° °
Theoretically, a writ of habeas corpus should be a method by which the
suspect may challenge the validity of his detention. He would do this by
showing that the grounds for his arrest are not sufficient or that a reasonable
amount of time for in-custody investigation has passed and that he should be
released. Actually, neither purpose is served by the writ; the judge, rather
than inquiring into the validity of the detention, generally determines, by
294. Id. at 300-01.
295. Id. at 306.
296. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) (interpreting FED. R. CRIM. P.
5(a)).
297. ALI PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 276, at132-50.
To the extent that the state courts have considered these early appearance stat-
utes, the dominant tenor of their decisions is to the effect that the need for some inves-
tigation of crime (including non-coercive questioning) may justify a period of
stationhouse custody and consequently some delay in taking the arrested person before
a magistrate. Beyond this, cases leave entirely indeterminate large areas relating to
the lawfulness, duration and conditions of pre-production custody.
Id. at 135-36 (footnote omitted).
298. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 176.
299. Id. at 322.
300. Teitelbaum, supra note 279, at 448.
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rule of thumb, a time limit within which the police must charge or release
the subject. 30 1 If the suspect is charged, the next procedural step would be
the initial appearance which has previously been shown to be ineffective in
determining the validity of the arrest or detention.
At the initial appearance, a determination of pretrial release is made. If
the defendant is detained, the next procedural appearance before a judicial
officer is the preliminary hearing or examination. At this stage, the magis-
trate checks only the charging decision, not the arrest, to determine that an
offense was committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the crime, so that he can hold the suspect for trial.
30 2
Again the requirements of article 9 are not met since the lawfulness of the
arrest is not checked.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution requires a judicial determination of proba-
ble cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty through pretrial
detention. 30 3 This probable cause determination may be made by a judicial
officer without an adversary hearing and any procedure is acceptable as long
as it provides a fair and reliable determination of probable cause either
before or promptly after arrest. 30 4 Therefore, in the absence of a prelimi-
nary hearing, all that is really required here is an arrest warrant; the result is
that "the probable cause hearing becomes susceptible to the rubber stamp-
ing habits of hurried magistrates." 30 5 On its face, this procedure meets the
requirement of article 9, paragraph 4 that a competent court be involved
somewhere in the procedure to check the lawfulness of the arrest. However,
in view of the perfunctory nature of judicial involvement with arrest war-
rants, and the fact that at the preliminary hearing probable cause is based
on the evidence at that time rather than at the time of arrest, the lawfulness
of the arrest is never really determined and the purpose of the provision is
not complied with.
30 6
2. Pretrial Release: Bail
Article 9, in keeping with its overall premise that liberty is the preferred
condition, provides that persons should not be detained pending trail; how-
ever, release may be subject to guarantees to appear. Nonmonetary forms of
provisional release are to be provided. Monetary provisional release must
301. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 407-09. Since the writ challenges the validity of the
detention rather the legality of the arrest, it is not appropriate to use the writ to challenge an
arrest on insufficient grounds if at the time of the hearing there is sufficient evidence of guilt.
Even if hearings are held shortly after arrest, with only the evidence available to the arresting
officer, detention is not challenged on grounds that the arrest is illegal as defense attorneys feel
that this would be inappropriate and judges have indicated that there should be time for inves-
tigation.
302. Id. at 321.
303. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
304. Id. at 120-25.
305. Comment, Pretnal Detainees Have a Fourth Amendment Right to a Nonadversay,]Judcial Deter-
mination oflobable Cause, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 199, 208 (1975).
306. It should be noted that some states have gone beyond the Gerstein case and ordered a
judicial hearing even if an arrest warrant had issued and sometimes require that it be an adver-
sary hearing. Id at 215 n.87.
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not be arbitrary or compensatory. Rather, it should be limited to an amount
sufficient to secure the suspect's appearance at trial.
The United States has traditionally applied one system of provisional
release-bail.30 7 The defendant must post a monetary bond sufficiently
high, but not higher than the amount necessary, to assure his appearance at
trial.308 Those who cannot financially afford bail, or due to the nature of the
offense are not allowed bail, are detained in jail pending trial.30 9 The Con-
stitution recognizes bail by simply requiring that it not be "excessive"; noth-
ing in the Constitution "suggests whether the accused has a right to be at
liberty on bail before trial, or even have bail set for him at all."'3 10 The
Supreme Court has interpreted "excessive" to mean an amount that is more
than necessary to assure the defendant's appearance at trial.3 11
To the extent that American courts have adopted such a narrow view of
pretrial release alternatives and seldom resort to nonmonetary controls over
the defendant, American law is incompatible with the Covenant which pro-
vides that other forms of pretrial release rather than monetary must be pro-
vided.31 2 On the other hand, federal and state courts have held that the
only valid basis for requiring bail or setting high bail is the risk of nonap-
pearance at trial.3 13 On its face, this portion of American law appears to be
in accord with article 9; however, current practices show that this is not the
case.
Bail is usually set at the defendant's first appearance before a magis-
trate. The American bail system is frequently attacked as arbitrary, as no
effort is made to develop facts about the defendant's condition and back-
ground which would show whether the defendants could be released safely
without bail.31 4 Further, since it is virtually impossible to translate risk into
307. Panel, Bai Preveniiwe Detentzon and Speedy Trals, 8 COLUM. J.L. &Soc. PROB. 1, 7
(1971) (remarks of H. Richard Uviller) [hereinafter Colum. Panel]. For a comprehensive discus-
sion of various reform efforts, see J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL
AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 passim (1979).
308. Id.
309. In 1970, an estimated 100,000 persons in the United States were detained each day,
pending trial. See Comment, The Conditions ofltre- Trial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
310. Colum. Panel, supra note 307, at 7. The Constitution's enigmatic reference to bail is,
according to Mr. Andreoli, a vacuum in which
jurisdictions have gone their several ways, some deeming offenses "non-bailable," some
according the trial judge unencumbered discretion over whether or not to fix bail for
certain offenses and some seeking to encourage pre-trial release by setting forth various
terms of recognizance other than the traditional secured money bond. The constitu-
tions or declarations of rights of many of the states provide that all persons shall be
bailable by suflicent sureties, except in certain cases. See Corbo v. Donahue, 54 N.J.
Super. 575, 149 A.2d 828 (1959).
311. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). The Court in Boyle declared that the traditional
standards as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are to be applied in each
case to each defendant:
If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as in the
judgment of the commission of the court orjudge, or justice will insure the presence of
the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give
bail and the character of the defendant.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). For a further discussion, see J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 307, at 19, 32.
312. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at 26.
313. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 177.
314. ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at 2. A concern for defendants'
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monetary terms, bail is set according to a schedule based on the charge.3 15
Although the predominant criterion recognized in setting bail is the
likelihood that the suspect will appear for trial, as demanded by article 9, the
uncontrolled discretion of the magistrate results in the current practice of
denying release for reasons other than those recognized by the formal law.
3 16
By manipulating the system, which on its face does not so provide, judges
achieve a system of preventive detention. They may deny bail when permit-
ted or set it unattainably high whenever incarceration is deemed appropri-
ate.3 17 Because the question of bail is viewed as a matter for the lower court
to resolve in its discretion, and because the judge's ruling will not be dis-
turbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion, the judge has much
leeway.
31 8
Reasons given for manipulation of the bail system to reach improper
ends include: a fear by judges that the defendant will engage in criminal
activity if he is temporarily released on bail before trial; an apprehension
that evidence may be interfered with; the view that a taste of jail would do
the defendant good; the degree to which the alleged crime shocks the sensi-
bilities of the community; and the possible discrimination against minority
groups.3 19 "The net effect is to punish a defendant before his guilt has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt, although this is contrary to basic
law. "320
The Supreme Court has never directly answered the question whether
the Constitution permits confinement of a suspect because of a prediction
that he may engage in harmful conduct at a future time.32 1 Preventive de-
tention, in the sense of a statutory scheme where arrested persons are held in
custody to prevent future crimes, must be distinguished from the "de facto
preventive detention" which takes place when the bail system is used for this
purpose. 322 De facto preventive detention contains no clearly articulated
criteria for determining when the prisoner should be detained pending
trial.
3 23
Many of the deficiencies of the United States bail system mentioned
above have been the subject of activity in bail reform at both state and fed-
potential danger has been voiced in case law and legislation. See J. GOLDKAMp, supra note 307,
at 27 passn.
315. Id. at 55.
316. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 206-07.
317. R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM, A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 12 (1965).
"Most states allow bail to sufficient sureties before conviction except for capital crimes. A few
states limit the power to deny bail in murder and treason cases. A few grant an absolute right to
bail in misdemeanor cases, and a few allow the judge absolute discretion to grant or deny bail in
accord with the common law." Id. at 28.
318. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 185.
319. S. AscH, POLICE AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 88 (1967).
320. Id. at 89.
321. Individual justices have nonetheless addressed the issue. See Dershowitz, Preventle Con-
frement: A Suggested Frameworkfor Constitutional Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1973).
322. Colum. Panel, supra note 307, at 9. For recent empirical findings regarding defacto
preventive detention through bail, see J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 307, at 163 passim.
323. Manipulation of the bail setting process to prevent pretrial release for the purpose of
protecting the public has been held unlawful. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 348, 508 P. 2d 721,
723, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1975).
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eral levels in the past two decades. 324 Alternatives to monetary bail, such as
recognizance release, are becoming more widespread. 325 Although efforts
are being made to push the American system in the direction of article 9,326
much remains to be done before American law is in compliance.
3. Trial Within a Reasonable Time
Article 9 of the Covenant also provides that anyone arrested or detained
on a criminal charge shall be entitled either to trial within a reasonable time
or to release. Some guidelines interpreting this provision state that detention
pending investigation or trial must be based on a written order of a judge or
judicial officer, that the suspect must be given the opportunity to be heard,
that detention should not exceed four weeks except where an extension for
an additional four weeks is authorized, that detention should not exceed one
half of the minimum time of imprisonment for the offense, and that there be
a system of review to guard against unduly prolonged detention.
In applying these guidelines to American law, some discrepancies based
on previous observations are immediately apparent. Suspects are often de-
tained pending investigation without a written order as arrests are often
made without warrants. Moreover, post-arrest warrants often are not issued
until long after the suspect was detained. In any case, the perfunctory na-
ture of judicial involvement with warrants and the inability of the suspect to
be heard would render the document unacceptable. In addition, where the
defendant does not have an opportunity to be heard at either the initial
appearance or preliminary hearing, the guidelines of the Covenant are not
met. There is no automatic system whereby the pretrial detention of a sus-
pect is systematically reviewed.
The most crucial aspect of this provision is the period of detention and
the term "trial within a reasonable time." Although the United States Con-
stitution and most state constitutions provide that the accused has a right to
a speedy trial, the boundaries of such a guarantee are far from clear. 327 It
has been stated that the current American system cannot guarantee to the
accused a trial within six months of the date he has announced he is ready
for trial.
328
The concept of a right to a speedy trial in the United States has been
ambiguous and, until recently, could only be defined in the context of the
special circumstances of individual cases.3 29 There was no absolute guaran-
324. Pettine, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California, 5 PAC. L. J. 675
(1970). ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 317.
325. J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 307, at 70-73. As many as 47% of defendants were released
without cash bail in Philadelphia. Id. at 139.
326. The ABA Standards on Pretrial Release call for release as a general rule, relegate
money bail to the place of last resort and disallow its use for preventive detention. ABA PRE-
TRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 277, at § 5.
327. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS].
328. Colum. Panel, supra note 307, at 3, 4.
329. Chepiga, Speedy Tnals: Recent Developments Concerning a Vital Right, 4 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 351 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Chepiga].
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tee that the defendant would be tried within a short time of his arrest, as this
right was seen to be "consistent with delays."'330 The Supreme Court has
refused to hold that the sixth amendment requires trial within a specified
time and has used a less precise balancing test.
33 1
The Supreme Court indicated that its inaction was due to a hesitation
to engage in judicial legislation. 332 In light of the benefits to society as a
whole, as well as to the accused, Congress responded to the courts' inaction
by attempting to implement the sixth amendment through the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, which defines actual time limits within which trials have to be
held. Starting in 1979, all federal courts must assure: the filing of an infor-
mation or indictment within thirty days of arrest or summons, arraignment
within ten days of the filing date, and, where a not guilty plea has been
entered, trial within sixty days of arraignment. 333 If the defendant is not
brought to trial within the requisite time period, the court must dismiss the
case either with or without prejudice.
334
The federal courts are closer to the safeguards envisioned by article 9
inasmuch as the Speedy Trial Act provides for definite time limits, although
they exceed the suggested four weeks. Twenty-eight states, on the other
hand, still express the time limitation by reference to terms of court, the
number of terms varying from one to three.335 Approximately nineteen do
have a definite calendar period, ranging from 60 to 180 days, and a few
states do not fix a definite period but employ a broad standard of reasona-
bleness. 336 A violation of the state statute is rarely seen as a constitutional
denial, and there are considerable differences and uncertainties as to when
time begins to run, which defendants are covered, and what the conse-
quences of delay are.3 37 Standards whose purposes are to create uniformity,
provide that the consequence of a denial of speedy trial should be outright
dismissal; however, they fail to prescribe specific time limits. 338
4. Compensation
Finally, article 9 of the Covenant provides that anyone who has been a
victim of unlawful arrest or detention should have an enforceable right to
330. Id.
331. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 (1972); Poulos & Coleman, Speedy TIal, Sow
Implementation: ABA Standards in Search of Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 361 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Poulos].
332. 407 U.S. at 523.
333. Chepiga, supra note 329, at 362.
334. Holt, Federal System Adopts Speicfw Parameters For the Constitutional Right to a Speedy Tril-
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 449, 453 (1976).
335. Note, The Impact of the Speedy Trial Provisions. A Tentative Appratal, 8 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 356, 363-4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Speedy Trial Provisions].
336. Id. at 373-74.
337. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 327, at 2, 14.
Instead of dealing with the constitutional right, speedy trial litigation proceeds with refer-
ence to such statutes or court rules. Speedy Trial Provistons, supra note 335, at 361. Statutes of a
few states limit their operation to imprisoned defendants or only to felonies. Id. at 364. Also,
there are at least five general positions among the states on the remedy question. Id. at 362-63.
The definite time period is computed from a specific event which differs from state to state. Id.
at 361. See also Poulos, supra note 331, at 377.
338. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 327, at 2, 14.
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compensation. Further, if a public or government official is involved, the
state is jointly and severally liable and compensation will be payable from
public funds.
In the United States, a victim of arrest or imprisonment may bring a
tort action against a police officer, alleging that he made an arrest on insuffi-
cient grounds or improperly detained the person following his arrest. 339 The
effectiveness of this remedy is questionable. Tort actions are seldom used
because there is no source of monetary recovery, police officers lack assets,
there are limited bonding requirements, and the doctrine of governmental
immunity applies.
340
Governmental immunity in the United States is in direct conflict with
the requirement of article 9 that the state be liable and payment be made
from public funds. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is
not liable for any claim of false arrest or imprisonment. 34 1 There is no gov-
ernmental liability in tort unless the government consents. 342 Since a police
operation is a governmental function, cities and states are not liable for the
torts of their officers.343 Even though the degree of consent varies from state
to state, there is ordinarily no liability for the torts of police officers, such as
false arrest. 344 Although there has been substantial erosion of governmental
immunity recently, it still would be difficult to say that a victim of unlawful
arrest or detention in the United States has a meaningful right to compensa-
tion.
345
This incompatibility of American law with requirements of article 9,
paragraph 5 has been recently admitted officially by the State Department.
In effect, the State Department recommends that the Covenant be ratified
by the United States with the reservation that, "the United States does not
adhere to paragraph (5) of Article 9 . . . ",346 Since this is the only recom-
mended reservation pertaining to article 9, it follows that the State Depart-
ment believes American law compatible with all the remaining paragraphs
339. W. LA FAVE, supra note 268, at 412.
340. Id. at 421.
341. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 972 (4th ed. 1971).
342. Id. at 975.
343. E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST 415 (1967). "Thus it is held that a chief or super-
intendant is not liable for acts of his policeman in perpetrating a false arrest or imprisonment,
since such acts were performed in carrying out the city's governmental function, under which
neither the municipality, its officials nor its police officers can be held civilly liable." Id.
344. W. PROSSER, supra note 341, at 979.
345. Id. at 984-87.
The immunity of state and local governments for their torts has been subject to criticism
which is now having its effect. There has been general erosion by expanding "proprietary"
activities (that is, those activities of municipal corporations which are not governmental, politi-
cal or public but rather corporate and private for which it is liable) and also by statute. The
U.S. Supreme Court has recently substantially limited the immunity of local governments. See
Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S.Ct. 1389 (1980); Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). See also Klein, Recent Developments, 24 VILL. L.
REV. 1028 (1978-1979). The impact of these developments on the implementation of the right
to compensation by the victims of unlawful arrests or detentions seems to be insignificant. Id. at
1031.
346. Letter of Submittal, Dec. 17, 1977, Message from the President, supra note 16, at XII.
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of this article. In view of our analysis, however, such an assumption seems to
be unfounded.
3. Polish Law
A. Arrest: the decision to take a suspect into custody
1. Probable Cause
The Polish CCP explicitly spells out two conditions under which the
right of the police to arrest a suspected person arises: (a) a reasonable belief
that such person committed a crime; and (b) a danger that the suspect would
hide or tamper with evidence. 347 The concept of "a reasonable belief,"
clearly analogous to the much celebrated American concept of "probable
cause," has received little attention from Polish authorities. The Supreme
Court of Poland, has never tried to give the concept a precise or operational
meaning. Commentators usually dispose of the problem easily in a few
sentences. There is some consensus that under article 206 a "frivolous" sus-
picion on the part of the policeman making an arrest is insufficient. An
arresting officer has to have some kind of affirmative information, either
firsthand or from other persons, which justifies the suspicion that the ar-
rested person committed a crime.
348
2. Need for Custody
In addition to the requirement of probable cause (reasonable belief),
there must be a danger that the suspected person would hide or tamper with
evidence. In other words, reasonable belief is a necessary condition for an
arrest but is insufficient when standing alone.
3. Arrest Warrants
The police are vested with an independent power of arrest on the
grounds provided for by the CCP in article 206; no arrest warrant by the
judicial or prosecutorial officer is required.
349
4. Seriousness of Offense
Article 206 of the CCP, if applied literally, would allow for arrest in
every criminal case, including cases of even the most trivial offenses; hence, it
would not be compatible with the requirements of article 9 of the Covenant.
It has been pointed out by authoritative commentators, however, that the
power of arrest should not be broader than the power to apply pretrial de-
tention. 350 It follows that the police may not arrest in cases involving of-
347. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 206. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure,
everyone has a right to arrest a person caught tflagrante dicto or in hot pursuit. Id. at art. 205.
348. Kodeks postepowania karnego. KOMENTARZ 277 (M. Mazur ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Mazur]; M. S1EWIERSKI, T. TYLMAN & M. OLSZEWSKI, POSTEPOWANIE KARNE W
ZARYSIE 167 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as M. SIEWARSKII.
349. In addition to the arrest power provided for by art. 206, arrest, of course, may be made
in the execution of an arrest warrant issued by the court or by the prosecutor. CCP, supra note
67, at art. 208.
350. See notes 359-81 infia and accompanying text.
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fenses punishable only by imprisonment of up to one year or punishable by




The police have the power to arrest in a variety of situations unrelated
to criminal proceedings. For example, a person accused of certain noncrimi-
nal offenses, which are under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies,
352
may be arrested; a person "violating public order" 353 may be arrested; a
drunk may be detained and treated in "sobriety chambers"; 354 and a person




1. Notification of the Reasons for Arrest
Polish law does not require that the arrestee be informed at the time of
his arrest of the reasons for his arrest. This omission clearly makes Polish law
incompatible with article 9, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
2. Prompt Appearance
An arrestee may be detained by the police for a period of forty-eight
hours. During this period either a warrant for an arrestee's continuous de-
tention should be served or he should be released. The warrant may not be
issued without an appearance of the arrestee before the procurator. 356 Even
within the period of forty-eight hours, the arrestee should be released if the
need for his detention disappears.3 57 Immediately after the arrest is made,
police should start gathering the necessary data, and if grounds for continu-
ous detention are found, should make an appropriate motion to the procura-
tor. Supervision over the arrest/detention practices of the police is exercised
by the procurator or the court.
358
C. Preliminary Detention
Polish law makes a clear distinction between arrest and detention for a
short period of time on the one hand 359 and prolonged detention on the
other. The latter, called "preliminary detention" (in Polish: tymczasowe
351. Mazur, supra note 348, at 278, 296. This principal limitation of the power to arrest is
subject, in turn, to some exceptions. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 447.
352. The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses, supra note 69, at art. 141.
353. Edict of Dec. 21, 1955, On the Organization and Scope of Activity of the Civil Militia,
J.L. 1955, No. 46, Item 311, art. 7, sec. 1(2).
354. Order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mar. 8, 1961, J.L. 1961, No. 21, Item 104.
355. Administrative agencies may order imprisonment as a penalty for noncriminal offenses
and may issue civil commitment orders for the mentally ill.
356. See CCP, supra 67, at art. 207.
357. Id. art. 206.
358. Id. art. 216.
359. See notes 347-58 supra and accompanying text.
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aresztowanze) may be applied only by the procurator or by the court,
360 while
the former is entrusted to the police. We will focus now on preliminary de-
tention.
1. Probable Cause
Preliminary detention may be applied only to a person formally
charged with a criminal offense.36 1 This very fact implies the existence of
probable cause since formal charges may be made only on the grounds of
evidence (not informal information) which makes it probable that the sus-
pect committed a crime.362 Some authorities suggest that the probable
cause required for preliminary detention must be even stronger than the
probable cause required for a charging decision.
363
2. Need for Custody
Preliminary detention may be applied only when, in addition to proba-
ble cause, there is a need for protecting the integrity of the proceedings.
364
This is particularly so when: (1) there is a reasonable ground to believe that
the defendant would hide or escape, especially when he does not have a
definite place of residence or it is impossible to establish his identity; or
(2) there is a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant would connive
with the witnesses or otherwise interfere with the proceedings;3 65 or (3) the
defendant is charged with a felony 366 or is a recidivist; 36 7 or (4) the defend-
ant is charged with an act representing a high degree of social danger. 368 In
all of the above-mentioned situations, preliminary detention may be applied,
but is not required. Mandatory detention applies only to the defendants
who were convicted and sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment for a
term of more than two years for crimes of intent or to imprisonment for a
term of more than three years for crimes of negligence.
369
3. Seriousness of the Offense
Preliminary detention does not apply in trivial cases; that is, in cases
involving offenses punishable by imprisonment of up to one year or by non-
360. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 210.
361. Id. arts. 61, 209, 210.
362. Id. art. 269; Mazur, supra note 348, at 363.
363. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 209. Decision of the Supreme Court, May 14, 1974,
(1974) OSNIKiW, No. 9, Item 175; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 170.
364. See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 209, 217.
365. To apply preventive detention on the grounds specified under (1) and (2), it is neces-
sary to establish some facts about the defendant's conduct to this effect. Mazur, supra note 348,
at 296; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 173.
366. A felony is a crime punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of not less than
three years. See C.C., supra note 66, at art. 5, § 2.
367. See C.C., supra note 66, at arts. 60-65.
368. In situations specified under (3) and (4), the need for custody is presumed because the
severity of the anticipated punishment presumably represents sufficient temptation for escape or
tampering with evidence. The personality of the recidivist is presumed to be a menace to the
regularity of the proceedings. M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 174.
369. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 217, § 3.
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custodial penalties such as a fine, or correctional labor.
3 70
4. The Decision-Making Process and the Duration of
Detention
The initial decision on preliminary detention during investigation is
made by the procurator either on motion by the police or on his own initia-
tive. 371 Before preliminary detention is applied, the procurator has to inter-
rogate the defendant personally. This rule guarantees that within forty-
eight hours from the time of the arrest the defendant is physically produced
before the procurator. The initial period of detention may not exceed three
months. 372 The decision is subject to review by the court which has jurisdic-
tion over the case upon the filing of a complaint by the defendant or his
counsel. 373 If preliminary investigation by prosecutorial authorities, due to
the peculiar circumstances of the case, cannot be completed within the three
month period, the period of preliminary detention may be extended if neces-
sary. The power to extend preliminary detention for a period of up six
months is vested in a provincial procurator, 374 whose decision is subject to
review by a provincial court upon complaint by the defendant or his coun-
sel. 375 The defendant has no right to appeal the decisions of the reviewing
courts; however, such decisions may be appealed by the procurator.
3 76
The power to extend preliminary detention beyond six months, for a
period "necessary to complete the investigation" is vested in a provincial
court which acts upon a motion by a provincial procurator. A decision by a
provincial court on this matter may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
both parties.377 All the courts involved make their decisions in ex parte pro-
ceedings, in which only a procurator may participate. A hearing is not held
and the factual basis for the decision is evidence gathered by the investiga-
tion and submitted to the court in a dossier.
378
Under the above-outlined statutory scheme, a crucial question arises.
Namely, what have been the patterns of actual official behavior? Especially,
how have the Polish courts used their control over preliminary detention?
The scarce empirical data available and some of the published Supreme
Court decisions seem to suggest that the judiciary has applied preliminary
detention very broadly.
And so, for example, in 1971 the Provincial Court in Wroclaw re-
ceived 9 complaints about extensions of preliminary detention up
to 6 months by the provincial procurator and ruled in all the cases
against the complaining defendants. At the same time, the court
was petitioned by the procurator for an extension of preliminary
detention beyond 6 months in 39 cases, involving 103 prisoners,
370. Id. § 2; Mazur, supra note 348, at 296.
371. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 206, § 3.
372. Id. art. 173.
373. Id. art. 212, § 2; Mazur, supra note 348, at 290; M. SIEWARSKI, supra note 348, at 174.
374. A provincial procurator is the head of the procuratorial office at the intermediate level.
375. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 222, § 3.
376. Id. art. 212, § 3.
377. Id. art. 222, § 3.
378. Id. art. 88 & 299, § 1; Bafia el al., supra note 157, at 268.
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and granted all the petitions. Fifteen of the prisoners appealed the
decisions to the Supreme Court, which affirmed all of them.
3 79
The high regard for the needs of the investigation and relaxed standards of
application of preliminary detention have been reflected in some of the pub-
lished decisions by the Supreme Court. In its officially reported decision of
February 1, 1975,380 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Provin-
cial Court in Lublin and ordered the release of the prisoner under the follow-
ing circumstances.
The prisoner, Adam B., charged with a non-violent offense, had
been detained for a period of more than 2 years. The Provincial
Court in Lublin extended preliminary detention five times, having
been upheld by the Supreme Court twice. Only the last extension,
as appears from the opinion utterly frivolous, was finally reversed.
It is characteristic that the Supreme Court, having ultimately ruled for the
prisoner, did not try to draw any line in terms of permissible duration of the
detention. The opinion does not even hint that a preliminary detention in
excess of two years is per se excessive. The Court focuses primarily on the
fact that the fifth extension was frivolous because it was granted to enable
further investigation of the criminal activities of other persons having noth-
ing in common with the complainant. Moreover, the Court hastened to
point out that the issue of the complainant's guilt was controversial and that
his health was failing.
38 '
5. The Right to Compensation
Polish law as a matter of general rule provides for liability of the treas-
ury for torts committed by state officers acting in their official capacity.
38 2
More specific rules, which govern liability of the state for damages resulting
from "ill-founded conviction" and "obviously ill-founded preliminary deten-
tion," are included in the CCP and preempt application of the Civil
Code. 38 3 The fundamental premise of the state's liability is "obvious ill-
foundedness" of the preliminary detention. It is clear from various judicial
and scholarly pronouncements that the standard to be applied is the Polish
law on preliminary detention operative at the time when the decision to
detain was made. Mere unlawfulness of the decision to detain under the
Polish law is not a sufficient ground for the action. The unlawfulness (or
"ill-foundedness") must be shown to have been "obvious." To meet the
standard, a petitioner has to show at least two things:38 4 (1) the decision to
detain him was a flagrant and substantial violation of law, not a trivial or
technical one; and (2) the unlawfulness should have been obvious to the
379. Kaftal, Konirola sadu nad tymczasowym aresztowanzem w swetle orzecznictwa SN, supra note
134, at 99. For a similar pattern of decision-making by the Provincial Court in Kielce, see id. at
99.
380. (1975) OSNIKiW, No. 3-4, Item 45.
381. Id. at 66.
382. The Civil Code, Law of April 23, 1964, J.L. No. 16, Item 93 as amended, arts. 417-420.
383. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 487.
384. The burden of proof rests upon a petitioner. Mazur, supra note 348, at 779.
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procurator or the court at the time the decision to detain was made.
3 85
Therefore, the ultimate acquittal of the petitioner or the decision to
drop the charges are not dispositive since they may result from legal insuffi-
ciency of evidence apparent at the time of disposition but not at all apparent
at the time of detention. 386 Obvious ill-foundedness of preliminary deten-
tion, as the Supreme Court recently indicated, may be found in particular in
cases where there was never probable cause for the charging. decision, where
the proceedings were legally impermissible (e.g., the statute of limitation
lapsed), or where one of the "grounds" for detention was lacking.38 7 The
compensation should cover material as well as "moral" loss, such as physical
and moral sufferings and humiliation.
388
The proceedings for compensation for "unfounded conviction" and
"obviously unfounded preliminary detention" are governed by special rules
of criminal procedure.
The provincial court has jurisdiction and decides after a hearing before
a panel composed of three professional judges. Participation of counsel for
the petitioner and a procurator is mandatory.
Decisions of a provincial court are reviewable by the Supreme Court
upon a complaint by either party.
Damages resulting from unlawful arrest or detention by the police as
well as other kinds of unlawful detention by state officers or agents are also
actionable against the treasury. Such actions, however, are governed by the
rules of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure.
6. Noncriminal Detention
Polish law allows for detention in a variety of situations unrelated to
criminal liability. Without trying to be exhaustive, we will focus briefly on
the two kinds of noncriminal detention which are of considerable practical
significance.
A great variety of noncriminal, petty offenses are within the jurisdiction
of nonjudicial agencies. The agencies, called Collegia for the Cases of Petty
Offenses, are theoretically composed of laymen and, in practice, function as
administrative organs. The procedure they apply is administrative in na-
ture.
38 9
Petty offenses are punishable by imprisonment of up to three months,
385. Decision of the Supreme Court, June 7, 1975 OSNIKiW No. 8, Item 114; Mazur, supra
note 348, at 775; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 313.
386. See Decision of the Supreme Court, June 7, 1975, supra note 385; Decision of the
Supreme Court, Jan. 7, 1977 OSNIKiW, No. 4-5, Item 47; Mazur, supra note 348, at 775. For a
contrary opinion, that a defendant who was ultimately acquitted is, as a matter of course, enti-
tled to a compensation for "obviously ill-founded detention," see Waszczynski, Odszkodowanie za
uesluszne skazanzie i aresztowanie, 1974 Palestra, No. 11, 103, 108.
387. Decision of the Supreme Court, Jan. 7, 1977 OSNIKiW, No. 4-5, Item 47.
388. Mazur, supra note 348, at 772; M. SIEWIERSKI, supra note 348, at 313; Waszczynski,
supra note 386, at 109.
389. The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses, supra note 69; S. WALTOS, supra note
108, at 302-303; Olszewski, Kontrola sadowa had orzecznictwem w sprawach o wykroczenia---de lege
ferenda, (1976) PANSTWO I PRAwo (No. 1-2; 191).
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limitation of freedom of up to three months, fines up to 5,000 zlotys, or cen-
sure, and some "additional penalties" such as suspension of driving privi-
leges.
3 9 0
The penalties of limitation of freedom or fine, in cases of their nonex-
actability, may be replaced by imprisonment; therefore, the law on petty
offenses provides for two kinds of imprisonment: imprisonment as a "princi-
pal punishment" and imprisonment as a "substitute punishment.
' 391
Decisions of a collegium of the trial level are reviewable by a collegium
of the higher order upon appeal by either party. Decisions imposing impris-
onment as a principal punishment or limitation of freedom may be protested
to a regional court. 392 The court hears the case de novo, applying a simpli-
fied procedure. 393 The court may increase the sentence imposed by the col-
legium. 394 The court's decision is not subject to any direct review by an
appellate court.3 95 Imprisonment imposed by a collegium in lieu of fine is
therefore beyond judicial control of any kind.39 6 Imprisonment of this kind
has been quite widely applied in the past. In 1971, for example, a total of
21,690 persons served sentences of imprisonment for petty offenses. That
included only 6,945 cases of imprisonment as a principal punishment and
14,745 cases of imprisonment as a substitute punishment. 39 7 Polish writers
have been almost unanimously critical of the law which vests extensive
power to imprison exclusively with administrative agencies and removes
their decisions from judicial review.
398
The second major kind of noncriminal detention is commitment of the
mentally ill (civil commitment). This highly complex and sensitive area has
not been dealt with by the Polish legislature. Until recently all draft legisla-
tion died before being implemented. At present, the power of detention and
compulsory treatment of the mentally ill still resides with the medical per-
sonnel of psychiatric institutions. 399 Draft legislation now under considera-
tion, however, would allow the physician to commit a patient involuntarily
but would require the need for commitment to be confirmed by the guardi-
anship court.
4 ° °
390. The Code of Procedure in Cases of Petty Offenses, supra note 69, at arts. 1, 18, 28.
391. Id. at arts. 23, 25.
392. Id. at art. 86.
393. See CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 455-461. For a further discussion, see S. WALTOS, supra
note 108, at 301-336.
394. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 460; S. WALTOS, supra note 108, at 334.
395. See CCP, upra note 67, at art. 461.
396. S. WALTOS, supra note 108, at 312, 325; J. SKUPINSKI, MODEL POLSKIEGA PRAWA 0
WYKROCZENIACH 332 (1974).
397. J. SKUPINSKI, supra note 396, at 333.
398. Olszewski, supra note 389, at 194; J. SKUPINSKI, supra note 396, at 333; S. WALTOS,
supra note 108, at 312.
399. Pomorski, Problenatyka leczeniaprzmusowego n a Ileprojeklu uslay o ochronie zdrowia pychic
nego z 1970, 1972 PANSTWO i PRAwo (No. 3) 46, 50.
400. Daszkiewicz, Dabrowski & Kubicki, Prawna regulaqa ochronv z6drowia piyehiengo, 1974
PANSTWO I PRAWO (No. 8-9) 70.
The director of the admitting facility is required to notify the Guardianship Court
within 48 hours of the patient's involuntary admission and the Court, in turn, is re-
quired to hear the matter without cost to the patient within 14 days of such notifica-
tion. Whether or not the patient is to be civilly committed is determined by a judge
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D. Compatibility of Polish law with Article 9 of the Covenant
In the present section we will limit our discussion to those features of
Polish law which either are clearly incompatible with article 9 of the Cove-
nant or whose compatibility with this article is at least open to challenge.
A general power of the police to arrest and to detain a suspected person
up to forty-eight hours without a warrant is of questionable validity.4° t As
noted above, the absence of any requirement that the police inform a sus-
pected person at the time of arrest of the reasons for his arrest is a clear
violation of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. These shortcomings of
the Polish law on the police power to arrest have become recently even more
conspicuous. Reportedly, the police have been abusing the broad powers
granted by law to harass political dissidents. A large number of persons po-
litically "suspect" have been recently arrested (some of these many times),
without grounds and without any explanations, and subsequently released
within forty-eight hours. Apparently, criminal charges against these people
have never been prosecuted.
402
There is a serious question as to whether the rights of the defendant
provided for by article 9, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, have been imple-
mented adequately by Polish municipal law.
First of all, serious doubts arise in regard to the right of the defendant to
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer "authorized by law to
exercise judicial power." Whether the rule of Polish law that the arrestee
must be produced before the procurator within forty-eight hours of his arrest
satisfies the requirement of "promptness" is an issue per se, but not the pri-
mary one. Of more essential concern is the issue whether the procurator
before whom an arrestee is produced has the qualities of a judicial officer.
Under Polish law, the procurator's responsibilities and powers certainly
reach beyond the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses. The
procurator is expected to be a guardian and an advocate of legality and as
such is supposed to be fair and objective. Some of.his functions resemble
those of an ombudsman in Scandinavian countries. The procuratorial of-
fices are structured as a separate, hierarchically organized system, independ-
ent from the agencies of state administration. The chief officer of the system,
the Procurator General, reports directly to the Council of the State.40 3 Nev-
ertheless, the primary and by far the most important institutional function of
the officers of the procuracy is investigation and prosecution of crimes. 40 4 It
is rather obvious that the role of the prosecutor is totally incompatible with
and two assessors (citizen-magistrates) after the patient and two expert witnesses, both
psychiatrists, have been heard.
Dabrowski, Major Issues in the Polish Mental Health Legislation Draft Proposal, 1 INT'L J. OF L. &
PsYcH. 125, 132 (1978).
401. See Study on Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest, supra note 214.
402. See letter signed by A. Steinsberg on behalf of the Committee for the Defense of Work-
ers to Amnesty International (June 7, 1978), reprinted in 1978 Kultura (Paris), No. 7-8; 237-38.
Numerous instances of abusive uses of police power to arrest have been reported in RAINA,
POLrrICAL OPPosrrIoN IN POLAND, (1954-1977) 361 (1978).
403. Law of April 14, 1967 on The Procuracy of the Polish People's Republic, J.L. 1967, No.
13, Item 55, arts. 1-5.
404. Id. at art. 31.
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the role of a judicial officer, for the simple reason that the prosecutor is insti-
tutionally interested in the outcome of the case. Polish law gives unequivo-




Secondly, Polish law does not afford procurators the kind of indepen-
dence enjoyed by judges. To the contrary, all officers of the procuracy are
members of a bureaucratic hierarchy and must carry out orders from their
superiors.40 6 The principle of hierarchical subordination has been strongly
emphasized in Polish literature as a fundamental organizational feature of





On the other hand, the purpose of article 9, paragraph 3 of the Cove-
nant seems to be clear. The power to decide whether to release or to detain
an arrestee should be vested in an impartial state officer, one neither inter-
ested in the outcome of the case nor dependent on prosecuting authorities;
the officer should have substantial job security, free from pressures "from
above." Serious doubts exist whether Polish procurators meet these stan-
dards.
As noted above,4° 8 the right of the detainee to be tried within "a reason-
able time" or released is a separate and independent right provided for by
article 9, paragraph 3. Compatibility of Polish law with this requirement of
the Covenant is not entirely clear. Certainly, the notion of "reasonable
time" is susceptible to many interpretations, and to a large extent its mean-
ing depends upon the facts of an individual case. Nevertheless, certain fea-
tures of Polish law, as well as certain practices of Polish courts, seem to be of
questionable validity.
The Code of Criminal Procedure seems very generous to the prosecu-
tion. A suspect may be detained, even by a prosecutor of low rank, for a
period of up to three months. Already this initial period of detention greatly
exceeds the maximum duration suggested by the Draft Principles. 40 9 But
the duration of the detention may be, and often is, even longer. The provin-
cial procuracy has the power to extend detention up to six months, and a
provincial court may extend it indefinitely if the interest of the investigation
so requires. In one case, the provincial court granted many extensions
amounting, cumulatively, to a period of two-and-a-half years. Moreover,
the Supreme Court did not find such a period of detention excessive per
se. 4 10 In addition, preliminary detention may be continued after the investi-
gation is closed and formal charges filed with a court, again for an indefinite
time and without any explicit decision to this effect.
Whether ex parte proceedings before a court, in which a prisoner may
challenge the lawfulness of his detention, 4 11 satisfies the standards of article
9, paragraph 4 remains an open question. Given the nature of the proceed-
405. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 30, § 5.
406. Law on the Procuracy of the Polish People's Republic, supra note 403, art. 5, § 1.
407. Smolenski, supra note 139, at 28.
408. See notes 232-46 supra and accompanying text.
409. See note 233 supra and accompanying text.
410. See notes 380-81 supra and accompanying text.
411. See note 378 supra and accompanying text.
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ings, especially its ex parte character (with only a procurator participating),
its secrecy, and its lack of opportunity for the prisoner or his counsel to be
heard, it is arguable that the standards of the Covenant have not been met.
The instances of imprisonment imposed by administrative agencies for
noncriminal offenses which are removed from judicial review represent a
clear violation of article 9, paragraph 4.412
B. Right to Appeal
1. Interpretation of Article 14, Paragraph 5 of the Covenant
Very little interpretive work has been done on the Covenant as a
whole.4 13 This is particularly true of article 14, paragraph 5 due, in part, to
its content 41 4 and to its legislative history. 415 Nevertheless, an interpretive
framework may be established by examining the history and the travaux
preparatoires.
Article 14, paragraph 5 of the Covenant reads: "Evegone convicted of a
crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher
tribunal according to law." Article 14, as originally submitted by the Commis-
sion on Human Rights, included no mention of the right to appeal.
4 16
The purpose of article 14, as expressed by the Third Committee of the
General Assembly which added paragraph 5, was to proclaim and guarantee
the fundamental right of everyone to be judged fairly by providing the mini-
mum code of criminal procedure which should be applied universally.
41 7
While proposing an amendment to article 14 to include paragraph 5, the
Israeli delegate felt that "there could be no justice in criminal law unless
everyone's right to appeal to a higher court for review of judgments were
[sic] recognized. Only a higher court could decide whether a trial had been
conducted in accordance with the principles formulated in article 14. ' '418
412. Olszewski, supra note 389, at 193.
413. See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
414. The right to appeal does not constitute as fundamental a human right as, for example,
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention covered by art. 9. Commentators have
not dealt with nor has there been any subsequent United Nations study on the subject matter.
There is no possibility of utilizing the European Convention as an interpretive tool since it does
not provide for the right to appeal in criminal cases. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLEcrED TExTS, art. 6 at 4 (7th ed. 1971).
The notion that the defendant's right to appeal his conviction and sentence is an essential
ingredient of due process originates in continental European legal ideology. Strong appellate
mechanisms have been characteristic of legal systems emphasizing the value of uniformity and
predictability, systems adhering to a centralized authority structure. In the common-law world,
in contrast, the appellate mechanism has traditionally been weak. Many decisions at the trial
level have remained immune from appellate review. For a further discussion, see Damaska,
Strttures of Authority and Comparative Crimiatl Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975).
415. See notes 416-34 infra and accompanying text.
416. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 Annexes (Agenda Item 34) 1, at 9, U.N. Doe. A/4299 (1959).
417. See 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 259, at 260, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.961 (1959); 14
U.N. GAOR, C.3 (963d mtg.) 267, at 269, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.963 (1959); 14 U.N. GAOR,
C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 272, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959); 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (965th
mtg.) 275, at 276, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.965 (1959).
418. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 259, at 260, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.961 (1959).
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The new paragraph, as amended,4 19 was adopted by the Committee,
420 and
became part of the final text of the Covenant.
4 2
1
The discussion preceding the adoption of the new paragraph is enlight-
ening. The original text of paragraph 5 used the term "right to appeal,
' 4 22
which raised doubts in some delegations 423 as to whether it meant merely a
review of the case by another court or whether new evidence had to be ad-
mitted.424 In changing the wording to the present text, the Israeli delegate
stated that his intention was to provide for some form of appeal, and because
different legal systems made different provisions for appeal, he did not want
to specify how the appeal should be shaped. 425 The Ceylonese subamend-
ment4 26 to the new paragraph added the phrase "according to law" at the
end of the proposed text so that due regard would be paid to the conditions
to which the right of appeal was generally made subject, to prevent
abuses.427 Throughout the discussions it was emphasized that the provision
was drafted in general terms to be applied by the states according to the
methods they considered appropriate. 428 Yet, delegates reiterated the fact
that article 14, paragraph 5 recognizes the essential principle that as a gen-
eral rule any person convicted of a crime has the right of appeal4 29 and
although this might conflict with national laws, the provision is needed pre-
cisely so that states should bring their legislation into line with it.4 30 Finally,
the exceptions covered by the phrase "according to law" may not encompass
those which would render the paragraph meaningless.
43 1
The positioning of the right to appeal in article 14 of the Covenant
leads to further general propositions about its construction. Article 14 as a
whole sets forth the right to a fair trial, an important element of which is the
right to appeal.4 32 Conversely, the guarantees provided for in article 14,
(such as the equality before the courts/tribunals, the right to an independ-
ent, competent and impartial court, and the right to defense) apply not only
to proceedings before the trial court, but also to appellate proceedings. Even
though the European Convention does not have a provision analogous to
paragraph 5, the European Court of Human Rights, in construing article 6
of the Convention, held that a state which does institute courts of appeal is
required to ensure that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy before these
419. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3. Annexes (Agenda Item 34) 1, at 2, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/L.795/Rev.
2 (1959).
420. Id. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.833.
421. I. at 15.
422. Id. at 1, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/L.795/Rev. 1.
423. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (962d mtg.) 263, at 265, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.962 (1959).
424. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 259, at 261, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.961 (1959).
425. Id.
426. See note 204 supra.
427. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 272, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959).
428. Id. at 273-74; 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 Annexes (Agenda Item 34) 1, at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/4299 (1959).
429. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 274, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959).
430. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (966th mtg.) 279, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.966 (1959).
431. Id. at 280.
432. Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Pohital Rghts and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rghts, 43 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 21, 33 (1969).
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courts the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 6.
4 3 3
It may be argued, therefore, that certain fundamental safeguards of a
review procedure by "a higher tribunal" are inferrable from the text of arti-
cle 14, in particular from paragraphs 1 through 3. All defendants should be
equal before the review tribunals, and they shall be entitled to "a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law." The right to an effective defense should extend to appellate
proceedings as well.
A more difficult issue is the scope of appellate review required by article
14, paragraph 5. From the legislative history of the provision (outlined
above) it follows that the draftsmen wanted to write a flexible formula; one
which would accomodate the variety of solutions offered by municipal laws.
One should keep in mind that the several systems providing for appellate
review in criminal cases offer a great variety of solutions to the questions of
the grounds for review, the scope of review, and the powers of the reviewing
court. It follows from the plain meaning of paragraph 5 that the municipal
legal systems have to provide for a review by a higher tribunal of both con-
viction and sentence on the appeal by the defendant. Therefore, by neces-
sary implication, any legal system which provides only for a review of the
convictions but not the sentence or, conversely, provides only for a review of
the sentence but not the conviction fails the test. That much, but only that
much, seems to be clear. Beyond that, many questions arise to which text of
paragraph 5 does not suggest any ready answers.
May the review of conviction be limited to "the points of law" to the
total exclusion of "the issues of fact"? May, for example, a municipal legal
system bar a review on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the
theory that this is a "factual issue"? Such an arrangement seems to be of
doubtful validity since it would leave the presumption of innocence, in-
cluded in article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant as one of the due process
requirements, without an effective remedy. While construing the meaning of
paragraph 5, one should keep in mind that its purpose is to establish some
safeguards so that criminal defendants are not wrongfully condemned to
years of suffering.
43 4
May the review tribunal reverse a judgment of acquittal on appeal by
the prosecution and convict the defendant without a further possibility of
review, or may it, under similar circumstances, reverse a judgment of convic-
tion and convict a defendant for a more serious crime? May the reviewing
tribunal increase the sentence on appeal by the prosecution without a fur-
ther possibility of review? May the reviewing tribunal make such decisions
on the ground of independent fact finding? While seeking answers to the
above questions one should proceed from the notion of "review by a higher
tribunal." The essence of review seems to be checking whether a court
which made a decision on the merits committed any legally relevant errors.
Therefore, the defendant, under paragraph 5, is entitled to have his guilt
and his sentence decided by one court and these decisions checked by an-
433. F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 84-85 (1975).
434. 14 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (964th mtg.) 271, at 274, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.964 (1959).
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other court. The court of the first level "finds facts" and applies substantive
law. It addresses the issues of liability and punishment. The reviewing court
approaches the case from another perspective-whether the decisions of the
lower court have been made lege ar/is. Under this analysis all three questions
raised above must be answered in the negative, since the questions imply
one-level decision-making on the merits without checking its correctness.
The negative answers seem to be particularly compelling when the higher
tribunal makes its own fact-finding.
May the right to have one's sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal be
limited to challenging its legality, or does it necessarily include the right to
appeal on the merits, i.e., to a review of the severity of the sentence as well as
its legality? Limiting appellate review of sentences to the question of mere
legality to the exclusion of the review of their severity is of suspicious valid-
ity. First, it seems to fly in the face of the plain meaning of paragraph 5.
"Review of the sentence" means primarily a review of its severity. This
meaning should prevail unless a different, special meaning is discernible.
Second, the thrust of article 14 in general and of paragraph 5 in particular is
to ensure the fair outcome of criminal proceedings. The exclusion of the
most essential part of the decision from appellate review seems unreasonable
and to a large extent thwarts the purpose of the provision.
Finally, may appellate review initiated by the defendant only (ie., with-
out a parallel appeal by the prosecution or a third party such as the victim)
lead to a change of the decision below in a way detrimental to the defend-
ant? In other words, is the prohibition of reformatio in pezus, a principle al-
most universally recognized by the civil law systems, implied by article 14,
paragraph 5? It is arguable that the very possibility of reformatio in peius has
such a chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal by the defend-
ant that it amounts to a denial of the right to appeal.
With the above tentative suggestions concerning the possible meaning
of article 14 paragraph 5 of the Covenant, the next topic is a review of Amer-
ican and Polish municipal laws.
2. American Law
Appellate review of criminal convictions is not a right guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States. 435 In the federal system, appellate
jurisdiction is statutory and Congress may withhold the privilege entirely in
criminal cases. Currently, a court of appeals will not review a criminal con-
viction unless the appellant can allege some error of law; to attain review by
the Supreme Court, the defendant must show that the error involved an
issue of grave or constitutional importance.
436
All American states provide constitutional or statutory provisions for
defendant-initiated appellate review of errors committed in criminal
435. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88
(1894).




cases. 4 3 7 However, the state may either grant or deny review in a criminal
case and, absent the presence of a federal constitutional right, the legislature
may deny review. 438 Some statutes provide for an absolute right of appeal
as a continuation of the original suit; others make issuance of a writ of error
discretionary and an independent action in the nature of a new original
suit.439 Functionally, the distinction between "discretionary" appeal and an
appeal "of right" has been eroded in modern practice.
44 °
Although Louisiana is the only jurisdiction in the United States that
seems to lack appellate review of conviction for some significant crimes,
44'
limitations on defendants' appeals exist in other jurisdictions. For example,
some states refuse appeal to a convicted defendant who is on probation.
442
Further, a guilty plea has traditionally precluded appellate review. 443 Re-
cently, however, there has been an effort to remove such obstacles, and now
only a few states statutorily preclude an appeal from a conviction based on a
guilty plea.
44 4
The general rule in the United States, that the reviewing court's func-
tion is limited only to the determination of questions of law is applicable in
criminal cases. 445 On appeal from a conviction, the issue for the appellate
court to review is whether the defendant was subjected to prejudicial er-
ror.446 Since relitigation of factual issues is not usually permitted on appel-
late review, 4 4 7 the present position of American appellate courts is that if the
evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, and if the jury was properly
instructed, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. 448 When reviewing
cases tried by a judge alone, appellate courts will ordinarily limit their re-
view to inferences and judgments made by the trial court. 449 American ap-
pellate courts must, however, deal with questions of fact when reviewing the
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a judgment.4 50 This is because an error of
437. See, e.g., State v. Stunkard, 28 S.D. 311, 133 N.W. 253 (1911).
438. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
439. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 94 Fla. 322, 113 So. 630 (1927).
440. D. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS; ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORMS
(1973).
441. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (approved draft) 17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA CRIMINAL
APPEALS STANDARDS].
Appeals from convictions of misdemeanors may be entertained by the state Supreme Court
only if the defendant is fined $500 or sentenced to more than six months in jail. LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC., Art. 312.1.
The Louisiana court of appeals has no jurisdiction over criminal appeals so it appears that
the conviction of a misdemeanent receiving a sentence of six months or less or a fine lower than
$500 is unreviewable. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441.
442. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441, at 29.
443. See, e.g., Lowe v. State, Ill Md. 1, 73 A. 637 (1909).
444. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS supra note 441, at 23.
445. See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 136 So. 2d 352 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
446. See, e.g., Legg v. Los Angeles County, Dep't of Charities, 175 Cal. App. 2d 637, 346
P.2d 472 (1959).
447. Bator, Finality in Cnmrinal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 441, 453-54 (1963).
448. D. MEADOR, supra note 440, at 89, 90.
449. D. KERLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 16 (1963).
See, e.g., Muller v. Nelson, Sherrod & Carter, 563 S.W.2d 697 (rex. Civ. App. 1978).
450. D. KERLEN, supra note 449, at 34.
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law is always committed when the great weight of evidence is against the
verdict. 45 ' Hence, state and federal appellate courts do re-determine the
merits of legal issues and thus help to satisfy the search for correctness which
no single court, unchecked, can provide.
452
The prevailing system of criminal appeals in America is based on the
premise that appellate review of a judgment of conviction is not required in
every case.453 Review is initiated by the defendant, and, although recently
there has been increasing support for a system of automatic review, this con-
cept has not been accepted. 454 Article 14, paragraph 5 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure sets forth the premise that appellate review of a criminal
conviction is a basic human right. The underlying spirit and rationale of the
provision4 55 would be enhanced if review were automatic, thus insuring all
defendants the protection of having their convictions reviewed. However, it
perhaps goes too far to say that automatic review is compelled by the con-
struction of article 14, paragraph 5.
The availability of appellate review of criminal convictions in all Amer-
ican jurisdictions is in accord with the mandate of the Covenant. Although
the scope of review is limited by the requirement that defendant must allege
error and by the limitation on review of the facts, the American system seems
to assure that an appellate court will have the opportunity to decide whether
the trial was conducted in accordance with the principles formulated in arti-
cle 14.456
Finally, a strict interpretation of what is required to constitute a review
of conviction would be unwarranted. The drafters raised issues of whether
an appeal after a guilty plea, or the taking of new evidence were necessary
and decided that the intent was not to specify how appeals should be made
but only that they are available.
457
A second guarantee in article 14 provides that anyone convicted of a
crime has the right to have his sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.
"[A]n irony of the American criminal justice system [is] that while every
jurisdiction allows a defendant to appeal a conviction on a wide variety of
grounds, a sentence which falls within the prescribed statutory range cannot
be appealed in the federal courts and in most states. ' ' 458 Traditionally, ap-
pellate courts in America have reviewed illegal sentences, those alleged to be
451. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 80 (1939).
Review of the facts would actually entail reviewing the credibility of the witnesses, ac-
cepting new testimony, calling new witnesses and, in its broadest sense, retrial of the case. None
of these things are reviewable under the present system when verdicts are set aside as contrary to
the weight of evidence. Id. at 82.
452. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441, at 23.
453. Id. at 19.
454. Id.
455. See note 467 supra and accompanying text.
456. See notes 418-19 supra and accompanying text.
457. U.N. GAOR, C.3 (961st mtg.) 261; U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.961, par.24 (1959).
458. Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences; Penology on the Judicial Doorstep 68 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 122 (1977). But see ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (approved draft) commentary
at 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS].
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outside the boundaries set by the Constitution. 459 Presently, an illegal sen-
tence is subject to review and correction through the normal appellate proc-




An appellant may also seek review of a sentence which, though legal, is
excessive.46 1 In the absence of a specific statutory grant of power, an appel-
late court generally will not reduce a sentence within the statutory limits
merely because in its view the sentence is excessive. 462 Although the imposi-
tion of a sentence is a critical stage in a criminal case, in most jurisdictions of
the United States this decision is not subject to appellate review.
463
Although recent surveys differ,4 6 4 the latest survey (1977) indicates that
some form of sentence review is available in at least twenty-three states.
4 65
Eighteen states base the power to review sentences on explicit statutory au-
thority, eight within the context of a general grant of appellate power, the
others in statutes addressing themselves elaborately and sometimes exclu-
sively to the subject of sentence review. 466 The five remaining states review
sentences on appeal through application of a general jurisdictional stat-
ute. 4 6 7 Some statutes limit reviewable sentences on the basis of their length
and type (more than two years; committment to the state prison), others on
the basis of the type of proceeding for determining guilt (defendant must
have pleaded guilty; sentence imposed by jury not reviewable) and some on
the basis of the general authority of the reviewing court. 468 If the states in
which sentence review is severely limited are not considered, it appears that
the remedy of sentence review obtains in only seventeen states, and in only
ten of those states is appellate review of sentences practiced as a real and on-
going remedy offering reasonable chances of success.
46 9
In the states which severely restrict or do not recognize sentence review
and in the federal courts, a sentence which falls within the range of punish-
ment provided by statute is final.4 70 Federal courts have no authority to
review sentences they regard as excessive but which are within statutory lim-
its;47I however, certain review techniques have been initiated by the circuit
courts of appeal and accepted by the Supreme Court. 472 Sentences are re-
459. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
460. ABA CRIMINAL APPEALS STANDARDS, supra note 441, at 23.
461. L. ORFIELD, supra note 451, at 101.
462. Id.
463. Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing, 33 LA. L. REV. 559, 560 (1973).
464. See Mueller, Penology on Appeal- Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND.
L. REV. 671 (1962); Comment, Criminal Sentencizg. Is the Judge's Sound Discretion Subject to Review?
1959 JUDICATURE 112 (1975); Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 221
(1972).
465. Labbe, supra note 458, at 123.
466. Id. at 123, 126.
467. Id. at 126.
468. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458 at 2. See also Smithburn, Sentenc-
ing in Indiana: Appellate Review of the Trial Court Discretion, 12 VAL. U.L.R. 219, 225 (1978).
469. Labbe, supra note 458, at 127.
470. Id. at 123.
471. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).




viewed for abuse of discretion, insufficient individualization of disposition,
adherence to fixed or mechanical sentencing policy, and failure to exercise
discretion.
4 73
The number of states which have developed an excessive sentence re-
view doctrine similar to the one implemented at the federal level is undeter-
mined. Observers have noted, however, that in the absence of power to
review a sentence, the appellate court will strain the law if it is convinced
that a penalty is grossly excessive. 4 74 In addition, appellate courts in many
jurisdictions have the power to pass on the manner in which a sentence is
imposed, even without a provision for review of the propriety of the sentence
itself.4 75
The general rule in American jurisdictions, limiting appellate review of
sentence to questions of legality while refraining from examining the severity
of the sentence, is of doubtful validity under article 14, paragraph 5. Be-
cause the intent of the Covenant is to assure that each stage of the dispostion
of a criminal case may be reviewed, review should not be limited to the
process by which the sentence was chosen. The merits of the sentence must
be open to examination. The provision mandates that the sentence be
checked, that this crucial decision not be left to one tribunal. This is espe-
cially important in jurisdictions, as are found in the United States, in which
the length of a sentence legally imposed for a given crime may vary from
months to decades.4 76 To limit the right of appellate review of sentences to
mere legality and to prohibit any appellate consideration of the severity of
the sentence is to render the guarantees contained in article 14, paragraph 5
meaningless.
4 77
To what extent may appeal of a conviction or sentence be detrimental
to a defendant in the United States? Traditionally, the general rule pre-
cluded the prosecution from appealing a judgment in favor of the defendant
in a criminal case. 478 Exceptions to this rule, based on statutes, pertained to
certain pretrial motions dismissing the case. No appeal by the state from a
judgment of not guilty was permitted. 479 Today, jurisdictions differ consid-
erably. Some bar appeal by the state in criminal cases while others take a
broad position on prosecutorial appeals.
4 a °
The prosecution can appeal after the jury finds the defendant not guilty
under some provisions, while this possibility is excluded under others.
4 1
473. Id. at 281.
474. Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards in Sentenang, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 257 (1952).
"[Tihere is probably more appellate review than appears on the surface where courts reverse on
what would otherwise be dismissed as harmless error because the record shows extreme severity
or prejudice in sentencing." Id. at 264.
475. Note, Appellate Review of Sentenchg Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
476. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458.
477. See note 434 supra and accompanying text.
478. United States v. Weissman, 266 U.S. 377 (1924).
479. In Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 344-45 (1954), the Court referred to "the deeply
rooted principle of criminal law that a verdict of guilty is appealable while a verdict of acquittal
is not."
480. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458, at 35; Note, Limited Right of
Appealfar the State, 14 Hous. L. REv. 735, 737 (1977).
481. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 335-41.
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Some states permit appeals in very narrow circumstances, such as when a
statute is held unconstitutional, but most states have broader authority for
prosecutorial appeals on pretrial orders.48 2 Only a handful of states allow
the prosecution to appeal a verdict favorable to the defendant on admission
of evidence, privilege, instructions to the jury or other trial questions; how-
ever, a substantial number of states permit such appeal from orders granting
defense motions to arrest judgment or for a new trial. 48 3 To avoid double
jeopardy, some states authorize prosecutorial appeals in broad circumstances
but provide that the defendant shall not be affected by the outcome of the
appeal .
4 84
The Criminal Appeals Act was amended by Congress in 1970 to extend
the power of a federal prosecutor to appeal in criminal cases to the limits
allowed by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.
48 5 As de-
fined by the Supreme Court, these powers include a prosecutorial appeal
from a termination in favor of the defendant when there has been a finding
of guilt which can be reinstated and appeal from terminations in favor of the
defendant that occured prior to impanelment of a jury or before the court
began to hear evidence in a bench trial. Appeal is barred by jury acquittals
and determinations of factual innocence by a trial judge.
48 6
In the United States, a defendant, after a successful appeal, may receive
a more severe sentence upon re-prosecution. Federal and state courts have
barred prior results in cases where constitutional questions are raised when a
heavier sentence is imposed after the initial conviction is upset on appeal.
48 7
The American Bar Association's standards provide that, in accordance with
the prohibition against reformatio in pezus, a fundamental precept of criminal
law in civil law countries, the original sentence should serve as a maximum
and the defendant should receive credit for any time served on the new sen-
tence.
488
The United States Supreme Court has not resolved this question. In
1969 the Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce that a criminal defendant who
had successfully appealed his original conviction could not receive a more
severe sentence on reconviction unless the increase was due to the defend-
ant's conduct subsequent to his original conviction. 48 9 Although there is no
absolute constitutional bar to an increased sentence on retrial, the Court
concluded that due process precluded penalizing a defendant for having suc-
cessfully attacked his original conviction.49 0 However, in 1972 in Cotten V.
Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant who had exer-
cised his absolute right to a trial in a superior court following conviction in a
482. 2 B. GEORGE, CRIMINAL PROSECUTOR'S SOURCEBOOK 1331 (1976).
483. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 264, at 350.
484. Id. at 38.
485. Luckey, Double Jeopardy Lznitations on Appeals by the Gvenment in Criminal Cases, 80 DICK.
L. REV. 525 (1976).
486. Id. at 546.
487. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS supra note 458, at 58.
488. Id. at 50-
489. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
490. Id. at 725, 726. See Note, Criminal Law-Increased Sentences on an Appeal B Right From
Infernor Courts, 51 N. CAR. L. REV. 882 (1973).
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lower court could receive a more severe sentence upon reconviction in a
court of general jurisdiction.4 9 '
The problem of a defendant receiving an increased sentence on appeal
is also present when he seeks review of his sentence. Among those states
which allow review of sentences, the original sentence can be increased on
appeal in eight states if the court finds that the original sentence was too
lenient. 492 Only one state, Alaska, permits the prosecutor to appeal to have
a sentence declared deficient. Two federal statutes allow increases of
sentences on appeal at the instance of the government. 493 One state allows a
sentence to be increased only upon the introduction of new evidence of ag-
gravation.
4 94
Several recent proposals concerning appellate review of sentences would
provide for such an increase. 495 The federal statute implementing appellate
review of sentences in the federal courts, which did not pass both houses,
contained such a provision as did a proposal by the Council of State Govern-
ments.496 Moreover, the proposed Act to reform federal criminal law re-
cently passed by the Senate, allows the government to appeal criminal cases
to obtain a more severe sentence.49 7 Since the government may appeal inde-
pendently of the defendant, his decision to appeal need not consider possible
government action.498 The Act precludes an increase of sentence if only the
defendant appeals.
499
However, it does enable the appellate court to impose a quota or lesser
sentence without remand, which means that the new sentence will not be
reviewed unless certoriari is granted.
5° °
The intent of article 14, paragraph 5 is undermined by the type of prac-
tices now in force which made a defendant's appeal detrimental to him. The
fundamental right to review truly exists only where it may be exercised with-
out fear that the prisoner's position will be worsened. The chilling effect of
reformatto i'n pezius makes much of the American practice incompatible with
the Covenant. In addition, it is basic to article 14, paragraph 5 that any
fundamental change in the disposition of the defendant must be subject to
review. Therefore, it is unacceptable for the reviewing court to increase the
sentence without remanding the case to a lower court from which the de-
fendant may appeal.
Finally, a brief note must be made of other remedies available to a de-
fendant in the United States which provide some of the protection sought in
491. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).




495. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 458, at 1-2.
496. Id.
497. S. 1437, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. § 3725 (1978).
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. The proposals to allow government appeals of sentences are controversial, and their
constitutionality is disputed. See Spencer, The Federal Cnminal Code Reform Act of 1977 and
Prosecutonal Appeal of Sentences. Justice of Double Jeopardy, 37 MD. L. REV. 739, 778 (1978).
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article 14 paragraph 5. Although direct appeal of conviction and sentence is
preferrable and is demanded by the Covenant, post-conviction remedies ex-
ist that may be invoked after the final appeal from conviction has been de-
cided or after the prescribed time for taking an appeal has passed.50 1 The
considerable number and variety of post-conviction remedies found in
American jurisdictions duplicate and overlap with one another. Therefore
there is uncertainty as to the scope and purpose of each. Combinations of
such remedies exist, however, or are thought to exist, in most jurisdictions.
50 2
The principle remedies are common law or statutory writs of habeas corpus,
common law or statutory writs of error, motion to set aside or correct a sen-
tence, motions to withdraw a plea of guilty, and petitions for leave to take an
appeal (or to reopen an appeal).50 3 However, the inadequacy of most state
systems of post conviction review has led to the need for federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction as a post-conviction remedy for state prisoners.
There are some serious limitations for the defendant in the post-convic-
tion remedies currently available. The present practice is to favor the assign-
ment of applications for post-conviction relief to the same judge who
presided at the original trial. 50 4 Present systems tend to create an elaborate
overlay of procedural rules in an attempt to dispose of post-conviction peti-
tions rather than treating them and their underlying merits. 50 5 Finally,
when a judgment has been set aside in a post-conviction procedure, renewal
of prosecution of the charges is not foreclosed and a new conviction may
follow. 50 6 In the United States, defendant may be given a harsher sentence
on re-conviction or re-sentence than was originally imposed, either by an
outright increase in the sentence or by denial of credit for time served under
the prior, invalid sentence. 50 7 Given these limitations, current post-convic-
tion remedies do not provide the type of review envisioned by article 14,
paragraph 5 of the Covenant.
3. Polish Law
Current Polish law50 8 provides for a review of the conviction or sen-
tence rendered by a trial court in all criminal cases. 50 9 As a matter of gen-
eral principle, the review mechanism has to be set in motion by one of the
parties. To have standing, the appellant must show that his rights or inter-
ests have been violated by the judgment from which appeal is taken. 510
501. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150 (1883).
502. Note, State Post-Conviction Appeals, 61 COLUM. L.R. 681 (1961).
503. Id.
504. A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 379-83 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CAMPBELL].
505. ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, s'upra note 458, at 33.
506. A. CAMPBELL, supra note 504, at 196.
507. Id.
508. Set CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 374, 387, 392, 397.
509. As to reviewability of decisions on petty offenses, see notes 389-98 supra and accompa-
nying text.
510. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 374. The following parties have the right to appeal
decisions of the trial court: a public prosecutor, a private prosecutor, a subsidiary prosecutor, a
civil plaintiff, and a defendant. Id. arts. 35-71. A public prosecutor may also file an appeal in
favor of the defendant; a subsidiary prosecutor may appeal only a decision on guilt but not on a
sentence. The right to appeal by a civil plaintiff is even more limited. Id. arts. 374, 395-96.
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In at least two exceptional and narrowly defined situations the appel-
late court may review on its own motion decisions by the trial court. 51 I The
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is exercised either by the courts of
intermediate leyel (provincial courts) or by the Supreme Court, depending
on the level at which a case was tried.
51 2
The scope of review has been broadly defined. The CCP 51 3 identifies as
reversible errors:
(1) a violation of substantive law;
(2) a violation of the rules of criminal procedure if it might have
had an impact on a decision;
51 4
(3) an error in fact-finding if it might have had an impact upon a
decision; and
(4) flagrant disproportionality of punishment or application or
failure to apply a "security measure or other measure. '"515
The reversible errors listed under (1) and (2) belong to a classical rep-
ertoire of appellate review since they are "legal" errors par excellence. A
category of reversible errors under (3) indicates that a reviewing tribunal
also checks the factual foundation of the decison by the trial court. This
category includes much more than review of convictions on the ground of
legally insufficient evidence. It obviously includes decisions contrary to the
weight of evidence as well as other decisions on guilt or on the sentence
based on factual errors.
Sentencing decisions are closely reviewed by appellate courts. Legality
of the decisions falls within the reviewing power under headings (1) and (2),
their factual foundations under heading (3), and their reasonableness in
terms of severity/leniency under heading (4). "Flagrant disproportionality"
of punishment should be assessed by standards set forth in the criminal
code. 5 16 A sentence may be "flagrantly disproportionate" either by being
too lenient or too severe.
An appellate brief should be filed by an appellant at a prescribed time
and in a prescribed manner with a trial court. The trial court subsequently
transfers the brief with the entire record of trial proceedings to the appellate
court; 5 17 the appellate court generally holds a hearing.5 18 Additonal evi-
dence at this stage may be admitted.5 19 After a summary of the case is
presented by one of the judges, parties may argue the case orally.
520
Representation by lawyers is generally allowed 52 1 and in certain cases is
even required. The appellate court may: affirm the judgment; reverse it and
511. Id. at arts. 383-84.
512. Id. at arts. 17-18.
513. Id. at arts. 387-88.
514. A violation of a procedural rule entails reversal only if such a violation "might have
had an impact upon a decision" however, the most serious violations listed in CCP., art. 388
merit a reversal regardless of the consequences.
515. As to "preventive measures" see CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 99-104.
516. M. LIPCZYNSKA, POLSKI PROCES KARNY 330 (1975).
517. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 377.
518. Id. at art. 399.
519. Id. at art. 402.
520. Id. at art. 403.
521. Id. at art. 407.
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remand the case for a new trial; or change the judgment, ze., vacate the
judgment below and decide the case on the merits. The latter type of ruling
by the appellate court deserves some elaboration. It may be rendered only
when evidence gathered is sufficient to decide the case on the merits. 522 A
decision changing judgment of the trial court to the detriment of the defend-
ant may issue only under the condition that an appeal to his detriment was
filed.
5 2 3
The appellate court may decide the case on the merits based on its own
fact findings, which may be, of course, radically different from facts found by
the trial court. A new, independent finding of fact by the appellate court
may be made either on the basis of the evidence produced before the trial
court, the evidence admitted at the appellate level, or both. 524 A decision on
the merits may also issue without any independent fact-finding by the review
tribunal. That is, the appellate court may agree with the findings made
below, but give them a different legal assessment.
Appellate decision making on the merits contains a potential for radical
changes to the defendant's harm. An appellate court of the intermediate
level may even convict a defendant who was acquitted by a trial court. Any
appellate court may convict the defendant of a more grievous crime than the
one the defendant was convicted of by the trial court and may also increase
the sentence imposed by the court below. 525 Such rulings are not subject to
a further review under the CCP.5 26 As already mentioned, the appellate
court may change the judgment below to the detriment of the defendant
only if an appeal was filed "to his detriment." Accordingly, upon retrial, an
originally imposed sentence may not be increased unless a previous decision
was appealed "to the detriment" of the defendant. 527 The foregoing safe-
guards do not apply to a mere reclassificaton of an offense under a more
severe statute. Moreover, they do not apply to the application of "security
measures" such as confinement in a mental hospital ("criminal commit-
ment").528 Therefore, the defendant, by exercising his right to appeal, may
bring upon himself a substantial loss of liberty or reputation.
The strongest doubts about the fairness of the Polish appellate review
system arise with regard to the broad powers given appellate courts to decide
on the merits to the detriment of the defendant. In such a situation, the
appellate court assumes the role of the trial court, especially when it substi-
tutes its own findings of fact for the ones made at the trial level. Since these
decisions are final, the defendant is in effect deprived of the right to have his
conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. 529 The.prohibition
522. Id. at art. 386.
523. Id. at art. 383.
524. Id. at arts. 386, 402. For a criticism of the prevailing rules see A. KAFrAL, SYSTEM
SRODKOW ODWOLAWACZYCH W POLSKIM PROCESIE KARNYM 145 (1972).
525. See CCP, supra note 67, at art. 383.
526. A mechanism of discretionary review of final decisions may be set in motion only by
the three top legal offices. CCP, supra note 67, at arts. 462-73. As to a possibility of reopening of
criminal cases on the ground of newly discovered evidence, see arts. 474-83.
527. Id. at arts. 383-408.
528. Mazur, supra note 348, at 548.
529. A. KAF-rAL, supra note 524, at 146.
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of reformatio inpeius, arguably implied by article 14, paragraph 5 of the Cove-
nant, has been implemented by the Polish CCP only partially. That the
defendant may bring upon himself a substantial loss of liberty or reputation
by exercising his right to appeal is undeniable. 530 Finally, the absence of the
right to appeal in cases of petty administrative offenses is not beyond re-
proach. One can argue that article 14, paragraph 5 does not apply to these
offenses, since under Polish law they are not classified as "crimes." The ar-
gument is not compelling. Generally, in the area of human rights, technical
classification offered by municipal law rarely, if ever, should be dispositive.
Whether the particular offenses are "crimes" for the purposes of article 14,
paragraph 5, should be decided on the basis of the severity of sanctions and
the stigma attached to them. Since many of them carry the potential for loss
of liberty and at least some involve substantial stigmatization, 53' the right to
appeal is strongly suggested.
530. Id. at 66-69.
531. For a critical assessment of the lack of appellate review, see S. WOLTOS, supra note 108,
at 326-35.
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ENCOURAGING CONSERVATION OF NATURAL GAS
THROUGH THE PRICE MECHANISM
STUART I. SILVERMAN*
I.
As the nation continues to grapple with its seemingly intractable energy
problems, the natural gas industry is certain to play a significant role in
meeting the country's energy needs. Natural gas is a premium resource due
to its clean burning characteristics and low cost relative to the market price
of substitute fuels. It is, however, an irreplaceable resource and its supply is
dwindling. A rational energy policy must take account of the wasting nature
of the country's natural gas reserves by encouraging more efficient uses of
remaining supplies.
Conservation has received increased attention of late as a means of ef-
fectuating a balance of supply and demand in energy markets. Numerous
proposals have been enacted by state legislatures and the Congress providing
for special tax incentives, mandatory building codes, and thermostat controls
to encourage more thoughtful uses of all energy forms. While the effective-
ness of these measures is not to be minimized, the most promising means of
achieving more optimum natural gas utilization is through its market price.
Obviously, reliance upon the price mechanism depends to a large extent
upon the degree to which the demand for natural gas is price responsive.
Although there may be need for more analysis of demand elasticity' for vari-
ous specific end uses, there is little doubt that the price elasticity of demand
for natural gas is significant for residential, commercial, and industrial con-
sumer categories. 2 Given the degree of price elasticity for natural gas, more
optimum allocations are possible if rates charged by pipelines and local dis-
tributors accurately reflect the true value of gas service to consumers.
* B.S., 1972, Drexel University; J.D., 1975, Temple University School of Law. Member,
Pennsylvania and District of Columbia Bars. Member, American Bar Association: Section of
Natural Resources Law; Natural Gas, Overseas Mineral Resources, and Electric Power Com-
mittees.
The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, as
professorial lecturer in Energy Law during the 1978 Winter Term at George Washington Law
Center, for his advice and assistance in the preparation of this article. Judge Cudahy's nomina-
tion to the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, was confirmed by the United States
Senate on September 25, 1979.
1. Elasticity of demand is a measure of the responsiveness or sensitivity in quantity of
goods or services demanded or consumed to changes in price. Elasticity is the percentage
change in quantity demanded caused by a one percent change in price or the percentage
change in quantity demanded over the percentage change in price. See E. BERLIN, C. CICHET-
TI, & W. GILLEN, PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 117 (1974).
2. Although difficult to precisely measure, it has been estimated that the long run elastic-
ity of demand for residential/commercial and industrial users is -.721 and -.392, respectively.
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, 1976 NATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK C-7, C-10 (1976).
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The concept of functional pricing in the natural gas industry is not an
outgrowth of the nation's current energy ills. Thirty-six years ago, Justice
Jackson, in his dissent in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. ,3 advocated reliance
upon the price mechanism as a means of ensuring more socially desirable
end uses of natural gas. A majority of the Supreme Court, however, viewed
the ratemaking powers of the Federal Power Commission4 under sections 4
and 5 of the Natural Gas Act as more circumscribed, that is, strictly limited
to traditional concerns of meeting gas utility revenue requirements, includ-
ing return on investment, at just and reasonable rates. 5
Governed by these conventional approaches to natural gas ratemaking,
federal regulators of interstate pipelines have favored accounting methods
which, in recent years, have failed to afford natural gas consumers accurate
pricing signals by which to gauge their incremental purchases. Likewise,
practices adopted by state utility commissions vested with ratemaking au-
thority over natural gas distributors have had similar unfavorable results.
Major reforms of federal and state ratemaking practices are needed before
more efficient end uses of natural gas by consumers can be realized.
II.
Ensuring that gas transmission and distribution rates are sufficient to
satisfy utility revenue requirements necessarily involves the identification of
the various costs incurred as an incidence of serving consumers. Once fixed
and variable costs of the pipeline or distribution company are determined,
these costs are apportioned among different customer classes, and rates are
set at levels guaranteeing recovery of utility revenue requirements including
a reasonable rate of return to investors.
The opportunity for utility regulators to influence conservation of natu-
ral gas exists at this juncture of the ratemaking process. Fundamental eco-
nomic theory suggests that in an economy of finite resources, most optimum
allocations of these resources occur when market prices reflect marginal
costs.
6 Simply stated, marginal cost is the cost of providing one more unit of
3. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
4. In August 1977, the Federal Power Commission's authority to regulate natural gas
rates was transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under § 402 of the Depart-
ment of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a) (Supp. 11 1978). Throughout the re-
maining portion of this article, the Federal Power Commission and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission will be referred to as the "Commission."
5. The Court in Hope specifically held that the Commission was without statutory author-
ity to discourage certain end uses of natural gas in fulfilling its ratemaking responsibilities under
4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, d (1976). 320 U.S at 616.
The Commission's ratemaking authority under §§ 4 and 5 of NGA extends to any "natural
gas company," specifically defined in § 2(6) of NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1976), as an individ-
ual or corporation "engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the
sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale." The scope of this article as it relates to
federal regulation of natural gas rates concerns the Commission's exercise of its statutory au-
thority over natural gas rates charged by interstate pipelines. However, as a result of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947) and Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), the Commission's ratemaking powers
under §§ 4 and 5 of NGA are considerably broader, extending to wellhead prices charged by
natural gas producers engaged in the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale.
6. See I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, 65 (1970).
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a good or service.
7
Identifying these individual marginal costs is an essential first step in
the application of marginal costing theory to the establishment of natural
gas rates. The most significant marginal cost of providing natural gas service
under current market supply conditions is the cost of natural gas, otherwise
known as energy costs, to pipelines and local distribution companies. 8 Once
marginal energy costs are accurately measured, their allocation to end users
is dependent upon the rate tariff or design utilized for particular customer
classes of a gas utility. The rate tariff most commonly suggested by propo-
nents of marginal costing is the inverted rate structure which imposes higher
per unit rates for gas service as the level of gas usage increases toward the last
consumption block of the rate design. The per unit price at the outer block
of an inverted rate tariff represents the actual marginal cost of natural gas at
that level of consumption. 9 Excess utility revenues, generated as a result of
setting gas rates at marginal costs while utility revenue requirements are
based upon average costs, may best be avoided by downward adjustments of
gas rates in the initial consumption blocks of the inverted rate tariff.'o
Setting the price of natural gas service equal to the marginal cost of
providing such service for various customer classes would ensure greater eco-
nomic efficiencies and conservation by confronting consumers with the true
costs of additional consumption. Cognizant of these costs, consumers would
be better able to judge whether to forego further purchases of natural gas
either for substitute fuels, or for reliance upon energy saving measures such
as cogeneration, insulation, or improvements in boiler combustion efficien-
cies.
Acceptance of marginal costing principles in the natural gas industry
has thus far been resisted by federal and most state regulatory authorities."
7. Id
8. The inclusion of capital expenditures, as a marginal cost of providing gas service, for
increased utility plant capacity to service either the demands of new gas customers or higher
peak demands by existing end users seems unwarranted given the unlikely incurrence of such
costs in the future. Notwithstanding the current surplus of gas in the interstate market, interme-
diate and long term supply forecasts indicate a shortage of natural gas and underutilization of
most gas utility systems.
The costs of natural gas are also commonly referred to as "commodity costs" whereas ex-
penditures for plant expansion are often known as "demand costs."
9. This method of apportioning the marginal cost of natural gas has often been referred
to as "marginal cost pricing" whereby the cost of an infinitesimally small additional unit of
production is imposed only at the last consumption block of the inverted rate tariff.
The term "marginal cost pricing" and "incremental cost pricing" are often incorrectly used
synonymously. The latter term properly refers to an alternative marginal costing method in
which the average cost of an additional large, finite unit of production is imposed in toto on a
particular customer class. See text accompanying notes 17-27 in a.
These definitional distinctions are noted only for purposes of clarification. The thrust of
this article is to focus attention on the need to adopt marginal costing principles in the establish-
ment of natural gas rates rather than an endorsement of a particular rate design or method of
allocating the marginal cost of natural gas service.
10. Proposed in varying contexts and deserving of further consideration, taxation of excess
profits and consumer rebates are two alternative means of contending with excess utility reve-
nues resulting from the adoption of marginal cost concepts in the establishment of natural gas
rates.
11. Wisconsin and California are two of the few states which have, in the past few years,
begun to incorporate marginal cost concepts in the structuring of natural gas rate tariffs. See,
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However, its adoption is long overdue. Largely as a result of changing cost
relationships, the accounting methods most favored by regulators for arriv-
ing at the value of the energy and capacity cost components of gas rates have
grossly distorted the market price of natural gas service. Traditionally, the
wellhead costs of vintaged, older gas have been averaged or rolled in with
the costs of more expensive, newly discovered reserves and imported supple-
mental gas supplies. Similarly, expenditures for increased plant capacity of
pipeline or distribution companies to meet peak demands have been aver-
aged with historical book values of the utility's rate base. Under prevailing
economic conditions, where marginal costs far exceed average costs, these
regulatory practices have tended to understate the true economic value of
natural gas as delivered to the customer.
In conjunction with these cost accounting deficiencies, rate designs most
commonly used by gas transmission and distribution companies have gener-
ally failed to properly allocate the fixed costs of providing necessary peak
demand capacity to those end users most responsible for the peak demands.
The declining block rate design, prevalent in gas sales by local distributors to
residential and small commercial users, allocates a major portion of the dis-
tributor's fixed capacity costs in the initial consumption blocks of the rate
tariff. As the volume of gas consumption increases toward the tail blocks,
the per unit charge for gas consumed typically decreases, ultimately repre-
senting only energy costs incurred. ' 2 Additionally, following its adoption of
the Seaboard formula' 3 for apportioning fixed pipeline capacity costs, the
Commission has consistently assigned a portion of fixed capacity costs to the
commodity component of the demand-commodity rate design which governs
gas sales by interstate pipelines to local distributors.' 4 Allocating the fixed
costs in this manner has had the effect of shifting away from peak service
e.g., In re Application of Southern California Gas Co., Decision No. 90822 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Sept. 12, 1979); Action on Motion of the Commission to Determine Revenue Require-
ment and Design Gas Rates for Wisconsin Southern Gas Co., Case No. 6710-GR-5 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, Dec. 11, 1979); Application of Superior Water, Light & Power Co., Case No.
5820-UR-4 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Sept. 28, 1979); Application of Wisconsin Fuel & Light
Co., Case No. 6640-GR-4 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug. 23, 1979); Application of Wisconsin
Power & Light Co., Case No. 6680-GR-3 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Oct. 26, 1978). Generally,
however, the utility commissions in both states have favored defining the marginal cost of gas
equal to the equivalent price of alternative fuel rather than the accurately measured true cost of
additional gas.
12. The predominance of capacity costs in the initial consumption blocks has produced
discount rates in the tail end of the declining block rate form, thereby encouraging more gas
usage and, ultimately, expansions to the utility's physical plant. While apportioning fixed ca-
pacity costs in this manner may have accurately reflected resulting economies of scale during a
time when the marginal costs of providing additional plant capacity were less than average
costs, it is arguable that such economies have, for the most part, been greatly diminished if not
exhausted. However, the problem of allocating future expenditures for increased plant capacity
is purely academic and no longer of great concern given foreseeable gas supply conditions. See
note 8 supra.
13. Re Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 94 Pub. U. Rep. (n.s.) 235 (FPC 1952).
14. The rate tariff which governs gas sales by interstate pipelines to local distributors im-
poses a charge based upon demand and commodity components of a two part rate design. The
demand charge primarily represents the fixed costs associated with providing the necessary util-
ity plant capacity to meet peak demands in accordance with contractual entitlements. The
commodity charge of the rate design embodies the variable costs, principally energy costs, in-
curred during a discrete billing period.
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users the cost responsibility of maintaining sufficient pipeline capacity to
serve their peak demands. The Seaboard formula of assigning 50% of the
fixed capacity costs to the demand component and 50% of such costs to the
commodity component has generally predominated. Federal regulators
have occasionally tilted the Seaboard formula by assigning a greater share of
pipeline fixed costs to the demand component; however, this practice has
been motivated more from a desire to influence improvements in pipeline
load factors, to encourage construction of storage and peak-shaving facilities,
or to ensure the competitive standing of natural gas in relation to other fuels
rather than from a commitment to properly assign fixed capacity costs to
those users who demand service at the system peak.'
5
As a consequence of these ratemaking practices by both federal and
state regulatory commissions, natural gas consumers have been given inaccu-
rate pricing signals by which to judge their incremental purchases, thereby
resulting in costly plant expansions and less than optimum allocations of
natural gas supplies. The regulatory induced misallocations of the country's
natural gas reserves has contributed substantially to the gas shortages exper-
ienced in the past decade. The Commission's response to these natural gas
shortfalls has resulted in further regulation of market forces by the imposi-
tion of curtailment plans purportedly designed to allocate available gas sup-
plies of jurisdictional pipeline companies according to predetermined
priority end use categories. While these curtailment plans represent an hon-
est effort at managing an otherwise complex energy shortage problem, sub-
stitution of an administratively imposed curtailment program for the market
ordering potential of the price mechanism necessarily ensures other than
most optimum uses of scarce natural gas supplies.'
6
III.
On two separate occasions, the Commission has attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to depart from the conventional practice of rolling in the costs of addi-
15. E.g., Fuels Research Council, Inc., 34 F.P.C. 973 (1965), af'dsub nom., Fuels Research
Council, Inc. v. FPC, 374 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1967); United Fuel Gas Co., 31 F.P.C. 1342 (1964);
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 28 F.P.C. 731 (1962).
16. The remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978) surfaces a major shortcoming
in the natural gas curtailment program. The court noted that prior to the Commission's issu-
ance of an order prescribing a permanent curtailment plan for Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corporation (Transco), it had not made the requisite findings as to the actual impact Transco's
curtailment plan would have on ultimate consumers. As with many existing curtailment plans
of other jurisdictional pipelines, the Transco plan was based upon stale end use consumer
profiles. In view of this fact, the Court expressed skepticism that the Transco plan allocated
natural gas on a basis which reasonably ensured protection of high priority users.
Natural gas shortages in the early 1970s led the Commission to consider an alternate rate
tariff technique in a proposed rulemaking. 40 Fed. Reg. 8,571 (1975). Terming the demand-
commodity rate tariff ineffective in discouraging industrial consumption, otherwise viewed as an
inferior end use, the Commission proposed end use rate schedules designed to impose the higher
price of newer gas on industrial users. By removing economic incentives for continued gas
purchases in lieu of higher priced substitute fuels, the Commission contemplated a decline in
gas usage by industrial concerns and conservation of this resource for higher priority residential
and commercial end use categories. Due to overwhelming opposition, the concept of separate
rate schedules for various categories of use as proposed by the Commission was short-lived.
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tional gas supplies by pricing imports of Algerian liquified natural gas
(LNG) on an incremental cost pricing basis.1 7 In both rate cases, incremen-
tal pricing was initially thought to be the appropriate means of apportioning
the cost of the LNG imports to avoid creating false markets for the supple-
mental gas supply. Averaging, or rolling in the price of the LNG would
have effectively disguised the true cost of what was considered expensive gas
supplements. However, subsequent conditions in the natural gas market and
an apparent reluctance to renounce rolled-in pricing led to a return, in both
cases, to the longstanding practice of averaging gas costs.
On June 28, 1972, the Commission issued Opinion No. 622 in Re Colum-
bia LNG Corp. 18 granting applications filed by three jurisdictional pipeline
companies to import for sale in interstate commerce approximately
1,000,000 Mcf per day of Algerian LNG to service the pipeline applicants'
existing low priority industrial customers. 19 The Commission conditioned
its approval of the LNG project by requiring that the imported gas be sold
on a curtailable basis under separate incrementally priced rate schedules at
both the pipeline and distributor levels.
Considerable opposition to Opinion No. 622 ensued which threatened
the financial viability of the Algerian gas import project. Distributor cus-
tomers of the three jurisdictional pipelines asserted that the Commission ex-
ceeded its statutory authority by requiring that the imported LNG be sold at
the burner tip under separate incrementally priced rate schedules. Addition-
ally, low priority industrial customers and distributors who served a high
proportion of such customers contended Opinion No. 622 was inequitable;
under the Commission's order, low priority users were to absorb the higher
incremental cost of the imported supplemental gas supplies yet faced the
prospect of curtailment under pipeline curtailment plans during periods of
gas shortages. Absent a willingness on the part of low priority industrial
customers and distributors to enter into long term contracts for the LNG,
lenders were reluctant to commit financial resources to fund the LNG pro-
ject.
To ensure financial backing for what was considered badly needed sup-
plemental gas, the Commission, following rehearing, issued Opinion No.
622-A 20 in which it modified its previous order. The Commission declared
the Algerian LNG subject to contract on a firm basis and ineligible for cur-
tailment. While the Commission declined to concede lack of jurisdiction to
require incremental pricing at the burner tip, it recognized the regulatory
obstacles in administering such a far reaching pricing scheme. It therefore
17. See note 9 supra.
18. 95 Pub. U. Rep.3d 145 (FPC 1972), rev'd in part, 96 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d 389 (FPC 1972),
rev'd, UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,894 (FPC 1977).
19. The approved initial per unit price of the imported LNG was approximately 40%
greater than the pipeline applicants' averaged per unit cost of their respective gas system sup-
plies. This estimate is exclusive of construction costs for required receiving terminals and pipe-
line extensions which were properly included as capital expenditures by the Commission in the
approved price of the LNG.
20. Re Columbia LNG Corp., 96 Pub. U. Rep.3d 389 (FPC 1972), rev'd, UTIL. L. REP.
(CCH) 11,894 (FPC 1977).
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imposed incremental pricing for the imported LNG solely at the pipeline
level.
Notwithstanding the modifications to Opinion No. 622, the Commis-
sion's departure from the traditional cost allocation method of rolled-in pric-
ing led to judicial review by the Fifth Circuit in Columbia LNG Corp. V. FPC. 21
Noting that the Commission's substitution of incremental for rolled-in pric-
ing was unsupported by substantial evidence, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings that portion of Opinion No. 622-A per-
taining to pipeline pricing of the LNG. Ultimately, the Commission reem-
braced rolled-in pricing coupled with pipeline curtailment as the means of
allocating the costs of the Algerian LNG imports. Following its reconsidera-
tion in light of the Fifth Circuit remand, on January 21, 1977, the Commis-
sion issued Opinion No. 78622 in which it cited two developments in the
natural gas market influencing its decision to withdraw its earlier endorse-
ment for incremental pricing. At the time of Opinion No. 786, the approved
per unit price of the Algerian LNG was roughly equivalent to the existing
national rate for new domestic gas delivered to the interstate market. Conse-
quently, the Commission no longer viewed the Algerian LNG as an exotic,
expensive supplemental gas supply. Moreover, domestic supplies of natural
gas had appreciably deteriorated since Opinion No. 622 was issued in 1972
to an extent which made it likely that the Algerian LNG, at one time
earmarked exclusively for low priority industrial users, would substantially
contribute to meeting the basic gas needs of high priority residential and
small commercial users. The Commission believed rolling in the price of the
LNG would ensure that those high priority end users benefiting from the
supplemental supply also bore the attendant costs.
23
Three months following its repudiation of incremental cost pricing in
Columbia LNG Corp., the Commission returned to this method of cost alloca-
tion in Trunkhe LNG Co. 24 by granting an application in Opinion No. 796,
issued April 29, 1977, for the importation and subsequent sale in interstate
commerce of approximately 168,000,000 Mcf per year of Algerian LNG.
Like the gas supply forecasts in Columbia LNG Corp., indications were that the
supplemental gas supplies in this second LNG import case were to service
the basic requirments of the pipeline applicant's high priority residential and
small commercial customers. The Commission distinguished its earlier deci-
sion in Columbia LNG Corp. in which it ultimately rejected incremental pric-
ing by stressing the wide price differential in Trunk/he LNG Co. between the
imported LNG and the national rate for new domestic gas.2 5 Given the
21. 491 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1974).
22. Columbia LNG Corp., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 1 11,894 (FPC 1977).
23. Although in January 1977, the price of Algerian LNG was comparable with the na-
tional rate for new domestic gas, the Commission's decision to roll in the cost of the LNG
actually resulted in an averaging of the price of the imported gas supplement with the infra
marginal costs of older, less expensive domestic gas, thereby concealing from the end user the
true cost of the imported gas supplement.
24. UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 1 11,942, rev'dinTpart, UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) § 11,970 (FPC 1977).
25. In 1980, the year in which importation of the Algerian LNG would commence, the
national rate for new domestic gas was estimated at approximately $1.60 per Mcf, compared
with an estimated cost of $3.37 per Mcf for the regasified LNG, delivered to the pipeline appli-
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substantial cost difference, the Commission held that incremental pricing of
the Algerian LNG would confirm whether or not the supplemental gas pro-
ject was economically justifiable. The Commission stated that "[u]se of the
incremental method discourages the inefficient use of the gas because the
LNG will be subject to the market test of whether its users value the LNG
enough to pay the true cost of supplying them with this expensive gas."
'2 6
The requirement that the LNG be incrementally priced was imposed solely
for pipeline sales of the imported gas to distributors. The Commission, how-
ever, explicitly encouraged state utility commissions to adopt incremental
pricing of the LNG for sales by distributors to ultimate end users so that the
full weight of market forces could properly determine the economic sound-
ness of the Algerian import venture.
An apparent lack of sufficient demand for the Algerian LNG under sep-
arate incrementally priced rate schedules threatened financial support for
the supplemental gas project. The Commission noted gas supply projections
which indicated the LNG project, if successful, would be a major source of
needed gas supply in the mid- 1980s for residential, commercial, and essential
industrial end uses of the pipeline applicant's system. Unwilling to allow
market forces to determine the fate of the Algerian LNG project, the Com-
mission, in Opinion No. 796-A2 7 reversed its previous decision and ordered
the LNG priced on a rolled-in basis, thereby guaranteeing the financial suc-
cess and viability of the venture.
IV.
Reversal of existing maladjustments in the allocation of natural gas may
best be accomplished by remedial legislation at the national level in the con-
text of a comprehensive national energy policy.28 The Ninety-fifth Congress
did enact legislation which will have a direct bearing on natural gas pricing.
Under Title II of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA),29 interstate
pipelines and their local distributors are required to pass through to certain
industrial facilities, in the form of a surcharge, most of the costs of acquiring
natural gas above a specified pricing level 30 until the cost to these end users
equals the Btu equivalent price of alternative fuel.3 ' The conference report
cant's transportation system. The approximate cost of the regasified LNG includes capital ex-
penditures for required receiving terminal, regasification plant, storage, and pipeline extensions.
These expenditures were properly included by the Commission in the approved initial per unit
price of the imported LNG.
26. 12 F.P.S. 5-33, 5-54 (FPC 1977).
27. Trunkline LNG Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,970 (FPC 1977).
28. Consideration by federal lawmakers of legislative measures for more effective gas pric-
ing techniques appears warranted given the national scope of the problem and the serious ques-
tions regarding limitations on the Commission's current authority to influence more efficacious
gas uses pursuant to its ratemaking powers under the Natural Gas Act. See note 5 supra.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3341-3348 (Supp. H 1978).
30. The specified pricing level for most natural gas categories subject to the pass through
provisions of Title II is known as the incremental pricing threshold, established under Section
203 of NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3343 (Supp. H 1978), at S1.48 per MMBtu as of March, 1978; for
succeeding nionths, the threshold escalates by application of an inflation adjustment factor as
defined by the Act. The pricing level for remaining natural gas categories subject to Title II is
set by statutory formula under NGPA.
31. Pursuant to § 201 of NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3341 (Supp. 11 1978), the Commission has
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indicates that once the cost of natural gas to affected industrial facilities
reaches this equivalent price, interstate pipelines and affiliated distributors
may allocate remaining energy costs by the traditional means of averaging
or rolling in the price of additional gas supplies. 32 The conferees explicitly
admonish state regulatory commissions against mitigating incremental
surcharges passed through to industrial facilities by adjustments in basic cost
of service charges or other components comprising a particular industrial
rate tariff.
33
The price mechanism under Title II is certain to reverse the traditional
practice at both the federal and state level of pricing natural gas sales to
industrial consumers well below the market price of alternative fuels. The
obvious purpose of NGPA's incremental pricing scheme is to protect high
priority residential and commercial customers from initial increases in well-
head rates mandated by Title I of NGPA. The Congress intended low prior-
ity industrial users to absorb as much of these wellhead price increases as
possible without precipitating loss of industrial load and concomitant in-
creases in gas prices for high priority residential and commercial users.
The full import of Title II is not strictly limited to impacts on gas rates
at the burner tip for certain end use categories. Title II must also be viewed
in conjunction with substantial changes in federal regulation of wellhead
prices imposed by Title I of NGPA. One of the major issues which domi-
nated congressional debate regarding natural gas policy concerned an ap-
propriate substitute for the much criticized dual market system of interstate
and intrastate gas pricing. 34 The House bill3 5 extended federal control of
wellhead prices to the intrastate market while the Senate bill 36 provided for
gradual decontrol of wellhead rates of new gas in the interstate market.
Title I of NGPA reconciles these two fundamentally divergent ap-
proaches. For the first time in the history of federal regulation of the natural
gas industry, federal control of all wellhead prices of natural gas is extended
to the intrastate market. Wellhead rates in both intrastate and interstate
markets are established by a statutorily based formula which provides for
gradual price escalations for various gas categories. Further, Title I man-
adopted a three-tier approach for the establishment of the alternative fuel price ceiling for large
industrial boiler facilities subject to the pass through provisions of Title II. Dependent upon the
facility's legal authority and installed capability to burn certain fuels, the appropriate regional
price will be set at either the price of No. 2, No. 6 low sulfur, or No. 6 high sulfur fuel oil. The
three-tier system will be fully implemented by November 1, 1980. In the interim, the appropri-
ate regional price of No. 6 high sulfur fuel oil will act as the sole alternative fuel ceiling price. 44
Fed. Reg. 57,754, 57,778 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 1,872 (1980) (to be codified in 18 C.F.R. § 282).
Under § 202 of NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3342 (Supp. 11 1978), the Commission is directed to
adopt a rule, within 18 months of the Act's enactment, which would expand the applicability of
the incremental pricing provisions of Title II to a larger category of industrial natural gas users.
Pursuant to § 202(c) of NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c) (Supp. 11 1978), the rule promulgated by
the Commission will become effective if not vetoed by either house of the Congress.
32. H.R. REP. No. 95-1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1978).
33. Id at 100.
34. The existence of two distinct markets often resulted in higher intrastate wellhead rates
and conscious withholding by producers of gas from the federally controlled interstate market
for higher priced intrastate sales.
35. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4 (1977).
36. H.R. 5289, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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dates the deregulation, in 1985, of the wellhead price of new gas sold in both
interstate and intrastate markets.
Economic analyses, however, have forecasted a supply-demand imbal-
ance in the interstate market in the mid-1980s, the time deregulation is to
occur. To ensure adequate supplies for their low priority industrial custom-
ers in the face of natural gas shortfalls, interstate pipelines would ordinarily
be induced to bid extremely high prices for deregulated gas which are far
above long run marginal costs of production. Little incentive would exist for
pipelines to moderate their bidding practices out of fear of pricing them-
selves out of the market and thereby losing industrial customers. By averag-
ing or rolling in demand-driven prices of deregulated gas with the cost of
cheaper, price controlled gas comprising the major portion of a pipeline's
overall gas supply, transmission companies would effectively pass through
the higher costs of deregulated gas to all their customers.
Legislative history suggests that the Congress intended the incremental
pricing provisions of Title II to serve the additional function of preparing the
interstate natural gas market for wellhead price deregulation. 37 By enacting
Title II, the Congress sought an orderly transition to a deregulated market
absent disruptive, excessive price increases for deregulated new gas and ac-
companying large, excessive income transfers to gas producers. It was
thought that setting the price of natural gas for large industrial users equal
to the market price of alternative fuels would cause these end users to en-
courage interstate pipelines to exercise restraint in bidding for new gas in a
deregulated market.
V.
Title II of NGPA clearly falls short of the kind of legislative reforms
required to encourage more optimum uses of natural gas through the price
mechanism. The need for gas utility rate reform is even more imperative as
the market prices of natural gas substitutes such as oil and electrical power
continue to approach the marginal cost of production. 38 Absent needed
37. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND POWER, 95TH. CONG., 2D SESS., ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS POLICY ALTERNATIVES 11-12 (Comm. Print No. 95-31, 1978);
HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND POWER, 95TH. CONG., 2D SESS., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
H.R. 5289, NATURAL GAS PoLIcY AcT OF 1978, 3-5 (Comm. Print No. 95-62, 1978). See also
H.R. REP. No. 95-543, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON EN-
ERGY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 8444, Vol. II at 394-416 (1977).
38. The market price of oil has been nearing marginal cost as a result of growing depen-
dence on imported foreign oil and certain regulatory measures adopted by the Economic Regu-
latory Administration (ERA). In the past five years, the percentage of foreign oil consumed in
the country at world market prices has increased appreciably while that of domestically pro-
duced, price controlled oil has diminished. Further, in preparation for total price decontrol of
domestic crude oil, mandated by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 to occur on
September 30, 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1976), a number of steps have been taken administra-
tively by the ERA to gradually phase out existing price controls.
With regard to the electric utility industry, approximately twelve states have already
adopted marginal costing concepts in the establishment of electrical rates. (Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont
and Wisconsin). This trend is likely to continue given the mandatory duty imposed under Title
I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3120 (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 16, 42 U.S.C.), requiring state regulatory authorities to determine in writing,
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changes in natural gas ratemaking practices to ensure gas prices more nearly
reflect the marginal costs of providing service, consumers of oil and electrical
power and potential new users of these energy forms will find it economically
beneficial to rely upon natural gas as the cheaper fuel.39 Such fuel switching
will hasten depletion of the nation's remaining gas reserves and add to the
already existing suboptimal end uses of this resource.
Federal legislation has been enacted which could materially limit, by
the imposition of certain regulatory prohibitions, fuel switching from oil to
natural gas by electric powerplants 40 and other end use categories. Except
as provided therein, Title II of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
of 19784' (FUA) precludes the use of natural gas by new electric powerplants
and fuel-burning installations, as specifically defined. Additionally, section
301(a)(1) of Title III of FUA prohibits the use of natural gas as a primary
energy source by an existing electric powerplant on and after January 1,
1990.42 In the interim, sections 301(a) (2) and (3) of FUA43 permit the use of
natural gas, in specified limited quantities, as a primary energy source by an
existing electric powerplant provided the subject plant used natural gas as a
primary energy source during the calendar year 1977.
44
Notwithstanding regulatory measures implemented by the Economic
Regulatory Administration under FUA which impose limits on current and
future gas usage, achieving more efficient natural gas utilization can best be
accomplished by the market ordering potential of the price mechanism, a
based upon evidence introduced at a public hearing, whether or not implementation of certain
specified rate concepts related to marginal cost principles are appropriate for each electric util-
ity for which they have ratemaking authority. Each determination made by a state regulatory
authority is reviewable in the appropriate state court. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2613, 2621-2625
(Supp. 11 1978).
39. It has been estimated that, for the year 1978, the average price of gas to end users was
$2.18 per MMBtu while that for oil was $3.66 per MMBtu. AMERICAN GAS ASS'N, GAS FACTS
115 (1978). For the same year, in the home heating market alone, there were approximately
135,000 conversions of heating units (singly metered homes and multifamily units) from oil to
natural gas, representing an increase of approximately 61% from the previous year. AMERICAN
GAS ASS'N, GAS HOUSEHEATING SURVEY 11 (1978).
Substantial benefits will be derived from the application of marginal cost principles even if
the per unit cost of natural gas at the margin is lower than the equivalent per unit cost of
substitute fuels. While still the cheaper fuel, end users of natural gas will be given an incentive
to adopt more thoughtful and conservative consumption habits when confronted with the true
replacement value of the product.
40. The preference for natural gas rather than for oil by new and existing electric utilities
is certain to exist given that these end users are exempt from incremental pricing surcharges
imposed under Title It of NGPA. The price of gas to these users would be substantially below
the cost of substitute fuel oil and thus economically desirable.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8311-8312, 8321-8324 (Supp. I 1978).
42. Id at § 8341(a)(1).
43. Id at § 8341(a)(2), (3).
44. However, in response to what it perceived as a need for "immediate action" to reduce
the country's dependence on foreign oil, the Economic Regulatory Administration promulgated
a special rule setting forth criteria and procedures by which owners and operators of electric
powerplants subject to §§ 301 (a)(2) and (3) may petition for a special public interest exemption
for a two year period, subject to further extensions of up to a total of five years, if, among other
things, such allowance would result in the substitution of natural gas for middle distillates and
residual fuel oils as boiler fuels. 44 Fed. Reg. 21,230 (1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. § 508).
Reducing the country's reliance on foreign oil should undoubtedly be one of several
predominate objectives of a comprehensive national energy policy. Of no less import, however,
is the conservation of remaining domestic natural gas reserves.
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concept which may be gaining increasing acceptance of late by both federal
regulators and legislators. Recently, the Commission published a "study
proposal," 4 5 known as industrial end use deregulation, which relies upon
market forces to assist in the implementation of its pipeline curtailment pro-
gram as well as the incremental pricing provisions under Title II of NGPA.
Premised upon the concept that market price is "the best mechanism for
allocating natural gas among low-priority users," the Commission proposed
a bidding or auction type program whereby low-priority industrial end users
subject to incremental pricing under NGPA would select a price no lower
than No. 6 fuel oil to serve the dual purpose of establishing their curtailment
status during periods of gas shortages and as an alternative fuel price ceiling
for the surcharge pass through provisions of Title 11.46 Although the Com-
mission suspended, at least temporarily, active consideration of industrial
end use deregulation in the wake of adverse comments received in response
to the proposal, 47 the concept of introducing market forces to the allocation
of natural gas supplies is an encouraging sign perhaps indicative of emerging
attitudes on the part of federal regulators.
Apparently, the Ninety-fifth Congress was not unmindful of the need to
consider ratemaking reforms designed to influence more efficient end uses of
natural gas. In accordance with Title III of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), the Secretary of the Department of Energy is
required to undertake a study of various rate reform measures, including
marginal cost pricing and incremental cost pricing, and to submit to the
Congress, within twenty-four months of PURPA's enactment, proposals, to-
gether with legislative recommendations, to improve gas utility rate design
and promote conservation of natural gas.48 Undoubtedly, further inquiry is
required to determine the means by which marginal cost principles may best
be applied in conjunction with longstanding ratemaking objectives of equi-
table treatment among customer classes, maximization of utility revenue sta-
bility, and efficient use of existing gas utility systems. Of equal importance
are the questions of appropriate rate tariff designs and the most effective
means of dealing with excess utility revenues generated as a result of setting
gas rates at marginal costs while utility revenue requirements are based upon
average costs.
The need for more optimum natural gas use can perhaps best be illus-
45. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,857 (1979).
46. By pegging an industrial user's curtailment status to yearly, self-designated market val-
ues, the Commission was attempting to overcome a major problem with most curtailment plans
of predicating a user's curtailment status on stale end use data. See note 16 supra.
Further, the Commission perceived its industrial end use deregulation proposal as a means
of lightening administrative burdens imposed by NGPA's incremental pricing program as well
as a way of removing the incentive for installations of No. 6 fuel oil burning equipment by
industrial users for the sole purpose of escaping higher incremental pricing surcharges imposed
upon users of No. 2 fuel oil. The Commission viewed the latter result as unjustified economic
waste and circumvention of Congressional purposes underlying enactment of Title II.
47. One of the most often cited objections filed in response to the study proposal concerned
the perceived lack of statutory authority of the Commission to impose its auction or bidding
type program. See Regulations Implementing the Second Stage Incremental Pricing Provisions
of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, FERC Docket No. RM79-56 (1979).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8341-8343 (Supp. 11 1978).
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trated by current estimates which indicate a decline by approximately 30%
in the past ten years in the level of proved natural gas reserves in the United
States. The country can ill afford a national energy policy which fails to
ensure the conservative uses of one of its most valued and diminishing re-
sources.

FIXED RATE CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
POWER AND NATURAL GAS ACTS
DAVID C. HJELMFELT
Under the Federal Power Act' and the Natural Gas Act, 2 the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, like its predecessor the Federal Power Com-
mission,3 is empowered to review the lawfulness of rates set in the first in-
stance by private parties. If the rates are found to be unjust, they may be set
at a lawful level by the commission. 4 Both acts prescribe procedures for
changes in rates, but neither abrogates the power of private parties to set
rates contractually. A problem that has arisen with surprising frequency is
the interpretation of the language of private contracts to determine whether
a party to the contract, typically the seller, may unilaterally initiate a rate
change.
In general terms, both Acts require entities subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction to file their rates with the Commission 5 and charge only the filed
rates.6 When an initial rate is filed with the Commission, it becomes effec-
tive upon thirty days notice 7 subject to the power of the Commission to hold
1. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976).
3. In 1977 the Federal Power Commission ceased to exist pursuant to the provisions of the
Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 301(b), 91 Stat. 565 (1977) and
Exec. Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,267 (1977) and its functions were transferred, in perti-
nent part, to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
4. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956).
5. The Federal Power Act provides:
Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every public util-
ity shall file with the Commission, within such time and in such form as the Commis-
sion may designate, and shall keep open in convenient form and place for public
inspection schedules showing all rates and charges for any transmission or sale subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices, and regula-
tions affecting such rates and charges, together with all contracts which in any manner
affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (1976). The Natural Gas Act provides:
Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every natural-gas
company shall file with the Commission, within such time (not less than sixty days
from June 21, 1938) and in such form as the Commission may designate, and shall
keep open in convenient form and place for public inspection, schedules showing all
rates and charges for any transportation or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission, and the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such rates and
charges, together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates,
charges, classifications, and services.
15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1976).
6. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. North-Western Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
7. The Federal Power Act provides in pertinent part: "Unless the Commission otherwise
orders, no change shall be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or
service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to
the Commission and to the public." 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1976). This provision applies to
initial rates as well as changes in existing rates. American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 546 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
The Natural Gas Act provides in pertinent part: "Unless the Commission otherwise orders,
no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or
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a hearing to determine whether the rate is just and reasonable and not un-
duly discriminatory and therefore lawful. If the initial rate is found to be
unlawful, the Commission may prescribe rates to be in effect from the date
of its order. 8 When a change in existing rates is filed, the Commission may
either allow the changed rate to become effective immediately and hold a
hearing to determine whether the rate is lawful or suspend the rate for up to
five months while holding a hearing to determine whether the rate is lawful.
In the former situation, any rate change ordered after hearing is prospective
only, while in the latter situation, any reduction in the new rate ordered by
the Commission relates back to the effective date of the new rate filing; in
addition the Commission may order any excessive rates received by the
Company to be refunded.9
service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to
the Commission and to the public." 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1976).
8. The Federal Power Act provides:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon com-
plaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged,
or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to thejurisdiction
of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such
rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or prefer-
ential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classifica-
tion, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and,
shall fix the same by order.
16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1976).
The Natural Gas Act provides:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon com-
plaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall
find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected
by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural
gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, prac-
tice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable,
unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and
reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however,
That the Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained
in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Com-
mission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such natu-
ral gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are
unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are not the lowest
reasonable rates.
15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976).
9. The Federal Power Act provides:
Suspension of new rates; hearings; five month period.
Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority,
either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and, if it
so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the public utility, but upon reason-
able notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge,
classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the
Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the public utility af-
fected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend
the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or
service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would
otherwise go into effect; and after full hearings, either completed before or after the
rate, charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission may make such
orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had
become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the
expiration of such five months, the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or
service shall go into effect at the end of such period, but in case of a proposed increased
rate or charge, the Commission may by order require the interested public utility or
public utilities to keep accurate account in detail of all amounts received by reason of
such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts are paid, and
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Suppose that a natural gas pipeline has contracted with a natural gas
distributor to sell gas to the distributor for a set rate for an agreed upon
number of years. Do the rate provisions of the Natural Gas Act permit the
pipeline company to unilaterally file a rate schedule imposing higher rates
during the term of the contract? The Federal Power Commission thought
so, and held that section 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act,' 0 requiring thirty days
notice of filing of new rates, authorized such a unilateral contract change.
The Supreme Court reversed in United Gas Pie Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service
Corp." stating that section 4(d) only provides the method by which rate
changes can be made and says nothing at all about when rate changes can
be made. According to the Court, the Natural Gas Act is a single statutory
scheme under which all rates are established initially by the natural gas com-
panies, by contract or otherwise, and reviewed by the Commission. The Act
proposes neither to define nor grant the initial rate setting powers of natural
gas companies.
The same day that the Court decided the Mobile case under the Natural
Gas Act, it decided the companion case Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pa-
cific Power Co.' 2 under the Federal Power Act. Sierra purchased power from
upon completion of the hearing and decision may by further order require such public
utility or public utilities to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose behalf such
amounts were paid, such portion of such increased rates or charges as by its decision
shall be found not justified. At any hearing involving a rate or charge sought to be
increased, the burden of proof to show that the increased rate or charge is just and
reasonable shall be upon the public utility, and the Commission shall give to the hear-
ing and decision of such questions peference over other questions pending before it
and decide the same as speedily as possible.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976). The Natural Gas Act provides:
Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority
either upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distribut-
ing company, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders,
without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but upon reasonable
notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classifi-
cation, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commis-
sion, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company
affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend
the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or
service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would
otherwise go into effect; and after full hearings, either completed before or after the
rate, charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission may make such
orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had
become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the
expiration of the suspension period, on motion of the natural-gas company making the
filing, the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or service shall go into effect.
Where increased rates or charges are thus made effective, the Commission may, by
order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond, to be approved by the Com-
mission, to refund any amounts ordered by the Commission, to keep accurate accounts
in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in
whose behalf such amounts were paid, and upon completion of the hearing and deci-
sion, to order such natural-gas company to refund, with interest, the portion of such
increased rates or charges by its decision found not justified. At any hearing involving
a rate or charge sought to be increased, the burden of proof to show that the increased
rate or charge is just and reasonable shall be upon the natural-gas company, and the
Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over
other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible.
15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1976).
11. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
12. 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) for resale to consumers. In 1947,
Sierra began to negotiate for an alternate and less expensive source of power
from the Bureau of Reclamation's generator at Shasta Dam. To forestall
such competition, PG&E offered Sierra a special low rate for a fifteen year
term. Sierra accepted PG&E's offer in 1948. In 1953 when power from
Shasta Dam was no longer available, PG&E filed unilaterally with the Com-
mission a twenty-eight percent rate increase pursuant to section 205(d) of the
Federal Power Act. The Commission accepted the rates for filing, suspended
them, and commenced a proceeding to review the rates under section 205(e)
of the Act.13 Sierra appealed, arguing that the parties' contract precluded a
unilateral rate filing.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission on the grounds
that the Federal Power Act, like the Natural Gas Act, does not abrogate
fixed rate contracts. Accordingly, it was error for the Commission to have
accepted the rate for filing and proceeded under section 205(e).
14
PG&E and the Commission also argued that in finally approving the
new rates, the Commission had found by implication that the contract rate
was unjust and unreasonable and therefore the new rates should be allowed
prospectively under section 206 of the Act.1 5 The Court rejected this argu-
ment also, noting that as a condition precedent to changing a rate prospec-
tively under section 206, the Commission must first find that the existing
rate is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential. How-
ever, the purpose of section 206 is the protection of the public interest.
Therefore the Court held that a contract rate may not be said to be unjust or
unreasonable simply because it is unprofitable to the public utility.
[W]hile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose
upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair
return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree
by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it
does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain. [ci-
tation omitted] In such circumstances the sole concern of the Com-
mission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely
affect the public interest-as where it might impair the financial
ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other
consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.
1 6
In one of the first tests of the scope of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division argued that its contract with
United Gas Pipe Line Company for a wholesale supply of gas at a desig-
nated rate "or any effective superceding rate schedules" on file with the
Commission was a fixed rate contract. 17 Memphis argued that the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine precluded the acceptance for filing of a rate change under
section 4(e) of the Natural Gas Act' 8 unless the parties mutually agreed to
13. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1976).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1976).
16. 350 U.S. at 355 (emphasis in the original).
17. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
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the rate change. All other rate changes had to be processed under section
5(a) of the Act' 9 with only prospective application. The Commission held
that the contract was for sales at United's "going rate" and that unilateral
filings under section 4(e) were permissible.
The court of appeals reversed, citing Memphis. The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held that United had reserved the right to
make unilateral rate changes and that section 4(e) of the Act did not pre-
clude a contractual reservation of the right by either party to make unilat-
eral rate changes.
20
The holding of the Sierra, Mobile and Memphis cases has been character-
ized as "refreshingly simple. The contract between the parties governs the
legality of the filing. Rate filings consistent with contractual obligations are
valid; rate filings inconsistent with contractual obligations are invalid."
'2 1
Refreshingly simple or not, since its inception in 1956 the Mobile-Sierra doc-
trine has been the subject of considerable litigation and has given rise to
some intriguing questions concerning rate discrimination.
RATES SUBJECT TO THE MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINE
It is clear that changes in rates filed with the Commission are subject to
the Mobile-Siera doctrine, but what of rates not filed or erroneously accepted
for filing?
Prior to 1954, the rates charged by natural gas producers were not con-
sidered to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 22 Producer rates
were arrived at contractually but were not filed with the Commission. In
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America . Harrngton,
23 the court was called upon to
decide whether, after Commission jurisdiction was established, a producer
might increase its rates when its contract did not permit unilateral rate
changes. The court concluded that there was nothing in the Natural Gas
Act or in the orders of the Federal Power Commission to indicate that in
such circumstances there was no effective or lawful rate prior to filing of the
rate. Accordingly, under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine the contract rate even
though unfiled became and remained the only lawful rate until changed by
the order of the Commission.
In another case involving Natural Gas Pipeline Company, the Third
Circuit held that the fact that the Mobile case dealt with an attempt to super-
sede an already filed rate and that the instant case dealt with the filing of an
initial rate was an immaterial difference. Thus the unilateral filing of an
initial rate over the protest of the other contracting party could not annul
19. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1976).
20. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
The court of appeals decision created a chaotic condition in the bond market because of the
restriction it placed on rate increases. See YOUNG, FORTY YEARS OF PUBLIC UTILITY FINANCE
(1965).
21. Richmond Power & Light v. FPC, 481 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 414 U.S.
1068 (1973).
22. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
23. 246 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1957).
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the rate established by the unfiled contract.2 4 This is true even if the higher
rate had actually been used for billing purposes.
25
Despite the two Natural Gas Pipeline cases which made clear that Mobile-
Sierra applied to unfiled as well as filed rates, the Commission has tried to
evade the rule in dealing with electric rates. In Borough of Lansdale v. Federal
Power Commission,26 the parties had executed a fixed rate contract which was
duly offered for filing with the Commission. The Commission refused to
accept the contract for filing on the grounds that fixed rate contracts were
presumptively invalid. Subsequently, the company filed a new rate schedule
at higher rates and Lansdale protested, arguing that the new rates were
barred by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. The Commission rejected the Mobile-
Sierra argument, stating that the doctrine applied only to contracts previ-
ously accepted as lawful by the Commission. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
reversed, holding that the doctrine applied whether the company had
properly filed the contract or not and that it applied to contracts not previ-
ously approved by the Commission.
In Cqy of Clevelando. Federal Power Commission,2 7 the Commission refused
to consider the city's Mobile-Sierra contentions. The city had negotiated a
rate for load-transfer service from the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com-
pany and the city council had enacted an ordinance authorizing the city to
enter into a contract for the service at those rates. The company prepared a
letter agreement containing a higher schedule of rates, which the city signed.
The company then filed the letter agreement with the Commission. Subse-
quently, the city protested, claiming that the filed rate was not the agreed
upon rate. The Commission refused to consider the city's argument claim-
ing that a party could not go behind the filed rate.28 On appeal the court
reversed and remanded holding that "the proposition that a filed rate vari-
ant from an agreed rate is nonetheless the legal rate wages war with basic
premises of the Federal Power Act,"'29 "that a contracted rate cannot be
changed by the unilateral act of either party to the contract," 30 and "that a
utility is no more at liberty to alter an agreed rate as yet unfiled than it is to
depart from one that has been filed.
' ' 3 1
In Sam Rayburn Dam Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,32 the
parties had a fixed rate contract for a stated amount of power. The contract
was on file with the Commission. Over the years, the parties had in fact
bought and sold power under the contract rate in amounts greatly in excess
24. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
927 (1958); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 543 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Mobile-Sierra doctrine
applies to certificate proceedings under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act).
25. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1958); Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of America v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
26. 494 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
27. 525 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
28. More recently the Commission has held that Mobile-Sierra allegations are so fundamen-
tal to the power to accept rates for filing that the issue can be raised at any time. Columbus &
S. Ohio Elec. Co., Docket No. EN 77-529, FERC Order modifying Prior Order (Feb. 2, 1978).
29. City of Cleveland v. FPC, 525 F.2d at 854-55.
30. Id. at 855.
31. Id. at 856.
32. 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
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of the contract amount. The seller then filed a rate increase to apply to all
amounts sold in excess of the contract amount. Mid-South Electric-Cooper-
ative argued that the course of conduct had transformed the contract into an
all-requirements contract at a fixed rate. The Commission rejected Mid-
South's argument on the grounds that a contract on file could not be altered
by a course of conduct. On appeal the court reversed, holding that Mobile-
Sierra applied to the actual contract whether or not it was on file with the
Commission. It cannot now be argued tht the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is applic-
ble only to contracts already filed with the Commission.
CONTRACTS CONSTRUED
The first step when a Mobile-Sierra issue is raised is to determine whether
the contract provides for sales at a fixed rate as in Mobile and Sierra or at the
"going rate" as in Memphis.
Interpreting contract language dealing with the right to make rate
changes "involves matters peculiarly within the area of the Commission's
special competence." 33 Nevertheless the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has pointed out that "[t]he FPC's distaste for the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine is well known, and it has been in the past necessary for this court to
remind the FPC that it is not free to ignore the doctrine."'34 In practice, the
court has given lip service to approaching the Commission's determination
with deference while making its own determination. 35 The Seventh Circuit
has said that it is "at least as capable of interpreting the effect of [the] con-
tract as the Commission."
36
The normal rules of contract interpretation are applicable and resort to
extrinsic evidence is permitted only in cases of ambiguity.37 However, the
Federal Power Commission's construction of conract language, colored by its
"distaste" for the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, has led to several stinging rever-
sals.38 With this background, a review of the interpretation of various con-
tracts should assist contract draftsmen to avoid undesired results in future
cases.
In Nevada Natural Gas Poe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, the court
held that the following contract language permitted the filing of a unilateral
rate increase: "The rates contained in aforesaid rate schedule on file with
said Commission and in effect at the time of commencement of service here-
under shall be the rates to be paid by Buyer to Seller under this agreement
33. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. at 114.
34. Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
35. City of Kaukauna v. FPC, 581 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Sam Rayburn Dam Elec.
Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
36. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1210 n.6 (7th Cir. 1978).
37. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978); Appalachian Power Co. v.
FPC, 529 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop.
v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
38. Borough of Lansdale v. FPC, 494 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Richmond Power &
Light v. FPC, 481 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973); Sam Rayburn Dam
Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
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until the same are changed in accordance with lawful requirements. '3 9
The court said the contract was typical of "tariff-and-service arrange-
ments," which, like the "going rate" contract in Memphis, did not preclude a
unilateral rate filing.
Another example of contract language creating an unambiguous right
to make a unilateral filing was quoted in Pubh'c Service Company of Indiana v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (PSCI) as follows:
The terms and conditions of this Agreement, and the provisions of
the rates attached hereto and made a part hereof, may be changed
by the Company from time to time by filing such change(s) with
the Federal Power Commission and upon receipt of such Commis-
sion's acceptance for filing will supercede [sic] and cancel the pres-
ent terms and conditions of this Agreement and such rate
provisions.
40
Although it would seem to be a simple enough task to contractually
reserve a right to make unilateral rate changes, that has not always been the
case. For example, a contract which stated that rate changes could be made
pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act and that the purchasing
city "agrees to accept such new or changed rates as are ultimately made
effective through such proceedings and review" was held to fall under the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine in Cty of Kaukauna v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion.4 ' The court held that, pursuant to the parties' contract, no rate in-
crease could become effective until finally approved by the Commission.
Section 205 does not dictate when a contractually-authorized rate increase
can be made effective. Beyond minimum statutory constraints, parties are
free to determine by contract when a rate change may become effective.
Contracts between Louisiana Power & Light Company and its whole-
sale customers, providing that the rates were subject to change "as a result of
and in accordance with" an order of a regulatory agency, were construed by
the Commission to permit unilateral rate changes but only prospectively
pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act.
4 2
Frequently wholesale customers have attempted to tie their rate to the
wholesale supplier's retail industrial rate to maintain their competitive posi-
tion and avoid a price squeeze. These attempts have created confusion re-
garding the right of the wholesale supplier to make unilateral rate filings.
For example, a contract providing that when an increase in the supplier's
retail industrial rate was approved by the Wisconsin Public Service Commis-
sion the wholesale customers would "automatically receive and accept such
rates" did not provide when the new rate would become effective. Rather,
39. 267 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1959).
40. 575 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978).
41. 581 F.2d 993, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
42. Louisiana Power & Light Co., FPC Docket No. ER-77-533, Order Rejecting Section
205 Filing, Amending Prior Order, Establishing Section 206(A) Proceedings, Granting Inter-
vention and Establishing Price Squeeze Procedures (Sept. 30, 1977). Accord, Kansas Power &
Light Co., FERC Docket No. ER 78-1, Order Accepting For Filing and Suspending Proposed
Increased Rates, Denying Motion to Reject, Granting Intervention and Establishing Procedures
Issued (Dec. 1, 1977) (contract provided for billing at rates "as may from time to time be au-
thorized by . . . any . . . regulatory body having jurisdiction").
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approval by the state commission was merely a triggering event permitting
the filing of new rates, which would become effective only after Commission
approval under section 205.
4
3
The City of Richmond, Indiana, had a contract with Indiana and
Michigan Electric Company (I&M) which provided for sales to Richmond
at I&M's industrial rate on file with the Indiana Commission. It was con-
ceded that when I&M filed for a ten percent increase in its industrial rate, it
could have sought a similar increase in its rate for sales to Richmond. In-
stead, I&M filed a new rate for sales to Richmond, increasing the rate by
forty-five percent. The Federal Power Commission permitted the filing, rea-
soning that since the contract concededly permitted a unilateral rate filing,
there was no Mobile-Sierra problem. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed,
holding that the parties had by contract limited the rate filing. 44 Moreover,
the court found no impermissible attempt to limit the Commission's jurisdic-
tion by a private contract.
In the Sam Dam4 5 case, the parties agreed that the "draftsmenship evi-
denced by the contract leaves much to be desired." The contract included
several rate provisions, each of which included a provision for renegotiation
of the rate. Following each renegotiation provision was a clause, 4(c), pro-
viding that if a rate change should be made applicable by final order or
acceptance for filing such changed rate would be the contract rate. The
Commission held that clause 4(c) provided for unilateral rate changes. Once
again the commission was reversed on appeal. The appellate court ruled
that clause 4(c) merely described the method of effectuating a rate resulting
from renegotiation.
In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commis'sion,46 the parties had a
fixed rate contract with a capacity limitation of 8000 kw. Over the years,
Gulf routinely delivered power in excess of the contract amount by a factor
as great as eleven. In 1970, the parties amended the contract to remove the
capacity ceiling. In 1973, Gulf filed a unilateral rate increase. The Commis-
sion and the reviewing court agreed that when the parties eliminated the
capacity ceiling the fixed rate provision was applicable to all power sold.
The same result should have been reached on the basis of a course of conduct
change in the contract even without the formality of the 1970 contract
amendment.
4 7
Even the effective period of a fixed rate contract can cause problems. In
Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co.,48 the fixed rate contract was executed
on February 9, 1976 with the rates made effective as of January 1, 1976. The
contract provided for successive one year fixed rate renewals absent prior
43. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., FPC Docket No. ER 76-303 and Wisconsin Michigan
Power Co., FPC Docket No. ER 76-394, Order Granting in Part and Denying In Part Applica-
tion for Rehearing and Granting Stay (Sept. 26, 1977).
44. Richmond Power & Light v. FPC, 481 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068
(1973).
45. Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 515 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 907 (1976).
46. 518 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
47. See text accompanying note 32, supra.
48. FERC Docket No. ER 77-529, Order (modifying prior order) (Feb. 2, 1978).
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notice of termination or rate change. At issue was whether for Mobile-Serra
purposes the one year period began on January 1 or February 9. The Com-
mission held that the starting date was February 9.
An interesting evasion of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine occurred in Municipal
Electric Uth'y Association of Alabama v. Federal Power Commission.49 On Novem-
ber 1, 1971 Alabama Power Company filed new rates to become effective
upon the termination of some forty-six individual contracts which expired at
varying times between January 3, 1972 and April 1976. The new rates were
predicated upon a 1970 test year. The court said the filing did not violate
Mobile-Sierra because the new rates only became effective when the fixed rate
contracts expired. The problem of a stale test period,50 was theoretically
avoided by requiring the Commission to provide an opportunity for a modi-
fied section 205 hearing upon the expiration of each fixed rate contract. As a
result certain customers were forced to participate in a rate proceeding to
contest rates which, because of intervening rate proceedings, never did be-
come effective as to them. This unwarranted burden is one of the matters
sought to be avoided by fixed rate contracts. Nor did the Court consider the
rate discrimination which resulted from the varying contract termination
dates. That problem is discussed below.
CHANGING RATES IN A FIXED RATE CONTRACT
The rate established by a fixed rate contract may be changed prospec-
tively after a section 206 hearing under the Federal Power Act or a section 5
hearing under the Natural Gas Act. In such a proceeding
the sole concern of the Commission would seem to be whether the
rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest-as where it
might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue
its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be
unduly discriminatory.
5 '
In practice, when the Commission has found a unilateral rate filing banned
by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, it has not hesitated to order a section 206 hear-
ing.
5 2
The test set forth in Sierra is a difficult one. It is doubtful that the first
leg of the test, that is, whether the rates are so low as to impair the financial
ability of the public utility to continue its service, could ever be met.5 3 The
other two tests in Sierra are also difficult to satisfy.
One issue is whether Sierra imposed a test different from the test set out
49. 485 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. Tennessee Valley Mun. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 470 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., supra note 12.
52. Public Serv. Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978); Louisiana Power &
Light Co., FPC Docket No. ER 77-533 (Order issued Sept. 30, 1977); Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
FPC Opinion No. 791 (issued Apr. 6, 1977).
53. Wholesale sales typically represent less than 20% of an electric utility's business. The
wholesale customers of Commonwealth Edison, for example, account for less than 1% of the
company's revenues. Commonwealth Edison Co., FERC Docket Nos. E-9002 and ER 76-122.
When a single wholesale contract is involved the financial impact is likely to be d minr nis. Sales
to the Borough of Lansdale account for only .089% of the seller's total revenues. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., supra note 52.
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in section 206. In Philadephia Electrzc Co., 54 the Commission rejected the ar-
gument that the Sierra case definitely established the only three elements
bearing upon the public interest which would be sufficient to set aside rates
under section 206. Rather the Commission held that the public interest "is a
fluid concept, dynamic in nature, and necessarily discernible only within a
particular context once a full appreciation of all relevant facts is
achieved." '55 According to the Commission, the elements discussed in Sierra
were illustrative only.
56
The Commission then rejected the finding of the administrative judge
that a rate which recoups revenues insufficient to recover costs is necessarily
contrary to the public interest. 57 Rather, the Commission said that a public
utility may only be excused from its contractual obligations where it is
demonstrated that the public, which it has a duty to serve, will as a whole be
seriously disadvantaged if the commitment is allowed to run its full course.
Moreover in assessing the impact of the fixed rate, it may be necessary in
some cases to look at the impact on the company over the entire term of the
contract. In the early years the rate may be more than compensatory, miti-
gating in some degree a later revenue deficiency under the rate.
58 As inter-
preted by the Commission, changing a fixed rate under section 206 is a very
unlikely event.
Public Service Company of Indiana (PSCI), appealing a rate proceed-
ing, argued that its fixed rate contracts should be changed as unduly dis-
criminatory.5 9 PSCI's contract permitted unilateral rate changes by its
supplier, while its contract with four other cities did not permit rate changes
during the term of the contract. PSCI argued in the section 206 proceeding
that the fixed rate contracts were unduly discriminatory and should be in-
creased. The court, applying the Sierra test, rejected PSCI's argument, not-
ing that a rate may be excessively discriminatory under section 205 but not
unduly discriminatory under section 206. The purpose of section 205 is pro-
tection of the consumer, while the purpose of section 206 is protection of the
public interest.
The court then explained the difference in application of the two sec-
tions as follows:
In our view the anti-discrimination policy in section 205(b) is vio-
lated in a case such as this where one consumer has its rates raised
significantly above what other similarly-situated consumers are
paying. In such a case, the lone consumer would be placed in an
unjustifiably non-competitive position, and thus should have re-
course to the FPC under section 205(b). Section 206's ban on dis-
crimination may be breached in a case where one consumer is
afforded, without any factual justification, a contract rate that is
54. Philadelphia Elec. Co., FPC Opinion No. 791 (Apr. 6, 1977).
55. Id. at 12.
56. It was assumed without analysis that the elements set forth in Serra governed but were
to be applied in the alternative, in Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978).
57. A contract may not be said to be unjust or unreasonable under § 206 simply because it
is unprofitable to the public utility. FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
58. Philadelphia Elec. Co., FPC Opinion No. 791 (issued Apr. 6, 1977).
59. Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1978).
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significantly lower than the pre-existing rates for all other members
of the class. In that case the public interest in avoiding blatant
favoritism by a regulated utility and in protecting the vast majority
of the class of consumers may require the FPC to find a violation of
section 206.60
Given the difficulty of changing a fixed rate contract under section 206
of the Federal Power Act or section 5 of the Natural Gas Act, the problem
arises as to what to do with rate differentials between customers which exist
solely because some customers of a supplier have fixed rate contracts while
others have going rate contracts. This problem is discussed in the following
section.
RATE DISCRIMINATION
In the PSCI rate proceeding discussed above, PSCI served a group of
five cities at wholesale rates. Four of the cities had fixed rate contracts and
Frankfurt, the remaining city, had a going rate contract. Both the Commis-
sion and the reviewing court refused to increase the rates to the fixed rate
cities after a section 206 hearing. This caused Frankfurt to pay significantly
higher rates than the fixed rate cities. Frankfurt argued that the result was
rate discrimination prohibited by section 205. The Commission rejected
Frankfurt's contention, but the reviewing court reversed and remanded.
6 1
Differences in rates are justified where they are predicated upon differences
in facts. 6 2 In this case the Commission determined that the existence of the
contracts constituted such a factual difference. Since the rates were other-
wise just and reasonable, it permitted the increased rates.
The court held that the Commission was not responsive to the statutory
test. Once Frankfurt demonstrated a substantial rate disparity, it was in-
cumbent upon PSCI to show factual differences that justified the specific
rate differential. 63 The Commission's failure to tie factual differences to the
nature and amount of the rate differential in its opinion required a re-
mand.64 The court went on to state that matters that might justify a rate
differential included the length of the contract term, since discounts can be
justified on the basis of long-term commitments.
65
However, both the Commission in Kansas Power & Ligh166 and the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Boroughs of Chambersburg v.
Federal Energy Regulatoty Commissz'on67 have disagreed with the result reached
in the PSCI case. Both have held that a rate differential which exists by
virtue of the fact that one customer had a fixed rate contract while others
had going rate contracts, where no other factual difference is demonstrated,
is not discriminatory. In such cases, the contractual differences alone justify
60. Id. at 1213.
61. Id. at 1222.
62. St. Michaels Util. Comm'n v. FPC, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967).
63. 575 F.2d at 1212.
64. Id. at 1213.
65. Id. at 1212 n. 12.
66. See note 42, supra.
67. 580 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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the difference sufficiently for section 205. Further the court found that the
necessary result of the Mobile, Sierra and Memphis cases is a potential for rate
discrimination which can not be unreasonable if it exists solely as a result of
contracts.
In PSCI, the court attempted to distinguish the Chambersburg case factu-
ally.68 The court noted that in PSCI only one city had a going rate contract
while in Chambersburg only one city had a fixed rate contract. Further, in
PSCI the Commission had agreed that Frankfurt would be significantly in-
jured by the rate differential while no such finding was made in Chambers-
burg. In a section 205 proceeding to protect the consumer, the number of
consumers injured should make no difference. Accordingly the first factual
distinction is irrelevant. The second distinction goes to the question of
whether there is in fact an undue preference or an unreasonable difference in
rates.
There exists then a fundamental divergence between the Seventh Cir-
cuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding the existence of undue rate discrimina-
tion resulting from the applicability of Mobile-Sterra to some but not all of a
supplier's wholesale contracts. On the one hand, it is clear that a significant
rate disparity not predicated on cost-of-service differences may result. On
the other hand, it is argued that the company should not be deprived of the
benefit of its bargained for going rate contract simply because some of its
customers had fixed rate contracts. Both arguments are appealing.
The resolution of the dispute between the circuits lies in the develop-
ment of a more exhaustive record regarding the inception of the contractual
differences. The damage from the discrimination does not arise until one
consumer has experience a rate increase. No relief is appropriate until that
event occurs. However, the discriminatory event occurred when different
contracts were executed. Accordingly, when no cost-of-service justification
for the rate differential appears, it is necessary to consider the facts surround-
ing the execution of the contracts. In this regard, it would be appropriate to
consider whether the going rate customers had the option of signing fixed
rate contracts. Other differences in the contracts may also justify the distinc-
tion.
When it is recognized the wholesale suppliers frequently have a monop-
oly position in dealing with a wholesale customer the potential for discrimi-
nation at the inception of the contracts is apparent. 69 In such situations one
of the customers of a wholesale supplier may be so fortuitously situated as to
have an alternative supplier. To keep that customer, the supplier may offer
a fixed rate contract which it will not offer to customers who are not geo-
graphically situated so as to have a choice among suppliers. It appears that
such evidence would be considered by the D.C. Circuit.
When rate discrimination is demonstrated, the remedy in cases under
section 205 has been to reduce the level of the higher rate to the level of the
68. 575 F.2d at 1212 n.12.
69. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Consumers Power Co.,
ALAB-452, 6 N.R.C. 892 (1972); Toledo Edison Company, ALAB-560, - N.R.C. - (Sept. 6,
1979), appealed docketed, Duquesne Light Co., No. 80-1295 (3d Cir., Feb. 29, 1980).
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lower rate.70 This remedy would remove the damage resulting from discrim-
ination at the inception of the contracts.
CONCLUSION
The law regarding the application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is suffi-
ciently clear that most problems can be avoided by careful contract drafting.
When the existence of both fixed rate and going rate contracts produces a
significant rate differential not resulting from cost-of-service differences, a
full record regarding the contract negotiations should be developed to per-
mit a determination of whether section 205 discrimination exists.
70. Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 134 (1940).
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INTRODUCTION
The Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act,1 effective in 1917,2 was a
startling departure from common law. The Act required an employee to
abrogate all his common law remedies and to accept fixed benefits. Con-
comitantly, it required an employer to abrogate all his common law de-
fenses, such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 3 In place of
the common law compensatory system, the Act provided injured workers
with monetary relief from on-the-job injuries in a separate forum that be-
came known as the Industrial Commission of Colorado.
The Act has grown in bulk, and litigation over it has mushroomed as a
result of incessant mutations over the years. 4 The most sweeping changes in
the Act occurred in September 1, 1975 when vocational rehabilitation bene-
fits were enacted, 5 the Occupational Disease Disability Act was repealed
with vestiges reenacted and incorporated within the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act,6 and lifetime benefits were created for certain dependents of fatally
injured workers.
7
Benefits have increased in a dizzying spiral since the Act was first
promulgated. For the period from July 1, 1979 through June 30, 1980, bene-
fits for each compensable accident included $20,000 for medical expenses
and vocational rehabilitation,8 $222.74 per week maximum for temporary
total and permanent total disability,9 and $84 per week for permanent par-
tial disability.'o
Although the legislature structured the Act to dispense compensation
benefits under highly technical formulae, litigation persists despite the anti-
septic quality of the statutory language. The bulk of the litigation has pro-
duced philosophical catch-lines based on public policy: (1) the purpose of
the Act is to protect all workers, except those specifically excluded, by pro-
viding a scheme of compensation benefits to be paid by the employer; " (2)
1. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-40-101 to -54-127 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
2. Colorado, following New York's lead, was the second state to enact a workmen's com-
pensation act. New York had imported the concept from Germany, the origin of workmen's
compensation during Bismarck's massive social reforms.
3. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-42-101 to -205 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
4. State Compensation Insurance Fund, the single largest workmen's compensation car-
rier in Colorado, reports that from July 1, 1975 to January 1, 1979 (3 1/2 years), 52,287 claims
were litigated. This figure does not include an even larger number of injuries reported by
employers to the Division of Labor for which benefits were voluntarily paid by the insurer.
During the same period, State Compensation Insurance Fund paid $51,738,526 in compensa-
tion benefits.
Over 7,300 new cases were filed with the Colorado Division of Labor just in the month of
August 1979. More than 1,200 of the claims filed each month with the Division are set for
hearing and litigated. This dramatic volume of litigation includes a striking number of for-
merly esoteric claims; e.g., carcinomas, harmful substances exposure, employment harrassment,
nervous breakdowns, and cardiovascular congestion. The impact on employers is reflected by a
97.1% insurance premium increase since September 1, 1975.
5. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-49-101(4)-(6) (Supp. 1979).
6. Id § 8-51-112 (Supp. 1979).
7. Id. § 8-50-103 (Supp. 1979).
8. Id § 8-49-101(1)(a), (4) (Supp. 1979).
9. See Appendix V zhfa.
10. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-108(I)(b) (Supp. 1979).
11. City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967); University of Denver v.
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the Act should provide a remedy in areas where remedies did not exist at
common law;12 (3) the Act is highly remedial and beneficent in purpose, and
should be liberally construed so as to accomplish that intent;' 3 and (4) the
referee is vested with wide discretion in awarding benefits under the Act.'
4
As a result, knowledge of workmen's compensation law requires careful
study of the prescriptive language contained in the Act, the interpretations
placed on the Act by the Colorado Supreme Court and the Colorado Court
of Appeals, and the idiosyncrasies of each referee in making his own inter-
pretation of both the Act and reported case law.
This treatise provides an overview of the permanent disability benefits
provided under the Act through a discussion of the statutory language of
each section dealing with permanent partial or permanent total disability,
court decisions interpreting each section, and the impact of the referee's dis-
cretionary role in applying a particular section.
I. SCHEDULE OF PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS
The Act sets forth a detailed schedule of permanent disability benefits
compartmentalized into thirty-six categories distinguished from each other
by a separate anatomical injury. 1 5 Conspicuously absent are any provisions
Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Drake v. Hodges, 114 Colo. 10, 161 P.2d 338
(1945); Consolidated Fast Freight v. Walker, 103 Colo. 347, 85 P.2d 720 (1938); Sechler v.
Pastore, 103 Colo. 139, 84 P.2d 61 (1938); Empire Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Colo. 26,
77 P.2d 130 (1938).
12. Chartier v. Winslow Crane Serv. Co., 142 Colo. 294, 350 P.2d 1044 (1960).
13. James v. Irrigation Motor & Pump Co., 180 Colo. 195, 503 P.2d 1025 (1972); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Faulk, 158 Colo. 441, 407 P.2d 348 (1965); Idarado Mining Co. v. Barnes, 148
Colo. 166, 365 P.2d 36 (1961); Industrial Comm'n v. Baldwin, 139 Colo. 268, 338 P.2d 103
(1959); Snyder v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (1959); University of Denver
v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959); Graden Coal Co. v. Yturralde, 137
Colo. 527, 328 P.2d 105 (1958); Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698
(1957); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Industrial Comm'n
v. Corwin Hosp., 126 Colo, 358, 250 P.2d 135 (1952); Industrial Comm'n v. Golden Cycle
Corp., 126 Colo. 68, 246 P.2d 902 (1952); L.B. Cole Produce Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 123
Colo. 278, 228 P.2d 808 (1951); Continental Oil Co. v. Sirhall, 122 Colo, 332, 222 P.2d 612
(1950); National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950); Arvas v. McNeil Coal
Corp., 119 Colo. 289, 203 P.2d 906 (1949); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 114
Colo. 91, 162 P.2d 413 (1945); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Ill Colo. 470, 143
P.2d 267 (1943); Skjoldahl v. Industrial Comm'n, 108 Colo. 140, 113 P.2d 871 (1941); McNeil
Coal Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 105 Colo. 263, 96 P.2d 889 (1939); McBride v. Industrial
Comm'n, 97 Colo. 166, 49 P.2d 386 (1935); Danielson v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 522, 44
P.2d 1011 (1935); Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Colo, 481, 271 P. 617
(1928); Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Colo. 283, 176 P. 314 (1918); Karoly
v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Colo. 239, 176 P. 284 (1918); Industrial Comm'n.v. Johnson, 64 Colo.
461, 172 P. 422 (1918); Claimants v. Director of Div. of Labor, 31 Colo. App. 141, 500 P.2d 1186
(1972).
14. See Industrial Comm'n v. Seastone, 167 Colo. 571, 448 P.2d 963 (1969); Industrial
Comm'n v. Cutshall, 164 Colo. 240, 433 P.2d 765 (1967); Bowlus v. Industrial Comm'n, 152
Colo. 535, 383 P.2d 789 (1963); University of Denver v. Johnston, 151 Colo. 465, 378 P.2d 830
(1963); Idarado Mining Co. v. Barnes, 148 Colo. 166, 363 P.2d 36 (1961); University of Denver
v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
15. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-104 (1973) is set forth below in its entirety.
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for injuries to the head (except for vision and hearing), neck, or trunk of the
(1) In case an injury results in a loss set forth in the following schedule, the injured
employee, inaddition to compensation to be paid for temporary disability, shall receive com-
pensation for the period as specified:
(a) The loss of an arm at the shoulder 208 weeks
(b) The loss of forearm at the elbow 139 weeks
(c) The loss of a hand at the wrist 104 weeks
(d) The loss of a thumb and the metacarpal bone thereof 50 weeks
(e) The loss of a thumb at the proximal joint 35 weeks
() The loss of a thumb at the second or distal joint 18 weeks
(g) The loss of an index finger and the metacarpal bone thereof 26 weeks
(h) The loss of an index finger at the proximal joint 18 weeks
(i) Loss of an index finger at the second joint 13 weeks
(j) Loss of an index finger at the distal joint 9 weeks
(k) Loss of a second finger and the metacarpal bone thereof 18 weeks
(1) Loss of a middle finger at the proximal joint 13 weeks
(m) Loss of a middle finger at the second joint 9 weeks
(n) Loss of a middle finger at the distal joint 5 weeks
(o) Loss of a third or ring finger and the metacarpal bone
thereof 11 weeks
(p) Loss of a ring finger at the proximal joint 7 weeks
(q) Loss of a ring finger at the second joint 7 weeks
(r) Loss of a ring finger at the distal joint 4 weeks
(s) Loss of a little finger and the metacarpal bone thereof 13 weeks
(t) Loss of a little finger at the proximal joint 9 weeks
(u) Loss of a little finger at the second joint 9 weeks
(v) Loss of a little finger at the distal joint 4 weeks
(w) Loss of a leg at the hip joint or so near thereto as to
preclude the use of an artificial limb 208 weeks
(x) Loss of a leg at or above the knee, where the stump remains
sufficient to permit the use of an artificial limb 139 weeks
(y) The loss of a foot at the ankle 104 weeks
(z) The loss of a great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof 26 weeks
(aa) The loss of a great toe at the proximal joint 18 weeks
(bb) The loss of a great toe at the second or distal joint 9 weeks
(cc) The loss of any other toe with the metatarsal bone thereof 11 weeks
(dd) The loss of any other toe at the proximal joint 4 weeks
(ee) The loss of any other toe at the second or distal joint 4 weeks
(fl) The loss of an eye by enucleation (including disfigurement
resulting therefrom) 139 weeks
(gg) Total blindness of one eye 104 weeks
(hh) Total deafness of both ears 139 weeks
(ii) Total deafness of one ear 35 weeks
(J) Where workman prior to injury has suffered a total loss of
hearing in one ear, and as a result of the accident loses total
hearing in remaining ear 139 weeks
(2) The director shall determine the time when temporary disability terminates as to
injuries coming under any provision of this section.
(3) For the purpose of this schedule, permanent and complete paralysis of any mem-
ber as the proximate result of accidental injury shall be deemed equivalent to the loss
thereof.
(4) If amputation is made between any two joints mentioned in this schedule, except
amputation between the knee and the hip joint, the resulting loss shall be estimated as if the
amputation had been made at the joint nearest thereto. If any portion of the bone of the
distal joint of any finger, thumb, or toe is amputated, the amount paid therefor shall be the
amount allowed for amputation at said distal joint.
(5) The amounts specified in this section shall be at the compensation rate of eighty-
four dollars per week.
(6) When an injured employee sustains two or more injuries coming under this sched-
ule, the disabilities specified in this section shall be added, and the injured employee shall
receive the sum total thereof; except that, where the injury results in the loss or partial loss of
use of the index finger and thumb of the same hand or of more than two digits of any one
hand or foot, the disability, in the discretion of the director, may be compensated on the
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body. Of the thirty-six scheduled injuries, twenty-two relate to an upper
extremity, nine to a lower extremity, two to the eyes, and three to the ears.
Impaired earning ability of the worker is not a condition precedent to
an award of benefits under the schedule. The Colorado Supreme Court
stated the general rule in Hawkeye-Securzto Insurance Co. v. Tupper.
16
Nearly all compensation acts have provisions for "scheduled
injuries".
Scheduled compensation for a specific injury is in the nature
of damages or indemnity for the physical or functional loss and is to be
awarded even though there is no loss of earning power or wages, and without
regard to the extent of the disability suf9ered 17
An anomaly arises under section 8-51-104(7), however, because the di-
rector may award the amount provided by the schedule of benefits or use his
discretion to award permanent partial disability under section 8-51-108. In
contrast to the indemnity rule set forth in Hawke, the Colorado Supreme
Court has upheld the loss of earning capacity test in awarding permanent
partial disability benefits."8
The director's discretion resulted from inequities built into original pro-
visions of the Act. The schedule of disability benefits, in existence for many
decades, was designed to compensate workers for amputations, blindness, or
deafness. Originally ;, "d not include any provision to award scheduled
benefits for loss of use of affected members. Mere loss of use was compen-
sated only under the permanent partial disability section of the Act. This
statutory scheme resulted in an unexpected inequity; higher awards were
made for "loss of use" injuries than the schedule of disability benefits al-
lowed for amputation of the same affected member.1 9 Consequently, the
Act was amended to permit compensation for "loss of use" of an affected
member under the scheduled benefits rather than under the permanent par-
tial disability provisions.
2 0
Subsequent to this amendment, the legislature recognized another in-
sidious inequity. Seemingly less severe injuries were compensated for higher
basis of the partial loss of use of said hand or foot, measured respectively from the wrist or
ankle.
(7) Where an injury causes the loss of, loss of use of, or partial loss of use of any
member specified in the foregoing schedule, the director may determine the disability suf-
fered and the amount of compensation to be awarded by awarding compensation which
bears such relation to the amount stated in the above schedule for the loss of a member as
the disabilities bear to the loss produced by the injuries named in the schedule, and such
amount shall be in addition to compensation for temporary disability; or the director may
award such compensation under the permanent partial disability section of this article as the
director in his discretion may determine from the particular facts in each case.
16. 152 Colo. 12, 380 P.2d 31 (1963).
17. d at 15, 380 P.2d at 32-33 (quoting 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensaiion § 306 (1958))
(emphasis added).
18. American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978). For a
discussion of loss of earning capaity as a measure of permanent partial disability under the Act,
see notes 88-104 tnfra and accompanying the text.
19. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 71 Colo.
115, 204 P. 338 (1922).
20. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 81-12-4, -9 (1953). See Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Tupper,
152 Colo. 12, 380 P.2d 31 (1963).
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sums of money under section 8-51-108 than seemingly more severe injuries
which were restricted to sheduled disability compensation under section 8-
51-104. Thus, section 8-51-104(7) was enacted to give discretion to the direc-
tor to ignore the schedule specifying benefits for an injury enumerated
therein and instead award benefits for those same injuries under the formula
of section 8-51-108.
21
A claimant who suffers loss of use of an affected member cannot be
compensated for the same injury under both the scheduled disability and
permanent partial disability sections. In Wrid of Sleep, Inc. v. Davi's,22 claim-
ant suffered an injured right knee. He was awarded ten percent loss of use of
the right leg as measured at the knee under the disability schedule and an
additional ten percent for precisely the same loss under the permanent par-
tial disability provisions. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the dupli-
cate award was an error and remanded the case with directions to enter an
award under one section or the other but not both.
2 3
In practice, it comes down to which section's formula gives more money
to a claimant. That is the apparent, pragmatic criterion applied by the refe-
ree in each case of any injury included under section 8-51-104. An award is
mandated under the scheduled benefits, however, where there is no evidence
to support an award under the criteria of permanent partial disability; e.g., if
there has been a superb medical recovery with no lost earning capacity and
the claimant has returned to full time work at full pay.
Because of the discretion vested in the referee, it is incumbent upon the
practitioner to be aware of the idiosyncrasies of the referee assigned to a case
when an injury involves a body member enumerated under section 8-51-104.
The general trend of referees in the Division of Labor is to award benefits for
permanent partial disability rather than scheduled disability unless the lat-
ter would provide a higher monetary award.
II. PERMANENT FACIAL OR BODILY DISFIGUREMENT
Although the scheduled benefits exclude any provisions for injuries to
the head, neck, or trunk of the body absent loss of vision or hearing, the Act
specifically allows a referee to award up to $2,000 for permanent facial or
bodily disfigurement. 24 Subject to the statutory limit, any award for disfig-
urement is discretionary. In one case, the loss of three upper front teeth
21. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-104(7) (1973).
22. 188 Colo. 443, 536 P.2d 34 (1975).
23. The court specifically stated that the two sections provide alternative remedies:
When an injury results in the complete or partial loss of use of a member, section
81-12-4(7) [now § 8-51-104(7)] of the Workmen's Compensation Act . . . clothes the
Commission with the discretion to determine disability, and the amount of compensa-
tion to be awarded, in one of two alternate ways: either under the "above schedule" of
section 81-12-4 or under the "permanent partial disability section of this statute,"
which is section 81-12-9 [now § 8-51-108]. While there is direct prohibition not to
consider the factors of one section while awarding under the other, we construe the use
of the disjunctive to indicate a choice, not a fusion, of the sections to be applied.
Id at 446, 536 P.2d at 35 (emphasis in the original).
24. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-51-105 (Supp. 1979) provides:
If any employee is seriously, permanently disfigured about the head, face, or parts
of the body normally exposed to public view, the director, in addition to all other
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constituted such a disfigurement; use of an. artificial device such as false teeth
did not alter the nature of the injury nor preclude benefits for facial disfig-
urement.
25
Any award under the specific provisions for such injuries is expressly in
addition to all other benefits under the Act;26 however, the permanent par-
tial disability provisions exclude any award of benefits for injuries specifi-
cally covered by the lump sum benefits available for disfigurement. 2 7 The
statutory language creates a conundrum which may be illustrated by the
following hypothetical.
What benefits would the Act provide if a woman who earned her liveli-
hood as a professional photographer's model suffered a severe facial or bod-
ily disfigurement by scarring that impaired her earning capacity? If she
were awarded benefits for disfigurement under section 8-51-105, that would
seem to be all she could gain. The provision for permanent partial disability
in section 8-51-108 specifically excludes its application if any injury has been
compensated under section 8-51-105. Although a claim for further benefits
for permanent partial disability after a specific award for disfigurement
would seemingly be denied because of this exclusionary language, such a
claim would apparently be awarded if the professional photographer's model
further alleged that embarrassment and humiliation as a result of the facial
ot bodily scarring caused her earning capacity to be impaired. In spite of
the exclusionary wording of the permanent partial disability provisions, if a
claimant can show some injury in addition to mere disfigurement, recovery
under both the lump sum and permanent partial disability sections may be
possible.
III. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY FROM CUMULATIVE PARTIAL
INDUSTRIAL INJURIES
Section 8-51-106, as amended in 1975, provides for the situation where a
worker suffers an accident that results in superimposing one permanent par-
tial disability upon a previously sustained permanent partial industrial disa-
bility to produce permanent total disability. 28 To qualify for benefits in that
compensation benefits provided in this article, may allow such sum for compensation
on account thereof as he may deem just, not exceeding two thousand dollars.
25. Arkin v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Colo. 463, 358 P.2d 879 (1961).
26. See note 24 supra.
27. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-51-108(l)(a) (1973). For the text of the section, see note 75 infa.
28. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-106 (1973 & Supp. 1979) reads as follows:
(1)(a) In a case where an employee has previously sustained permanent partial
industrial disability and in a subsequent injury sustains additional permanent partial
industrial disability and it is shown that the combined industrial disabilities render the
employee permanently and totally incapable of steady gainful employment and inca-
pable of rehabilitation to steady gainful employment, then the employer in whose
employ the employee sustained such subsequent injury shall be liable only for that
portion of the employee's industrial disability attributable to said subsequent injury,
and the balance of compensation due such employee on account of permanent total
disability shall be paid from the subsequent injury fund as is provided in this section.
(b) In addition to such compensation and after the completion of the payments
therefor, the employee shall continue to receive compensation at his established com-
pensation rate for permanent total disability until death out of a special fund to be
known as the "subsequent injury fund", created for such purpose in the following
manner: For every compensable injury resulting in death wherein there are no persons
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situation, the employee must be permanently and totally (1) incapable of
steady, gainful employment and (2) incapable of rehabilitation to steady,
gainful employment. Whenever that unique combination occurs, the em-
ployer at the time of the subsequent injury is liable only for that portion of
the entire disability attributable to the subsequent injury, and the balance of
the permanent total disability compensation is paid out of a "subsequent
injury fund."
'29
A. Cumulative Permanent Partial Disability
If a combination of injuries occurs that results in less than permanent
total disability, but some degree of permanent partial disability, section 8-
51-106 does not apply. No apportionment is made, and the employer at the
time of the subsequent injury is liable for all of the resulting disability unless
an apportionment is possible under section 8-47-102 of the Act. 30 Assuming
the latter section provides inadequate relief for the employer, the employer is
in the unique and anomalous position of arguing, in tandem with the claim-
ant, that the claimant's disability is total. Anything less would be an eco-
nomically untenable position from the viewpoint of the employer.
An employer has no economic incentive to prove that his worker's disa-
bility can be reduced through some expensive vocational rehabilitation pro-
gram for which the employer must pay under section 8-49-101.3' Further,
there is no economic incentive to rehire the employee after medical recovery,
either for the same job or for a position specially created to accommodate his
disabilities. Either course of action would defeat the employer's right to an
apportionment of compensation.
32
The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that the purpose of section 8-
51-106 is to enhance the opportunities for employment of a partially dis-
either wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased, the employer or his insurance
carrier, if any, shall pay to the division the sum of fifteen thousand dollars to be depos-
ited with the state treasurer, as custodian, into the subsequent injury fund. In the
event there are only partially dependent persons dependent upon the deceased, the
employer or his insurance carrier, if any, shall first pay such benefits to such partial
dependents and the balance of the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, to be deposited
with the state treasurer, as custodian, into the subsequent injury fund.
(2) If an employee entitled to additional benefits, as provided in this section,
obtains employment while receiving compensation from the subsequent injury fund,
he shall be compensated out of said fund at the rate of one-half of his average weekly
wage loss, subject to the maximum and ninimum provisions of the workmen's com-
pensation act, during such period of employment.
(3) In case payment is or has been made under the provisions of this section and
dependency later is shown or if payment is made by mistake or inadvertence or under
such circumstances that justice requires a refund thereof, the division is authorized to
refund such payment to the employer or, if insured, his insurance carrier.
(4) The sums provided for the subsequent injury fund created by this section
shall be used to make such compensation payments as may be required by the provi-
sions of articles 40 to 54 of this title.
29. Id § 8-51-106(1)(b).
30. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-47-102 allows an apportionment only to the extent that any
prior partial disability still exists at the time of a subsequent partial injury. See notes 34-49 tn/a
and accompanying text discussing § 8-47-102.
31. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-49-101 (1973 & Supp. 1979), the medical benefits section of the
Act, provides for benefits up to $20,000 for medical expenses and vocational rehabilitation.
32. See id § 8-51-106(l)(a) (Supp. 1979).
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abled person by relieving his employer of an otherwise greater potential lia-
bility.33 The statutory language, however, defeats its own raison d'&re
unless an employer, at the onset of employment, believes he can prove total
disability in the event of a subsequent industrial injury to the partially dis-
abled person.
B. Pre-exzti)ng Nonindustrial Partial Dsabilh
Amendment of section 8-51-106 is necessary before the idealistic goal of
enhancing opportunities for employment of persons with prior medical con-
ditions or handicaps may be attained in practice: the employer must be
accorded the protection of apportionment for injury to a worker who did not
have a prior ihdustrial disability but instead had a pre-existing, symptomatic,
nonindustrial impairment known to the employer or even a pre-existing,
asymptomatic, nonindustrial impairment unknown to anyone at the time of
employment. Conditions involving aortic or vascular congestion, spinal os-
teoarthritis, scoliosis, or a cerebral vascual aneurism-either symptomatic or
asymptomatic-may not have caused any prior industrial disability. None-
theless, such conditions may cause substantial physical impairment.
What happens when that worker suffers an aggravating or precipitating
on-the-job injury that renders him permanently and totally disabled because
of the cumulative effect of his pre-existing impairment and the subsequent
injury? His employer has no relief under section 8-51-106 for any apportion-
ment of liability. The employer is fully responsible to the injured worker for
permanent total disability-an onerous burden to impose upon an employer
who has hired an employer with a pre-existing condition.
C. Curing the Apportionment Inequities
The illogically limiting and restrictive language presumably did not in-
tend the unequal results it has caused. An employer in reality, acting in his
own economic best interests, is reluctant to hire a handicapped worker. To
do so would be economic folly. The hiring of handicapped persons could be
encouraged if section 8-51-106 were amended to correct the illusory protec-
tion now offered to the employer. The purpose articulated by the court of
appeals will only be accomplished if the subsequent injury fund covers per-
sons who become partially disabled as well as those who become totally dis-
abled when a subsequent injury does occur.
If apportionment made the subsequent injury fund liable for the disa-
bling effects resulting from all pre-existing medical conditions, regardless of
whether they were previously disabling or were industrially induced, an em-
ployer could take solace in the protection of the Act and hire a worker no
matter what his handicap or pre-existing condition. The employer would
only be liable for that portion of disability attributable to the subsequent
accident with the subsequent injury fund liable for that portion attributable
to the pre-existing condition.
33. Horizon Land Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 178, 524 P.2d 638 (1974).
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
IV. PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY FROM CUMULATIVE PARTIAL
INDUSTRIAL INJURIES
A. Apportionment of Permanent Partial Dzsability
The only part of the Act that specifically treats a situation where a
permanent partial disability results from a combined previous disability and
subsequent accidental injury is, strangely, under Article 47, which covers
earnings and wages, 34 whereas permanent disability benefits are contained
in Article 51, appropriately entitled "Accident Benefits." Section 8-47-102
provides that the total percentage of partial disability must be determined
first. The percentage of "the previous disability as it existed at the time of
the subsequent injury" 35 is then deducted. The employer pays the balance
representing the percentage of the disability attributable only to the subse-
quent injury.
This method of apportionment applies to permanent total disability as
well as permanent partial disability unless the apportionment provisions of
section 8-51-106 apply. The latter section will apply when total disability
results from a combined previous industrial disability and subsequent indus-
trial disability. 36 In juxtaposition, the differing apportionment requirements
of section 8-47-102 and section 8-51-106 become clearer. Section 8-47-102
requires a previous disability to exist at the time of the subsequent injury.
Section 8-51-106 does not, by its language or interpretive case law, specifi-
cally require a prior disability to exist at the time of the subsequent injury.
It requires only that there be a "previously sustained permanent partial disa-
bility." Section 8-47-102 does not require the combined disabilities to pro-
duce permanent total disability. Section 8-51-106, however, does require the
prior and subsequent disablities to produce permanent total disability.
It is important to note that the apportionment made under section 8-47-
102 is solely of permanent disability benefits. There is no apportionment of
either medical expenses or temporary disability during medical convales-
cence. Hypothetically, if a person had five percent permanent partial disa-
bility remaining at the time of the subsequent injury, the subsequent
accident would be a separate event entitling the claimant to medical ex-
34. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-47-102 (1973) generally sets forth the manner in which average
weekly earnings are to be calculated:
(1) The fact that an employee has suffered a previous disability or received com-
pensation therefor shall not preclude compensation for a later injury or for death, but,
in determining compensation for the later injury or death, his average weekly earnings
shall be such sum as will reasonably represent his average weekly earning capacity at
the time of the later injury and shall be arrived at according to and subject to the
limitations in section 8-47-101.
(2) In case there is a previous disability, the percentage of disability for a subse-
quent injury shall be determined by computing the percentage of the entire disability
and deducting therefrom the percentage of the previous disability as it existed at the
time of the subsequent injury. In such cases awards shall be based on said computed
percentage. Such computation, when applicable, shall be made in the following types
of awards under articles 40 to 54 of this title: Permanent total, permanent partial,
including scheduled, working unit, and lump sum; except that, in the event the provi-
sions of section 8-51-106 are applicable, such apportionment shall not be made.
35. Id § 8-47-102(2).




penses and temporary disability benefits while convalescing until such time
as he reached maximum medical improvement. Apportionment would then
be made of whatever residual permanent disability was sustained.
B. Statutory Conditions to Apportionment
The apportionment allowed to the employer is illusory for two reasons.
First, it requires the existence of "a previous disability"; however, a "disabil-
ity" has been interpreted by some case decisions to mean a loss of earning
capacity, not just a functional or physical impairment. 37 Second, the em-
loyer must establish by competent evidence what the previous disability was
"at the time of the subsequent injury."'38 He is precluded from credit for any
previous disability awards that were made months or years prior to the sub-
sequent injury if the worker ultimately recovered with only a residual func-
tional or physiological impairment but no disability. 39 The subsequent
employer is liable for the entire disability without any apportionment if he
cannot prove that the worker's disability at the time of the subsequent injury
was the same as that for which compensation was awarded previously.
The burden placed upon the employer by the statutory prerequisites to
apportionment is evident from the landmark cases in which the Colorado
Supreme Court has reviewed and interpreted section 8-47-102.4 0 In Mat-
thews v. Industrial Commission,4 1 the claimant had a congenital low back con-
dition prior to the on-the-job accident but nonetheless was able to work as a
truck driver driving long distances and lifting 50-100 pound sacks of chemi-
cals. His employment activities, according to his testimony, caused him no
discomfort. The Industrial Commission determined that the accident
caused 8% permanent disability and awarded the claimant 4%, finding that
4% pre-existed the accident. The supreme court reversed the Industrial
Commission and ordered the entire 8% paid to the claimant on the basis that
he was not industrially disabled from performing his work full time at full
pay prior to the accident. Even though the claimant admitted that the in-
jury aggravated a pre-existing condition, the employer was held liable for
the entire degree of permanent impairment because the claimant's earning
capacity was not diminished by the pre-existing condition immediately prior
to the injury in dispute.
42
The supreme court made it very clear that the employer takes a worker
as he finds him with all of his impairments in Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. V.
Industrial Commission.43 The claimant had suffered three previous back inju-
ries for which he had received three separate compensation awards. Al-
37. See, e.g., Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Colo. 146, 355 P.2d 300 (1960).
38. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-47-102(2) (1973).
39. See Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Rhodes, 166 Colo. 82, 441 P.2d 652 (1968); Empire
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. McLain, 151 Colo. 510, 379 P.2d 402 (1963).
40. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Rhodes, 166 Colo, 82, 441 P.2d 652 (1968); Empire
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. McLain, 151 Colo. 510, 379 P.2d 402 (1963); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 151 Colo. 18, 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n, 144
Colo. 146, 355 P.2d 300 (1960).
41. 144 Colo. 146, 355 P.2d 300 (1960).
42. See id at 149-50, 355 P.2d at 301.
43. 151 Colo. 18, 379 P.2d 153 (1962).
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though he had been advised not to perform any heavy work after his third
injury, he was able to work full time at full wages before his fourth injury left
him permanently totally disabled. The court ruled that the employer was
not entitled to any apportionment on the basis of a pre-existing condition.
44
The court stressed the absence of any apportionment provisions in the
Act to cover this situation 45-an omission rectified by amending section 8-
51-106 to apportion permanent total disability. If a worker's disability by
chance is less than total, the employer would still be denied relief under the
rule articulated in Colorado Fuel and Iron.
The claimant's ability to work full time at full wages after a previous
industrial disability was determinative in a third supreme court case which
upheld a full award of disability benefits without any apportionment. 46 The
fact that the claimant had received compensation benefits for a prior perma-
nent disability did not preclude an award of full benefits for the subsequent
injury because the employee "nevertheless, had fully recovered as a working
u n it .
'4 7
The significance of the second condition in the statutory language of
section 8-47-102 was expressly stated by the Colorado Supreme Court in Col-
orado Fuel and Iron Corp. v. Rhodes.48 The claimant in Rhodes had suffered a
previous back injury for which he was awarded permanent partial disability
benefits. He suffered a second back injury in 1964. Prior to the second in-
jury he had returned to work full time at full wages. The Industrial Com-
mission determined that 15% permanent partial disability existed after the
subsequent injury but limited the award to 7 1/2%. The supreme court held
that the entire 15% was owed to the claimant:
The fact that Claimant in 1955 received an award for permanent
partial disability based on a finding of 7 1/2% disability as a work-
ing unit, does not necessarily mean that such percentage of disabil-
ity existed at the time of the subsequent injury. . . . And the
statutory test is that percentage of the previous disability existing
as of the time of the subsequent injury, not the percentage of previ-
ous disability as it existed some nine years- prior to the subsequent
injury.
49
The evidentiary requirements of section 8-47-102, as interpreted by the
court, virtually preclude any apportionment of benefits for successive inju-
ries resulting in only permanent partial disability. If the legislature intended
a true apportionment, why did it not include, in favor of the employer, pre-
vious impairment---either industrial or nonindustrial-regardless of whether
the impairment prevented the employee from working full time at full wages
at the time of the subsequent injury?
44. Id at 26-27, 379 P.2d at 157-58.
45. Id at 26, 379 P.2d at 157.
46. Empire Oldsmobile, Inc. v. McLain, 151 Colo. 510, 379 P.2d 402 (1963).
47. Id at 516, 379 P.2d at 405.
48. 166 Colo. 82, 441 P.2d 652 (1968).
49. Id at 88-89, 441 P.2d at 655.
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V. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
The compensation rate for permanent total disability is set forth in sec-
tion 8-51-107.50 This section also creates a rebuttable presumption that loss
of two hands or arms or feet or legs or eyes or a combination of any two thereof
caused by the same znJhit shall be permanent total disability.
5'
Again, the legislature has acted strangely. It included an almost iden-
tial anatomical pairing as itemized in the scheduled disability section 8-51-
104, but conspicuously omitted a presumption for deafness in both ears. In
addition, the loss of use of these body members is not included in the pre-
sumption of permanent total disability. Another inexplicable omission is the
absence of any provision for injury to the spinal column, brain, or trunk of
the body.
The employer is relieved from payment of permanent total disability if
he obtains "suitable employment" for the injured worker in spite of the pre-
sumption of total disability. 52 What type of job constitutes "suitable em-
ployment," however, is not defined by the statute. Further, even when
"suitable employment" is offered by the employer, section 8-51-107 provides
for an award of permanent partial disability to the claimant without any
guidance as to how or by what formula such partial disability is to be deter-
mined. Thus, there are no statutory standards by which any employer or
claimant may analyze the strengths and weaknesses of a particular claim
before a hearing on the merits. The courts have not supplied the missing
standards.
A. General or Speqjci Employment-Which is the Test?
In Rio Grande Motor Way v. De Merschman,53 the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld an award of permanent total disability although the claimant was
given a supervisory position with the same employer at $125 per month (a
50% reduction from earnings prior to the accident). In doing so, the court
stated that "[w]hether degree of disability be determined from general impair-
ment, or impairment of capacity to perform specic work, or both, depends upon the
facts of each case, and thereto the commission is vested with the 'widest possible
50. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-51-107(1) (1973) provides:
In cases of permanent total disability, the award shall be sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of the average weekly wages of the injured employee and shall continue until
death of such person so totally disabled but not in excess of the weekly maximum
benefits specified in this article for injuries causing temporary total disability.
51. The loss of both hands or both arms or both feet or both legs or both eyes or of any
two thereof, by injury in or resulting from the same injury or occupational disease,
shall create a presumption which may be rebutted by competent contrary evidence of
total and permanent disability to be compensated according to the provisions of this
section; except that, where the disability comes under this section and where the em-
ployer or the division obtains suitable employment for such disabled person which he
can perform and which in all cases is subject to the sole approval of the director, the
disabilities set out in this subsection (2) shall not constitute total disability during the
continuance of the director's approval of said employment but shall constitute such
partial disability as may be determined by the director after a finding of the facts.
Id § 8-51-107(2) (Supp. 1979).
52. Id.
53. 100 Colo. 421, 68 P.2d 446 (1937).
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discretion.' "4 The court, with only speculative and conjectural evidence at
best about the claimant's alleged industrial disability and loss of earning
capacity, obviously did not consider the supervisory position suitable alter-
native employment.
This employment appears to arise solely from the corporation's rec-
ognition of a "moral responsibility," plus the influence of its presi-
dent, claimant's brother. . . . We think the conclusion inevitable
that it has no relation to earning power, that it is in fact charitable,
a mere gratuity, which in all probability would vanish with the
death, disability, or discharge of the brother, leaving claimant
mere flotsam on the industrial sea.
55
Only three years after De Merschman, the court held that the test of per-
manent disability is lost earning capacity in general employment and is not re-
stricted to the type ofjob the employee performed at the time of the injury.
56
The claimant was a forty-two year old coal miner with a seventh grade edu-
cation and no training in any work other than mining. He suffered a low
back injury for which he was awarded sixty percent permanent partial disa-
bility. On appeal by the claimant, the supreme court affirmed the partial
disability award, primarily on the basis of one doctor's opinion of the claim-
ant's future ability to work in some field of general employment. 57 The rec-
ord was barren of any evidence the claimant could return to coal mining-
an irrelevant fact under the test articulated by the court. Equally irrelevant
were percentages of functional or medical impairment:
The functional disability of an injured workman, compared with
that of a normal man, does not control in fixing his compensable
status, since the term "disability" as used in the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, means industrial disability or loss of earning capac-
ity and not mere functional disability. . . . [Tihere was evidence
that claimant retained or would regain efficiency in some substan-
tial degree as a working unit in the fields of general employ-
ment ...
It may further be observed that neither under the applicable
statutes nor any cases adjudicated prior to or since their amend-
ment to the present state, is the extent or degree of disability solely
to be determined by the claimant's impaired earning capcaity as it
relates to the kind of labor in which he was employed when in-
jured.
58
The supreme court did not follow its own general employment rule in
54. Id at 423, 68 P.2d at 447 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The claimant had been
burned in an explosion and could no longer perform his work as a master mechanic. Doctors
estimated his disability at 65-100%. He had no special training or skill for other work.
55. Id, 68 P.2d at 447.
56. Byouk v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Colo. 430, 433-34, 105 P.2d 1087, 1089. (1940).
57. Seven doctors examined the claimant: three for the claimant, two for the employer,
and two for the Industrial Commission. Two of the claimant's doctors thought he was
permanently tozall.y disabled; but one, fixing no percentage of disability, testified that the claim-
ant would be able to do ordinary labor in the future. His testimony appeared to be determina-
tive. The employer's doctors varied in their estimates of the claimant's disability: one set the
percentage between 25-30%; the other, at 62 1/2%. Estimates by the Commission's doctors
ranged from 50-60%. Id at 433, 105 P.2d at 1088-89.
58. Id at 433-34, 105 P.2d at 1089 (citations omitted).
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National Fuel Co. v. Arnold.59 The claimant, a twenty-five year old coal miner,
suffered a back and pelvis injury that residually left his feet paralyzed, re-
quiring canes or crutches to walk. Nevertheless, the claimant managed to
complete a typewriting course at Opportunity School in Denver and subse-
quently worked as a clerk, bookkeeper, and cook. The supreme court held
that these jobs in fields of general employment did not reduce his permanent
total disability just because "this most unfortunate young man, who, perse-
vering to the utmost, has at times, and under unusual circumstances, been
able to obtain some employment. . . ,,60 Further, the supreme court em-
phasized that the claimant had obtained the jobs himself. Because the em-
ployer had played no part in obtaining jobs for the claimant, the court did
not believe the employer was "in a position to complain" that the claimant
had been able to do so on his own initiative.
6 1
Wage-earning capacity was discarded as a test for determining perma-
nent total disability in New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission.6 2 The
claimant was a twenty-four year old zinc miner with a ninth grade education
who injured his spinal cord in a mine accident. He lost control over his
bowel and urine functions and lost total feeling in the perirectal region. The
referee interpreted these injuries as a purely functional disability, but the
Commission awarded permanent total disability. The supreme court re-
marked that the claimant performed other jobs after his medical recovery,
but did not bother to enumerate them. It simply stated that "[o]ne able to
obtain occasional employment under rare conditions and at small remunera-
tion may be totally disabled for all practicable purposes."
'6 3
B. The "Widest Possible Discretion" Rule
The only consistent rule which emerges from the cases on permanent
total disability is that " '[ilt is axiomatic that the Industrial Commission is
vested with the widest possible discretion with the exercise of which the
courts will not interfere.' ",64 Where the Act vests the Commission with dis-
cretionary power, the courts will not overrule "the exercise of that discretion
unless there is a clear showing of an abuse thereof."'6 5
In the NewJersey Znc Co. case, the supreme court relied on the Commis-
sion's exercise of discretion in awarding permanent total disability in spite of
conflicting medical evidence. Two doctors had testified that the claimant
was totally unemployable as a hard rock miner; other doctors testified that
the claimant suffered only fifty percent permanent partial disability. The
court laid to rest anyone's idea that medical opinions or any expert opinions
59. 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950).
60. Id. at 226, 214 P.2d at 787.
61. Id at 227, 214 P.2d at 787.
62. 165 Colo. 482, 440 P.2d 284 (1968).
63. Id at 486, 440 P.2d at 286.
64. National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 226, 214 P.2d 784, 787 (1950) (citations
omitted); New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Colo. 482, 440 P.2d 284 (1968); Rio
Grande Motor Way v. De Merschman, 100 Colo, 421, 68 P.2d 446 (1937); F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Humes, 523 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1974) (not selected for official publication).
65. Industrial Comm'n v. Seastone, 167 Colo. 571, 576, 448 P.2d 963, 965 (1969).
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bind the Industrial Commission on the issue of permanent disability:
"[Elven if the expert testimony 'were undisputed, it would not necessarily be
concusive on the fact-finding body'-the Commission.
'
"66
The issue in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Hiumes6 7 was whether an award of
permanent total disability could be made without an opportunity for the
employer to introduce evidence concerning the percentage of the claimant's
disability. Two doctors had testified that the claimant was totally perma-
nently disabled although the question of the degree of disability was techni-
cally not at issue during the original hearings. Conflicting medical
testimony had also been given. No mention had been made of the claimant's
earning capacity nor any other test for permanent total disability. The Col-
orado Court of Appeals upheld the award of permanent total disability ben-
efits by invoking the "widest possible discretion" rule.68
Using "widest possible discretion" as the test, it would seem that even a
whim could be the basis of an award for permanent total disability just so
long as there is some testimony or exhibit properly admitted into evidence.
The decision then becomes a matter of what weight the referee gives the
evidence however meager. Our appellate courts have persistently reiterated
that they will not substitute their judgment for the referee's.
C. Exercising Discretion
Pragmatically, the discretionary language of the Act and the case law
place the referee in an unusually difficult position whenever a case requires
evaluation of a substantial permanent disability. The difficulty arises be-
cause Colorado does not have a pure permanent partial disability statute;
ie., the Colorado Act does not provide for an award of benefits over the
claimant's life expectancy based purely on the degree of permanent impair-
ment. Instead, there is a statutory dollar limit of $26,292 for permanent
partial disability which places a ceiling on the amount of benefits payable in
spite of the degree of disability and the life expectancy of the injured
worker.
69
There is a substantial disparity between permanent partial disability
and permanent total disability benefits. Permanent partial disability is cur-
rently paid at a rate of $84 per week, subject to the $26,292 limit; but perma-
nent total disability is paid at a higher rate without any ceiling on the total
amount payable. The latter rate is the same as compensation for temporary
total disability, two-thirds of a worker's average weekly rate not to exceed
$222.74 per week. 70 A worker must earn $334.11 per week to qualify for the
maximum weekly rate of $222.74.
7 1
Hypothetically, if a worker were 21 years of age at the time of an injury,
66. 165 Colo. 482, 486, 440 P.2d 284, 286 (1968).
67. 523 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1974) (not selected for official publication).
68. d at 144.
69. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-51-108(a) (b) (Supp. 1979). For the text of the permanent par-
tial disability provisions, see note 73 infra.
70. From July 1, 1979 through June 30, 1980, $222.74 is the maximum rate for both tem-
porary total and permanent total disability. See Appendix IV infra.
71. See Appendices IV, V ifia.
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he would have a life expectancy of 52.07 years. A 1% partial disability
would amount to a maximum award of $2,274.42.72 A permanent partial
disability rating of only 11 1/2% would bring the worker to the maximum
limit of $26,292. In contrast, if the same worker, earning $334.11 per week,
were determined to be permanently totally disabled, he would receive
$603,099.73 total compensation ($222.74 per week times 52.07 years life ex-
pectancy without the benefit of any offset or reduction for social security
disability benefits or any other allowable statutory offset).
73
What happens, practically speaking, when a referee is faced with a seri-
ous injury that results in a substantial degree of permanent disability clearly
exceeding 11 1/2% by any standard? The referee would probably calculate
the various sets of rating figures and anguish whether to award the worker
permanent total disability. In accordance with governing case law, he is
vested with the "widest possible discretion" should he choose to award per-
manent total disability. In that regard, it has been stated by the supreme
court that it is not necessary for a worker to have sustained a "helpless paral-
ysis reducing bodily functions to the minimum essential for the maintenance
of a mere spark of life."'74 Claimant and respondent alike are painfully
aware of the shocking disparity in the two possible awards and of the conun-
drum facing the referee: whether he should award permanent total disabil-
ity or maximum permanent partial disability. Either award is unfair, but no
intermediate award is allowed by the Act.
VI. PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
The statutory provisions for permanent partial disability are set forth in
section 8-51-108 of the Act. 75 This section excludes from consideration as
72. Ser Appendices, I, II infa.
73. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-107(1) (1973).
74. New York Indemn. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Colo. 364, 366, 281 P.2d 740, 741
(1929).
75. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-108 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
(1)(a) Where an accident causes injury resulting in permanent partial disability,
except the sustaining of any one of the injuries specifically covered by sections 8-51-
104 to 8-51-106, the injured employee shall be deemed permanently disabled from the
time he is so declared by the director and from said time shall be entitled to compensa-
tion for permanent partial disability in addition to any compensation theretofore al-
lowed.
(b) In determining permanent partial disability, the director shall ascertain in
terms of percentage the extent of general permanent disability which the injury has
caused, taking into consideration not only the manifest weight of the evidence but also
the general physical condition and mental training, ability, former employment, and
education of the injured employee. The director shall then determine the injured em-
ployee's expectancy of life from recognized expectancy tables and such other evidence
relating to his expectancy as may be presented, but in no event shall the employee's
life expectancy be reduced for these purposes if his injury or illness is the direct cause
of his reduced life expectancy. He shall then ascertain the total amount which said
employee would receive during the balance of his expectancy at the compensaton rate
of eighty-four dollars per week and shall then take that percentage of the total sum so
arrived at as is indicated by the percentage of general permanent disability found to
exist in the manner as set forth in this article, not to exceed in any event the aggregate
sum of twenty-six thousand two hundred ninety-two dollars, said sum to be paid at a
weekly rate of not more than eighty-four dollars.
(2) At any time, and from time to time, during the period for which compensa-
tion has been awarded for either permanent total or permanent partial disability,
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permanent partial disability any injury specifically covered by sections 8-51-
104 through 8-51-106. Section 8-51-108 thus effectively precludes any (1)
scheduled disability under section 8-51-104(7) after a referee has exercised
his discretion and made an award under that section, 76 (2) facial or bodily
disfigurement which has been awarded by the director under section 8-51-
105,
77 or (3) permanent total disability which has been awarded under sec-
tion 8-51-106 or section 8-51-107. 7 8 Because of the exclusionary language,
the Colorado Supreme Court has held that the 'method for determining ben-
efits for an injury under any one of those sections cannot be the same
formula as set forth in section 8-51-108(1)(b).
79
A. When Does Permanent Partial Disability Commence?
Under section 8-51-108(1)(a), permanent partial disability commences
at the time the director declares that a worker is permanently partially dis-
abled. The date is purely discretionary with the director since no specific
time is legislatively prescribed.8' Sequentially, permanent partial disability
generally follows a period of temporary total disability; therefore, the direc-
tor's discretion is very significant because of the wide disparity between the
weekly rate for permanent partial disability and the maximum weekly rate
for temporary total disability ($84.00 and $222.74 respectively from July 1,
1979 through June 30, 1980). It is to the employer's benefit for the com-
mencement date to be set as early as possible. As a result, insurers contend
that the commencement date should be the earliest of (1) the date of maxi-
mum medical improvement, (2) the date the claimant actually returns to
work, (3) the date the claimant was able to return to work in the opinion of a
treating or examining physician, or (4) the date of the first rating of perma-
nent physical or functional impairment given by a physician. The claimant,
of course, maximizes his benefits-by arguing for the latest possible permanent
partial disability commencement date. One case has held that the com-
mencement date is when the claimant reaches maximum medical improve-
ment. 8 1
B. Permanent Partial Disability after Permanent Total Disabihty
If a claimant qualifies for permanent partial disability benefits, then
upon application of any party in interest, the director shall require such injured em-
ployee to be examined by one or more physicians, and, upon petition from any such
interested party supported by a showing that the disability of such injured employee
has undergone a change in degree since the entry of such award, the case shall be
reopened, and the compensation previously awarded shall be modified, terminated, or
continued as the evidence may require.
76. For a discussion of the referee's discretion under § 8-51-104(7), see the text accompany-
ing notes 15-23 supra.
77. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
78. For a discussion of§ 8-51-106, see the text accompanying notes 28-33 supra. Section 8-
51-107 is discussed in the text accompanying notes 50-73 supra.
79. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Tupper, 152 Colo. 12, 380 P.2d 31 (1963); Arkin v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 145 Colo. 463, 358 P.2d 879 (1961).
80. Wilson v. Sinclaire, 109 Colo. 592, 128 P.2d 996 (1942).
81. Pickett v. Colorado State Hosp., 32 Colo. App. 282, 513 P.2d 228 (1973).
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such benefits are "in addition to any compensation" previously awarded.8 2
In other words, the benefits provided under section 8-51-108 are not to be
reduced by payment of any other benefits. For example, permanent partial
disability benefits would not be reduced by payments made for a preceding
period of temporary total disability. The claimant can receive the $26,292
aggregate limitation on permanent partial disability benefits8 3 without re-
gard to temporary total disability compensation received.
What happens if a worker had been awarded permanent total disability
benefits for an injury and his condition dramatically improved with ongoing
treatment, so that he could return to work at gainful employment? Under
section 8-51-108(2), any interested party may petition to reopen the case if
there has been a change in the degree of disability.8 4 If the requisite showing
of changed conditions is met, the director must reopen the case for modifica-
tion, termination, or continuance of the award. 85 Alternatively, under sec-
tion 8-53-119, the claimant, his representative, an employer, or an insurer
has the right to petition to reopen the case at-any time within six years from
the date of the injury or within two years from the date the last compensa-
tion payment becomes due and payable.8 6 Under the latter section, reopen-
ing the case is discretionary with the director. If the case is reopened under
section 8-53-119, however, the director may consider termination, diminu-
tion, continuance, or increase in compensation and medical benefits. 8 7 The
difference in language is inexplicable. Was it the result of negligent drafting
or intentional? If purposeful, the legislative intent remains hidden. Note
that the two sections are not cross-referenced to the statute despite dealing
with the same subject matter of procedures for reopening claims.
If a determination is made that permanent total disability no longer
exists, payment for such disability is discontinued. Any new award made for
permanent partial disability would be paid in addition to benefits previously
paid for total disability; ie., without credit or reduction for permanent total
disability benefits previously paid. Significantly, however, the permanent
partial disability benefits would be paid at the lower rate of $84 per week
82. CoLo. REV. STAT, § 8-51-108(1)(a) (1973).
83. Id. § 8-51-108(1)(b)(Supp. 1979).
84. Id § 8-51-108(2) (1973). See note 75 supra for the text of the statute.
85. Id
86. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-53-119 (Supp. 1979).
Upon his own motion on the ground of error, mistake, or a change in condition,
the director, at any time within six years from the date of injury in cases where no
compensation has been paid, or at any time within two years after the date last pay-
ment becomes due and payable, or within six years from the date of injury, whichever
is longer, in cases where compensation has been paid, and after notice of hearing to the
parties interested, may review and reopen any award and, on such review, may make
an award ending, diminishing, maintaining, or increasing compensation and any med-
ical benefits previously awarded, subject to the maximum and minimum provided in
articles 40 to 54 of this title, and shall state his conclusions of fact and rulings of law,
and shall immediately send to the parties a copy of the award. No such review or
reopening shall affect such award as regards any moneys already paid. The director
shall grant or deny a request filed by any interested party asking that the case be
reopened under this section and shall state his reasons therefor. Any such order or




and would terminate after a specified period when the statutory limit was
met.
C. The Test for Permanent Partial Disability
Section 8-51-108(l)(b) requires the director, in awarding permanent
partial disability, to determine the percentage of a worker's "generalpermanent
disabih which the injury has caused" and mandates factors for him to con-
sider, which are "not only the manifest weight of the evidence but also the
general physical condition and mental training, ability, former employment,
and education of the injured employer."
1. Loss of Earning Capacity or Functional Impairment?
Although the statute refers to "general permanent disability," the
proper test for permanent partial disability has not been definitively deter-
mined. The crucial, polemic issue is whether permanent partial disability
should (1) indemnify a functional impairment caused by an industrial injury
(akin to personal injury in a common law tort case) or (2) reimburse a claim-
ant for loss of wage-earning capacity caused by an industrial injury. The
polarization of the differing philosophies when applied to interpretation of
permanent partial disability under section 8-51-108 was articulated in two
recent Colorado cases.
88
In Puffer Mercantile Co. v. Arellano,89 the court of appeals affirmed an
award of one percent permanent partial disability for surgical removal of the
claimant's left testicle and left and right epidymides. 90 The claimant, in the
process of unloading box cars, had aggravated a pre-existing groin infection
which eventually necessitated the surgery. Following medical treatment, the
claimant stated that he was afraid to try lifting heavy objects. At the hear-
ing, no evidence of any loss of earning capacity was introduced. The only
medical opinion, by the treating physician, established functional impair-
ment at best: " '[H]e has one less testicle, and I am not sure that would be of
any consequence other than how he feels about it, ... from an emotional stand-
point. ' ,91
The majority opinion of the court of appeals stated that loss of physical
function, despite no loss of earning capacity, is a proper basis for an award of
permanent partial disability: "'"The term 'disability' is not restricted to
• . .[impairment of] present earning power. . . , but embraces any loss of
physical function which detracts from the former efficiency of the body or its
members in the ordinar, pursuits of life." '.92
The effect of the majority opinion was to treat permanent partial disa-
88. American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978); Puffer
Mercantile Co. v. Arellano, 34 Colo. App. 434, 528 P.2d 966 (1974), rev'd, 190 Colo. 138, 546
P.2d 481 (1975).
89. 34 Colo. App. 434, 528 P.2d 966 (1974), rev'd, 190 Colo. 138, 546 P.2d 481 (1975).
90. The epidymides are elongated cord-like structures in which spermatozoa are stored
after being produced in the testicles.
91. 34 Colo. App. at 437, 528 P.2d at 967 (emphasis supplied by the court).
92. Id, 528 P.2d at 968 (emphasis supplied by the court) (quoting London Guar. & Acci-
dent Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 70 Colo. 256, 258-59, 199 P. 962, 963 (1921)).
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bility awards like personal injury damages in tort cases since the claimant
could be working full time at full wages when he received the award. In
essence, the Puffer majority interpreted section 8-51-108 as compensation for
functional impairment alone.
Judge VanCise delivered a scathing dissent in which he contended that
no permanent partial disability should have been awarded. His rationale
was that the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act is not based upon
"whole-man impairment" but rather was enacted to compensate for loss of
earning capacity. Judge VanCise agreed with the majority that the Act is to
be liberally construed to accomplish a beneficent social and protective pur-
pose but added that the court cannot extent the Act beyond the limits of its
purposes. He admonished that the London Guarantee case relied on by the
majority involved a worker unable to protractedly perform physical exertion
without many rest periods during his working hours.9 3 He then pointed out
the substantial distinctions between the "whole-man theory" and the "work-
ing unit theory" of compensation.
"In compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated
for are those which produce disability and thereby presumably af-
fect earning power. For this reason classes of injuries which result
in verdicts of thousands of dollars at common law produce no
award whatever under a compensation statute. . . . Similarly, im-
pairment or destruction of sexual potency is not in itself a basis for
an award, and presumably the same result would apply to such an
injury as destruction of child-bearing capacity in a woman."
'94
"[A]ny abandonment of the pervading impairment-of-earning
capacity concept in favor of an ill-defined notion that workmen's
compensation is designed to indemnify for physical injury as such
could raise serious dangers to the system. One danger stems from
the utter absence of any yardstick by which to measure in dollars
the intrinsic value of individual functions of different parts of the
body to different persons ....
A familiar practical danger lies in the tendency for the whole-
man theory to turn imperceptibly into the less elegant 'let's-give-
the-poor-guy-something' theory. The end of this road is the kind of
situation. . . in which a grotesque proportion of the compensation
benefit dollar is frittered away on trivial awards of, perhaps, 2
1/2% disability . . . awards that bear no conceivable relation to
the real purpose of workmen's compensation, that of protecting the
victims of industrial injury from insecurity and dependence. '95
Noting Judge VanCise's dissenting opinion, the Colorado Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case with directions to
deny the award. 96 In its short, cryptic opinion, the court pointed out that
93. 34 Colo. App. at 440, 528 P.2d at 969 (VanCise, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 441, 528 P.2d at 969 (VanCise, J., dissenting) (quoting I A. LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATON LAW § 2.40).
95. 34 Colo. App. at 441, 528 P.2d at 970 (Van Cise, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 A. LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.10).
96. Puffer Mercantile Co. v. Arellano, 190 Colo. 138, 546 P.2d 481 (1975).
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the record did not "support a finding of industrial disability or loss of earn-
ing capacity, as distinct from a mere functional disability."
'9 7
The implication of the supreme court's decision in Pufr was that the
discretion given to the director in section 8-51-108 to award permanent par-
tial disability must be narrowed to evidence of a wage-earning loss of capac-
ity. The case left several questions unanswered, however. Must a
percentage of wage-earning loss of capacity apply as the measure of perma-
nent partial disability? Or, once a percentage loss of earning capacity is
established, is discretion then returned to the director or referee to award
some percentage of "general permanent disability," as stated in section 8-51-
108, based upon any evidence that the claimant can produce of any of the
enumerated factors bearing upon permanent partial disability? Or, can a
director or referee award some percentage of "general permanent disability"
based upon a vague notion of what effect the injury has had on the worker,
even if the worker produces no proof of any of the enumerated factors? If
some percentage loss in earning capacity is merely the threshold requirement
for a compensable injury, then evidence of a minimal loss of earning capac-
ity may support a substantial award of permanent partial disability based on
general functional impairment.
The subsequent case of American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros98 further
confused the issue of whether permanent partial disability represents whole-
man impairment or working-unit disability. It also confused the require-
ment that a worker prove his claim for permanent partial disability. In the
AMAX case an underground miner suffered an arm injury. During the
medical examination for that injury, a routine chest x-ray revealed early
symptoms of mild silicosis. A medical examiner recommended that the
claimant not return to underground mine work because of the distinct dan-
ger of exacerbating the silicosis. The claimant did return to work for the
same employer as a janitor. He then filed for permanent partial disability
benefits for an occupational disease. 99 He proved that his wage as an un-
dergound miner would have been $5.53 per hour at the time he was medi-
cally able to return to work but that his janitor's wage was only $4.42 per
hour, a 17% wage loss. He was forty-five years old and had worked as a
miner most of his adult life, including nine years employment with Ameri-
can Metals Climax, Inc. The Industrial Commission awarded the claimant
17% permanent partial disability.
After stating the test for permanent partial disability in terms of indus-
trial disability or loss of earning capacity, the court of appeals held that "the
Industrial Commission's use of claimant's wage loss as the best measure of
97. Id at 139, 546 P.2d at 482 (citations omitted).
98. 39 Colo. App. 560, 571 P.2d 315 (1977), afd, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978)
[hereinafter referred to as AMAX].
99. Although the claim was brought under the Occupational Disease Disability Act, the
court of appeals cited the Puffer case as authority for the true test of permanent partial disabil-
ity. 39 Colo. App. at 562, 571 P.2d at 317. Thus the cases are relevant to understanding § 8-51-
108 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Occupational Disease Disability Act was re-
pealed September 1, 1975; however, occupational diseases are now subject to the provisions of
the Workmen's Compenation Act. COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-51-112 (Supp. 1979).
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his industrial disability did not constitute an abuse of discretion."' 0 0 The
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. 1° 1 Unfortunately, it
did not state that percentage loss of wage-earning capacity must be the test
when the issue is permanent partial disability. It merely approved the refe-
ree's exercise of his limitless discretion under section 8-51-108. The supreme
court simply adopted loss of wage-earning capacity as a test if the referee
chose to select it as the standard in a particular case. Justice Erickson, writ-
ing for the court, stated that "[a] compensable disability under the statute
requires a finding that the claimant has suffered an industrial disability or a
loss of earning capacity."' 01 2 His reiteration of the "widest possible discre-
tion" maxim, 10 3 however, begs the question of whether the referee may ig-
nore evidence about loss of earning capacity.
The parameters of this discretion are still not defined, but at the very
least an award will not be overturned if wage-earning loss of capacity is the
basis for such award. It is regretful that the language could not have been
more forceful in frankly stating that wage-earning loss of capacity shall be
the test for awarding permanent partial disability. As a result, no one can
truly gauge the effects of this decision on other industrial injuries where the
issue is permanent partial disability. Earlier cases interpreting permanent
partial disability under the Act may still retain viability.
10 4
2. Factors to be Considered by the Referee
Although section 8-51-108(l)(b) enumerates factors for a referee to con-
sider, to what degree these factors are in fact considered is academic. There
is a judicial presumption that the presiding referee considered each one of
them and gave it due weight in arriving at his determination of permanent
partial disability. 10 5 Furthermore, the factors are not conditions precedent
to proof of a compensable permanent partial disability claim.
The statutory factors are not exclusive, but are merely illustrative
of the types of evidence which are relevant to the issues before the
commission. . . . [L]ack of evidence as to any of the statutory fac-
tors does not automatically mandate the dismissal of an employee's
claim. If the commission can reasonably conclude from the evi-
dence that the claimant has suffered a compensable disability and
can also reasonably determine the extent of that disability, .. an
award is justified and will be upheld on appeal.
10 6
The burden of proof is theoretically on the worker to establish his per-
manent partial disability, but the claimant apparently only needs to estab-
lish two things: (1) the existence of the disability, and (2) the extent
100. 39 Colo. App. at 563, 571 P.2d at 318 (citations omitted).
101. 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978).
102. Id at 166, 576 P.2d at 556 (citations omitted).
103. Id., 576 P.2d at 556.
104. Simpson & Co. v. Wheeler, 153 Colo. 480, 386 P.2d 976 (1963) (working-unit disabil-
ity); Industrial Comm'n v. Vigil, 150 Colo. 356, 373 P.2d 308 (1962) (working-unit disability);
Wierman v. Tunnell, 108 Colo. 544, 120 P.2d 638 (1941) (whole-man impairment).
105. American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978); Dravo
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 57, 569 P.2d 345 (1977).
106. 195 Colo. at 167, 576 P.2d at 557.
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
thereof.10 7 The claimant does not have to prove that jobs at comparable
wages are unavilable to him; the burden is on the respondent to prove avail-
ability of work which the claimant can perform in order to rebut either the
existence or the extent of the claimant's disability.' 08 Evidence of available
work is relevant, but it is not required. Such evidence is "merely an addi-
tional factor which the commission must consider in reaching its decision if
such evidence is in fact submitted."109
The "mereness" of available work seems strange since it would appear
that evidence of available work would be the best evidence of "industrial
disability or a loss of earning capacity," which was articulated as the proper
test for permanent partial disability in the AMAA case. 1 0 If the statutory
factors are merely "illustrative" and the Industrial Commission has the
"widest possible discretion," then it seems that a claimant need introduce
nothing more than a medical opinion that he has suffered a permanent phys-
ical or mental injury in order to be awarded permanent partial disability
benefits under section 8-51-108.
This conclusion is supported by the Colorado Court of Appeals decision
in Dravo Corp. v. Industrial Commisson,"'1 which upheld an award of 25% per-
manent partial disability based upon a doctor's estimate of 25% anatomical
disability rather than industrial disability. The claimant had suffered a
mycoardial infarction while shoring timber to support the roof of a mine
tunnel. In the doctor's opinion, the anatomical loss of heart muscle created
an inherent risk of a future attack. Consequently, the claimant had suffered
an irreversible efect as a result of the heart attack. The referee specifically
adopted the cardiologist's opinion as a basis for the award of permanent
partial disability. The court of appeals considered anatomical disability a
relevant factor, useful as a guideline for determining the percentage of per-
manent industrial disability." 2 The court was not concerned about the co-
incidence between the cardiologist's estimate of 25% anatomical disability
and the 25% permanent partial disability award even though the referee did
not expressly consider any of the statutory factors in his findings of fact. The
court sidestepped the issue of a claimant's ability to satisfy his burden of
proof with mere medical opinion by invoking the judicial presumption that
the referee considered all of the statutory factors."
13
The award in Dravo compensated the claimant for loss offuture earnings
without any evidence of a present loss of earning capacity. 1 4 An award
based upon present disability would have been far more compatible with the
concept of working-unit disability than a speculative award of what might
become. If a heart attack in fact occurred later as a result of a worsening
107. Id at 167-68, 576 P.2d at 557-58.
108. American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 39 Colo. App. 560, 563, 571 P.2d 315, 318
(1977), a~fd, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978).
109. 195 Colo. at 168, 576 P.2d at 558 (emphasis added).
110. Id at 166, 576 P.2d at 556.
111. 40 Colo. App. 57, 569 P.2d 345 (1977).
112. Id at 60, 569 P.2d at 348.
113. Id at 60-61, 569 P.2d at 348.
114. Id at 59-60, 569 P.2d at 347-48.
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condition traceable to the on-the-job injury, the case could be reopened
upon petition of the claimant under section 8-53-119, assuming the time lim-
itations of that section were met.115
After the referee has determined the percentage of disability, section 8-
51-108(l)(b) requires the director to "determine the injured employee's ex-
pectancy of life from recognized expectancy tables and such other evidence
. . . as may be presented, but in no event shall the employee's life expec-
tancy be reduced for these purposes if his injury or illness is the direct cause
of his reduced life expectancy." The legislature has codified a mortality ta-
ble to use for purposes of determining life expectancy;' 16 however, it is not
mandatory for the Division of Labor to use this mortality table. 1 7 The ta-
ble is merely evidence which may be considered in conjunction with any
other evidence of the claimant's life expectancy or may be disregarded en-
tirely. 118
The director's discretion with respect to the mortality table becomes
significant if the true test of permanent partial disability is a working-unit
disability or loss of earning capacity. Under this type of test, the 1ndustrial
life expectancy of the injured worker may be the relevant time frame upon
which benefits are based. The employer or insurer could establish industrial
life expectancy through (1) testimony or exhibits reflecting an industry-wide
life expectancy or (2) evidence from a specific employer on the remaining
years that the worker could be employed with that employer or (3) a medical
opinion of the remaining reasonably expected productive working years of a
claimant in his particular occupation. Because the statute mandates that a
worker's life expectancy cannot be reduced by the effects of his injury or
illness, evidence of industrial life expectancy would have to assume the
worker was either healthy or that his life expectancy was diminished by
other systemic conditions not related to the injury or illness in question.
The life expectancy of an injured worker must be measured as of the
date that his permanent partial disability is determined and not the date
that he was injured." 9 Use of the later date may result in a higher award of
incremental benefits if revised mortality tables have been adopted between
the date of the injury and the date of determination of permanent partial
disability. The present mortality table approved by the Colorado legislature
contains a longer life span than previous tables. A longer life span is equated
to more money per segment of one percent disability than a shorter life span.
When multiple awards of permanent partial disability are made at dif-
ferent dates, the additional or reduced disability is required to be based
upon the worker's age on the date when the supplemental award was en-
tered and not his age at the time of an earlier award. 120 Assuming the same
115. The text of § 8-53-119 is set forth in full in note 86 supra.
116. The Division of Labor is presently using the mortality tables set forth in COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-25-13 (Supp. 1979), which became effective on July 1, 1977. The table is reproduced
in Appendix I infra.
117. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 148 Colo. 557, 367 P.2d 597 (1961).
118. Id at 559-60, 367 P.2d at 598.
119. Id at 558-60, 367 P.2d at 598-99.
120. Lefkaras v. Moffat Coal Co., 113 Colo. 416, 158 P.2d 386 (1945).
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mortality table is effective throughout the duration of the claimant's case,
the result would be a decrease in the incremental benefits paid to the worker
because the value of each one percent disability segment diminishes as a
claimant grows older.'
2 1
VII. LAST EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
On September 1, 1975, the Occupation Disease Disability Act was re-
pealed. Concurrently section 8-51-112 was enacted to provide coverage for
occupational diseases under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 122 Addi-
tional amendments were made to include occupational disease within the
definitions of "accident" and "injury" in section 8-41-108(2)123 and to specif-
ically define "occupational disease."' 124 For a disease to be compensable
under the Act, certain criteria must be met. The disease must result
directly from the employment of the conditions under which work
was performed, which can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the nature of the employment, and which can be fairly traced to
the employment as a proximate cause and which does not come
from a hazard to which the worker would have been equally ex-
posed outside of the employment.1
25
Once an occupational disease has been found to be compensable, all the
provisions in the Act for permanent disability would seem to apply equally
to occupational diseases and accidental injuries.126 Section 8-51-112, how-
121. See Appendix I infra.
122. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-51-112 (Supp. 1979).
(1)Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in
whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease and the insurance carrier, if any, on the risk when such employee was last so
exposed under such employer shall alone be liable therefor, without right to contribu-
tion from any prior employer or insurance carrier. In the case of silicosis, asbestosis, or
anthracosis, the only employer and insurance carrier liable shall be the last employer
in whose employment the employee was last exposed to harmful quantities of silicon
dioxide (SiO2) dust, asbestos dust, or coal dust on each of at least sixty days or more
and the insurance carrier, if any on the risk when the employee was last so exposed
under such employer.
(2) In any case where an employee of an employer becomes disabled from silico-
sis, asbestosis, anthracosis, or poisoning or disease caused by exposure to radioactive
materials, substances, or machines or to fissionable materials, or any type of malig-
nancy caused thereby, or in the event death results from silicosis, asbestosis, an-
thracosis, or poisoning or disease caused by exposure to radioactive materials,
substances or machines or to fissionable materials, or any type of malignancy caused
thereby, and, if such employee has been injuriously exposed to such diseases while in
the employ of another employer during his lifetime, the last employer or his insurance
carrier, if any, shall be liable only for compensation and medical benefits as provided
by articles 40 to 54 of this title, including funeral expenses and death benefits, up to
the amount of ten thousand dollars. In addition to such benefits, such employee or, in
the event of death, his dependents shall receive additional benefits equivalent to the
difference between the amount paid by the last employer or his insurance carrier, if
any, and the total amount of benefits payable under said articles. Such additional
benefits shall be paid out of the subsequent injury fund created by the provisions of
section 8-51-106.
123. Id § 8-41-108(2) (Supp. 1979).
124. Id § 8-41-108(3).
125. Id
126. See id § 8-47-102 (1973) (effect of prior disabilities), § 8-51-104 (1973) (scheduled disa-
bility), § 8-51-105 (Supp. 1979) (facial or bodily disfigurement), § 8-51-106 (1973) (loss of re-
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ever, follows all permanent disability provisions in the Act and includes
unique provisions for occupational diseases. For example, the last employer
alone is liable for occupational disease benefits "without right to contribu-
tion from any prior employer or insurance carrier."' 127 This language appar-
ently overrides the apportionment provisions for cumulative permanent
partial or permanent total disability under section 8-47-102 and 8-51-106
respectively.' 2 8 If so, section 8-51-112 discriminates harshly against the last
employer as compared with employers of accidentally injured workers.
There is a limited exception to the last employer rule. Apportionment
is allowed between the last employer and the subsequent injury fund if com-
pensation and medical benefits exceed $10,000 and if the disease just hap-
pens to be "silicosis, asbestosis, anthracosis, or poisoning or disease caused by
exposure to radioactive materials, substances, or machines or fissionable
materials, or any type of malignancy caused thereby."' 129 In such cases, all
benefits over $10,000 are paid by the subsequent injury fund.
The puzzling, harsh, and questionably punitive treatment of employers
under section 8-51-112 is reflected in the recent cases of Union Carbide Corp. v.
Industrial Commission 13 0 and Vanadium Corp. of America v. Clatmants.1 3 1 In the
Union Carbide case, the employee died from lung cancer after he had worked
only eight days for the company. He had been exposed to radioactive mater-
ials during his years as a uranium miner for various employers. Union Car-
bide urged that since his employment with the company was so short, it was
insignificant in causing the lung cancer. A medical expert explained that the
short exposure with Union Carbide probably did not cause lung cancer and
death, but such exposure "was of a level which if continued indefinitely
would increase the probability of lung cancer."1 32 The court of appeals held
that the testimony was sufficient to meet the "last injurious exposure" test in
section 8-51-112 which makes liable "the employer in whose employment the
employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease."'
133




In Vanadium Corp., the employer was found liable as the last Colorado
employer, despite the fact that the claimant left Colorado in 1955 and last
worked for eight years in Utah uranium mines. He died from lung cancer
due to radiation exposure. The Colorado Supreme Court ignored the fact
that the last employer was in Utah since that would have defeated the claim
for benefits. The dependents of the deceased worker filed a claim in Utah,
which was denied. If their claim had been denied in Colorado, no benefits
would have been paid. The supreme court reiterated the familiar litany that
''a contrary result would not comport with the long-recognized rule that the
maining members), § 8-51-107 (1973 & Supp. 1979) (permanent total disability), § 8-51-108
(1973 & Supp. 1979) (permanent partial disability).
127. Id § 8-51-112(1) (Supp. 1979).
128. See notes 28, 34 supra.
129. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-51-112(2) (Supp. 1979).
130. 40 Colo. App. 182, 573 P.2d 938 (1977).
131. 194 Colo. 358, 572 P.2d 1205 (1977).
132. 40 Colo. App. at 184, 573 P.2d at 940.
133. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-112(1) (Supp. 1979).
134. 40 Colo. App. at 184, 573 P.2d at 940.
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Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to accomplish its
humanitarian purpose of assisting injured workers and their families."'
135
After ruling that Vanadium Corporation was the last employer in Colorado
and consequently should be liable for benefits to the dependents, the court
attempted an explanation:
The result, seemingly harsh in this requirement that one employer
pay for portions of the loss caused by others, is not unlike the usual
rule of proximate cause in tort cases. That familiar rule saddles
one of several tortfeasors, each of whom was a substantial factor in
bringing about the loss, with paying the entire loss caused by all.
There, as here, the law favors a prompt, efficient remedy for the
injured person. '
36
The supreme court apparently either ignored or forgot that the Work-
men's Compensation Act is significantly different from tort cases, or is sup-
posed to be, and that section 8-47-102 is one example of the legislature's
attempt to emphasize that difference.
137
CONCLUSION
The complex verbiage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the indeci-
siveness of the courts, and the independence of the referees precludes any
clear understanding of permanent disability under the Colorado statute. Al-
though scattered sections of the Act provide the analytical starting point in
permanent disability cases, the anomalies in the statutory language cause
more confusion than resolution of permanent disability claims. The vacilla-
tion of the Colorado appellate courts between the loss of earning capacity
and functional impairment tests for permanent disability contributes to the
chaos. The standard to be applied in a particular case appears left to the
total discretion of each referee. Whatever weight he may give the evidence,
however thin or flimsy, will not be disrupted by the appellate courts.
Although cross-references exist in some of the provisions touching on
permanent disability, the statutory language leaves the impression that each
particular section was drafted without any attempt at providing a cohesive
scheme for awarding permanent disability compensation. Inequities called
to the attention of the legislature have been corrected through piecemeal
amendments. The result is a disparity between benefits provided by various
provisions layered onto discretion in the referee to base an award upon alter-
native provisions. In the absence of guidelines for exercising this discretion,
employers, insurers, employees, and attorneys have no reasonable means to
evaluate the merits of an individual claim.
Particularly troublesome are the inconsistencies in the apportionment
provisions for cumulative partial disabilities resulting in total disability as
opposed to cumulative partial disabilities resulting in only partial disability
and cumulative hazardous exposure resulting in occupational disease. The
135. 194 Colo. at 360, 572 P.2d at 1206-07.
136. Id at 361, 572 P.2d at 1207.
137. For a discussion of the distinctions between tort theory and workmen's compensation,
see the text accompanying notes 88-95 supra.
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apportionment rate differs for each type of permanent disability. In any
case, however, the protection afforded by the apportionment provisions is
basically illusory because of the burden of proof placed on the employer or
the minimal apportionment allowed. The statutory discrepancies defeat the
beneficent purpose of the Act which, according to judicial interpretation,
was designed to aid injured workers and facilitate hiring of the handicapped.
Accomplishment of this purpose will be possible only if the legislature enacts
a provision that would limit the last employer's liability to that portion of
permanent disability caused by the last accident in an injury case, or that
portion of the disease caused by the last employment in an occupational
disease claim. The subsequent injury fund could absorb all losses attributa-
ble to pre-existing conditions regardless of the cause of such conditions.
A second major source of difficulty is the disparity between the amount
of benefits provided under various sections of the Act. The rate of compen-
sation for permanent partial disability plus the statutory ceiling on such ben-
efits seems patently unfair in light of the higher rate for permanent total
disability which is not subject to any artificial limitation on the aggregate
amount payable.
The most significant source of uncertainty, however, is the inability or
unwillingness of the courts to adopt either the loss of earning capacity test or
the functional impairment test as the standard for determining permanent
disability. So long as a choice is not made between these inconsistent philos-
ophies of compensation, uniformity, and certainty in workmen's compensa-
tion law is impossible.
One alternative for eliminating the confusion would be to repeal all
sections of the present statute which touch upon permanent disability. A
new section could be enacted that would determine the percentage of per-
manent disability from 0-100% based on the degree of loss of earning capac-
ity. Apportionment between the last injury or exposure to disease and pre-
existing conditions should be mandatory with the subsequent injury fund
liable for compensation attributable to any pre-existing condition. All per-
manent disability, whether total or partial, should be based on the same
weekly rate of compensation with no statutory ceiling on the dollar amount
payable.
If drastic restructuring of the statute is not feasible, at the very least
standards should be promulgated to govern the exercise of discretion by the
referees. The referees as a group could issue guidelines based on the prevail-
ing statute and pertinent case law. Procedures for drafting such guidelines
might be enacted under section 8-46-108 of the Act, which was the touch-
stone for enacting the present rules of procedure followed by the referees. If
all else fails, attorneys practicing in the field of workmen's compensation in
Colorado are left with only the hope that each referee, vested with the "wid-
est possible discretion," will exercise that discretion in a reasonable manner.
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of Life, of Life, of Life,
U.S. Life U.S. Life U.S. Life
Completed Table: Completed Table: Completed Table:
Age 1969-71 Age 1969-71 Age 1969-71
0 70.75 37 37.23 74 9.82
1 71.19 38 36.32 75 9.32
2 70.28 39 35.42 76 8.84
3 69.34 40 34.52 77 8.38
4 68.39 41 33.63 78 7.93
5 67.43 42 32.74 79 7.51
6 66.46 43 31.86 80 7.10
7 65.49 44 30.99 81 6.70
8 64.52 45 30.12 82 6.32
9 63.54 46 29.27 83 5.96
10 62.57 47 28.42 84 5.62
11 61.58 48 27.58 85 5.28
12 60.60 49 26.75 86 4.97
13 59.62 50 25.93 87 4.68
14 58.65 51 25.12 88 4.42
15 57.69 52 24.32 89 4.18
16 56.73 53 23.53 90 3.94
17 55.79 54 22.75 91 3.73
18 54.86 55 21.99 92 3.53
19 53.93 56 21.23 93 3.35
20 53.00 57 20.49 94 3.19
21 52.07 58 19.76 95 3.06
22 51.15 59 19.05 96 2.95
23 50.22 60 18.34 97 2.85
24 49.30 61 17.65 98 2.76
25 48.37 62 16.97 99 2.69
26 47.44 63 16.30 100 2.62
27 46.51 64 15.65 101 2.56
28 45.58 65 15.00 102 2.51
29 44.64 66 14.38 103 2.46
30 43.71 67 13.76 104 2.41
31 42.77 68 13.16 105 2.37
32 41.82 69 12.57 106 2.34
33 40.92 70 12.00 107 2.30
34 39.99 71 11.43 108 2.27
35 39.07 72 10.88 109 2.24
36 38.15 73 10.34 110
* CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-103 (Supp. 1979) (effective July 1, 1977).
PERMANENT DISABILITY PRIMER
APPENDIX II
VALUE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION USING MORTALITY TABLE
EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1977 AT $84 PER WEEK
AGE EXPEC.* I%W.U.** WEEKS***
16 56.73 2477.97 29.4996
17 55.79 2436.91 29.0108
18 54.86 2396.28 28.5272
19 53.93 2355.66 28.0436
20 53.00 23.1504 27.5600
21 52.07 2274.42 27.0764
22 51.15 2234.23 26.5980
23 50.22 2193.61 26.1144
24 49.30 2153.42 25.6360
25 48.37 2112.80 25.1524
26 47.44 2072.18 24.6688
27 46.51 2031.56 24.1852
28 45.58 1990.93 23.7016
29 44.64 1949.88 23.2128
30 43.71 1909.25 22.7292
31 42.77 1868.19 22.2404
32 41.82 1826.70 21.7464
33 40.92 1787.39 21.2784
34 39.99 1746.76 20.7948
35 39.07 1706.58 20.3164
36 38.15 1666.39 19.8380
37 37.23 1626.21 19.3596
38 36.32 1586.46 18.8864
39 35.42 1547.15 18.4184
40 34.52 1507.83 17.9504
41 33.63 1468.96 17.4876
42 32.74 1430.08 17.0248
43 31.86 1391.64 16.5672
44 30.99 1353.64 16.1148






























































* Dollar value of each one percent unit of permanent partial disability
*** Number of weeks payable at $84 per week for each 1% unit of permanent partial disability
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APPENDIX III
MEMORANDUM
TO: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CARRIERS
IN COLORADO




It has come to my attention that many carriers are not using the
Mortality Table effective July 1, 1977, when entering admissions
for working unit ratings subsequent to that date.
Based upon the Supreme Court Decision CF&I vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 148 Colo 557, 367 P2d 597, 1961, the table in effect at the




DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
DIVISION OF LABOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE AVERAGE
WEEKLY WAGE
WHEREAS, pursuant to 1973, Colorado Revised Statute 8-
46-113, as amended, the State Average Wage shall be established
by the Director of the Division of Labor annually, on or before July
1; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to the requirements of said statute, the
Director of the Division of Employment and Training has fur-
nished the State Average Weekly Wage to the Director of the Divi-
sion of Labor, based upon the average of the average weekly
earnings in selected industries in Colorado as published by the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, weighted by the volume
of employment according to the records of the Division of Employ-
ment and Training in each of the selected industries;
WHEREFORE THE DIRECTOR HEREBY ESTAB-
LISHES, effective on 12:01 A.M. July 1, 1979, and for the ensuing
twelve months through and including June 30, 1980:
1. That the Colorado State Average Weekly Wage is $278.42
per week;
2. That the maximum benefit rate for Temporary-Total Dis-
ability, Temporary-Partial Disability, and Permanent-To-
tal Disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Colorado shall be eighty percent (80%) of such Average
Weekly Wage for a weekly rate of $222.74;
3. That Temporary-Total Disability, Temporary-Partial
Disability and Permanent-Total Disability benefits shall
be based upon the individual claimant's weekly income
and shall be two-thirds (2/3) of such weekly income, but
shall not exceed the maximum benefit rate set in para-
graph 2 of this Order;
4. That to be eligible for the maximum rate of $222.74 the
claimant must have a weekly income of $334.11 or a
monthly income of $1,447.81; and
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Director of the Division of
Labor has caused these presents to be duly executed this 20th day






TO: ALL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INSURANCE CARRIERS
ALL SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS
FROM: JOHN KEZER, DIRECTOR
COLORADO DIVISION OF LABOR
DATE: June 20, 1979
SUBJECT: BENEFIT RATES FOR WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION FOR THE YEAR BEGINNING
JULY 1, 1979 THROUGH AND INCLUDING
JUNE 30, 1980
As a result of the adjustment in the State Average Weekly
Wage, maximum benefits payable under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of Colorado have been changed as follows:
BENEFIT SCHEDULE
1/7 2/7 3/7 4/7 5/7 6/7
DAILY RATE = $31.82 63.64 95.46 127.28 159.10 190.92
1 Week 222.74 254.56 286.38 318.20 350.02 381.84 413.66
2 Weeks 445.48 477.30 509.12 540.94 572.76 604.58 636.40
3 Weeks 668.22 700.04 731.86 763.68 795.50 827.32 859.14
4 Weeks 890.96 922.78 954.60 986.42 1,018.24 1,050.06 1,081.88
5 Weeks 1,113.70 1,145.52 1,177.34 1,209.16 1,240.98 1,272.80 1,304.62
6 Weeks 1,336.44 1,368.26 1,400.08 1,431.90 1,463.72 1,495.54 1,527.36
7 Weeks 1,559.18 1,591.00 1,622.82 1,654.64 1,686.46 1,718.28 1,750.10
8 Weeks 1,781.92 1,813.74 1,845.56 1,877.38 1,909.20 1,941.02 1,972.84
9 Weeks 2,004.66 2,036.48. 2,068.30 2,100.12 2,131.94 2,163.76 2,195.58
10 Weeks 2,227.40 2,259.22 2,291.04 2,322.86 2,354.68 2,386.50 2,418.32
EFFECTIVE DATE - JULY 1, 1979 AT 12:01 A.M.
MAXIMUM COMPENSATION: To qualify, a Wage of $334.11
per week must be earned or $1,447.81 per month must be
earned. (1973 C.R.S. 8-51-102)
MEDICAL MAXIMUM: $20,000 (1973 C.R.S. 8-49-101)
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION: Charged under the
$20,000 medical maximum.
FACIAL & BODILY DISFIGUREMENT: Maximum $2,000
(1973 C.R.S. 8-51-105)




MAXIMUM PERMANENT PARTIAL: $26,292 (1973 C.R.S. 8-
51-108)
SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND: No dependents at all -
$15,000. Partial dependents paid first, then balance paid to the
Subsequent Injury Fund to maximum of $15,000. (1973 C.R.S.
8-51-106)
TEMPORARY TOTAL BENEFITS: Payable every Two (2)
Weeks. (1973 C.R.S. 8-51-101)
RETROACTIVE 'PAYMENTS: Payable after Two (2) Weeks
(15th Day) (1973 C.R.S. 8-51-101)
P.T. BENEFITS: Payable to maximum of $222.74 per Week
(C.R.S. 1973 8-51-107)
P.P. DISABILITY: All cases paid at $84 per week; $4,368 per year
(1973 C.R.S. 8-51-108)
YEARLY T.T. BENEFITS: $11,582.48 (maximum) (1973 C.R.S.
8-51-102)
FUNERAL MAXIMUM: $1,000 (1973 C.R.S. 8-50-107)
FATAL CASES: Maxiinum of $222.74 per week (1973 C.R.S. 8-
50-103)
Lifetime Benefits for widows and widowers totally dependent.
(1973 C.R.S. 8-50-101)
Upon Remarriage of Widow or Widower, a Two-Year Lump
Sum without discount, less lump sums previoasly paid, must be
paid to such widow or widower, if no dependent children.
(1973 C.R.S. 8-50-106)
Social Security Offset: 100% offset of benefits to widow or wid-
ower and their dependents. (1973 C.R.S. 8-50-103)
Dependent Children: Minor dependents' benefits are included
in the lifetime benefits to widows and widowers. (1973 C.R.S.
8-50-101)
Minimum Death Benefit: 25% of Maximum Weekly Benefit




CONFLICT OF INTEREST TRANSACTIONS: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS WHO ARE
ALSO CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
CHRISTA K.M. DE LA GARZA*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1978 Colorado joined the increasing number of states which
have enacted corporation codes based on the 1969 edition of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act.' One of the most important changes effected by the
new code is contained in section 7-5-114.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
2
This section deals with director conflict of interest transactions, and deline-
ates the manner in which such transactions may be validated. 3 The statute
is a legislative attempt to establish uniformity of treatment for conflict of
interest situations and to resolve confusion in the area created by case law.
4
Section 7-5-114.5, however, does not control all possible conflict of inter-
est situations. For example, it does not control the conflict which occurs
* Ms. De La Garza received her J.D. from the University of Denver College of Law in
1979. She is presently associated with the law firm of McGinnis, Lochridge, and Kilgore in
Austin, Texas.
1. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-5-101 to -118 (Supp. 1978) based on Model Business Corp. Act
prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking, and
Business Law of the American Bar Association (1969). For jurisdictions which have passed the
same or similar statute, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.124 (West 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10-5 (Burns 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34
(1962) (as amended, 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 717 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1545-.1546 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2040.01
(1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Page
1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.265 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7.1.1 to 37.1 (1970); VA. CODE
§ 13.1-39.1 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-25 (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.355 (West 1972).
2. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978) reads:
Director--Conflicts of Interest. (1) No contract or other transaction between a corpo-
ration and one or more of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association, or
entity in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers or are financially
interested shall be either void or voidable solely because of such relationship or interest
or solely because such directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or
a committee thereof which authorizes, approves, or ratifies such contract or transac-
tion or solely because their votes are counted for such purpose if:
(a) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of
directors or committee which authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transac-
tion by a vote or consents sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or
consents of such interested directors; or
(b) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the sharehold-
ers entitled to vote and they authorize, approve, or ratify such contract or transaction
by vote or written consent; or
(c) The contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
(2) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which
authorizes, approves, or ratifies such contract or transaction. (Added by H.B. 1245, L.
'77, eff. 7-1-78).
3. Id.
4. C. Mauer & Giacomini, The 1977Revisions to the Colorado Corporation Code, 7 COLO. LAW.
911, 918 (1978).
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when a director who is also a controlling shareholder purchases the assets of
the corporation prior to liquidation. This article will analyze to what extent
the new statute controls such a situation and to what extent traditional case
law must be relied upon.
Prior to addressing this specific issue, the general fiduciary duties owed
to a corporation by directors who are also majority or controlling sharehold-
ers will be reviewed. It is also necessary to examine Colorado's historic
conflict of interest rules governing corporate fiduciaries since some are appli-
cable today in conflict of interest situations not covered by statute.
While the Colorado statute is the focal point of this article, the analysis
is equally applicable to other jurisdictions having enacted similar conflict of
interest statutes.
II. GENERAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND
MAJORITY OR CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS
A. Application of Trust Law to Corporations
It is axiomatic in Colorado, as elsewhere, that directors and officers oc-
cupy fiduciary relationships to the corporation. Moreover, all three - direc-
tors, officers, and the corporation - occupy a fiduciary relationship to the
collective body of stockholders. 5 Colorado courts, in determining the nature
and extent of this fiduciary relationship, have consistently held that directors
and officers are trustees with the corporate assets as the res of the trust and
the stockholders as beneficiaries.6 Therefore, the duties and responsibilites
which are concomitant with this relationship are the same as those a trustee
owes to his trust and its beneficiaries.? One such case, Burchhalter v. Myers, 8
held directors to be trustees on the basis of the corporate statutory law of the
day,9 which used the terms trustee and director interchangeably.' 0 Courts
today could reach the same conclusion for the Uniform Fiduciaries Act de-
fines a fiduciary as both a trustee of an express trust and a director or officer
of a corporation."
5. See, e.g., Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965); Rosenthal v. Four
Comers Oil & Mineral Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762 (1965); Hudson v. American Founders
Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1963); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 P.
416 (1900); Great United Corp. v. Great Producers Coop., 41 Colo. App. 34, 588 P.2d 380
(1978); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 313, 587 P.2d 799 (1978); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20
Colo. App. 454, 79 P. 742 (1905). At the federal level, see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
6. See, e.g., Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 558, 404 P.2d at 540 (1965); Kullgren Navy
Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 461, 135 P.2d 1007, 1011 (1943); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at
553, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Great W. United Corp. v. Western Producers Coop., 349 Colo. App. at
353, 588 P.2d at 382 (1978); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 456, 79 P. at 743 (1905).
7. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 558, 404 P.2d at 540 (1965); Hudson v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 151 Colo. at 58, 377 P.2d at 395 (1963); Fishel v. Goddard, 30
Colo. at 153, 69 P. at 607 (1902); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 553, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Burns v.
National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913); Mosher v. Sin-
nott, 20 Colo. App. at 558, 79 P. at 743 (1905).
8. 85 Colo. 419, 276 P. 972 (1929).
9. Colorado Compiled Laws §§ 2263-64, 2267-68, 2270 (1921) (current version at CoLo.
REV. STAT. tit. 7, "Corporations and Associations").
10. 85 Colo. 419, 276 P. 972.
11. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-103 (1973).
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Frequently, based on this assumption that directors are trustees, Colo-
rado courts have applied trust law to determine the extent of the director's
duty, what constitutes breach of that duty, and the extent of his liability.'
2
The reliance on trust law in dealing with officers and directors is to empha-
size the duty and implied obligations of fidelity owed by them to the corpo-
ration. 13
B. Duties of Good Faith and Undi'vided Loyalty
Among the plethora of fiduciary duties imposed on a director, two of
the most important (and the two most often breached in a conflict of interest
situation) are the duty to act honestly and in good faith and the duty of
undivided loyalty to the corporation. The latter involves the duty to admin-
ister the corporation fairly and solely in the interest of the corporation and
the stockholders, and to communicate to the stockholders and the corpora-
tion all the material facts in connection with a particular transaction which
the trustee knows or shall know.14 In analyzing these two duties, the Tenth
Circuit has held that mere honesty of purpose was not enough to test the
propriety of the directors' conduct since their obligation was fiduciary in
character and not merely to abstain from fraud. The test was expressed as
follows:
The standards of conduct for a trustee rise far above the ordinary
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but a punctilio of
honor, the most sensitive is then the standard behavior required of
a trustee. He must completely efface self-interest. His loyalty and
devotion to this trust must be unstinted. Its well being must always
be his first consideration. 
5
Theoretically, these two duties are separate and distinct. In practical
application, however, they regularly tend to overlap, for a breach of the duty
of good faith invariably involves a breach of the duty of loyalty and vice
versa. Hence, courts, including Colorado courts, have a tendency to discuss
them in the same breath, making it difficult to analyze them separately.
In Colorado, the duties of good faith and loyalty that directors owe to
the corporation and to the stockholders were first enunciated in Kullgren v.
Navy Gas & Supply Co.i6 The supreme court, responding to a transparent
12. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 558, 404 P.2d at 540 (1965); Hudson v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. at 58, 377 P.2d at 395 (1963); Fishel v. Goddard, 30 Colo. at
153, 69 P. at 609 (1902); Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 553, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Glengary Consol.
Mines v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. at 315,
587 P.2d at 801 (1978); Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. at 550-51,
130 P. at 1039 (1913); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 558, 79 P. at 743 (1905).
13. See Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 539; 63 P. at 416 (1900); 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 840 (1975).
14. HENN, CORPORATIONS §§ 235-38 (1970); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 170 (1957).
15. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967) (relying on Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J.)).
16. 110 Colo. at 454, 135 P.2d at 1007 (1943). In Kulgren, the director and president of a
corporation, along with the other directors, attempted to effectuate an exchange of shares be-
tween the defendant corporation, Navy Gas & Supply Co., and another corporation, The
Grand Co. Eighteen shares of the Navy Gas & Supply Co. were to be exchanged for 50 shares of
The Grand Co., thereby causing The Grand Co. to become a wholly-owned subsidiary. The
1980]
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stock exchange scheme between related corporations, perpetrated solely to
maintain certain directors in their lucrative positions, held:
A director of a corporation is in the position of a fiduciary ...
[H]e owes loyalty and allegiance to his corporation, a loyalty that's
undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action by no
other consideration other th.n the welfare of the corporation. He
is held in official action, to the extreme measure of candor, unself-
ishness and good faith. Those principles are rigid, essential and
salutory. . . . The directors of a corporation act in a strictly
fiduciary capacity. Their office is one of trust and they are held to
the high standard of duty required of trustees.
17
In addition, directors in Colorado are required to "manage the corpo-
rate affairs in good faith . . . . and give the corporate entity the benefit of
their best judgment and care" and skill and act only in the interest of the
corporation. 18 The directors must also impartially administer the corporate
affairs for the good and benefit of all the stockholders and the corporation.
They therefore have the duty placed upon them not to abridge the rights of
the shareholders either individually or collectively,' 9 and they are held to the
highest degree of honesty.
20
More specifically, Colorado courts have held that directors as trustees
have the following duties: (1) not to profit at the expense of the corporation
or stockholders, 2 t (2) not to speculate with corporate property 22 or use cor-
porate property or their relation to it for personal gain, 2 3 (3) not to secure a
private advantage through the use of official powers at the expense of the
corporation, 24 and (4) not to deal with corporate property in a personal
problem, however, was that all of the directors of The Grand Co., except for the one proposing
the sale, were the directors of the Navy Gas & Supply Co. With The Grand Co. receiving the 18
shares of the Navy Gas & Supply Co., the directors, combining those shares with the shares they
personally owned, would then have had a majority of the stock of Navy Gas & Supply Co.
under their control, and therefore would be able to maintain their lucrative jobs as directors of
the Navy Gas & Supply Co.
17. Id. at 461, 135 P.2d at 1010 (citing Turner v. American Metal Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 356,
369). This language was used again by the Colorado Supreme Court in Hudson v. American Foun-
ders Lifef Ins. Co. to establish that the president and director of American Founders had breached
his fiduciary duty by causing to be issued 15,000 shares of American Founders stock worth $2.00
a share and exchanging them for shares of dubious or worthless value of the Texas Adams Oil
Co., of which he was also a director.
18. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972).
19. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 145, 403 P.2d at 765
(1965); Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. at 461, 135 P.2d at 1010 (1943); Lay-
bourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. 339, 343, 211 P. 367, 369 (1922); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App.
at 351, 587 P.2d at 800 (1978).
20. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 145, 403 P.2d at 767
(1965); Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. at 462, 135 P.2d at 1010 (1943); Lay-
bourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. at 343, 211 P. at 369 (1922). See also Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725,
726 (10th Cir. 1943).
21. Dunnet v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934); Davis v. Pearce, 30 F.2d 85 (8th Cir.
1928); Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 145, 403 P.2d at 766 (1965);
Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. at 315, 587 P.2d at 800 (1977).
22. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. at 559, 404 P.2d at 538 (1965); Fishel v. Goddard, 30
Colo. at 153, 69 P. at 609 (1902).
23. Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. at 315, 587 P.2d at 801 (1978).
24. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Mineral Co., 157 Colo. at 143, 403 P.2d at 766 (1965);
Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. at 462, 135 P.2d at 1010 (1943).
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transaction without the approval of the shareholders. 25 Finally, the Tenth
Circuit has held that a director has the duty not to elevate his interests above
those of the corporation or the stockholders, but instead he must place the
performance of his duties above his personal interests.
26
If a transaction involves the sale of corporate assets, it is a breach of
trust for the director to sell the property at an inadequate price. As trustee,
the director has a "duty to determine the fair value of the trust property
before selling it, and any sale of it for an inadequate consideration measured
against its fair value may be subject to being set aside as constructive fraud
upon proper complaint being made."
2 7
C. Application of Fiduciary Duties to Controlling Stockholders
Fiduciary obligations are not confined solely to directors and officers.
Majority, dominant, or controlling stockholders are also said to occupy a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to the minority stockholders.
A "controlling stockholder" as defined by the case law, does not neces-
sarily have to own a majority of the voting stock of the corporation. Rather
he is deemed to be controlling because no other person owns a greater per-
centage of voting stock in the corporation, and therefore, the larger stock-
holder is able to exert considerable influence over the policies and future of
the corporation.28
Even though "controlling stockholder" is an inexact term, it has been
defined as conferring on the corporate stockholder the power to "direct cor-
porate policy," and as endowing him with "considerable patronage."
29
Practical or working control of the corporation exists where a stockholder or
group of stockholders has the power to elect the board of directors because of
ownership of a large block of shares. Such control occurs even though in
terms of aggregate shares outstanding the block constitutes a minority, if the
remaining shares are widely scattered. A stockholder who owns only twenty-
three percent of the voting stock of a corporation will have share control of
the corporation as a practical matter if no other stockholder owns more.
30
The Securities and Exchange Commission defines control as follows:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled
by," and "under common control with") means the possession, di-
rectly or indirectly of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person whether through the
25. Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203, 40 P. 499 (1895).
26. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967).
27. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537, 541 (1965).
28. Set, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962); Perlman v. Feld-
man, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Insuranshares Corp. of Del. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,
35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
29. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
30. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d at 575 (2d Cir. 1962); Perlman v. Feld-
man, 219 F.2d at 174 n.l (2d Cir. 1955); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at




ownership of voting securities, by contract or otherwise.
3 1
The case law dealing with the issue of control under the Securities and
Exchange Act have made it clear that "indirect means of discipline or influ-
ence" need not be stock ownership. It may arise from a myriad of factors
including other business relationships, interlocking directorships, and family
relationships. Furthermore, a controlling person need not be the only person
or entity with "direct means of discipline or influence."'32 Federal cases deal-
ing with securities violations further define a controlling person as any per-
son who has the power to control, either directly or indirectly, the direction,
management, and policies of a corporation whether by agreement, owner-
ship, or stock or de facto control of the officers and directors of the corpora-
tion.
33
In federal courts, the two landmark decisions which established that
controlling or dominant stockholders are fiduciaries are Pepper v. Litton,
34
and Southern Paciic Co. v. Bogert.35 Southern Pacific dealt with three interlock-
ing corporations with Southern Pacific Co. dominating Houston & Texas
Central Railroad by electing its directors and officers through a subsidiary
which owned a majority of the Houston & Texas Central Railroad stock. In
1888, the Houston & Texas Central Railway was reorganized with all of its
new stock going to the Southern Pacific Co. The minority stockholders in
this transaction received nothing. In 1913, the minority stockholders
brought suit to have the Southern Pacific Co. declared trustee for them of
stock in the new Houston & Texas Central Railway Co. and for an account-
ing. The minority stockholders brought suit only against the Southern Pa-
cific Co. and not against its subsidiary. The wrong complained of consisted
of not sharing with the minority the proceeds of the common property of
which Southern Pacific Co., through its majority holding, had gained con-
trol. In upholding the federal district court's decision for the plaintiffs, the
Supreme Court stated:
The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occu-
pies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the
corporation itself or its officers or directors. If through that control
a sale of the corporate property is made and the property acquired
by the majority, the minority may not be excluded from a fair par-
ticipation in the fruits of the sale.
36
Pepper v. Litton37 involved the disallowance by a trustee in bankruptcy of
a judgment obtained by the dominant and controlling stockholder (who was
also president and board member) of the bankrupt corporation on alleged
salary claims. The evidence supported the claim that the dominant stock-
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(b)-2() (1979).
32. Harriman v. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D. Del. 1974). See also
Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970).
33. Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 558 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Kennedy v. Tallant,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 95779; Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rose, 527 F.2d
880 (3d Cir. 1975); Lanza v. Drexel Co., 479 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1973).
34. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
35. 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
36. Id. at 487-88.
37. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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holder had obtained the confession of judgment of his salary in the amount
of $33,468.89 and employed other manipulative devices in order to avoid the
payment of a debt on a lease. The Supreme Court upheld the trustee in
bankruptcy's disallowance of the judgment and further held that the bank-
ruptcy court, in allowing or disallowing the claim in issue, was also able to
apply the equitable rules pertaining to fiduciaries because "a director is a
fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockhold-
ers. Their powers are powers in trust . . . . [f]or that standard of fiduciary
obligation is designed for the protection of the entire community of interests
in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders."'38
Three major federal court of appeals cases further cemented this princi-
ple in federal corporate law: Perlman v. Feldman,3 9 Zahn v. Transameri can
Corp. ,40 and Seagrave Corp. v. Mount.4t All three cases dealt with transactions
in which the dominant stockholder was interested, and all three relied on the
above-mentioned Supreme Court cases to establish that dominant or con-
trolling stockholders are fiduciaries.
The Tenth Circuit also unequivocally adhered to this position by hold-
ing that "[a] director of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation and its stockholders, and a dominant or controlling stockholder
or a group of stockholders occupies a fiduciary relationship to the minority
stockholders.
4 2
Colorado case law is consistent with this position.43 The principle that
majority stockholders have a duty to minority stockholders is by no means of
recent origin in Colorado. In 1900, the Colorado Supreme Court in Glenga.r
Consohdated Mines v. Boehmer44 held that majority stockholders, in certain sit-
38. Id. at 307-08 (citations omitted).
39. 219 F.2d at 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
40. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
41. 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1934).
42. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d at 77 (10th Cir. 1967). See Wheeler v. Abeline Nat'l
Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908).
43. See Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 34, 587 P.2d 799; Security Nat'l Bank v.
Peters, Writer & Christensen Inc., 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875 (1977).
44. 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900). This early litigation involved the Ibex Corporation gain-
ing control of the Glengary Consolidated Mines Company by purchasing a majority of its stock
and electing its directors. Ibex' purpose in securing control of the Glengary Company was to
secure a bond and a lease on Glengary property which adjoined property of Ibex. Ibex secured
a contract of this nature on its own terms and conditions through the directors it had elected.
The court held the transaction void and in doing so, said:
Ordinarily, the majority of the stockholders of a corporation have the right to control
its affairs, but this right is limited to the legitimate exercise of the corporate powers.
Among these is the management of the affairs of the corporation through its proper
representatives and officials in the interest of all shareholders. Meeker v. Winthrop Iron
Co., 17 F. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1886) rev'd 122 U.S. 635 (1887). No combination of stock-
holders of a corporation less than the whole will be permitted to manage or control its
affairs in their interest alone. Minority stockholders cannot be deprived of their rights
by such a combination [of majority stockholders] under the guise of a policy of the
corporation dictated by the majority. So far as the rights of the minority are con-
cerned, the majority, in furtherance of their plan to reap a benefit to themselves
through a transaction in which the minority do not participate, become the corpora-
tion itself, and assume the trust relation occupied by the corporation towards its stock-
holders.
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uations, occupy the position of trustee not only toward the corporation but
also toward the remaining stockholders.
The current leading Colorado case in this area is Security National Bank v.
Peters, Wrter, & Christensen Inc. ,45 which involved an alleged breach of fiduci-
ary duties by the corporate directors against the preferred shareholders. The
action complained of was the refusal of the directors to redeem the preferred
shares of the stockholders even though they had already made the decision to
dissolve. Additionally, the preferred shareholders were not notified of the
stockholder meeting at which the decision to dissolve was made nor given
the opportunity to vote on the proposition nor given an opportunity to file
written objections or demands for the payment of the fair value of their
shares as required by statute. 46 The directors did not wish to redeem the
preferred shares because to do so would have required selling certain stock
which the directors believed would increase in value. Interestingly, any such
increase in value would inure only to the benefit of the common stock share-
holders (the directors), for the preferred shareholders were limited by the
articles of incorporation to receiving a fixed amount upon liquidation plus
accumulated and unpaid dividends. In holding the directors' failure to re-
deem their preferred stock as constructively fraudulent and a breach of
fiduciary duty, the court stated:
Further, we note that together the four directors (including the
third party defendant) owns 64,000 shares of the common voting
,stock. This was a substantial amount when contrasted to the total
outstanding of 96,000 voting shares. Thus, in addition to the
fiduciary duties they owed as directors, they also owed fiduciary
duties to the preferred stockholders because of their dominant and
controlling stock ownership.4 7
These fiduciary duties were not imposed on controlling or majority
stockholders by virtue of their influential stock ownership alone. On the
contrary, the majority rule holds that a dominant or majority stockholder
does not become a fiduciary for other stockholders unless he steps out of his
role as a stockholder and begins to "usurp the functions of the director in the
management of corporate affairs."'48 The stockholder must assert active in-
fluence in control of corporate affairs in order to be deemed a fiduciary. The
mere fact that a stockholder owns twenty-three percent of the stock "and is
considered to be controlling and influential because no other stockholder
owns an equal or greater percentage" and by the use of that stock elects
several of its nominees as directors is not enough to make him a fiduciary
when the directors so elected act independently of the stockholder.
49
If a dominant or majority stockholder does undertake to control the
45. 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875 (1977).
46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-5-13 (1963) (now COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-112 (Supp. 1978)).
47. 39 Colo. App. at 352-53, 569 P.2d at 881 (1977). As recently as September 1978, the
Colorado Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle that "[tihe directors of a corporation and its
controlling stockholders also owe fiduciary duties to the remaining stockholders." Wright v.
Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 313, 587 P.2d 799 (1978).
48. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
49. Id. See also Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d at 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Harriman v. E.I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101 (D. Del. 1954).
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corporation by dominating the corporation's transactions and management
through a board of directors which he has elected, or if the majority stock-
holder becomes a director or officer, then he is said to also be a trustee.
50
Although it is not clear to what extent Colorado will impose fiduciary
duties on a passive controlling or majority stockholder, Colorado law is con-
sistent with the majority rule that dominant or majority stockholders who
are also directors or who also undertake to control the destiny of the corpora-
tion are held to the same fiduciary duties as directors and officers when vot-
ing such majority or controlling interest. 5 1 In Glengag ConsohdatedMihes the
Colorado Supreme Court specifically held:
In arranging the price and terms for this property the Ibex Com-
pany was acting for itself and not for the interest of the Glengary
Company. Ostensibly the contract was by the latter, but, in fact, it
was one which the Glengary Company was compelled to accept at
the instance of the Ibex Company . . . . [B]eing in control of the
affairs of that company for this very purpose it [the Ibex Company]
occupied the relation which that company did to its stockholders,
ie., their trustee. The subject-matter of this contract was the prop-
erty of which it was trustee and in which the shareholders of Glen-
gary Company, including the minority, were interested as cestui
que trustent.
52
Due to the fact these controlling stockholders are equated to directors or
officers, they are then, in all of their corporate actions, held to the same high
standard of good faith, undivided loyalty, and fairness. For example, they
are trustees both in their actions as directors and in their actions as share-
holders. 53 The applicable standard that the dominant stockholder is held to
in these situations, in most jurisdictions, is one of absolute good faith, includ-
ing the requirements that the stockholder dedicate his uncorrupted business
judgment to the sole benefit of the corporation and act in all things of trust
wholly for the benefit of the corporation and stockholders. 54 Like directors
and officers he is also under the duty to protect the corporation's interest and
to avoid exalting his own interests above those of the corporation or its share-
holders. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage to the detri-
ment of the stockholders.
55
The Tenth Circuit has also enunciated a standard of care for dominant
50. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1970); Perlman v. Feldman,
219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1965); Mount v. Seagrave Corp., 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954). See gener-
allv HENN, CORPORATIONS § 240 (2d ed. 1970).
51. Glengary Consol. Mines v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 839-40 (1900) (corporation
which gained majority control of another corporation elected dummy directors in order to se-
cure a lease for certain valuable corporate property); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 313,
587 P.2d 799 (1978); Security Nat'l Bank v. Writer, Peters & Christensen Inc., 39 Colo. App. at
352-53, 569 P.2d at 881 (1977) (directors were also controlling stockholders).
52. 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 839-40 (1900).
53. Id. at 4, 62 P. at 839-40. See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. at 483 (1919).
54. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d at 176 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. Northway, Inc. v. T.S.C. Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
426 U.S. 438 (1976); Farber v. Sevan Land Co., 393 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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stockholders in the case of United States v. Gates.56 The basis of that action
was the transfer of substantial amounts of stock of the Gates Rubber Com-
pany into an irrevocable trust for eighteen to twenty years. The income of
said stock was to be paid to the Gates Foundation, a charitable organization,
with the remainder to go to the lineal descendants of the trustors. The set-
tlors of the trust were two members of the Gates family which owned 9 7.6 %
of the stock of the Gates Rubber Company. The Internal Revenue Service
challenged the transaction, claiming that the settlor should not be allowed a
charitable deduction because of the possibility that the foundation would
not receive any beneficial interest in the stock.5 7 In making this argument
the IRS relied, inter a/ia, on the contention that since the directors of the
corporation and the owners of practically all of the stock were members of
the Gates family, and the trust would ultimately inure to the benefit of the
lineal descendants of the Gates family, the corporation might pass dividends
and accumulate earnings for twenty-one years in order to benefit the remain-
dermen of the trust.58 The Tenth Circuit held this contention to be untena-
ble due to the facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer (such as the
history of the directors to declare and pay dividends, the risk of accumulated
earnings tax, the large reduction in income of the members of the Gates
family each year a dividend was passed). It further held that even though
the determination of whether a dividend would be declared was within the
discretion of the board of directors, that discretion was limited in that it had
to be honestly exercised for the good and benefit of the corporation and its
stockholders. 59 Moreover, the court stated:
Here the members of the Gates family form a dominant group of
stockholders of the corporation, and they and the directors whom
they elect control the corporation. It follows that the directors, in
their official capacity and as members of such dominant group of
stockholders, occupy a fiduciary relationship to the holders of mi-
nority stockholder interests, and that they owe a duty to exercise
their powers as directors with unbending fidelity to their cestuis
que trust and to manage the affairs of the corporation in a way that
will be fair and impartial between the Gates family group, as ma-
jority stockholders, and the foundation and other holders of minor-
ity stock interests and not to the personal advantage of themselves
or other members of the Gates family as to the disadvantage or
detriment of the foundation and other holders of minority stock
interests.
6o
In terms of scope, this standard for dominant or controlling stockholders
is not unlike the rule in California which requires "that the comprehensive
rule of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority in any transaction
where control of the corporation is material properly governs controlling
56. 376 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1967).
57. Set Treas. Reg. 1.10-1(e) (1954).
58. United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d at 76 (10th Cir. 1967).
59. Id. at 77. The court further supported its holding by examining the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transfer, such as the history of the directors to declare and pay divi-
dends, the risk of accumulated earnings tax, the large reduction of income of the members of the
Gates family each year a dividend was passed.
60. Id. at 77.
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shareholders in this state." 6'
Because fiduciaries occupy positions of trust, it is particularly easy for
them to take advantage of the corporation and its stockholders without be-
ing discovered. For this reason, courts are inherently suspicious of transac-
tions between corporations and their individual directors, and special rules
have developed in these situations to insure that the corporation and its
stockholders are protected.
III. APPLICABLE RULES IN DIRECTOR OR CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER
CONFLICT OF INTEREST TRANSACTIONS
A. Hisorz'cal
There was some confusion in Colorado at one time as to whether trans-
actions between a corporation and its directors, between corporations having
common directors, and between a corporation and an entity in which a di-
rector had a financial interest were void or merely voidable. By far, the
weight of the case law is that these transactions are merely voidable.
Colorado case law divides transactions between a corporation and one
of its directors into three distinct categories: (1) transactions involving cor-
porate property (for example, real or personal property owned by the corpo-
ration, treasury stock or other securities owned by the corporation); (2)
transactions not involving corporate assets, but in which the director still
holds a direct and personal interest (for example, loans by a director to the
corporation, transactions or contracts between the corporation and an entity
in which the director is financially interested, or approval of the director's
salary) and in which the director's presence is necessary to form a quorum
and his vote is needed to effectuate the transaction; and (3) transactions not
involving corporate assets, where there is a quorum of disinterested directors
without the interested director's presence and the transaction is approved by
a majority vote of the disinterested directors.
Colorado courts have held that transactions between a corporation and
one or more of its directors involving corporate property are voidable at the
option of the corporation because of the trust relationship notwithstanding
proof that the director acted in good faith, with fairness, and without fraud;
that he paid as much or more than what the property was worth; or that the
transaction was in the best interest of the corporation. 62 This doctrine has
been applied where the interested director took part in the transaction on
behalf of the corporation, although the corporation was also represented by
other directors or officers and his vote and consent were not necessary. It
also has been applied where he took no part in the transaction on behalf of
the corporation, but was at the time, by reason of his official position, under
a duty to look out for the interests of the corporation. 63 This was the minor-
61. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 602, 460 P.2d 464, 474, 1 Cal. 3d 93,
112 (1969).
62. Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. at 555, 63 P. at 421 (1900); Glengary Consol. Mining Co. v.
Boehmer, 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 840 (1900); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 458, 79 P. at
743 (1965).
63. See cases cited supra note 62.
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ity position at the time, 64 and the substantive distinction between this type
of transaction and others involving corporate directors was the belief that
corporate directors were the equivalent of trustees, and the corporate prop-
erty was the equivalent of the res of the trust, and the stockholders were the
equivalent of the beneficiaries. 65 Therefore, based on trust law:
A trustee cannot deal with the trust estate in the matter where his
interest would or might conflict with his duty to his ceslui que trust.
In all cases where, without the full knowledge and assent of the
cestui que trust, he has assumed to act in the capacity of a vendor
and vendee, the cestut" que trust may avoid the transaction at his elec-
tion. No question of the fairness or unfairness of such a transaction
can be considered .... 66
Where, however, the cestuis que trust, that is, the stockholders, have
unanimous/f approved a transaction between a corporation and one of its di-
rectors involving corporate property, then the transaction will be upheld as
against the stockholders and creditors so long as it was fair and did not in-
volve any actual fraud. 67 This too is consistent with trust law, which pro-
vides that a trustee may purchase trust property without being liable for
breach of his duty of loyalty if the following conditions are met: (1) the
trustee does not induce the sale by taking advantage of his relation to the
beneficiary or by other improper conduct, (2) the trustee makes full disclo-
sure to the beneficiaries, and finally (3) the beneficiaries are all sui juris and
unanimously consent to the sale.
6 8
In transactions between a corporation and one of its directors which do
not involve corporate assets, but which do require the director's presence to
form a quorum and his vote to effectuate the transaction, the Colorado
courts are divided as to whether the transactions are void or merely voidable.
Clearly, under Colorado case law a director is disqualified from not only
voting personally or by proxy in a transaction in which he had a personal
interest, but also from being counted in order to determine if a quorum was
present. 69 The philosophy behind this rule is two-fold: (1) regarding the
constitution of a quorum, the courts believe that an interested director loses
his character as a director and assumes that of a stranger, and therefore he
64. The majority ofjurisdictions have held that transactions entered into between a direc-
tor and a corporation were valid if entered into with good faith and were fair if the corporation
was represented by a majority of disinterested directors. The transaction was then not voidable
by virtue of the relationship alone. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 931. Where, however,
the interested director's vote was needed to effectuate the transaction, it was voidable at the
option of the corporation without regard to fairness because of the relationship. Id. at § 936.
65. See generally cases cited at note 62 supra.
66. Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. at 459, 79 P. at 743 (1965) (quoting Glengary Consol.
Mining Co. v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. at 3, 62 P. at 839 (1900)).
67. Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203, 40 P. 499 (1895).
68. A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 170.1, 216 (3d ed. 1967).
69. Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1972) (applying Colorado
law); Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665
(1961); Laybourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. 339, 211 P. 367 (1922); Gold Glen Mining, Milling &
Tunneling Co. v. Stimson, 44 Colo. 406, 98 P. 727 (1908); Steele v. Gold Fissure Gold Mining
Co., 42 Colo. 529, 95 P. 349 (1908); Paxton v. Heron, 41 Colo. 147, 92 P. 15 (1907); Gumaer v.
Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co., 40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 81 (1907); Burns v. National
Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913).
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cannot be counted as part of the quorum; 70 and, (2) regarding voting by the
director on the contracts or transactions, the courts have held that "[a] direc-
tor cannot with propriety vote in [si'] the board of directors on a matter
affecting his own private interest any more than a judge could sit on his own
case. .. "71 Moreover,
[t]he relation of a director to the corporation which he represents in
that capacity is fiduciary, and for this reason the law forbids him
from making a contract in which his private interests may conflict
with the interests of his principal. He cannot unite his personal
and representative character in the same transaction.
72
At this juncture, the courts appear to be divided. The most recent Colo-
rado Supreme Court case dealing with this type of transaction, however,
held that a contract between two corporations having common directors or
officers is voidable by nature of the relationship alone, irrespective of fairness,
if the vote of the common member or members is necessary to form a quorum
of the board and to effectuate the contract.
73
This decision differs from two much earlier supreme court cases which
held that if an interested director was necessary to form a quorum any vote
taken by the board of directors approving a suspect transaction was illegal
for want of a quorum and therefore void.
74
Finally, Colorado case law indicates that transactions between a direc-
tor and his corporation, not involving corporate assets, are valid and binding
on the corporation where there is a quorum of disinterested directors who,
by a majority vote, approve the transaction. In Steele v. GoldFissure GoldMin-
ing Corp. ,75 the Colorado Supreme Court held invalid a transaction by the
board of directors fixing salaries for two officers of the corporation who were
also two of the three directors fixing the salary. In doing so, the court stated:
"It is essential that the majority of the quorum of a board of directors be
disinterested with respect to the matter voted upon in order to render it valid
and binding upon the corporation."
76
In Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co. ,77 the court held that a
promissory note given by a corporation to a partnership in order to secure a
70. Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co., 40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 81 (1907);
Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913).
71. Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver, 145 Colo.
413, 419, 359 P.2d 665, 668 (1961) (quoting Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23
Colo. App. at 550, 130 P. 1039 (1913).)
72. Steele v. Goldfissure Gold Mining Co., 42 Colo. at 531, 95 P. at 350 (1908).
73. Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. at 418,
359 P.2d at 668 (adopting the decision of Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23
Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1973).
74. Gold Glen Mining, Milling & Tunneling Co. v. Stimson, 44 Colo. 406, 98 P. 727
(1908); Paxton v. Heron, 41 Colo. 147, 92 P. 15 (1907). This is due to the doctrine commonly
held by the Colorado courts at that time which stated that the interested director was disquali-
fied by law from being counted as part of the quorum, hence there could be no legal quorum
assembled for the purpose of transacting business unless there were sufficient disinterested direc-
tors to form a quorum without counting the interested director. This is not true today under
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978). See note 80 in/a.
75. 42 Colo. 529, 95 P. 349 (1908).
76. Id. at 532, 95 P. at 350.
77. 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 P. 1037 (1913).
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
loan was voidable at the option of the shareholders of the corporation be-
cause two of the four directors present and voting at the meeting authorizing
the note were also members of the partnership. However, the court stated
iter ah'a: "Where . ..a majority of the directors vote in favor of a resolu-
tion in which one member of the board has a personal interest, the resolution
is not invalid by reason of that personal interest."' 78 By having a disinter-
ested board of directors represent the corporation and approve the transac-
'tion, the interests of the cestuis que trust were protected. The interested
director was held not to have violated contract law which requires two per-
sons to form a contract, nor did he violate the law of agency which prohibits
an agent from representing and acting for himself and his principal in a
transaction .
79
B. Scope and Effect of Section 7-5-114.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes
As noted previously, the enactment of section 7-5-114.5 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes8° and similar statutes in other jurisdictions is a legislative
attempt to resolve the confusion created by the case law. 81 The scope of the
statute, however, is limited to transactions (1) between a corporation and
one or more of its directors, (2) between two or more corporations having
directors or officers in common, and (3) between a corporation and an entity
in which a director has a financial interest. The statute does not address the
problem of majority shareholders entering into transactions with the corpo-
ration nor the problem of a director who enters into a transaction with his
corporation and then ratifies the transaction by his vote as majority share-
holder. Also, it only requires fairness to the corporation and not to the indi-
vidual or minority stockholders.
The purpose of the statute is to establish guidelines for determining the
validity of potential conflict of interest transactions and to eliminate the in-
equities and uncertainties caused by the existing rules while leaving undis-
turbed the power of the courts to deal with such matters under general
equitable principles. 82 The statute will validate, if the prescribed tests are
satisfied, a transaction with interested directors which the common law rules
often made voidable or void.8 3 It disposes of the technical case law rules
related to quorums and voting by allowing an interested director to be
counted in forming a quorum. Additionally, it establishes that the contract
or transaction in which a director is interested is not void or voidable solely
because of the director's interest or solely because he was present and voting
on the transaction at a board of directors meeting, if the director's interest is
disclosed or known to the directors whose authorization is sufficient without
counting the vote of the interested director, or if such interest is disclosed or
78. Id. at 550, 130 P. at 1039. See Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining
Co., 40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 8 (1907).
79. Morgan v. King, 17 Colo. 539, 63 P. 416 (1900); Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203,
40 P. 499 (1895); Mosher v. Sinnott, 20 Colo. App. 458, 79 P. 742 (1965).
80. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
81. See notes 1 & 4 supra.




known to the shareholders who approve or ratify the contract or transaction,
or if the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
8 4
Substantively, the statute eliminates the dichotomy between transac-
tions which involve corporate assets and those which do not. Additionally, it
eliminates the requirement (when read in conjunction with section 7-4-
114)85 that a transaction between a corporation and one of its director's in-
volving corporate assets be approved by a unanimous vote of all the share-
holders, by providing that the transaction will not be void or voidable if
approved by a majority of the shareholders (or whatever vote is required by
statute).8 6 Finally section 7-4-114.5 eliminates the prohibition against dual
representation by providing that a transaction will not be void or voidable
even if a director votes on the transaction if it is fair to the corporation.
7
Logically, however, when the statutory guidelines are not met, and
therefore by definition the transaction is unfair, or the transaction has
ramifications not covered by the statute (for example, where a majority
shareholder is ratifying a transaction between himself either as director or as
majority shareholder) or the concern is the fairness of the transaction to mi-
nor', shareholders, then current rules of equity and law will control. 8
The effect of the enactment of section 7-5-114.5 is better understood by
analyzing separately the distinct sections of the statute within the context of
the applicable case law and specific factual situations.
C. Appication of the Statute and Case Law
1. Approval or Ratification by Disinterested Directors
In order to have a valid transaction when one or more of the directors is
personally interested in the sale or contract being considered, the resolution
by the board of directors must either be passed by a vote of the disinterested
directors or the transaction must be ratified by the shareholders with full
disclosure or the transaction must be fair to the corporation.8 9 Section 7-5-
114.5(1)(a) states that the approval by the board of directors of a contract or
a transaction where one of the board of directors is interested in that transac-
tion will not be void or voidable solely because of the relationship or interest
if the relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of directors,
and the board of directors approves of the transaction by a vote which is
sufficient for that purpose without counting the votes or vote of the inter-
ested directors or director.
What constitutes a "vote sufficient for that purpose" is defined by sec-
tion 7-5-106 of the Colorado Revised Statutes9° which states that a majority
of the aggregate number of directors of a corporation shall constitute a quo-
84. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(l) (Supp. 1978).
85. Id. at § 7-4-114.
86. Id. at § 7-5-114.5(1)(b).
87. Id. at § 7-5-114.5(I)(c).
88. Mauer Jr. & Giacomini, The 1977Revirons to the Colorado Corporation Code, 7 CoLO. LAw.
910, 918 (1978).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
90. Id. § 7-5-106.
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rum for the transaction of business, and the acts of a majority of directors
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the
board of directors.9 ' This particular statutory provision is consistent with
the prevailing law in a majority ofjurisdictions as well as past Colorado case
law.92 As early as 1907 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a resolution
acknowledging a debt owed a director for extraordinary services rendered to
the corporation by the director during his tenure as president where only
three of the five directors voted on the resolution (one being absent, the other
being the president who rendered the services). 9 3 The court in doing so
stated: "In ordinary cases, when there is no other express provision, majority
of the whole number of an aggregate body, who may act together, constitute
a quorum, and a majority of those present may decide any question upon
which they can act."' 9 4 In other words, if a corporation had a total of four
directors three would constitute a quorum; and in a meeting where only
three directors were present, two directors would constitute a majority of
that quorum and their concurring votes would be binding on the corpora-
tion.
Of equal importance is the fact that the case law establishing which
directors may be counted in order to constitute a quorum has been substan-
tially changed by the statute. Section 7-5-114.5(2) states that Common or
interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quo-
rum at a meeting which authorizes, approves, or ratifies the transaction in
which the director is interested. However beneficial this statute may appear,
it also can have unanticipated adverse effects. As noted previously, section
7-5-106 requires a vote of the majority of directors present at a meeting at
which there is a quorum in order to bind the corporation. Combining that
provision with section 7-5-114.5(2) the result is that if an interested director
is present at a meeting and is counted in order to determine if a quorum is
present and then does not vote, he is in effect counted in the negative for the
purpose of determining whether or not the resolution has been carried by a
majority vote. Thus his presence could cause the resolution to fail. In other
words, if a corporation has four directors (quorum being three) and all four
are present and counted in determining a quorum, and two are interested in
the transaction before the board and do not vote, then the resolution will fail
because the votes of the other two directors do not constitute a majority of
those present at the meeting.
In the same situation, if only three of the four directors are present,
there is still a quorum. Even though one director is interested in the transac-
91. "This provision applies unless the act of a greater number is required by this code or
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws." Id. at § 7-5-106.
92. Se generalli3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 419 for case law in other jurisdictions
that are in accord with this principle. Many states resolved this problem by statute. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 23-1-10-6 (Burns 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1970); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2040 (1970); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.265 (1975); Wis. REV. STAT. ANN. § 180.35
(WEST SUPP. 1979).
93. Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co., 40 Colo. at 11, 90 P. at 84
(1907).
94. Id. (quoting Sargent v. Webster, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 497 (1847)).
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tion and does not vote, the vote of the other two disinterested directors will
be a majority of the quorum and will be sufficient to bind the corporation.
Nevertheless, in situations where there are not enough disinterested di-
rectors voting on a transaction between the corporation and one or more of
its directors, the transaction will still not be void or voidable merely because
some of the directors were interested, present, and voting if the transaction is
ratified by a majority of the shareholders with full disclosure of the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction or if the transaction is fair and reason-
able to the corporation.
2. Approval or Ratification by Stockholders of Corporation
Section 7-5-114.5(1)(b) 95 provides that a transaction between a director
and his corporation will not be void or voidable solely because the director is
present and votes at the meeting of the board of directors approving the
transaction if the stockholders approve or ratify the transaction by the ap-
propriate vote after full disclosure of the director's interest. This is merely
the codification of the prior general rule in Colorado that voidable acts of
directors and officers, for example, transactions between themselves and
their corporation, can be ratified by the majority of stockholders who are
disinterested in the transaction, and who act in good faith. Thereafter, as
long as the transaction is fair, lacking in actual fraud, and fully disclosed, it
is binding on strangers, the corporation, and the individual stockholders, in-
cluding the nonconsenting minority.
96
The statute does change, however, the requirement that transactions
between a director and his corporation involving corporate property must be
ratified by a unanimous vote in order to be binding.
9 7
Although the statute merely requires disclosure of the director's interest,
the general rule in Colorado and elsewhere is that there must be full disclo-
sure of all of the facts and circumstances of the transaction, the terms of the
contract, and, of course, the director's interest therein, for without full
knowledge on the part of the ratifying general party, the ratification is inef-
fective and void. 98 Furthermore, notice and proxy materials sent to stock-
holders informing them of the meeting at which ratification of the
transaction is to occur must state specifically that the purpose of the meeting
is to ratify the particular transaction, and there must be approval by a spe-
95. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(1)(b) (Supp. 1978).
96. Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 360, 281 P. 737, 739 (1929); see
Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963). See also Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry, 113
U.S. 322 (1885); Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U.S. 13 (1877); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury,
91 U.S. 587 (1875); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
97. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-4-115, 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
98. Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. at 56, 377 P.2d at 397 (1963)
("ratification can never exist unless it is clearly shown that the party charged with ratification
had full knowledge of all the material facts, and thereafter knowingly accepts and approves the
contract."); Colorado Mangement Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359
P.2d 665 (1961); Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260
(1959). See also United Hotels Co. of America, Inc. v. Mealy, 147 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1945); Hill
Dredging Corp. v. Risly, 18 N.J. 501, 114 A.2d 697 (1955); State v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64
Wash. 2d 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964).
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cific vote on the transaction rather than a blanket approval. In order to
have a valid ratification the minutes of the meeting, and the proxy material
sent to the shareholders, must show that there was full disclosure of all terms
of the transaction or of the specific and exact terms necessary for an intelli-
gent disposition of the matter (preferably the minutes should reflect a discus-
sion of the transaction also).99
Finally the burden of proving ratification of a voidable contract, where
the shareholder had full knowledge of all the material facts, is on the party
alleging it. °° But the rule appears to be that if there has been a valid ratifi-
cation by a majority of the stockholders who are disinterested in the transaction, the
burden of showing fraud or the unfairness of the transaction is on the one
challenging it. 101
Ratification of transactions, however, which are fraudulent, which cut
off the rights of the minority stockholders, or which are oppressive to the
minority are not binding, and the ratification will not preclude a court of
equity from setting aside the transaction at the instance of an innocent mi-
nority stockholder.' 0 2 This is but a logical requirement that all transactions
between a corporation and one of its directors be fair, regardless of whether
or not there has been ratification. 10 3 Further, this rule is not altered by the
existence of section 7-5-114.5 which states that a contract between a corpora-
tion and one of its directors is not voidable "solely by virtue of" that interest
or his voting on the transaction if the interest is disclosed and ratified by the
stockholders.'o4 The statute makes no provision for validating fraudulent
acts; therefore, the traditional equitable rules apply. Of course, as noted
earlier, a contract which is not fraudulent, but which is voidable for violat-
ing the rule that directors cannot enter into a contract for their own benefit
without the knowledge and consent of the stockholders, may be ratified by
the majority of the stockholders.' 0 5 If there is actual fraud in the procure-
ment of the ratification then it is not valid.' 06
Generally, the effect of a valid ratification by a majority of stockholders
disinterested in the transaction is to render a transaction between a corpora-
99. Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. at 66, P.2d at 397 (1963). See
generally 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at §§ 983-984.
100. Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. at 468, 335 P.2d at 260
(1959). Seegenerally 3 W. FLETCHER, rupra note 13, at §§ 979-980.
101. Gropper v. North Cent. Tex. Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 144 A.2d 231 (1955); Findanque
v. American Marcaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311 (1952).
102. Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (1952); Findanque v.
American Marcaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 Ad. 311 (1952); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225
Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969); Chesapeake Const. Co. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156
(1970); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (1952), afd, 12 N.J. 467,
97 A.2d 437 (1953); Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 A. 136 (1911). See
generally 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 983.
103. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762 (1965);
Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963). See also Remillard Brick Co. v. Remil-
lard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225
Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969).
104. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
105. Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5
(Supp. 1978); see Pollitz v. Wabash Ry., 217 N.Y. 113, 110 N.E. 721 (1912).
106. Mountain Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 335, 281 P. 737 (1929).
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tion and one of its directors binding. Neither the corporation, individual
stockholders, nor strangers can later sue to set it aside or otherwise attack its
validity without showing actual fraud and unfairness. 7
Special rules apply when the interested director is also the majority or a
controlling stockholder. None of the cases analyzed dealt with a controlling
stockholder; instead all dealt with majority stockholders who had a personal
interest in the transaction. However, if the traditional rules concerning rati-
fication do not apply because there is not a disinterested majority of stock-
holders voting due to the majority stockholders' interest, it is logical to
assume that they would not apply where the resolution calling for ratifica-
tion of a particular issue is only passed by counting the votes of an interested,
controlling stockholder.
There is of course nothing to deprive a stockholder from voting on any-
thing that properly comes before the stockholders on account of a personal
interest in the transaction.' 0 8 The general rule is, however, that such a ratifi-
cation is not binding on the minority, nonvoting stockholders; the director or
stockholder will still have the burden of proof to show that the transaction
was fair.109 Naturally, a director cannot effectively ratify as a stockholder
his own acts as director which are fraudulent, a breach of fiduciary duty, or
oppressive to the minority stockholders. 1 10
Regardless of whether a transaction is ratified by disinterested share-
107. Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); Mountain Packing Co. v. Cur-
tis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737 (1929). See generall Dimpfell v. Ohio & Miss. Ry., 110 U.S. 209
(1884); Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry, 113 U.S. 322 (1885); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91
U.S. 587 (1876); Eastern Okla. Tel. Co. v. Ameco, Inc., 437 F.2d 138 (10th Cir. 1971); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150
(1969).
108. See, e.g., Hodge v. United States Steel Corp., 64 N.J. 807, 54 A. 1 (1903); Beutelspacher
v. Spokane Say. Bank, 164 Wash. 227, 2 P.2d 729 (1931); Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery Co., 82
W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918); cf. Mountain Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737
(1929) (the interested director voted his shares, but the court unheld the transaction relying on
the fact that there was a majority of shareholders who approved the transaction without his
vote).
109. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (where a majority of a corpora-
tion's shares were held by the directors interested in effectuating a sale of capital stock to them-
selves, there could be no effective ratification at least in the sense that it transferred to the
attacking stockholders the burden of showing fraud. The stockholders could sue derivatively
and the directors had the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction
was fair, honest and reasonable.); Sarner v. Fox Hill, Inc., 151 Conn. 437, 199 A.2d 6 (1964)
(holding that a director voting as the sole stockholder present at the meeting ratifying the board
of directors' actions transferring shares of treasury stock to him as compensation for managerial
services did not preclude an attack by a minority stockholder on such a transaction nor absolve
the director/stockholder of the burden of proving that payment for such shares was fair and
reasonable compensation); Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 231 11. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1907)
(directors who sold property to corporation at a price that was $16,575 greater than the market
value could not prevent a director suit to set aside the transaction by nonconsenting stockholder
for they could not procure a ratification of the transaction by resolution); Chesapeake Constr.
Corp. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970) (asserted ratification would not bar a court
of equity from setting aside a transaction whereby the director of the corporation sold property
to the corporation at a cost several hundred thousands of dollars over the market price, when
said director also owned 75% of the stock ratifying the transaction). See generally 3 W. FLETCH-
ER, supra note 13, at §§ 761, 764, 933.
110. See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Chesapeake Constr. Co. v. Rodman,
256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150
(1969); Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 231 I11. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1961).
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holders or by counting the votes of an interested director or stockholder,
those shareholders who vote to affirm a transaction involving a director or
controlling stockholder after a full disclosure are estopped to attack the
transaction, either individually or derivatively."' Swa,rd v. Berry is the
most current Colorado case in this area. In that transaction four incorpora-
tors/directors (a father and three sons) transferred a business and its assets to
a corporation in exchange for 10,000 shares of the corporation's common
stock. These four directors then owned the majority interest in the corpora-
tion, and two other directors of the corporation owned 2,500 shares."l 2 The
transfer was ultimately challenged by the minority stockholders who alleged
that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties. The court first es-
tablished that full disclosure of the facts and circumstances of the transaction
had been made by the interested directors to the stockholders and that the
transaction was fair to the corporation. The court then stated with regard to
the plaintiff's ability to bring the suit:
Stockholders' suits on behalf of a corporation are entertained only
in equity . . . and equity has always demanded certain minimum
standards of those who seek relief in its forum. Thus we find the
general rule that a shareholder who, with knowledge of the mate-
rial facts, has consented or acquiesced in the transaction of which
he complains ordinarily cannot attack the transaction on behalf of
the corporation . . . . By purchasing their shares in the corpora-
tion after being fully apprised of the details of the transaction
... . the plaintiffs consented to or acquiesced in the transaction.
We are led to the inescapable conclusion that these plaintiffs had
no standing to obtain the relief they sought here.
113
It is important to note that stockholders are not only estopped to com-
plain about a director's voidable transactions which they have ratified or
acquiesced in, but they also are estopped to complain about ultra vires or
unauthorized acts of directors in which stockholders have acquiesced.
1 14
Furthermore, not only are the stockholders who acquiesce in or ratify voida-
ble transactions estopped, but also their transferees are estopped to challenge
the transaction except where the transfer occurred by operation of law.' IS
Nevertheless, if an interested director is unable to secure a ratification of
his action by an independent board of directors or by the stockholders, his
transaction with the corporation will still be valid if it is fair to the corpora-
tion, as provided for by the law paragraph of section 7-5-114.5.16
111. See Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); Gallup v. Pring, 108 Colo.
277, 116 P.2d 202 (1941); Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 P. 634 (1907) ("Stockholders
who vote in favor of a transaction and their transferees cannot maintain suit on behalf of the
corporation and other stockholders to avoid the transaction"). See generally W. FLETCHER, supra
note 13, § 5862; see also Morse Gen. Tires, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 128 F. Supp. 74
(W.D. Okla. 1954); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969).
112. 152 Colo. at 494-98, 382 P.2d at 1000-01.
113. Id. at 499-500, 382 P.2d at 1002 (1963).
114. See Gallup v. Pring, 108 Colo. 277, 116 P.2d 202 (1941).
115. Langlois v. B. F. Merchant Inv. Co., 101 Colo. 438, 73 P.2d 1385 (1937); Boldenweck v.
Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 P. 634 (1907); Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, Transp. & Mining Co.,
40 Colo. 1, 90 P. 81 (1907).
116. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
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3. Requirement of Fairness
The gravamen of the test of the validity of conflict of interest transac-
tions in corporate law is fairness. Unless a transaction between a corporation
and one of its directors is ultimately fair, it will not withstand later attack
even though all the technical rules are met." 
7
Section 7-5-114.5 specifically states that a transaction between a direc-
tor and his corporation will not be void or voidable solely because of that
interest or solely because the interested director was present and voted at the
meeting approving the transaction if the transaction is fair to the corpora-
tion. "18 The technical requirements of ratification by the shareholders or by
a disinterested board of directors do not have to be present in order to make
the transaction valid; however, the converse is not necessarily true. By com-
plying with section 7-5-114.5(l)(a) and (b) which requires full disclosure of
the director's interest and approval by either a majority of disinterested di-
rectors or the stockholders, an interested director is still not relieved of his
duty to act fairly toward the corporation and its stockholders. On the con-
trary, the case law construing statutes similar to Colorado's holds that even if
there has been full disclosure and ratification by the directors and stockhold-
ers, the transaction will still be voidable if found to be unfair to the corpora-
tion and the stockholders. 19
Remllard Brick Co. v. Dandt'nni Co. 120 is one of the leading cases in this
area. The board of directors of the Remillard-Dandinni Company consisted
of three directors, two of whom controlled the majority of voting stock by
proxies given to them by the stockholders, and they also had a contract with
the stockholders to buy the majority interest. The third director was the sole
stockholder of the Remillard Brick Company, the minority stockholder of
the Remillard-Dandinni Company. The two controlling directors devised a
plan whereby the Remillard-Dandinni Company would form a wholly-
owned corporation to handle exclusively the promotion and sales of all the
products manufactured by the Remillard-Dandinni Company and another
wholly-owned manufacturing company. The sales company used almost ex-
clusively the facilities and equipment of the manufacturing companies, and
the two directors received salaries from both corporations.
During litigation, in response to the minority shareholder's allegation
that the contracts between the sales corporation and the manufacturing cor-
porations were unfair, the two directors argued that since the fact of the
common directorship of the sales and manufacturing company was fully
117. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(construing a statute similar to the Model Business Code Annotated § 41); cf. Colorado Man-
agement Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (holding that
even if a transaction in which a member of the board is interested is approved by a majority of
disinterested directors, it will still be set aside if after strict scrutiny it is found to be unfair).
118. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1978).
119. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241
P.2d 66 (1952); cf. Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (applying Michigan
law); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna W. Mills Co., 53 I1. App. 3d 542, N.E.2d 629 (1977)
(applying Delaware law). Se genera/ly W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 919.
120. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
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known to the boards of the contracting corporations and because the major-
ity stockholders had consented to the transaction, they were therefore in
compliance with section 820 of the California Corporation Code' 2 1 and the
minority stockholders had no legal right to sue. Section 820 was substan-
tially identical to Colorado's section 7-5-114.5 in that it provided that con-
tracts between directors and their corporations or between corporations
having common directors would not be void or voidable on that basis if the
shareholders by a majority vote had approved the transaction after full dis-
closure. The California Court of Appeals held that argument to be untena-
ble and stated:
[N]either § 820 of the Corporations Code nor any other provision
of the law automatically validates such transactions simply because
there has been a disclosure and approval by the majority of the
stockholders. That section does not operate to limit the fiduciary
duties owed by a director to all the stockholders, nor does it operate
to condone acts which, without the existence of a common director,
would not be countenanced. That section does not permit an of-
ficer or director, by abuse of his power, to obtain an unfair advan-
tage or profit for himself at the expense of the corporation. The
director cannot, by reason of his position, drive a harsh and unfair
bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent. If he
does so, he may be compelled to account for unfair profits made in
disregard of his duty. Even though the requirements of § 820 are
technically met, transactions that are unfair and unreasonable to
the corporation may be avoided.
1 22
This interpretation would, in all probability, be the one enforced in
Colorado based on past Colorado case law which has held that a transaction
between a director and his corporation must be fair in order to withstand
later attack, notwithstanding the fact that there has been approval by a ma-
jority of a quorum of disinterested directors, or acquiescence in or ratifica-
tion by the stockholders.' 23 It also appears to be an interpretation the
Colorado courts would readily adopt given past Colorado case law holding
any transaction between a corporation and one of its directors involving cor-
porate assets voidable without regard to the fairness or the good faith of the
contract.
Section 7-5-114.5 also embodies the majority rule of American courts
which holds that transactions between directors and their corporations are
valid if they are open and above board, free from any taint of fraud, actual
or constructive, entered into honestly and in good faith, and fair and if the
director can show he has secured no advantage at the expense of the corpora-
tion.12 4 The statute, however, is limited to the requirement that the transac-
121. CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1947).
122. 109 Cal. App. 2d at -, 241 P.2d at 74 (1952).
123. See Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); Colorado Management
Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (1961); Laybourn v.
Wrape, 72 Colo. 339, 211 P. 367 (1922).
124. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943) (which
held that if dealings between a corporation and one of its directors are honest and to the benefit
of the corporation they are as valid as transactions with a stranger); Richland v. Crandall, 262
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tion be fair to the corporation. The case law expands on that requirement
and requires that the transaction not only be fair to the corporation but also
to those interested therein, for example, the other stockholders. Because the
case law expands the requirements of section 7-5-114.5 rather than being
superseded by it, this equitable principle will continue to apply in transac-
tions between directors and their corporations. 1
25
As noted earlier, section 7-5-114.5 does not treat the situations where
the majority stockholder is contracting with his corporation. However, the
case law in this area indicates that the rule for transactions between a corpo-
ration and its majority or controlling stockholders is the same as the rule for
directors and officers if the stockholders are ones who can be deemed
fiduciaries. Therefore, a controlling or majority stockholder who is engaged
in self-dealing with his corporation must prove the transaction scrupulously
fair, in good faith, free from actual fraud, and not oppressive to minority
stockholders or the corporation. 1 26 Once again, meeting the technical re-
quirements of disclosure will not protect a majority or controlling stock-
holder from having his transaction set aside if found to be unfair. Again
quoting from Remtllard Brick Co.:
It would be a shocking concept of corporate morality to hold that
because the majority directors or stockholders disclose their pur-
pose and interest, they may strip a corporation of its assets to their
own financial advantage, and that the minority is without legal
redress. 127
Nevertheless, where a stockholder or director makes a contract with the
corporation which a stranger might make, and the contract is fair, the trans-
action is as valid as if it were between the corporation and the stranger. This
is so even if the stockholder or director owns a majority of the stock.128
There is authority that a majority stockholder cannot make a contract
with his corporation so long as he is also acting as an officer or agent of the
corporation or so long as the directors are his puppets. This rule results from
F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (applying
Michigan law); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d
66 (1952); Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969); Brundage v. New
Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 266 A.2d 585 (1967). See generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 13,
§§ 949, 931, 919; HENN, supra note 14, § 467. It also appears to be the rule in Colorado at the
time COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (1973) was enacted. See Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil &
Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762 (1965); Swafford v. Barry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d
999 (1963); Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413,
359 P.2d 665 (1961).
125. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Seagrave Corp. v.
Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947);
Jones v. H.R. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 2d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Swafford
v. Berry, 152 Colo. 494, 382 P.2d 999 (1963).
126. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 306 (1939); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir. 1955); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Remillard Brick
Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952). See general[y W.
FLETCHER, supra note 13, §§ 5737, 5781, 5834.
127. 109 Cal. App. 2d at -, 241 P.2d at 74 (1952).
128. Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943); Geominerals Corp. v. Grace, 232
Ark. 524, 338 S.W.2d 935 (1960). See generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, §§ 5737, 5781.
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the prohibition against dual representation; that is, a person cannot be both
buyer and seller in the same transaction, and therefore a majority stock-
holder cannot authorize, through his vote on the board of directors or
through his control of the directors by his majority interest, a sale to himself
as buyer even if the transaction is in good faith. 129 Colorado's only case on
majority stockholders contracting with their corporations is Glengagy Consoli-
dated Mines Co. v. Boehmer decided in 1900.130 In this case the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the Ibex Corporation was merely contracting with
itself for it had complete control of the Glengary Company (which was at
Ibex's "mercy" in the language of the court). Ibex had secured control of the
stock of Glengary Company for the purpose of electing its own puppet direc-
tors to the corporation in order to contract with Glengary in its own interest.
The Colorado Supreme Court held the transaction void. 131 This case, how-
ever, does not have precedential value for several reasons. First, it is a 1900
case and now clearly in opposition to the weight of authority concerning
these types of transactions, including section 7-5-114.5 governing contracts
between corporate officers and directors personally and their corporation.
Second, since directors and majority or controlling stockholders are
fiduciaries to the same beneficiary it would be illogical and inconsistent to
apply a stricter rule to stockholders than to directors. Third, the use of the
word "void" in the case appears to be a mistake; what the court intended to
mean was that the transaction was voidable.
132
As noted earlier the weight of authority in Colorado is that these types
of transactions between a director and his corporation are voidable. It
would be unlikely in light of that rule that the courts would hold the same
type of transaction void merely because the contracting party is a stock-
holder not a director when both are considered to be a fiduciary of the same
nature. Following this line of reasoning, even though there are no current
Colorado cases in this area, due to the fact the Colorado courts consider
directors and certain controlling or majority stockholders to be corporate
fiduciaries and hold them to the same levels of good faith and loyalty, it
would be logical to hold majority or controlling stockholders to the same
standard as directors in conflicts of interest situations, that is, compliance
with section 7-5-114.5 and the case law regarding the requirements of fair-
ness. In so doing Colorado would also be in accord with the weight of au-
thority in most other jurisdictions.
129. See, e.g., Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 141 Ill. 320, 30 N.E. 667 (1892); Crichton
v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (1904) (which held that if a stockholder undertakes
to discharge the functions of director and conduct affairs of the corporation, he becomes subject
to the same trust relation which precludes directors from contracting with themselves).
130. 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900).
131. Id. at 839-40.
132. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the court relied on Morgan v. King, 27
Colo. 203, 40 P. 499 (1900), which held a similar transaction voidable not void. Also the court
stated in the last line of the opinion that the contract was "void at the instance of the plaintiffs
(stockholders of Glengary), without regard to whether Ibex Company was guilty of any actual
fraud in obtaining it or not." 28 Colo. at 4, 62 P. at 84. A void contract is void ab initio
without it being at the instance of anyone. Clearly, the court was again relying on Morgan v.
King which had held that a transaction in question was voidable without regard to fairness,
good faith or fraud.
[Vol. 57:4
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
4. Burden of Proving Fairness
If litigation should occur challenging a transaction between a corpora-
tion and one of its fiduciaries, the case law places additional burdens upon
fiduciaries by virtue of their trust relation to the corporation and its stock-
holder. It is almost universally agreed that transactions between directors or
dominant stockholders and their corporations are subject to rigid scrutiny by
the courts. 133 Furthermore, the evidential burden of proof, including the
burden of coming forward and the burden of persuasion, as to the good faith
of the transaction and its inherent fairness to the corporation and the stock-
holders is also placed upon the director or the majority shareholder. 134 In
the one case which discusses the quantum of proof necessary to establish
fairness, the court held that it must be proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 1
35
Once again, the leading case in this area is Pepper v. Litton, 136 which not
only established that majority stockholders are fiduciaries but also held that
they have the same burden of proof and close scrutiny placed upon their
transactions with the corporation as do the directors. In Pepper, the Supreme
Court developed the test by which the transaction should be judged:
Their [directors and dominant or controlling stockholders] dealings
with the corporation are subject to rigorous scrutiny and where any
of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is chal-
lenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to
prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent
fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein .... 137
Furthermore, where a director or a stockholder is seen to exercise greater
control, as where he is a sole director or one of a small number of directors,
then a greater burden is placed upon, him to be candid and to show good
faith than where there are several directors involved. Hence, "[h]is acts [are]
subject to most severe scrutiny, and their validity determined by more rigid
principles of morality, and freedom from motives of selfishness."' 1 38
Colorado courts, as early as 1922, have consistently applied the princi-
133. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590 (1921); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); United Hotels Co. of
America v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1945); Colorado Management Corp. v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665 (1961); Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected
Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260 (1959); Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 256
Md. 570, 261 A.2d 156 (1970); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585
(1967).
134. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590 (1921); Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. 136, 403 P.2d 762
(1965); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 381 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1967); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,
162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1967); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(1952); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967).
135. Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1968).
136. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
137. Id. at 306-07.
138. Id. at 307 n.14. See also Twin-Lick Oil Company v. Marbury, 91 U.S. at 590 (1876);
Schelensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Co., 166 N.E.2d 793 (Il1. 1960); Brundage v. New Jersey
Zinc Co., 226 A.2d 585 (1967).
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pie that when a director makes a contract with his corporation he has the
burden of showing that he acted in perfect good faith and that the contract
was fair to the corporation.' 39 Whenever a director enters into a contract
with his corporation or two corporations having common directors enter into
a contract, the transaction will be subject to rigid and close scrutiny by the
courts, and "[t]he burden is on the director, officer or agent to show the
validity of the contract and the fairness and honesty of his dealings with the
corporation, that he has gained no advantage therefrom, and that the corpo-
ration has not suffered thereby."' 40 The Colorado Supreme Court has
stated that such a rule "is deemed necessary to the end that in absence of
arm's length bargaining the scales may not be unfairly tipped to one side or
the other even through mistake or inadvertence."
14
1
Although there are no Colorado cases placing this additional burden on
dominant or majority stockholders, Colorado and Tenth Circuit cases clearly
establish that these additional burdens are concomitant with a fiduciary ob-
ligation. Since Colorado courts have held that a majority or dominant
stockholder is a fiduciary, it would be logical for the courts to unhesitatingly
extend this principle to controlling stockholders also. Finally, it should be
noted that the burden and scrutiny is not shifted or altered merely because a
director is dealing with a corporation which is represented by disinterested
directors or officers. The interested director still has the burden to show that
the transaction is fair, above board, entered in good faith, and free from
fraud. 142
Even by complying with modern statutes such as section 7-5-114.5,
which were specifically enacted to provide guidelines to validate these types
of transactions, the burden of proof will not shift because these statutes gen-
erally do not address that issue; therefore, it is still controlled by the equita-
ble and legal decisions of the courts. But, of course, in certain circumstances
stockholders and others interested in the transaction may lose their right to
sue through ratification and estoppel. Furthermore, if the interested director
is also a dominant or majority stockholder, or if the majority stockholder is
also interested in the transaction proposed, then ratification by a majority
(or whatever vote is necessary) of the stockholders will not change or shift the
burden of proof. In such a situation, the director or majority or dominant
stockholder will continue to bear the burden of proving the transaction is
fair and reasonable and lacking in fraud.'
4 3
Pappas v. Moss144 appears to be the leading case in this area. Pappas
involved the sale of treasury stock of the Hydromatics Company to all of the
members of the board of directors pursuant to a provision in its certificate of
139. Laybourn v. Wrape, 72 Colo. at 343, 211 P. at 369 (1922).
140. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 143, 403 P.2d at 766
(1965). See also Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260
(1959).
141. Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 145 Colo. 413, 418,
359 P.2d 665, 668 (1961).
142. Id., 359 P.2d at 668.
143. Set, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc
Co., 48 N.J. 450, 266 A.2d 585 (1961).
144. 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1908).
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incorporation which allowed such transactions to take place without share-
holder approval. Nevertheless, the directors, pursuant to a request by the
American Stock Exchange, asked for and received stockholder ratification of
this sale. The Third Circuit decided that pursuant to a New Jersey law, the
directors, absent stockholder approval, had the burden to show by clear and
convincing proof that the transaction was fair and honest and reasonable
and that this burden was not shifted because of the provision in the articles
of incorporation. Therefore, the court reasoned, the directors still had this
burden unless there had been an effective stockholder ratification in which
case the burden shifted and the stockholder challenging the transaction
would then have to prove that a fraud was perpetrated by the directors. In
this particular situation, the directors were also the majority stockholders of
the corporation and because of that fact the Third Circuit, again relying on
New Jersey law, held "that where .. .a majority of shares are held by those
'interested' in effectuating the [transaction] there can be no ratification, at
least in the sense that it transfers to the attacking party the burden of show-
ing fraud."'
45
The Third Circuit then remanded the case for a determination of
whether the directors who were also majority stockholders could establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the transaction had been honest, fair,
and reasonable. 146
There does appear to be some confusion, however, in whether the bur-
den shifts if a transaction between a corporation and a director who is a
controlling stockholder is ratified by a majority of the stockholders who are
disinterested in the transaction. 147 The better rule is that it would shift the
burden for that would be consistent with the principle that voidable acts of
directors are subject to ratification by the stockholders, which then makes
the transaction binding on the corporation. This type of ratification can
only be set aside by proof of actual fraud or bad faith, and the general rule is
that the person asserting the fraud must prove it.'
4 8
5. Test for Determining Fairness
While there is no inflexible rule or formula as to what constitutes fair-
ness, the test is an objective one, and the ultimate validity of a transaction
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The gen-
eral test of fairness in self-dealing transactions of corporate fiduciaries is
whether under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of
an arm's length bargain.1 49 In other words, if the transaction had been one
proposed by a stranger would an independent board of directors bind its
145. Id. at 868.
146. Id.
147. Compare Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1961) with Grop-
per v. North Cent. Texas Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 114 A.2d 231 (1955) and Pappas v. Moss, 393
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
148. See Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737 (1929); Nye
Odorless Incinerator Corp. v. Felton, 35 Del. 236, 162 A. 504 (1931).
149. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 306-07 (1939). See aLso Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91
U.S. at 590 (1876).
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corporation to such a transaction. 150 The philosophy which makes this test
necessary was best stated by the United States Supreme Court as follows:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and
his cestuzs second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of his corpora-
tion to their detriment and in disregard of the standards of com-
mon decency and honesty. He cannot by the intervention of a
corporate entity violate the ancient precept against serving two
masters. He cannot by the use of the corporate device avail himself
of privileges normally permitted outsiders in a race of creditors.
He cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position
for his own preferment. He cannot violate rules of fair play by
doing indirectly through the corporation what he could not do di-
rectly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to
the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how ab-
solute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous
he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that power is at all
times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exer-
cised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the
fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis. Where there is
a violation of those principles, equity will undo the wrong or inter-
vene to prevent its consummation.
15 1
There are, however, several more specific tests which can be used to
determine if the fiduciary has met his burden of proof: (1) the amount of
disclosure by the interested director; (2) whether there is fraud, actual or
constructive; and (3) if the transaction involves the purchase of corporation
assets, the amount paid by the directors for the assets as compared to their
fair market value and whether the fiduciary unduly profited in the transac-
tion. The fairness of the transaction will be judged in light of the facts and
circumstances at the time of its approval or ratification; it will not be judged
with the benefit of hindsight.
1 52
a. Requirement of full disclosure under Colorado law
Full disclosure is considered a test of fairness because it is required in
self-dealing transactions of directors or controlling shareholders by virtue of
the fiduciary nature of their relationship1 53 to the corporation. Without full
disclosure, the transaction itself is considered unfair.
154
By statute Colorado requires full disclosure of a director's personal in-
terest in a transaction to the independent directors or the stockholders in
150. H. HENN, supra note 14 at § 238.
151. Pepper v. Litton, 303 U.S. at 311 (1939) (footnote omitted).
152. Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch.
255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna W. Mills Co., 53 Ill. App. 542, 368
N.E.2d 629 (1977).
153. Lembeck & Betz Eagle Brewery Co. v. McAnarey, 287 F. 927 (W.D.N.Y. 1923); State
v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964). Ste generally 11 Scor TRUSTS
§ 170, 170.1; 14 Sco'rr TRUSTS § 216 (1957).
154. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1968); United Founders Life Ins.
Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 337 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971); Remillard Brick Co. v.
Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, -, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952); Schelnsky v. South
Parkway Bldg. Co., 19 11. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960).
[Vol. 57:4
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
order for the transaction not to be voidable because of his interest.155 The
case law in Colorado, however, broadens that requirement considerably.
Due to the fiduciary nature of the relationship, in order for a transaction
between a director and his corporation to be upheld when attacked, and
ultimately to be considered fair, there must be full and fair disclosure of all
the material facts and circumstances of the transaction.' 56 This principle
would logically be extended to dominant and controlling stockholders when
under the circumstances they are also held to be fiduciaries.
Like fairness, there is no formula for what constitutes full disclosure,
and hence it is normally determined on a case-by-case basis where the extent
of the disclosure will be judged within the context of all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. It is difficult to draw a conclusion as to what exactly
constitutes "full disclosure" for in the majority of cases dealing with disclo-
sure, the interested party, in order to secure ratification of a transaction
which he knows is questionable, discloses absolutely nothing, and of course
when the transaction is litigated the ratification is summarily held ineffec-
tive. Or, in the converse situation, there has been such a full disclosure of the
transaction that the issue is not even raised, or if it is, once again the court
deals with it in a summary fashion. Nevertheless, an examination of Colo-
rado case law will give an indication of what Colorado courts consider to be
"full disclosure" and "knowledge of the material facts."
In Hudson v. American Founders Life Insurance Co. 157 Hudson, a director
and the president of American Founders, was alleging that the stockholders
of his corporation had ratified his action of securing the issuance of 15,000
shares of the common stock of the corporation and exchanging that stock for
17,000 worthless shares of the ultimately insolvent Texas Adams Oil Corpo-
ration of which Hudson was also a director. Hudson had secured the issu-
ance of this stock without the approval of the board of directors. The court,
in holding that there had been no effective ratification, relied on the follow-
ing factors: (1) the resolution passed by the stockholders ratifying any legal
act taken by the board of directors did not, and in fact could not, ratify an
illegal invalid act such as the issuance of shares, and furthermore the resolu-
tion was passed before any discussion was entered into concerning the Texas
Adams stock; and (2) neither a balance sheet which read "Stock Owned
$47,600" nor Hudson's cryptic statement that the transaction was a stock
exchange and not a cash transaction in which he was taking full responsibil-
ity for the investment could amount under any doctrine to full and fair dis-
closure. 158 Furthermore, the Colorado Supreme Court required, in order to
have an effective ratification by the stockholders, that minutes of the stock-
holders' meeting reflect a discussion of the "specific" and "exact" details of
the transaction and that all the material facts concerning the controverted
155. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-5-114.5(l)(a)(b) (Supp. 1976).
156. Rosenthal v. Four Corners Oil & Minerals Co., 157 Colo. at 142, 403 P.2d at 766
(1965); Swafford v. Berry, 152 Colo. at 498, 382 P.2d at 1002 (1963); Hudson v. American
Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1963).
157. 151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1963).
158. Id. at 65-66, 377 P.2d at 397.
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transaction had been explained or discussed. 159
Swaford v. Berry160 held that in order to withstand later attack by a
stockholder, the transfer of a director's business with its assets to the direc-
tor's corporation in exchange for shares of the common stock of the corpora-
tion must be accompanied by "full and fair disclosure of the material facts to
those who are shareholders of the corporation at the time of the transaction"
and must not be attended by any unfairness or fraud. 16 1 In Swajbrd, within
the context of a closely held corporation, the verbal notification by the inter-
ested directors to the complaining stockholders, before purchase of the stock,
that they intended to transfer the assets of their business in exchange for
10,000 shares of the capital stock (valued at the time of the transfer at $10.00
a share) of the corporation coupled with the common knowledge within the
community, including the complaining stockholders, that this particular
business and its assets were worth in excess of $400,000 was complete disclo-
sure of the material facts of the transaction.1
62
Lastly, a director is not prohibited from making a reasonable profit in a
transaction with his corporation if full disclosure of the expected profit is
made to the corporation through disinterested directors or through the stock-
holders. ' 63 Corporate directors realizing "secret profits" in transactions with
their corporations are an anathema to the courts. Such profits will be con-
sidered a per se violation of the director's fiduciary duty not to gain an ad-
vantage at the expense of the corporation. Additionally, failure to disclose
the anticipated profit destroys any attempted ratification and renders the
transaction unfair. 
16 4
In summation, Colorado courts and statutes have specifically held that
in order for there to be full disclosure and a knowledgeable ratification there
must be (a) knowledge of the director's interest and all facts and circum-
stances surrounding the sale; (b) any profits expected to be realized by the
transaction must be reflected in the minutes; and (c) the exact and specific
details of the transaction must have been discussed so that the shareholders
knew all the material facts concerning the transaction.
b. Full disclosure as required byjuinsdictt'ns other than Colorado
The majority of other jurisdictions are in accord with Colorado law,
and they too require that in corporate transactions where a majority stock-
159. Id., 377 P.2d at 397.
160. 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963).
161. Id. at 498-99, 382 P.2d at 1002.
162. Other factors which influenced the court were that the complaining stockholders knew
what the assets of the business were, their actual cost in round figures, and the amount of time
and work the directors had expended in building up the business. Finally, in a directors' meet-
ing which took place subsequent to the transfer, the minutes reflected that the two complaining
stockholders felt that the $12.00 a share was too low a price based on the assets which the
corporation had received from the directors. Id. at 498, 382 P.2d at 1002.
163. Id., 382 P.2d at 1002.
164. Rosenthal v. Four Comers Oil & Mineral Co., 157 Colo. at 142, 403 P.2d at 766 (1965)
(Rosenthal as director of Four Comers failed to disclose that he was to receive as commission
40,000 shares of the 160,000 shares of Four Comers paid to another corporation in exchange for
mining claims owned by that corporation).
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holder or director has a personal interest, the director or controlling stock-
holder must make a full disclosure laying out "the truth without ambiguity
or reservation, in all of its stark significance" in order for the transaction to
be fair and the ratification to have a legal and binding effect.
t 65
One Seventh Circuit case, United Founders Life Insurance Co. v. Consumers
National Life Insurance Co.,166 does aid in determining what exactly consti-
tutes disclosure. In this transaction United owned 116,190 shares of Con-
sumers and contracted with another person and a corporation to buy more
stock in order to gain control of Consumers. United planned to eliminate
Consumers' board of directors and secure a merger of United and Consum-
ers. Directors of Consumers, in order to thwart a plan which would cost
them their jobs, decided that it was in the best interest of the corporation to
authorize 1,500,000 more shares of capital stock and to sell 280,000 of these
shares to a group of individuals in return for their promissory notes. After a
series of several more complicated machinations instituted by the directors of
Consumers in order to prevent a United takeover, litigation ensued between
the two corporations. United filed suit individually and derivatively against
Consumers asking the court to rescind the sale of the 280,000 shares, to en-
join the voting of the shares, and to grant damages. In order to settle the
litigation, a director, DaVoust, resigned from Consumers' board of directors
and then presented the plan that corporate assets of Consumers with a book
value of $1,473,000 be sold to D.P.C., Inc., a wholly-owned corporation of
DaVoust, for $1,160,000 cash. Further, DaVoust, through D.P.C., was given
an option to purchase 200,000 shares of the common stock of Consumers.
D.P.C. then was to sell the corporate assets to United (in order to prevent
United from showing a loss of $1,000,000 on the transfer) with payment be-
ing in the form of the 116,190 shares owned by United. In return United
agreed to rescind a stock purchase agreement whereby it was to gain control
of the corporation which in effect returned the stock to Consumers.
DaVoust, in another litigation seeking to hold the transaction invalid, was
accused of breaching his fiduciary duty to the corporation. 167
The Seventh Circuit upheld the transaction because an independent
board of directors had approved the settlement after full disclosure. Further-
more, the shareholders had received two notices about the proposed settle-
ment containing a full disclosure of the material facts. The notices
contained the following disclosures: (1) the settlement was promulgated by
DaVoust, former director and chairman of the board of Consumers; (2) the
assets were being transferred to D.P.C., Inc., "a corporation organized by
DaVoust"; (3) the issues in the three law suits and the terms of the proposed
settlement; (4) the assets were worth $1,973,072 and were being sold for
165. Breen Air Freight Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972); Julien J. Sludey,
Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 282 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313
S.W.2d. 802 (1958); United Homes, Inc. v. Moss, 154 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1963); Selensky v. South
Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Il1. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793; Levy v. Pacific E. Corp., 153 Misc. 488,
275 N.Y. 291 (1934); Poweroil Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Carstensen, 69 Wash. 673, 419 P.2d 793 (1966);
State v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964). S&egeneraly FLETcHER, supra
note 13, § 756 (lists 25 jurisdictions in accord with this principle).




$1,160,000; and (5) the difference between the purchase price and the sale
price was due to unearned interest on one of the mortgage assets of $161,556
which Consumers had the obligation to pay the purchaser of the mortgage
over a four year period and a recorded book loss of $151,516 on another
asset. The Seventh Circuit held that this notice was entirely adequate to
alert the cautious shareholder and his counsel that DaVoust was the central
party acquiring the United interest in Consumers and to outline the consid-
eration to be given and received by Consumers.
168
Finally, transactions litigated under the 1933 Securities and Exchange
Act 169 which requires full disclosure in connection with a purchase or sale of
stock further indicate what constitutes full disclosure.
Federal proxy rules promulgated under rule 14(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act 170 require full disclosure of all material facts. "Material" is
another word which escapes easy definition. The most widely accepted defi-
nition was given in the landmark case of the Securities Exchange Commission v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur' 7 1 in which the Second Circuit stated:
The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a reasonable man
would attach importance [to a fact] . . . in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question . . . . This, of course, en-
compasses any fact . . . which in reasonable and objective contem-
plation, might affect the value of the corporations stock or
securities. 17
2
Richland. Crandall,173 involved the sale of a construction corporation to
another corporation organized specifically to purchase it. Two of the direc-
tors of the selling corporation also had a substantial ownership interest in the
buying corporation, and a third director of the selling corporation agreed to
become an interim director and president of the buying corporation. The
court stated the general rule for determining if a material fact had been
omitted was whether, if disclosed, it would have influenced a reasonable
stockholder in voting on the proposal for the sale of the assets. The court
further stated that the general rule for determining if a statement made was
misleading was whether the claimed misstatement was of such a nature that
it could normally be expected to lead a reasonable stockholder to vote in
favor of the proposed sale.1
74
The court held that the proxy statement gave full and fair disclosure
based on the following findings: (1) it was proper to disclose the lengthy
discussion by the disinterested directors concerning the transaction and their
conclusion that it was fair based on an examination of past earnings of the
corporation, future prospects of the corporation, its competitive position, its
168. Id.
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78KK (1934).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I to a-12 (1979).
171. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
172. 401 F.2d at 868 (2d Cir. 1968). Accord, Northway Inc. v. T.S.C. Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d
324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (the test of whether omissions from
a proxy statement are material must include all facts which a reasonable stockholder might
consider important); Richland v. Crandall, 362 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
173. 362 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
174. Id. at 553.
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recent construction contract experience, and its assets and market history; (2)
it was not a material omission to omit the fact that the purchasers were
borrowing all of the funds necessary to finance the acquisition given the fact
that the loans were induced by personal guarantees of the wealthy purchas-
ers and a $2,000,000 security deposit; (3) it was proper to disclose the backlog
of construction contracts at their face value of $256,460,901, and it would
have been improper to speculate as to their ultimate worth as that would
have been misleading; (4) it was proper to disclose that the gross income of
the corporation had declined due to increased costs and intensified competi-
tion; (5) it was not an omission to fail to assign a dollar value to the goodwill
of the corporation as the nature of the business made such a designation
speculative; and (6) it was proper and necessary to disclose that the three
interested directors were not present at the meeting discussing the transac-
tion and their interest was properly and fully disclosed in a separate section
of the proxy statement which stated their respective interests, their positions
in the selling corporation, the fact that they had participated in the negotia-
tions, and all other material facts.'
7 5
Finally, it is important to note that in the cases dealing with this issue,
federal courts have held that nondisclosure in a purchase of a corporation's
assets by another corporation or a merger of two corporations of the fact that
the corporations had the same or common directors or officers was materi-
ally misleading and deceptive as a matter of law.
176
c. Transaction must be free offlaud
The second requirement in order for a transaction to be deemed fair is
that it must be free from fraud, actual or constructive.
Actual fraud in its general sense comprises anything calculated to
deceive, including all acts, omissions and concealments which breach a legal
or equitable duty, trust, or confidence and which result in an undue or un-
conscionable advantage being taken of another. Actual fraud, of course, in-
volves a knowing or intentional deception using any connivance, deception,
artifice, or concealment of material facts in order to cheat or deceive an-
other. It has been defined as any "concealment of a material fact which
should have been disclosed or the representation of the existence of a mate-
rial fact which did not exist. ' ' 1 77 Common law generally places the burden
of proving actual fraud on the party alleging it.
Within the context of corporate self-dealing, however, fraud is a loosely
used term and often used for transactions which do not fit within the term
"fraud" as it is traditionally used. Liability is often imposed for transactions
which constitute bad faith, breaches of fiduciary duty, acts constituting ac-
tionable negligence or gross unfairness, or acts which are truly oppressive to
175. Id. at 554-59.
176. Northway, Inc. v. T.S.C. Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975); Swanson v. Ameri-
can Consumers, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969), rev' 328 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Il. 1971).
177. Premier Poultry Co., v. W. Burnstein & Son, Inc., 61 A.2d 632, 634 (Mun. Dist. App.
Dist. Col. 1948).
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the minority stockholder. 178 As to minority stockholders the general rule is
that "[w]here a majority of the directors or stockholder, or both, acting in
bad faith, carry into effect a scheme which, even if lawful upon its face, is
intended to circumvent the minority stockholders and defraud them out of
their legal rights, the courts interfere and remedy the wrong."'
179
Many times fraud need not be shown as a fact nor must it be shown
that the directors or stockholders were motivated by any fraudulent intent; it
is sufficient that the existence of fraud is the necessary legal inference from
the facts found. °80 It seems apparent, however, that actual fraud within this
context does involve some misrepresentation or omission of material facts to
the innocent stockholders, and therefore the issue of actual fraud is inextrica-
bly tied to the issue of full and fair disclosure. If there has been no inten-
tional concealment or misrepresentation concerning a transaction,
actionable actual fraud does not exist, but, of course, the transaction can still
be set aside as constructively fraudulent or unfair.' 8 1
Specifically what constitutes fraud is a question of fact, to be decided on
a case by case basis. However, it appears that the requisite elements for a
finding of actual fraud in the sale or purchase of corporate assets are as fol-
lows: (1) some type of misrepresentation or nondisclosure; (2) oppressive and
unfair tactics toward minority stockholders; and (3) less than adequate or
full consideration for the assets purchased.'
8 2
178. See generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, § 5829.
179. Flynn v. Brooklyn City Ry., 158 N.Y. 493, 507, 55 N.E. 520, 524 (1899).
180. See Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312 (1915) (California court found fraud
present when the purchasers of all the stock in the corporation falsely represented to third per-
sons that said stock was treasury stock and that the proceeds of the sale would go into the
treasury and be used in developing the corporation's business when instead it was used to pay
unearned dividends in order to stimulate the sale of their own holdings); Gamble v. Queens
County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890) (purchase of property from a stockholder by
a corporation at such an exorbitant price as to necessarily lead to the inference of fraud);
Humbaugh v. Hitchcock, 115 Kan. 182, 222 P. 114 (1924) (The court found fraudulent a trans-
action whereby a stockholder, who owned all of the preferred stock of a corporation, and a large
majority of the common stock, caused the preferred stock to be cancelled and in lieu thereof
caused to be issued to himself more common stock. This occurred at a meeting not attended by
the minority stockholders, and so they had no knowledge of the proposed transaction. The
transaction was found fraudulent without deciding the director's bad faith because it was
financially beneficial to the majority stockholder and a substantial disadvantage to the minor-
ity).
181. See, e.g., Levin v. Hunter, 6 Il. App. 2d 461, 128 N.E.2d 630 (1955). (There was no
proof of fraud where it was shown in an action by a stockholder to enjoin the execution of a ten-
year noncancellable management contract executed by the directors, that the question of the
contract had been fairly and openly discussed with the plaintiffs prior to the transaction).
182. The following cases do give an indication of what the courts will consider fraudulent
when a director/majority stockholder purchases the assets of his corporation.
In Kletin v. Independent Brewing Assoc. 231 111. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1907), the court held fraudu-
lent a sale of property to the corporation (without disclosure to the stockholders) by the domi-
nant director at a price $16,575 in excess of the fair market value of the property.
One earlier case, Leopolda. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1942) involved the direc-
tors and 80% stockholders of the Inland Steamship Company, forcing the dissolution of that
profitable company over the objection of the minority stockholders, and then appropriating the
business and all its assets to their wholly-owned corporation which was held fraudulent for
several reasons. First the directors dissolved the corporation for their own personal interests and
not in the best interest of the minority stockholders. Second, they represented to the minority
stockholders that the business of the corporation would be discontinued when all along they
intended to appropriate said business to their own corporation. Third, inadequate consideration
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The second type of fraud, constructive, has long been applied in Colo-
rado for breach of fiduciary duty. 183 Constructive fraud is defined as being:
A breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law de-
clares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, violate confi-
dence or to injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty nor
intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud ....
Such fraud often arises where a special confidence or fiduciary rela-
tionship exists, which affords the power and the means of one to
take undue advantage over the other . . . . A breach of fiduciary
duty constitutes constructive fraud. Moreover constructive fraud,
like "[a] constructive trust is . . . [a] remedial device through
which preference of self is made subordinate to loyalty to
others."1
84
It is a doctrine which is designed to prevent the taking advantage of the
weakness or necessity of another. The conditions precedent to the applica-
tion of the doctrine are (1) an inequality between the parties; (2) a weakness
on one side and advantage taken of that weakness on the other; and (3) an
appearance that "the dominant party either brought about the uneveness in
the conditions, or finding it ready to his hand, utilized it and traded on it to
extract from the servient party a gift or contract he would not otherwise
have made."' 18 5 Where such a relationship is said to exist several presump-
tions are used to facilitate the finding of constructive fraud:
The law presumes in favor of the servient party against the domi-
nant party, (1) that the relation placed the dominant party in a
position to exercise influence and dominion over the servient party;
(2) that such influence and dominion operated upon, and pro-
cured, the transaction; and (3) that the influence was an improper
and unfair, or (to use the accepted phrase) an "undue influence."
was paid for the stockholders' interest, notwithstanding the fact that the directors had paid fair
market value for the assets, because the goodwill of the corporation and its history of substantial
profits were not taken into account when determining the value of the business. Finally, the
directors had forced the stockholders to accept the fair market value of the assets as representa-
tive of their stocks' worth by stating that the selling corporation had no business future without
the directors' corporation feeding business into it. Id. at 373-75.
A more blatant case of misrepresentation was Lembeck &Betz Brewing Co. v. McAnag, 287 F.
927 (W.D.N.Y. 1923), wherein a director and plant manager of a brewing plant caused the
directors of the corporation to sell the plant to him for an inadequate price by virtue of his
knowing misrepresentation as to the condition of the plant and the nature of its contents. The
directors had relied on the representations of the purchasing director as an accurate account of
the plant because they were too far from the plant to inspect it for themselves. Id. at 933.
Finally, in a more recent case, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found a transaction fraud-
ulent where the director of a corporation (1) conspired to obtain 80% of the selling corporation's
stock; (2) formed a new company for the purpose of buying the assets and conducted the identi-
cal business previously conducted by the selling corporation; (3) excluded the minority stock-
holder from participating in the stock ownership of the new company; and (4) purchased the
assets at less than their fair market value. Massey v. Farnsworth, 353 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962).
183. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965); Dittbrenner v. Meyerson, 114
Colo. 448, 167 P.2d 15 (1946); Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 39
Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d 875 (1961). Seealso Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D.
Colo. 1972), a~fd, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1973).
184. Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 39 Colo. App. at 351-52, 569
P.2d at 880-81 (1961).
185. Irwin v. West End Dev. Corp., 342 F. Supp. at 697 (D. Colo. 1972) (citing Dittbrenner
v. Meyerson, 114 Colo. at 458, 167 P.2d at 20 (1946)).
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When the relative position of the parties is such as prima facie to
raise this presumption, the transaction cannot stand unless the per-
son claiming the benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by
contrary evidence, proving it to have been in point of fact fair, just
and reasonable. '
8 6
Recent Colorado cases have held the following transactions to be con-
structively fraudulent and subject to rescission and award of damages: (a) a
director with the connivance of a personal secretary voted himself a retroac-
tive salary of $15,000 for operating a leasing business, to be paid from a loan
received by the corporation in order to build tennis courts where no resolu-
tion was passed to that effect and even though the director was entitled to
compensation for his services;' 87 (b) failure of directors to redeem preferred
stockholders' stock pursuant to liquidation because in order to do so would
require the sale of valuable corporate-owned stock which would increase in
value and thereby increase the amount the directors would receive for their
common stock was gambling with corporate property which should have
been used to redeem shares, which without informing the preferred stock-
holders, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud;'
88
and, (c) a sale of corporate property for an inadequate consideration as mea-
sured against its fair market value.'
8 9
Inadequate consideration for corporate property, as well as being con-
structively fraudulent, is also, logically, considered unfair. The leading case
in this area is a United States Supreme Court decision, Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co. 90 In this action a minority stockholder challenged the
sale of all the corporate property of the Alice Gold and Silver Mining Com-
pany to Anaconda Copper Company. The stockholder alleged, inter ah'a,
that the sale was voidable because the property was purchased for inade-
quate consideration and because the transaction was negotiated by two
boards of directors with common membership.
91
The lower court had found the consideration paid to be inadequate and
had the transaction set aside. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision by
saying:
The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary na-
ture that transactions between boards having common members
are regarded as jealously by the law as are personal dealings be-
tween a director and his corporation, and where the fairness of
such transactions is challenged the burden is upon those who
would maintain them to show their entire fairness and where a sale
is involved the full adequacy of the consideration. Especially is this
true where a common director is dominating in influence or in
186. 342 F. Supp. at 697 (D. Colo. 1972).
187. Id. at 687.
188. Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 344, 569 P.2d
875 (1961).
189. Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965).
190. 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
191. Id. Further, the driving force behind the sale, the president and director of the Alice
Corporation, was also a dominating director and general manager of the Anaconda Corpora-
tion, as well as being the dominating director of the corporation which owned and voted the
majority of the shares of the Alice Corporation.
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character. This court has been consistently emphatic in the appli-
cation of this rule, which, it has declared, is founded in soundest
morality, and we now add in the soundest business policy'
9 2
The court set aside the sale even though authorized by a majority of the
stockholders because the consideration was found to be inadequate.
Following this basic principle, courts will set aside, in self-dealing trans-
actions, sales or purchases of corporate property when the property received
by the corporation is worth less than what was paid or if the property sold by
the corporation is worth more than what the corporation received as consid-
eration. 193
There are, however, several tests used by the courts to determine if ade-
quate consideration has been paid: (1) a comparison of the fair market value
of the asset sold as of the date of the agreement or ratification (including
goodwill if an entire business is sold) with the amount paid by the director or
stockholder; 194 (2) expert testimony and appraisals as to the value of the
property; 195 and (3) what offers (or lack of offers) were received from third
parties wishing to buy the same corporate assets prior to their sale to the
directors or majority stockholders.
1 9 6
The purchase of corporate assets at their fair market value is not always
sufficient to protect a director or majority stockholder from liability for
breach of his fiduciary duty for the director has the duty to obtain the high-
est price possible for the corporate assets. For example, in Wheeler v. Abehine
National Bank Buildng, 19 7 a director, who was also president and majority
stockholder, of a corporation purchased the corporate assets at fair market
value. The court held the transaction voidable when it was established that
a third person had offered to buy the assets at a price $1,000 in excess of fair
market value. The court held that the director had breached his fiduciary
duty to make the property of the corporation produce the largest possible
amount.
This devolution of unlimited power imposes on a single holder of
majority of the stock a correlative duty, the duty of a fiduciary or
agent, to the holders of the minority of the stock, who can act only
192. Id. at 598.
193. Lembeck & Betz Eagle Brewing Co. v. McAnarney, 287 F. 927 (W.D.N.Y. 1923); Gott-
esman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo.
152, 404 P.2d 537 (1965); Jordan v. Jordan Co., 94 Conn. 384, 109 A. 181 (1920); Schiff v. RKO
Pictures Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 329, 104 A.2d 267 (1954); Shelensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.,
19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960); Chesapeake Construction Corp. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531,
261 A.2d 156 (1970).
194. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Richland
v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Garbino v. Albercan Oil Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 27,
109 A.2d 824 (1955); Scheff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 329, 104 A.2d 267 (1953).
195. Ste Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Whatley v. Wood, 157
Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965) (expert testimony established that patented mining properties
which were sold by a director for $150 were worth $30,000 to $75,000); Abelow v. Midstates Oil
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 145, 189 A.2d 675 (1958); Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 128
A.2d 225 (1957); Gropper v. North Cent. Tex. Oil Co., 35 Del. Ch. 198, 114 A.2d 231 (1955).
196. See Wheeler v. Abeline Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908); Cardin Bldg.
Co. v. Smith, 125 Okla. 300, 258 P. 910 (1927); Williams v. Yocum, 37 Wyo. 432, 263 P. 607
(1928).
197. 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908).
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through him, the duty to exercise good faith, care, and diligence
. . . to protect the interests of the holders of the minority of the
stock, and to secure and pay over to them their just proportion of
the income and of the proceeds of the corporate property. Any sale
of the property of the corporation by him to himself for less than he
could obtain for it from another, or any other act in his interest to
the detriment of the holders of the minority of the stock, becomes a
breach of duty and of trust, renders the sale or act voidable at the
election of the minority stockholders, and invokes plenary relief
from a court of chancery . . . . The reason for this rule is the detri-
ment to the holders of the minority of the stock from such sales and
transactions, and not the benefit the holder of the majority derives
therefrom. . . . It is the duty of the master of the corporation who
sells its property to procure the highest possible price for it . . . ,
and, if he sells it to himself for less, the sale is voidable by the hold-
ers of the minority of the stock at their option, although he paid the
fair market value for it. 198
Conversely, if the corporate property was valued at a certain amount
and failed to sell at that amount when placed on the market, it is not unfair
for a director and/or majority stockholder to purchase it for less than what
was thought to be the fair market value of the asset. 199
Expert testimony is frequently relied on by the courts to determine the
accurate value of the corporate asset sold. Courts rely heavily on those indi-
viduals who demonstrate the ability to accurately assess an asset's worth ei-
ther by professional expertise and reputation, long-time experience and
intimate knowledge of the corporation's balance sheet, or the use of sophisti-
cated accounting methods in order to determine an asset's worth.
2° °
Other factors used by the courts are (1) the extent of dominance of the
controlling stockholder purchasing the assets; (2) whether the transaction
constituted a better bargain than the corporation could have obtained in
dealings with others or a detriment to the corporation as a result of the trans-
action; (3) whether there was a possiblity of corporate gains being siphoned
off by the directors directly or through corporations they controlled; and (4)




Section 7-5-114.5 does not control all possible corporate conflict of inter-
est situations. One such transaction is when a controlling shareholder, who
is also deemed to be a fiduciary by virtue of his position of leadership within
198. Id. at 394.
199. Cardin Bldg. Co. v. Smith, 125 Okla. 300, 258 P. 910 (1927) (sale of the major asset of
a corporation, a building, to a director for $85,000 where it was allegedly worth $150,000 to
$200,000 was not unfair when it could be shown that the directors had placed the building on
the market at $104,000 and then $90,000 and had failed to receive a bid).
200. See Richland v. Crandall, 362 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Abelow v. Mid-States Oil
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 145, 189 A.2d 675 (1958); Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 128
A.2d 225 (1957).
201. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. at 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Schelen-
sky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 11. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 703 (1960); Knudsen v. Burdett,
67 S.D. 20, 287 N.W. 673 (1939); Williams v. Yocum, 32 Wyo. 432, 263 P. 607 (1928).
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the corporation, contracts with his corporation so as to place himself in a
conflict of interest situation. In order to uphold such a transaction courts
demand that it be in good faith and scrupulously fair to the corporation and
the remaining stockholders. Further, compliance with the technical require-
ments of the statute cannot be in lieu of meeting the fairness requirement.
Clearly such a requirement is one of the simplest and, at the same time, one
of the most difficult to meet.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA V WEBER:
TITLE VII REVISED
INTRODUCTION
In 1974 the United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum
and Chemical Corporation entered into a master collective bargaining
agreement covering terms and conditions of employment at fifteen Kaiser
plants. This agreement included an affirmative action program designed to
increase minority representation in skilled craft jobs in Kaiser's factories.
The plan provided for the establishment of a new in-house apprenticeship
program. For every nonminority applicant accepted into the program not
less than one minority applicant was to enter until the ratio of minority to
nonminority craftsmen equalled the corresponding ratio in the local labor
force. I
In the agreement's first year of operation at the Gramercy, Louisiana
plant, thirteen craft trainees were selected from the hourly work force. Of
these, seven were black. Within each racial classification the most senior
employee applying was selected; however, some of the successful black appli-
cants had less seniority than their white co-workers who would have been
selected but for the one black-one white requirement. Brian Weber was in
the latter class, and when his application was denied he filed suit against
Kaiser and the union, charging that the program discriminated against him
and other members of his class in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.2 The district court agreed with this contention and enjoined
the defendants from denying Weber and his class access to on-the-job train-
ing on the basis of race.3 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed with one
dissent. 4 The Supreme Court reversed,
5 holding that title VII did not pro-
hibit private parties from voluntarily adopting affirmative action programs
to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in job categories that were tradi-
tionally segregated.
6
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
Prior to 1974, only 1.8% 7 of skilled craft workers and only 14.8%8 of all
employees at Kaiser's Gramercy plant were black. This was in stark contrast
to the racial composition of the surrounding area in which 39% of the work
force was black.9 Although Kaiser had apparently been recruiting black
1. 1974 Labor Agreement, pertinent parts reprihted tn Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (E.D. La. 1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
3. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761.
4. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
5. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
6. Id. at 2730.
7. Id. at 2725.
8. 415 F. Supp. at 764.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
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craftsmen,' 0 the company had a five-year prior experience requirement
which, because of historical discrimination by craft unions, few blacks were
able to meet. 1' Consequently, Kaiser and the union were under a great deal
of pressure to adopt an affirmative action program to increase minority rep-
resentation in skilled craft positions. First, there was the constant threat of
title VII litigation by minorities. A Kaiser plant in nearby Chalmette, Loui-
siana, had recently been sued under title VII due, in part, to the small per-
centage of black craftsmen.12 Second, the Office of Federal Contracts
Compliance (hereinafter referred to as the OFCC), which was responsible for
the administration of the President's anti-discrimination program,' was en-
couraging Kaiser to increase its minority representation. In 1971, the OFCC
had found violations of its regulations in a compliance review of Kaiser's
operations. 14 These infractions, if not corrected, could have resulted in a
number of sanctions against Kaiser including cancellation of its government
contracts. 15 Therefore, Kaiser dropped its five-year experience requirement
and, together with the union, established an apprenticeship program based
on OFCC suggestions. The plan was patterned after the consent decree en-
tered for the steel industry in the massive case of United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Industries, Inc. '6 No sooner had this occurred, however, than the pro-
gram was struck down by the courts as violating the civil rights of Kaiser's
white employees.
II. THE LEGAL SETTING
The particular provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that Kaiser's
program was said to violate are sections 703(a), 703(d), and 7030). Section
10. 415 F. Supp. at 764. But see Petition for Certiorari of United States and EEOC at 18.
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
12. Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
2417 (1979). The court held, inter a/ia, that evidence showing less than three percent of Kaiser's
craftsmen were black, when compared to the percentage of black hourly employees, was entitled
to substantial, if not dispositive, weight in assessing whether plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of discrimination. 575 F.2d at 1389.
13. The OFCC acts under the Secretary of Labor who is charged with the administration
of Executive Order No. 11,246. That order, one of a series in effect since 1941, requires federal
contractors to take affirmative action to insure that applicants for jobs are treated without re-
gard to their race. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232-36 (1976).
14. The OFCC found that Kaiser had waived prior experience requirements for white
craftsmen but not for blacks. Kaiser also had apparently failed to recruit black craftsmen. Peti-
tion for Certiorari of United States and EEOC at 18.
15. Other possible sanctions include enforcement or criminal proceedings by the Depart-
ment of Justice and debarment from further government contracts. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339, 343-44 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1234-35
(1976).
16. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). This was a suit brought
on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
against nine major steel companies and the United Steel Workers of America. The proceeding
involved over 240 plants employing more than 300,000 people and alleged widespread practices
of discrimination in hiring and job assignments. The suit culminated in two lengthy consent
decrees providing inter alia for: (1) immediate reform of seniority systems to remove the continu-
ing effects of past discrimination; (2) establishment of goals and timetables for fuller utilization
of females and minorities; and (3) establishment of a $30,000,000 back pay fund to be paid to
the victims of the unlawful practices alleged in the complaint.
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703(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any indi-
vidual on the basis of race with respect to terms or privileges of his employ-
ment or to classify employees in a way which would tend to deprive them of
opportunities because of their race. 17 Section 703(d) makes it unlawful to
discriminate against employees in admission to apprenticeship programs on
the basis of race.' 8 Section 7030) states that nothing in title VII shall be
interpreted to require an employer to grant preferential treatment to any
group merely on account of a racial imbalance in the work force.' 9
Until the Weber case, the Supreme Court appeared to be of the opinion
that these provisions were intended to promote the use of individual merit
rather than race as the criterion for hiring and promotion in employment.
20
In Grzggs v. Duke Power Co. the Court had declared that, far from disparaging
job qualifications, Congress, by enacting title VII, made such qualifications
the controlling factor so that race became irrelevant.2 ' Just as discrimina-
tion was made illegal, so too was preferential treatment for any race. 22 "Dis-
criminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, [was] precisely
and only what Congress [had] proscribed.
'23
Despite these developments, there had come to be a well-recognized ex-
ception to the rule against racial preferences. Preferential hiring and promo-
tion have often been ordered by courts as an equitable remedy for an
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) specifically provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire.or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976) specifically provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organiza-
tion, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other train-
ing or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1976), entitled "Preferential treatment not to be granted on
account of existing number or percentage imbalance," specifically provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual
or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed
by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or
labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or
admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in com-
parison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the avail-
able work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
20. In Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), a sex dis-
crimination case, the Court characterized title VII as "a statute that was designed to make race
irrelevant in the employment market . Id. at 709.
21. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
22. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1976).
23. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431.
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employer's past discrimination. 24 Indeed, title VII itself appears to contem-
plate such relief where appropriate to remedy past discrimination.2 5 The
rationale for the preference is that it is merely the consequence of a court's
equitable power to make an injured party whole. The fact that the remedy
is fashioned along racial lines merely reflects that the injury was inflicted in
racial terms.
26
Even as a remedy for past discrimination the validity of preferential
treatment has been questioned, 27 and in Regents of the Un'versit' of Califo'rna v.
Bakke, 28 Justice Powell reaffirmed the importance of limiting preferential
treatment to remedial situations. He pointed out that the Court had never
approved a racial classification aiding minorities at the expense of other in-
nocent individuals in the absence of some official finding of discrimination.
29
The difficulty with this limitation was that the Court had also recog-
nized that statistics showing a racial imbalance could be used by title VII
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. 30 These rules
created a dilemma for employers. On the one hand, they were faced with
the threat of title VII litigation by minorities if there was a racial imbalance
in the work force. On the other hand, employers who sought to correct the
imbalance by granting preferential treatment to the underrepresented class
were in danger of title VII liability to whites for "reverse discrimination.
'31
Indeed, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 32 the Court had held
that title VII protected whites just as much as blacks from employment dis-
crimination. 33 The only way for employers to avoid this dilemma would be
to admit past discrimination against the group sought to be preferred. The
racial preference could then be defended on the grounds that it was remedial
in nature and hence within the exception to title VII. But this would be, at
best, a Pyrrhic victory for the employers because they would be admitting
liability to the victims of their discrimination, which could include responsi-
bility for back pay.
34
Faced with these alternatives, most employers could be expected to do
24. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977). In Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the Court recognized the appropriateness of such
affirmative relief under certain circumstances. Id. at 774.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) specifically provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsi-
ble for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
26. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 224-25.
27. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 781 passim (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29. d. at 307.
30. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
31. See, e.g., EEOC Decision 75-268, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1502 (1975).
32. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
33. Id. at 280. Note, however, that the Court specifically declined to rule upon the appli-
cation of this principle to affirmative action programs. Id. at 280 n.8.
34. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 231 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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nothing to correct conspicuous racial imbalances in their work force. Kai-
ser's treatment in the lower courts in the Weber case indicated the fate an
adventurous employer could expect for adopting an effective affirmative ac-
tion program that was not a response to the employer's past discrimination.
This situation seemed at odds with the policy of the Civil Rights Act favor-
ing voluntary cessation of discrimination and informal resolution of racial
problems in employment. The reconciliation of these conflicting rules and
policies was the task to which the Supreme Court addressed itself in Weber.
III. THE DECISION
The majority, speaking through Justice Brennan, emphasized at the
outset that Congress' primary purpose in enacting title VII was to create
employment opportunities for blacks in areas from which they had tradition-
ally been excluded.3 5 To read the statute as prohibiting the kind of affirma-
tive action taken by Kaiser and the union would frustrate that purpose and
the policy favoring voluntary compliance. Thus, the Court relied heavily on
the fact that section 703j) only stated that preferential treatment cannot be
required. The statute does not say that preferential treatment is prohbited.
36
This omission was said to mean that Congress intended to leave employers
free to adopt plans to achieve a racially balanced work force. This conclu-
sion was bolstered by evidence that section 7030) was added to the bill to
allay the fears of many legislators in 1964 that title VII would increase gov-
ernmental intrusion into the private affairs of companies and unions.37 To
read section 7030) as a federal prohibition against private racial balancing
would be to introduce just the element of governmental interference with the
private sector that the section was designed to prevent. Finally, the majority
emphasized the reasonableness of the plan, noting that the program was
temporary and created no absolute bar to the advancement of white employ-
ees.
38
In a bitter dissent, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of not only
ignoring the plain language of title VII and the legislative history behind it
but also of deviating from what had been, up until now, the unswerving
interpretation of the statute by the Court. 39 Chief Justice Burger agreed,
accusing the majority of amending title VII to achieve what it regarded as a
desirable result.4°
Justice Blackmun questioned the soundness of the majority's reading of
the statute, but concurred on the theory that there ought to be an exception
to title VII allowing employers who have committed "arguable violations"
of the statute to take responsive action without liability to whites.4 1 Justices
Stevens and Powell took no part in the decision.
35. 99 S. Ct. at 2727.
36. Id. at 2729.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2730.
39. Id. at 2736-37.
40. Id. at 2734-35.
41. Id. at 2731. This is the theory Judge Wisdom relied on in his forceful dissent from the
opinion of the majority of the court of appeals. See 563 F.2d at 227.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S OPINION
A. The Legzslative Intent
The plain language of sections 703(a) and (d)42 seems to indicate that
the racial balancing system adopted by Kaiser and the union discriminated
against Brian Weber because of his race. Not only were certain applicants
selected for the craft training program over the more senior Weber because
they were black, but at least one position was open to blacks only; Weber,
being white, could not even apply.43 The program classified Weber in a way
that tended to deprive him of employment opportunities because of his race
in violation of section 703(a)(2) and thus discriminated against him in viola-
tion of sections 703(a)(1) and (d). Normally, given such clear language, the
rules of statutory construction would not permit the Court to consider ex-
trinsic matter such as evidence of the legislative intent.44 It could be argued,
however, that title VII is nevertheless ambiguous, thus justifying an inquiry
into the legislative history.
The Civil Rights Act seems to have been adopted for the purpose of
eliminating traditional race discrimination, i.e., the kind that is caused by
actual or subconscious hostility toward the group discriminated against. 45
Thus, it could be asserted that the Act is ambiguous in its application to
possible race discrimination not founded on distaste for a white "victim" but
caused by a benign attempt to eliminate the vestiges of society's discrimina-
tion against blacks. 46 Even if this contention is accepted, a resort to the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act does not seem to uncover any sup-
port for the majority's conclusion that the Act permits private racial balanc-
ing. Justice Rehnquist's dissent effectively catalogues the numerous
occasions during the congressional debates when it was unequivocally de-
clared that title VII would prohibit employers from discriminating against or
'n favor of an employee because of his race.47 Any deliberate attempt to
42. See notes 17 & 18 supra.
43. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 764.
44. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 490 (1917).
45. The Act "provides the means of terminating the most serious types of discrimination."
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2391, 2393. Citing remarks made by various senators and congressmen during the debates, the
union pointed out that title VII was aimed at "acts of 'ugliness', 'intolerance', 'bigotry', 'bias',
'prejudice', and 'racial preference'." Brief for Petitioner United Steel Workers of America at 20.
46. Even this argument is subject to doubt. Senator Humphrey defined discrimination
very broadly as different "treatment given to different individuals because of their different race
.... .110 CONG. REc. 5423 (1964).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 2741-51. "The bill would do no more than prevent ... employers from
discriminating against or in favor of workers because of their race, religion, or national origin."
110 CONG. REc. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Cellar). "Employers and labor organizations
could not discriminate in favor of or against a person because of his race, his religion or his
national origin. In such matters . . . the bill now before us . . . is colorblind." Id. at 6564
(remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
[I]f a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white
working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be
simply to fill future vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged--or indeed permitted--to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer
Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority
rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
Id. at 7213 (mem. of Sens. Clark & Case).
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maintain a racial balance would, it was stated, be a violation of title VII
because it would mean that employment decisions were being made on the
basis of race.48 This the Act strictly prohibited.
49
In support of its conclusion, the majority relied in part on language in
the House of Representatives' report accompanying the Civil Rights Act.
50
The report states that, in addition to dealing with the most glaring discrimi-
nation, the Civil Rights Act would "create an atmosphere conducive to vol-
untary resolution of other forms of discrimination."'" This suggested that
Congress did not intend to prohibit private voluntary affirmative action pro-
grams. Even if it is assumed, however, that one of those "other forms of
discrimination" was a numerical underrepresentation of minorities in skilled
jobs,52 the issue of the validity of the means chosen to overcome the discrimi-
nation still remains. Merely because an affirmative action program is volun-
It [the title] does not provide that any quota systems may be established to maintain
racial balance in employment. In fact, the title would prohibit preferential treatment
for any particular group, and any person, whether or not a member of any minority
group, would be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 11,848 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
48. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (mem. of Sens. Clark & Case). See also the memorandum
from the Department of Justice, introduced by Senator Clark, which stated:
There is no provision . . . in title VII . . .that requires or authorizes any Federal
agency or Federal court to require preferential treatment for any individual or any
group for the purpose of achieving racial balance . . . . No employer is required to
maintain any ratio of Negroes to whites . . . . On the contrary, any deliberate at-
tempt to maintain a given balance would almost certainly run afoul of title VII be-
cause it would involve a failure or refusal to hire some individual because of his race
... . What title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil rights bill seeks to accom-
plish, is equal treatment for all.
Id. at 7207.
49. Id. at 1518 (remarks of Rep. Cellar); id. at 6465 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 8921
(remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 11,848 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
In his dissent in Fransv. Bowman Transp. Co., Justice Powell speaks of "the kind of preferen-
tial treatment forbidden by § 7030) . . ." (emphasis added) and describes that provision as a
"bar" to preferential treatment. 424 U.S. at 792-93. In Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534
F.2d at 998, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "[a]ll agree, as do we, that
the non-remedial distortion of a seniority system through preferential treatment based solely
upon race is a form of reverse discrimination speciftcalyproscribed by Congress." 534 F.2d at 998
(emphasis added). "[Cireating fictional employment time for newly-hired Negroes would com-
prise preferential rather than remedial treatment. The clear thrust of the Senate debate is di-
rected against such preferential treatment on the basis of race." Local 198, United Papermakers
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), citediwith approval
in Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 709 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, sub nom. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. EEOC, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). In Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
997 (1976), the court upheld against a title VII attack a seniority system that had a last hired-
first fired feature. The court stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would be tantamount to shackling
white employees with a burden of past discrimination created not by them but by their em-
ployer. Title VII was not designed to nurture such reverse discriminatory preferences." 502
F.2d at 1320.
The commentators on the Act were largely in accord that nonremedial preferences were
illegal. See, e.g., Employment Dicrimination and Ttle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1109, 1114-15 (1971). See also Note, The Employer's Dilemma: Qyotas, Reverse Discrimznation,
and Volunitag Compliance, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 369, 373 (1977) in which the author states: "[T]he
legislative history strongly suggests that the section [7030)] was intended to expressly prohibit the
use of preferential practices by employers."
50. 99 S. Ct. at 2728.
51. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprtntedin [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2355, 2393.
52. Section 7030) of the Act which is entitled "Preferential treatment not to be granted on
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tary does not mean that it is consistent with title VII. Any affirmative action
program must be reconciled with the Act's mandate that each ind'idual's
right to be free from discrimination be respected.
53
The other argument advanced by the majority was that section 703(j)
states only that employers may not be required to engage in racial balancing.
It does not say that they are not permitted to do so.54 The Court pointed out
that opponents of title VII expressed two fears during the congressional de-
bates. 55 First, they charged that the word "discrimination" would be inter-
preted by the federal government to include the existence of a racial
imbalance in a factory. The government would then require the employer
to racially balance his work force. Second, the legislators argued that even if
not required to do so, employers would voluntarily prefer minorities in order
to correct racial imbalances. Since, the argument went, section 703(j) only
speaks to the first objection, it must be concluded that Congress did not
intend to prohibit employers from voluntarily giving minorities preferential
treatment.
56
The fallacy of this argument, however, is that there does not seem to be
any evidence to support the inference that the words "or permitted" were
left out because of some deliberate decision by Congress to leave employers
free to prefer minorities. The Court arrived at its conclusion by means of a
subtle distortion of the meaning of the legislative history of the statute. The
remarks of Senator Sparkman to which the majority referred5 7 did not ex-
press the concern that employers would voluntarily engage in racial balanc-
ing even if not required. No one had ever suggested that title VII would
permit this. In light of the clear language of sections 703(a) and (d) such a
contention would have been considered somewhat frivolous. 58 Senator
Sparkman was concerned that even though the bill did not expressly require
quotas, the agents charged with the administration of title VII would put
pressure on employers with unbalanced work forces to adopt preferential
programs. 59 Although proponents of the Act assured the Senator that such
account of existing number or percentage imbalance" strongly suggests that Congress did not
want mere racial imbalances to be illegal. See note 19 supra.
53. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court stated that "[i]t is
clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by title VII is to provide an equal opportunity
for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race
are already proportionately represented in the work force." Id. at 579. In Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the Court noted that "[t]he statute's focus on
the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a
racial . . . class." 1d. at 708. The basic policy of the Act "requires that we focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes." Id. at 709.
54. 99 S. Ct. at 2728-29.
55. Id. at 2729.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Justice Rehnquist forcefully pointed this out in his dissent. See 99 S. Ct. at 2748-49.
59. See 110 CONG. REC. 8618-19 (1964). Senator Sparkman showed impressive foresight in
predicting the practical administration of title VII over the years. He charged that the EEOC
would use any underrepresentation of minorities as evidence of discrimination and would pres-
sure the employer into adopting some type of quota system. He noted that "[sluch a tendency
has already been observed under the President's voluntary employment opportunities program.
Employers have been threatened with the loss of their Government contracts if they did not
comply." Id. at 8618. Senator Keating's response to this charge is very interesting. He said:
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a result would be impossible, 60 the concern over the possible imposition of
quotas was so pervasive that section 7030) was added to make the prohibi-
tion explicit. 6 1 Hence, section 7030) does not deal with the issue of volun-
tary preferences and does not seem to be authority for the proposition that
they are permissible.
B. The Federal Interference Argument
The Court found additional support for its conclusion that title VII left
employers and unions free to engage in racial balancing in the fact that title
VII was designed to prevent undue governmental intrusion into the private
affairs of business.62 A holding that it prohibited race-conscious conduct
would increase the role of the federal government and interfere with man-
agement prerogatives. There is no question that this was an important con-
cern of many of the members of the Eighty-eighth Congress,6 3 but the
Court's use of this argument is rather ironic because its ruling seems to au-
thorize just the kind of federal intrusion the Congress feared.64 By charac-
terizing Kaiser's affirmative action program as "voluntary" the Court shut
its eyes to the fact that the OFCC has for some time compelled employers to
practice racial balancing or risk the loss of their federal contracts. 65 The
influence of the OFCC on Kaiser's decision to adopt the program was sub-
stantial. 66 The governmental intrusion that would result from a statutory
prohibition against racial balancing seems less significant than the constant
federal surveillance and pressure validated sub silencio in this case.
V. WEBER AND THE CONSTITUTION
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court chose to assume, somewhat
artificially, that the Kaiser training program was voluntarily adopted. For
one thing, the parties argued the case largely under this theory. Further-
more, a finding that agents of the federal government were requiring or even
"Of course, improper administration of the law is a question that may be encountered at any
time. I was speaking about the provisions of the bill." Id.
60. Those opposed to H.R. 7152 should realize that to hire a Negro solely because he
is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a 'white only' employment policy.
Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by Title VII of this bill. The language of
that title simply states that race is not a qualification for employment.
110 CONG. REC. 8921 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
61. Senator Smathers, expressing the fear that employers would protect themselves "by
hiring a certain number of colored people in order to keep the might and majesty of the federal
law and its large bureaucracy off his neck," was asked by Senator Humphrey if he would be
content with the addition of a provision "that there should be no quota system." The Senator
answered that in his opinion the "bill would be improved." Id. at 7800.
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
63. "[Mianagement prerogatives.., and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible. . . . Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be
interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination prac-
tices." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29, repr'nted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2516.
64. See 99 S. Ct. at 2749.
65. See OFCC Rev. Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1978). See also 99 S. Ct. at 2737 n.2.
66. The district court judge in Weber emphasized that satisfying OFCC requirements and
avoiding suits by minorities were Kaiser's "prime motivations" for adopting an affirmative ac-
tion program. 415 F. Supp. at 765.
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encouraging the private use of racial quotas would have raised the specter of
the Constitution. 67 For the OFCC to sustain its program against the charge
that it violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 68 the agency
would have to show the program was necessary to satisfy a permissible fed-
eral interest. 69 The Bakke case,70 with its apparent rejection of rigid racial
selection criteria as a necessary means of achieving state interests would ap-
pear to pose a major obstacle to the justification of the OFCC's conduct. A
private, voluntary program free of constitutional limitations would be much
easier to uphold.
71
VI. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TITLE VII AND THE
EXECUTIVE ORDER PROGRAM
The Weber case is the latest development in the continuing dispute over
the possible conflict between title VII and the executive order program being
administered by the Secretary of Labor. 72 The conflict has been dealt with a
number of times by the courts 73 and at least once by the Congress. 74 The
67. State action for equal protection purposes may be predicated upon the conduct of
regulatory agencies. It is not limited to acts of the legislature. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S.
153 (1964). The informal pressure exerted by the OFCC on Kaiser could conceivably be state
action under the "encouragement" theory outlined in cases such as Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 379 (1967).
68. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court noted that the fifth
amendment does not contain an equal protection clause as does the fourteenth amendment,
which applies only to the states. But the Court pointed out that the two concepts are not
mutually exclusive and the discrimination may be so unjustifiable that it violates due process.
Id. at 497.
69. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Loz67g pointed out that racial distinctions
drawn by governments are subject to the most rigid scrutiny and require justification which is
far more extensive than the "rational basis" test applied in cases where race is not the basis for
the legal distinction. Id. at 8-11.
70. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
71. It should also be noted that the Court has often stated that it will avoid ruling on
constitutional questions when there are statutory or other solutions to the problem. Sete, e.g.,
Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
72. Compare 49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969) with 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1969). For a good
discussion of the nature of the conflict, see Comment, The Philadelphia Pla. A Study in the .ynam-
its of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1972).
73. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Joyce v.
McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970).
74. In 1971, Congressman Dent and Senator Ervin spearheaded attacks on the power of
the OFCC to demand racial balancing by employers even though such conduct might not be
permissible under title VII itself. Proposed amendments to pending legislation and to the Civil
Rights Act itself which would have put an end to the OFCC's activities were defeated in both
houses. It has been argued that these events mean that the President's executive order program
is no longer susceptible to challenges based on the separation of powers. See, Comment, The
Philadephia Plan" 4 Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CmI. L. REv. 723, 757 (1972).
Even if the refusal to pass legislation halting the OFCC's affirmative action program can be
taken for a sign that a majority of the members of both houses really approved of nonremedial
government sponsored racial balancing, such approval does not resolve the conflict between title
VII and the executive order program. The views of a later Congress are entitled to little weight
in construing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The intent of the Congress that enacted the statute
controls. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977). A
true resolution of the conflict would probably require an amendment to the statute specifically
providing for government-imposed racial balancing. See Employment Discrnmination and Tille VIIof
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1304 (1971).
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possibility of conflict arises, among other things, because the OFCC regula-
tions appear to require employers to engage in racial balancing in violation
of section 7030) and the general anti-discrimination provisions of title VII.
There is no requirement in the OFCC regulations that any racial preference
be a remedy for an employer's past discrimination. 75 A mere underutiliza-
tion of minorities is enough to require an employer to develop "goals" and
"timetables" and make efforts to meet them.76
Given the outcome of the Weber case, there was little chance that the
Court would give any overt recognition to this possible conflict. To do so
would then have required that the President's executive order program be
sustainable in spite of its incompatibility with the will of Congress. In light
of the historic decision in Youngstown Sheet Metal & Tube v. Sawyer,77 all the
parties seemed to agree that in a contest of strength, the President's program
would perish in the face of the primary right of Congress to legislate in this
area.78 Hence, the majority was obliged to find room in title VII itself for
Kaiser's affirmative action program, and any conflict between the OFCC
program and title VII was quietly resolved in favor of the former.
CONCLUSION
The Weber case has established the validity of reasonable affirmative
action programs designed to overcome racial imbalances in our factories.
The Supreme Court is to be commended for providing a relatively clear an-
swer to this question, in contrast to the confusing decision in Bakke; but one
may question whether the price of clarity was too great in this case. The
majority's interpretation of title VII is subject to doubt, and it is difficult to
reconcile the opinion with the previous decisions of the Court in this area.
The Court also seems to have ducked the issue of whether private employers
can, consistently with title VII and the Constitution, be pressured by the
federal government into racial balancing. Finally, the result seems inconsis-
tent with the traditional notion of judicial restraint. Justice Burger may
have been accurate in his characterization of the decision as a judicial
amendment of title VII. 79 If this is so, then the decision to allow the use of
strict racial classifications in the work place should have been entrusted to
Congress.80 Only the elected representatives of the people have the right to
make such a decision. The need for a national debate on this issue should
not have been underestimated in a country which supposedly considers ra-
75. 118 CONG. REc. 1385 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Saxbe).
76. OFCC Rev. Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12 (1978).
77. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
78. Brief for Petitioner United Steelworkers at 82-83; Brief for Petitioner Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp. at 34; Brief for Respondent at 80; Brief for Certiorari for Petitioner EEOC at 16.
79. 99 S. Ct. at 2734.
80. The defeat of the Dent and Ervin amendments in 1971 cannot be considered adequate
approval of the kind of affirmative action program adopted by Kaiser. It is far easier for legisla-
tors to vote against an amendment that would outlaw racial balancing than to approve affirma-
tively an amendment to the Civil Rights Act specifically allowing such government-mandated
race consciousness.
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cial distinctions between citizens "odious to a free people . "81
Charles W. Schlosser, Jr.
81. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
COLORADO RIVER WA TER CONSERVA TION DISTRICT V COLORADO
WATER CONSERVATION BOARD." DIVERSION As AN
ELEMENT OF APPROPRIATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation
Board, I the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado Water Conser-
vation Board (Board) can make an in-stream appropriation of water without
diverting it from the streambed. 2 Such a holding constituted a major step
away from the established Colorado doctrine of prior appropriation.
The issue of whether the Colorado Constitution requires a physical di-
version for a valid appropriation arose when the Board applied for mini-
mum stream flow rights for recreational purposes, fishery and wildlife. The
application was made pursuant to Colorado legislation popularly known as
Senate Bill 97.3 The Colorado River Water Conservation District (District)
objected to the Board's application, contending that Senate Bill 97, which
allows for an in-stream appropriation, was unconstitutional because the state
constitution requires a diversion for appropriation.
4
The Colorado Supreme Court, after looking to the state constitution
and to relevant case law, held that physical diversion of the water was not a
constitutional mandate. In light of this, the court found that Senate Bill 97
was a valid exercise of legislative authority.
5
After surveying the developments of Colorado water law in relation to
the necessity of a physical diversion, the applicable law in the prior appro-
priation states of California and Idaho will be briefly examined. 6 In the
analysis, it will be shown that, while the Colorado Supreme Court was cor-
rect in holding that no physical diversion is required for a valid appropria-
tion, the decision would have been more firmly grounded had the court's
approach been different.
1. 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979).
2. Id
3. Currently codified in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(3)-(4), (10) (1973).
4. The Colorado Constitution states:
The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purpose; but when the waters of any natural stream
are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the
water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any
other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have prefer-
ence over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
5. 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979).
6. All nineteen of the western states utilize, in varying degrees, the doctrine of prior ap-
propriation to determine water rights. This Comment will briefly examine the law of Califor-
nia, which requires a physical diversion or control of water for appropriation, and Idaho, whose
constitution and laws require no diversion.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Dr'vers'on Case Law
Traditionally, an appropriation of water was effected upon the con-
joining of two acts: the diversion of water from the natural stream and ap-
plication of the water to a beneficial use.7 The use of the doctrine of prior
appropriation in Colorado antedates the state constitution. 8 Accordingly, a
number of early Colorado cases contain language which indicates that diver-
sion is an essential element of appropriation. 9
In spite of the fact that a physical diversion was seemingly required for
an appropriation under Colorado law, the courts seemed willing to forego
this element in certain situations. Thus, in Thomas v. Guiraud,10 the court
emphasized the application of the water to a beneficial use, stating that the
true test of appropriation was the application of the water to the beneficial
use, the method by which the water was diverted being immaterial. 1' Al-
though later cases also appear to indicate that beneficial use, not diversion, is
the essence of appropriation,' 2 these cases, like Thomas, involved no issue as
to whether diversion was necessary for appropriation.
One of the few Colorado cases in which the issue of diversion did arise
was Lartmer County Reservoir Co. v. Luthe.'3 In this case Luthe alleged that,
since the reservoir company had stored water, not diverted it, there was no
appropriation. The main thrust of his argument was based upon the maxim
expresszo untus est exclusio altert's. Luthe contended that, because the Colorado
Constitution specifically mentions diversion as a means of appropriating
water,' 4 there are no other acceptable methods by which to effect an appro-
priation.'
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected his argument, stating that the
word "divert" must be interpreted in connection with the word "appropria-
7. A complete discussion of the doctrine of prior appropriation is beyond the scope of this
Comment. See generaly W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAwS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES (1971); C. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIA-
TION SYSTEM (1971) (Report to the National Water Commission); Carlson, Report to Governor
John A. Love On Certain Colorado Water Law Problems, 50 DEN. L.J. 293 (1973).
8. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1883).
9. E.g., Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. City and County of Denver, 189 Colo.
272, 539 P.2d 1270 (1975); Lamont v. Riverside Irrigation Dist., 179 Colo. 134, 498 P.2d 1150
(1972); Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. White River Elec. Ass'n, 151 Colo. 45, 376 P.2d 158
(1962); Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); City and County of
Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954); Board
of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938); Woods
v. Sargent, 43 Colo. 268, 95 P. 932 (1908); Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte
Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 1, 30 P. 1032 (1892); Farmer's High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. South-
worth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1028 (1889); Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901 (1884).
10. 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
11. Id at 533.
12. See, e.g., Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 F. 1011 (C.C.D. Colo.
1910), rev'd in part, 205 F. 123, modifed inpart, 205 F. 130 (8th Cir. 1913); Genoa v. Westfall, 141
Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
13. 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1886).
14. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
15. 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794.
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tion."' 6 The court stated that an appropriation was complete when an indi-
vidual, by some open, physical demonstration, indicated an intent to take for
a beneficial use and through his demonstration succeeded in applying the
water to the use designed.17
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky Mountain Power Co. 18
most closely approaches the issue decided in the instant case. Ironically, the
District, in the former case, was attempting to appropriate water without
diversion, whereas, in the latter, the District opposed the Board's attempted
in-stream appropriation.
In Rocky Mountain, the District attempted to appropriate a minimum
flow of water for piscatorial and recreational purposes pursuant to statutory
authorization.19 Each of the District's claims 2 0 alleged that water was not to
be diverted from the stream, but was to be preserved and kept in the stream
to the extent necessary for the preservation of fish. Rocky Mountain Power
Company alleged that the purported appropriation was not an appropria-
tion, that fish maintenance and recreational purposes were not beneficial
uses, and that the state constitution did not allow an appropriation of water
flowing in the stream for the use of the public as against a diversion and
appropriation of water for beneficial use.
The Colorado Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional argu-
ment, because it held that an appropriation for piscatorial purposes must be
accomplished by means of diversion. 2' Although the court indicated that
water could be beneficially used to maintain fish if there were a physical
diversion, it stated that to allow such use without diversion would constitute
a riparian right, forbidden in Colorado.
22
B. Diversion.: Statutoy Enactments
Diversion, as a requisite for the acquisition of water rights, was a
court-created element of appropriation in Colorado until 1969.23 In that
year, the Colorado General Assembly passed the Water Determination
and Administration Act of 1969 (Act). 24 Not only did the General
Assembly define "diversion, ' 25  but it also defined "appropria-
16. Id
17. Id
18. 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
19. Among other designated powers, this statute allowed the water conservation district:
[t]o file upon and hold for the use of the public sufficient water of any natural stream
to maintain a constant stream flow in the amount necessary to preserve fish, and to use
such water in connection with retaining ponds for the propagation of fish for the bene-
fit of the public. (Statute in effect at time case was decided.)t
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).
20. The District made three claims, each with a priority date of June 7, 1937. It asserted
rights in and to 1) waters of the south fork of White River and its tributaries, 2) waters of
Wagonwheel Creek and its tributaries, 3) waters of Buck Creek and its tributaries.
21. 158 Colo. at 335, 406 P.2d at 800.
22. Id at 336, 406 P.2d at 800.
23. 594 P.2d at 574.
24. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-3 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969) (current version at CoLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-101 (1973)).
25. The Colorado General Assembly defined "diversion" or "divert" as "removing water
from its natural course or location, or controlling water in its natural course or location, by
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tion"2 6 and "beneficial use" 27 in terms of diversion. Because the element of
diversion was recognized as essential to appropriation through legislative
definition, the constitutional issue of the validity of appropriation of water
absent a diversion was temporarily placed in abeyance.
In 1973, the Water Determination and Administration Act of 1969 was
amended.28 Today's Act, as did its predecessor, contains definitions of "ap-
propriation," "beneficial use," and "diversion." 2 9 Although the definition of
"diversion" remains unchanged, the General Assembly radically changed
the definitions of "appropriation" and "beneficial use." Indeed, it appears
that it was the intent of the legislature to eliminate entirely any requirement
of diversion for a valid appropriation. 30 A similar change was effected in the
definition of "beneficial use."
31
C. Trends in Other Prior Appropriation States
There does not seem to be a clear trend in other appropriation states as
to whether a physical diversion or control of water is necessary for a valid
appropriation. While a number of the western states have recognized recrea-
tion, fisheries, and wildlife as falling within the ambit of "beneficial use,"
'32
the requirements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to how such use
must be effected in order to be valid.
means of a ditch, canal, flume, reservoir, bypass, pipeline, conduit, well, pump, or other struc-
ture or device." COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-3(5) (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969) (current version at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (1973)).
26. "'Appropriation' means the diversion of a certain portion of the waters of the state and
the application of the same to a beneficial use." COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-3(6) (Perm. Cum.
.UpJ. A '3) (CuslA.e.AA~;.~...* at ***_. .~ E.-r. 3--!0f3---7))
27. " 'Beneficial use' is the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the
diversion is lawfully made and . . .shall include the impoundment of water for recreational
purposes, including fishery or wildlife." COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-3(7) (Perm. Cum. Supp.
1969) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973)).
28. 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 442, at 1521,
29. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-103(3)-(4), (7) (1973).
30. The definition of "appropriation" was amended as follows (dashes through words indi-
cate material deleted, whereas all capital letters indicate material added): "'Appropriation'
means t - s...- o. F .0  t..f' . ,. . oF hh. .a a and the application oF-the
same A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE WATERS OF THE STATE to a beneficial use."
1973 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 442, at 1521.
31. "Beneficial use" was redefined as (lines through words indicate material deleted,
whereas all capital letters indicate material added):
[Tihe use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate ... to accom-
plish without waste the purpose for which the diveision APPROPRIATION is law-
fully made and ... shall include the impoundment of water for recreational purposes,
including fishery or wildlife. FOR THE BENEFIT AND ENJOYMENT OF PRES-
ENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS, "BENEFICIAL USE" SHALL ALSO IN-
CLUDE THE APPROPRIATION . .. OF SUCH MINIMUM FLOWS
BETWEEN SPECIFIC POINTS OR LEVELS .. .ON NATURAL STREAMS
... AS ARE REQUIRED TO PRESERVE THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
TO A REASONABLE DEGREE.
1973 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 442, at 1521.
32. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 36-1601(b) (Supp.
1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.030 (1973); OR. REV.




In some states, the question of diversion is not a constitutional issue
because of the manner in which the relevant portions of the state constitu-
tion are framed. For example, the California Constitution, which empha-
sizes the requirements of "beneficial use," 33 expressly provides that the state
legislature may enact laws consonant with the constitutional mandate. Ac-
cordingly, California water law is determined by the provisions of a compre-
hensive water code.
34
Although neither the water code nor the state constitution contains an
express requirement of physical diversion for appropriation, water law in
California has consistently required diversion for valid appropriation. Thus,
in Fullerton v. California State Water Resources Control Board,35 the California
Court of Appeal held that the State Department of Fish and Game could
not appropriate a minimum flow of water for piscatorial purposes without
some physical act by the appropriator.
36
2. Idaho
At odds with the California position as to the necessity of control or
diversion of water for an appropriation is the State of Idaho. In State Depart-
ment of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water 4dminzstration (State Department of
Parks),37 the Idaho Supreme Court held that, for purposes of recreation and
preservation of scenic views, the Department of Parks could constitutionally
appropriate water without a physical diversion.
38
The issue of whether diversion was constitutionally mandated arose
when the Idaho State Department of Parks attempted to appropriate water
for scenic beauty and recreational purposes, pursuant to statutory authoriza-
tion.39 After deciding other issues raised by the Department of Water Ad-
ministration,40 the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that diversion was not a
33. The California Constitution commands that
[The water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which
they are capable, . . . and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with
a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof .... This section shall be self-
executing, and the Legislature may also enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in
this section contained.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1976).
34. CAL. WATER CODE (West 1943).
35. 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Ct. App. 1979).
36. Id at 604, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
37. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
38. Id
39. The Idaho Code provides:
The state park board is hereby authorized and directed to appropriate in trust for the
people of ... Idaho the unappropriated natural spring flow arising upon the area [of
Malad Canyon]....
The preservation of water in the area described for its scenic beauty and recrea-
tional purposes necessary and desirable for all citizens of... Idaho is hereby declared
to be a beneficial use of such water ....
IDAHO CODE § 67-4307 (Supp. 1979).
40. The Department of Water Administration raised three issues. In addition to the ques-
tion of the necessity of a physical diversion, the Department also alleged that a state agency
cannot constitutionally appropriate unappropriated waters of natural streams and that the pres-
ervation of aesthetic values and recreational opportunities are not beneficial uses that will sup-
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constitutional requisite of an appropriation made by the State Department
of Parks.
The Idaho Supreme Court relied upon the fact that Colorado, which
has a constitutional provision similar to that of Idaho,4 1 does not consistently
require a diversion for an appropriation. After citing the Colorado case
Genoa v. Westfa/142 for the proposition that no diversion is needed, the court
noted that the later Colorado case Lamont v. Riverside Irrgation D'strt 4 3 cast
some doubt upon the Genoa rationale; but it concluded that the issue was
resolved by the passage of the 1973 legislation."
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
Faced with conflicting language in Colorado cases as to whether the
state constitution requires diversion for a valid appropriation of water, the
Colorado Supreme Court squarely addressed this issue for the first time in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation Board.
45
Although the supreme court was correct in holding that the Board could
constitutionally appropriate water without actually diverting it, the court's
rationale is weak because of the manner in which the issue was approached.
This is particularly true in relation to the court's treatment of Rocky Moun-
tain46 and State Department of Parks.
47
A. The Rocky Mountain Power Case
Although the court in the instant case held that the Colorado Constitu-
tion does not require diversion for appropriation, the decision emphatically
stated that it was not overruling any of its previous opinions, which had held
that dive ;-n _ an ese.ntial element of appropriation. 48 The court deemed
its past decisions distinguishable. Whereas most of the past decisions can be
distinguished on one of the bases given by the supreme court, 49 Rocky Moun-
tain cannot be reconciled with the court's latest decision on diversion.
In certain respects, the two cases are factually similar. In each, a state
governmental agency or body attempted to appropriate a minimum flow of
port an appropriative water right under the state constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that such uses are beneficial and that such an appropriation could constitutionally be made by
the state agency in question.
41. IDAHO CONST. art. 15, § 3 states that "[tihe right to divert and appropriate the unap-
propriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied .
42. 141 Colo. 553, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
43. 179 Colo. 134, 498 P.2d 1150 (1972).
44. CoLO REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(3)-(4), (10) (1973).
45. 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979).
46. 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
47. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
48. 594 P.2d at 574.
49. The many cases [which held diversion essential] are distinguishable. Several really
had no issue as to diversion. Others involved (1) a diversion (proposed or actual), (2) a
beneficial use (involved or contemplated) clearly requiring a diversion, (3) situations
in which the evidence and measurement of an appropriative intent could be predi-
cated only upon the capacity to divert, (4) circumstances where there could not be a
bona fide appropriation without a physical diversion, or (5) matters in which a lack of
diversion violated the principle of maximum utilization. .... "
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water for piscatorial and recreational purposes pursuant to statutory author-
ization.50 However, the result was different: One appropriation was allowed
and one was not.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in the instant case, distinguished the two
cases by stating that Rocky Mountain held the attempted appropriation by the
District a forbidden riparian right.5 1 This was not the holding of the case.
Rather, while indicating that the appropriation may have been riparian in
nature, the case held that, by enacting the statute in question, 52 the Colo-
rado General Assembly did not intend to so radically depart from the estab-
lished doctrine of prior appropriation so as to permit appropriation for
piscatorial purposes without a diversion.
53
While acknowledging the legislative intent at the time of Rocky Moun-
tain, the court stated: "[I]t is obvious that the General Assembly in the en-
actment of S.B. 97 certainly did intend to have appropriations for piscatorial
purposes without diversion."'54 If indeed Senate Bill 9755 states the current
legislative intent in regard to appropriation for piscatorial purposes and
that intent differs from the legislature's earlier intent, then Rocky Mountain no
longer states the law.
The court in the instant case also purported to distinguish Rocky Moun-
tain on the basis that the latter case involved a riparian right and not an
appropriation. 56 In fact, the appropriations involved in the two cases are
indistinguishable.
Although the court in Colorado River Water Conservation Dstrtct v. Colorado
Water Conservation Board held that the Board may make an in-stream appropri-
ation without diversion, the Board had applied for mtnimum stream flow
rights5 7 pursuant to a statute providing for appropriation "of such minimum
flows between specific points or levels . . . as are required to preserve the
natural environment to a reasonable degree."' 58 The court found this stan-
dard to be constitutionally permissible, stating that it could be implemented
by agencies having specific expertise."
'59
In Rocky Mountain, the District attempted to appropriate water pursuant
to a statute which authorized the District "[t]o file upon and hold . . . suffi-
cient water. . . to maintain a constant stream flow in the amount necessarg to
preserve fish . . . for the benefit of the public. (emphasis supplied)"'60 The
court did not discuss the standard contained in this statute, but the standard
50. In Rocky Mountain, the District relied upon COLO. REV. STAT. § 150-7-5(10) (1963); in
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd, the Board relied upon the
authority of COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(3)-(4), (10) (1973).
51. 594 P.2d 570.
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).
53. 158 Colo. at 336, 406 P.2d at 800.
54. 594 P.2d at 574.
55. Currently codified in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(3)-(4), (10) (1973).
56. 594 P.2d at 574.
57. Id at 571.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973) (emphasis added).
59. 594 P.2d at 576.
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).
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does not appear to differ substantially from that allowed in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation Board.
Because of the similarity of the attempted appropriations involved in
the two cases, the distinction that one involves a riparian right, whereas the
other does not, is tenuous at best. The appropriation in the instant case is no
less-nor any more-a riparian right than that in question in Rocky Moun-
tain.
B. The Idaho Case
Although the Colorado Supreme Court did not rely heavily on State De-
partment of Parks in reaching its decision, 6 t the case was mentioned in support
of the proposition that the Colorado Constitution, whose provisions in rela-
tion to water appropriation are similar to those of the Idaho Constitution,
does not require an actual diversion for a valid appropriation.
62
The reliance of the Colorado Supreme Court upon the Idaho case was
misplaced because State Department of Parks, in holding that the Idaho Consti-
tution does not require a physical diversion for appropriation, looked to the
Colorado Constitution and past decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court.
63
In short, this portion of the reasoning contained in the instant case is circu-
lar.
The Idaho Supreme Court, after noting that the two state constitutions
are substantially the same in relation to their water law provisions, 64 cited
Genoa v. Westfallt5 for the proposition that no physical diversion is necessary
for appropriation. 66 The court then continued:
The rationale of Genoa became suspect after the decision of the Col-
cradc c,- in Jamont v. Riverside Irrteati'on District, but the matter
appears to have been laid at rest following the 1973 Colorado legis-
lation wherein its statutoy law of appropriation was amended so as to
permit appropriation without actual diversion.67
The 1973 legislation to which the Idaho Supreme Court was referring is Sen-
ate Bill 97,68 whose constitutionality was being challenged in Colorado River
Water Conservati'on Dtstrct v. Colorado Water Conservati'on Board. This appears to
be a classic case of "the tail trying to wag the dog." By mentioning the
Idaho case in support of its holding that an in-stream diversion is constitu-
tional, the Colorado Supreme Court was relying upon a case which had used
Colorado case reasoning to reach its result.
In yet another way the Colorado Supreme Court's reliance upon the
Idaho case was misplaced. Although the state consitutions are similar, they
61. 594 P.2d at 573:
"Idaho has a similar constitutional provision. Its supreme court has held 'that our
constitution does not require actual physical diversion.' State Dept. of Parks v. Idaho
Dept. of Water Admrhirtratton, 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974)."
62. Id
63. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924.
64. Compare COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 with IDAHO CONST. art. 15, § 3.
65. 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370.
66. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924.
67. Id at 445, 530 P.2d at 928 (emphasis added).
68. Currently codified in CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(3)-(4), (10) (1973).
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are not identical. Whereas the Colorado Constitution provides that the right
to divert water shall never be denied, 69 the Idaho Constitution indicates that
the right to divert and appropriate shall never be denied.70 Both provisions
seem to define the nature of the right, rather than how the right is to be
exercised. Nonetheless, if the manner in which the right is to be exercised is
co-extensive with the right itself, it appears that the Idaho constitutional
provision is broader than that of Colorado. In this case, it could be argued
that the Colorado Constitution does not allow appropriation without diver-
sion, whereas the Idaho Constitution does allow such appropriation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water
Conservation Board, that diversion is not a constitutional necessity for appro-
priation of water, is not seriously open to question. As the Colorado
Supreme Court indicated in that case, the word "divert" is used only once in
the constitution and then only to negate any thought that Colorado would
follow the riparian doctrine in the acquisition of water. 7' Furthermore, if a
literal construction of the constitutional provision were pursued, it would
mean that every person has an absolute right to divert, for a beneficial use,
as much water as he/she needed. Because Colorado's water supply is finite,
whereas the number of potential water users is infinite, such a strict construc-
tion addresses a factual impossibility. As indicated in the dissenting opinion
in Vogts v. Guerette, constitutional generalities make for living documents
which cover change in a developing society.
72
In addition to the constitution itself, a long line of cases, beginning with
Thomas v. Guiraud,73 indicate that diversion is not always essential for an
appropriation of water. These decisions have been reinforced by various
pieces of legislation enacted from time to time, such as the "Meadow Act"
'74
and Senate Bill 97.75 Both of these statutes appear to allow appropriation
for beneficial use without diversion.
Even though the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court has much to
commend it, the case holding would have been more firmly grounded had
the court overruled Rocky Mountain rather than distinguishing it. The facts of
the two cases are so similar that to distinguish them is to attempt to distin-
guish the indistinguishable.
Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court should have approached State
Department of Parks in a different manner. By not clearly stating how that
decision was reached and what factors it took into account, it appears that
the Colorado Supreme Court was attempting to bootstrap an in-stream ap-
propriation into existence without looking to the constitutional mandate.
69. CoLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
70. IDAHO CONsT. art. 15, § 3.
71. 594 P.2d at 573.
72. 142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851 (1960) (Frantz, J., dissenting).
73. 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-86-113 (1973).
75. Currently codified in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(3)-(4), (10) (1973).
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In spite of these weaknesses in the court's rationale, it seems that its
interpretation of the word "divert," as used in the Colorado Constitution,
will be longlasting. As our society grows and becomes increasingly complex,
more and more people will seek to return to the basics of nature. "If nature
accomplishes a result which is recognized and utilized, a change of process
by man would seem unnecessary. "76
Christine Cooke Parker
76. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123, 129 (8th Cir. 1913).
[Vol. 57:4
LIMITING THE BOUNDARIES OF STANLEY V ILLINOIS.-
CABAN V MOHAMMED
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Stanley v. Illinois,' the
rights of putative fathers in adoption proceedings were largely ignored.
Generally, only the consent of the unmarried mother was required before the
children could be adopted, whereas the putative father's consent was not
required. 2 Stanley signified the first attempt by the Court to accord recogni-
tion to the rights of putative fathers. Since Stanley, the rights of putative
fathers have received increasing attention and consequent constitutional
protection.
The most recent Supreme Court decision exemplifying this change in
attitude toward putative fathers is Caban v. Mohammed.3 In Caban, the Court
held that an adoption statute requiring the consent of an unmarried mother
but not the consent of a putative father before their child could be adopted
violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
4
The Caban decision limited the boundaries of the constitutional protec-
tion that would be extended to putative fathers as first enunciated in Stanley.
This comment will analyze the limited nature of this newly recognized right
by tracing its development in Stanley to its refinement in Caban.
I. CABAN < MOHAMMED
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed had two children during the five
years that they lived together unmarried. 5 Both parents contributed to the
children's support, and Caban was identified as the father on the children's
birth certificates. 6 After the couple separated, Maria married Kazim Mo-
hammed, and they petitioned to adopt the children. 7 Caban filed a cross-
petition to adopt the children.8
The New York statute9 in question required the consent of both parents
before adoption of a legitimate child, but required only the consent of the
1. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Comment, The Emerging Constitutonal Protection of the ttatie Father's Parental
Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1583-84 (1972). For a listing of state statutes regarding the
putative father's consent to adoption shortly after Stanle was decided, see 61 CORNELL L. REV.
312, 312-13 n.4 (1976).
3. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
4. Id at 1768-69.
5. Id at 1763.
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1764.
9. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § l1(1)(b)-(c) (McKinney 1977). Section 111 was amended
after the Surrogate Court proceedings. The amendment added § 11 1(2)(a) which provided that
the consent of a parent or custodian would not be required if either evinced an intent to forego
parental or custodial obligations for six months. Also added was § 111(6) which outlined condi-
tions under which consent could be dispensed with in accordance with § 111(2) (a).
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unmarried mother before adoption of an illegitimate child. Therefore,
Caban could not block the adoption of his children by withholding his con-
sent as all other classes of parents could. The Surrogate Court, granting the
adoption to Maria and Kazim Mohammed, was affirmed by the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,10 and the New York Court of Ap-
peals. "
On appeal, the Supreme Court, with Justice Powell writing for the ma-
jority, struck down the statute on equal protection grounds due to the sex-
based discrimination between unmarried mothers and putative fathers.
12
No procedural due process issue was raised.13 The Court declined to pass on
the substantive due process issue of whether parental rights could be termi-
nated absent a fitness hearing, stating that it was unnecessary to reach this
issue as the statute was struck down on equal protection grounds.'
4
Caban represented the third time the Supreme Court had addressed the
issue of putative fathers' rights in custody and adoption proceedings. One
cannot gain a true perspective of the constitutional protection extended to
putative fathers by reading Caban in a vacuum. In order to determine the
boundaries of this newly recognized right, Caban must be analyzed in light of
the Supreme Court's two previous decisions in this area, Stanley v. Illinois'5
and Quilloin v. Walcott. 16 Only then can the limited nature of this right be
fully comprehended.
II. RECOGNIZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE
FATHERS: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Initial Step.- Stanley v. Illinois
In Stanley, 17 an unmarried couple had three children during the eight-
een years that they had lived together intermittently. Under Illinois law,' 8
when the mother died, the putative father's illegitimate children became
wards of the state. Stanley protested this action, claiming that it was a viola-
tion of equal protection, since all other classes of parents, e.g., unmarried
mothers and married parents, could not be deprived of the custody of their
children unless they were found unfit.' 9 Stanley, in contrast, simply because
he was a putative father, could have his children taken away from him with-
out a fitness hearing. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of due
process, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his parental fitness before his
children could be taken away from him.
20
10. In re David Andrew C., 56 A.D.2d 622, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977) (mem.).
11. In re Adoption of David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977)
(mem.).
12. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
13. Id at 1764 n.3.
14. Id at 1769 n.16.
15. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
16. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
17. 405 U.S. 645.
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14, 702-1, 702-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
19. 405 U.S. at 646.
20. Id. at 658.
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Stanley was decided primarily on procedural due process grounds2 ' and
is classified as an irrebuttable presumption case. 22 The basis of the Court's
rationale was that a state could not presume that all putative fathers were
unfit to raise their children upon the mother's death. Since a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest was involved, that of a "man in the children he
has sired and raised,"'23 Stanley was entitled to procedural due process pro-
tection. The administrative convenience in presuming that all putative fa-
thers were unfit without giving them a hearing on their fitness was not a
sufficient state interest to justify this irrebuttable presumption.
2 4
Stanle held that a putative father who had actual custody of his chil-
dren could not be deprived of legal custody without a fitness hearing; but
Stanley left unresolved the extent of constitutional protection that would be
afforded to putative fathers. Chief Justice Burger commented in his dissent
that the majority opinion, by invalidating the Illinois statute, had embarked
"on a novel concept of the natural law for unwed fathers that could well
have strange boundaries as yet undiscernible.
' 25
The "strange boundaries" the Chief Justice referred to turn on whether
Stanley is interpreted narrowly as a procedural due process case or whether
Stanley is read broadly as a substantive due process case26 as well. The differ-
ence in result is substantial.
If putative fathers are only afforded procedural protection before their
parental rights are terminated, then they are entitled to notice and a "prop-
erly focused" 27 hearing. Under this interpretation, a "properly focused"
hearing may consist of a hearing solely on the best interests of the child and
not on the putative father's fitness. If so, then the putative father's rights can
21. The case was also decided on equal protection grounds although the equal protection
holding was derived from the due process analysis. After the Court held that Stanley was enti-
tled to a fitness hearing, the Court further held that "[I]t follows that denying such a hearing to
Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to
the Equal Protection Clause." Id
22. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTrrLrrIONAL LAw 888-95 (1975).
23. 405 U.S. at 651.
24. Id at 656-58. The Court noted that the cost of offering interested putative fathers a
fitness hearing was minimal. Id at 657 n.9.
25. Id at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
26. Szanlt contained language suggesting that the Court was declaring the putative fa-
ther's interest in his child to be a fundamental right. As such, it could not be terminated with-
out his consent absent unfitness. The relevant language is as follows:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children . . . . [is cognizable and substantial].
• . .The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essen-
tial,' . . . 'basic civil rights of man' . . . .
Id at 651-52 (citations omitted). The Court also noted that constitutional protection extends to
family relationships involving unmarried couples. Id at 651.
27. Part of the confusion that has arisen in interpreting Stanly can be attributed to foot-
note nine. In this important footnote, the Court notes that a state must give fathers like Stanley
a "properly focused hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding." Id. at 657 n.9. The Court
failed to define what type of hearing constitutes a "properly focused" hearing. To add to the
confusion, the Court also indicated in this footnote that the cost of a fitness hearing to the state
would be minimal, implying that a "properly focused" hearing is a fitness hearing. Quitloin,
however, intimates that a "properly focused" hearing may also be a hearing on the child's best
interests. See 434 U.S. at 255.
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be terminated even though he is not found unfit and has not consented to
the adoption-if the adoption is in the child's best interests.
If Stanley grants a putative father substantive rights, then the hearing
must be on the father's fitness, and the father must be found unfit before his
parental rights can be terminated. If he is fit, then his consent will be re-
quired for adoption. Consequently, the functional effect of interpreting Stan-
ley as a substantive due process case is to give putative fathers the same
constitutional protection accorded to all other classes of parents.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the interest of a
parent in his or her child is a fundamental right. 28 As such, any state inter-
ference with a fundamental right will be subjected to the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review requiring the state to show a compelling state interest to
justify the interference with the fundamental right.2 9 As applied to adoption
proceedings, this rule requires a state to first find a parent unfit before the
state can terminate parental rights unless the parent consents to the adop-
tion.
Giving Stanley a substantive due process interpretation could seriously
hinder the adoption process because a child could only be adopted if his
putative father were found unfit or had consented. The putative father
would have a strong veto authority over the adoption which might be exer-
cised adversely to the child's best interests even though the putative father
may not have assumed the full parental responsibilities and obligations nor-
mally borne by all other parents. This rationale was the basis for the Court's
refusal in Qulloin and Caban to interpret Stanley as extending substantive
rights to putative fathers equal to the rights enjoyed by all other parents.
A- will he shnwn the Clnurt in Quilloi'n and Caban limited the broad
boundaries of Stanley; therefore, Stanley should be read narrowly as a proce-
dural due process case30 providing notice and a "properly focused" hearing
before a putative father's rights can be terminated. The type of hearing pro-
vided will depend on the nature of the relationship between the putative
father and his child as illustrated in Quillo'n.
28. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942), rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). "The custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparations for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). There is a fundamental right to privacy in matters relating to mar-
riage and family life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The right to have a family is a fundamental right. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977). See Comment, Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the
Child, 14 J. FAM. L. 547, 548-49 (1975-1976).
29. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
30. For the view that Stanle is a substantive due process case, see Comment, The Unwed
Father's Rights in Adoption Proceedings. A Case Study and Legislative Cnt'que, 40 Ata. L. REv. 543,
547-53 (1976). Note, however, that this comment was published before Quiloin and Caban were
decided. For the view that Stanly did not grant a fundamental right to putative fathers after
Quilloitn was decided, see Disanto & Podolski, The Right to va' and Trilateral Balancig--Implica-
tionsfor the Family, 13 FAM. L.Q. 183, 216 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Disanto & Podolskl]; Note,
Constitutional Lawe-The Rights of an Unwed Father in an Adoption Proceeding, 27 KAN. L. REV. 483,
488 (1979).
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Shortly after Stanley was decided, the Supreme Court remanded two
cases for reconsideration in light of Stanley.3 ' These cases merit attention
because they aid in defining Stanley's boundaries. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Services32 concerned an adoption proceeding, illustrating that Stanley is not
limited to custody cases but extends to adoption cases as well. Vanderlaan V.
Vanderlaan33 involved a custody dispute between divorced parents over two
children born following the divorce decree. Vanderlaan indicates that Stanley
applies not only to custody disputes between the state and the putative fa-
ther, but also to custody disputes between an unmarried mother and a puta-
tive father.
Further, the Stanley Court was unclear as to whether the rights of puta-
tive fathers who do not have actual custody of their children at the com-
mencement of the proceedings would be protected. Initially, the Court
noted that the cost of providing unwed fathers with an opportunity for in-
dividualized fitness hearings would probably be minimal.34 At a later point,
however, the Court employed more specific language and stated that all Illi-
nois parents were entitled to a fitness hearing before their children could be
removed from their custody. 35 In both Rothstein and Vanderlaan, however, the
putative father did not have actual custody of his children at the commence-
ment of the proceedings which indicates that actual custody is not a prereq-
uisite for Stanley to apply.
B. Limtihg Stanley: Quilloin
The issue of putative fathers' rights came before the Supreme Court a
second time in Quilloin v. Walcott.3 6 Quilloin sought to block the adoption of
his illegitimate child by the child's step-father. Quilloin never had and did
not seek actual or legal custody of his child. Under Georgia law,37 only the
consent of the unmarried mother was required before adoption of an illegiti-
mate child, whereas the consent of both parents was required before adop-
tion of a legitimate child. Since Quilloin had not legitimated his child either
by marrying the mother 38 or by a court proceeding, 39 his consent was not
required.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that Quilloin's sub-
stantive rights under the due process clause were not violated by applying
the best interests of the child standard in determining whether to terminate
his parental rights.4 ° Thus, Quilloin's rights could be terminated even
31. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970),
vacatedsub noma. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); Vanderlaan v. Van-
derlaan, 126 11. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970) vacated 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
32. State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970),
vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051.
33. 126 Il1. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), vacated, 405 U.S. 1051.
34. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9 (1972).
35. Id. at 658.
36. 434 U.S. 246.
37. GA. CODE § 74-403(1)-(3) (1975).
38. GA. CODE § 74-101 (1975).
39. GA. CODE § 74-103 (1975).
40. 434 U.S. at 254.
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
though he was not found unfit. The Court also held that the statute did not
violate equal protection because a state can constitutionally distinguish be-
tween a married father (even if later separated or divorced) and a putative
father.4 1 The basis for this distinction was that Quilloin had never
shouldered any significant responsibility for his child, whereas a married fa-
ther does shoulder significant responsibility for his child.
42
Quilloin's importance in determining the limited nature of constitutional
protection extended to putative fathers lies in three areas. The first lesson to
be learned from Quilloin is that while the Court is willing to grant substan-
tive rights to a putative father, it is not willing to give the putative father the
same substantive rights accorded to all other parents. The Quilloin Court
recognized that a putative father has a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest in his child, and, therefore, is entitled to some degree of protection,
43
but the Court was unwilling to raise this interest to the status of a fundamen-
tal right.
This proposition is evidenced by the Court's action in allowing Quil-
loin's parental rights to be terminated without giving him a fitness hearing
44
and also in permitting his child to be adopted without his consent. The
Court stated that whatever substantive rights Quilloin might have, they
were amply protected by a hearing solely on the child's best interests.
45
Thus, Quilloin illustrates how the Court is limiting Stanley to procedural due
process. If the Court were reading Stanley as a substantive due process case,
then Quilloin's parental rights could not have been terminated as he did not
consent to the adoption and was not given a fitness hearing and found unfit.
The second significant aspect of Quilloin is the Court's discussion of the
factors relating to the putative father's relationship with his child that are
determinative of the type of hearing that a putative father will receive. 'Ihe
four factors that the Court considered important are whether the putative
father ever had actual custody of the child, whether the putative father par-
ticipated in the upbringing of the child, whether the putative father sup-
ported the child regularly, and whether the adoption would be by a family
with whom the child was already living.
46
Because Quilloin never had actual custody of his child, did not partici-
pate in the child's upbringing, only provided irregular support, and the child
was to be adopted into a family with whom the child had been living,47 the
41. Id. at 256.
42. Id
43. The Court stated that "we have recognized on numerous occasions that the relation-
ship between parent and child is constitutionally protected [under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment]" (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923)). The
Court also stated that "it is now firmly established that 'freedom of personal choice in matters of
. . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment'" (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). 434
U.S. at 255.
44. The Court noted that Quilloin had not been found unfit. Id at 247.
45. Id at 254.
46. Id at 255-56.
47. The trial court found that during the eleven years of the child's life, before the adop-
tion proceedings, Quilloin did not petition to legitimate the child nor did he support the child
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Court was unwilling to extend the same protection to Quilloin that all other
parents receive, ie., a fitness hearing and consent to adoption. For a puta-
tive father like Quilloin, a hearing on the child's best interests was sufficient,
and his consent for adoption was not required.
The Court is implicitly stating that if a putative father does not accept
the same responsibility for his child presumably accepted by all other par-
ents, then he has no right to expect the same degree of constitutional protec-
tion. Stanl/y could be distinguished because Stanley had accepted full
responsibility for his children. Therefore, he was entitled to a fitness hearing.
Quilloin, on the other hand, had not. Therefore, he was entitled solely to a
best interests hearing.
The third facet of Quilloin that merits attention is the Court's holding
that a state can constitutionally distinguish between married and putative
fathers. 48 This holding adds still another limitation to the rights of putative
fathers. It also further supports the proposition that the interest of a puta-
tive father in his child is not fundamental. If it were, the Court would have
applied strict scrutiny to the classification. 49 Instead, the Court did not ex-
plicitly state which standard of review it applied to the classification, but
merely indicated that under any standard of review, the classification would
be constitutional.
50
The import of this holding is that a state may constitutionally provide
lesser standards for terminating a putative father's rights than for terminat-
ing a married father's rights, such as not requiring his consent or not finding
him unfit before his child can be adopted. The appropriate standard of re-
view would be either the traditional rational relation test 5 t or an intermedi-
ate standard of scrutiny 52 since neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
class is involved. 53 Under either of these tests, the classification would be
upheld unless the putative father could prove that he shouldered significant
responsibility as defined by the factors set forth in Quillo'n for the child simi-
lar to that of a married father. Since this is a heavy burden of proof, most
regularly. Also, the child had been living with the mother and stepfather when they filed a
petition to adopt the child. Id at 247, 249, 251.
48. Id at 256.
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
50. 434 U.S. at 256.
51. Under the rational relation test, the statutory classification must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
52. The intermediate standard of scrutiny requires that the classification serve important
governmental objectives and that it is also substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
53. The Court would probably apply the traditional rational relation test since the only
classifications that have thus far received an intermediate level of scrutiny are gender, Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and illegitimacy, Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972). Classifications which the Court has found suspect include race, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967), national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), and alienage,
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). The rights held to be fundamental by the Court are the
right to have a family, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the right of
privacy in marriage and family matters, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the right to vote, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969), the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the right of access to
courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958), and the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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adoption statutes which distinguish between married and putative fathers
will pass constitutional muster.
Quilloin narrowed considerably the boundaries of Stanley in extending
constitutional protection to putative fathers. Caban added further refine-
ments to this newly emerging right.
III. ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STANLEY CABAN
A. The Court's Analysis of Caban
The Court decided Caban solely on equal protection grounds54 even
though Caban raised a substantive due process claim.5 5 Because the classifi-
cation involved gender, the Court properly applied an intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny rather than the traditional rational relation test.56 Strict
scrutiny was not warranted as the classification did not involve a suspect
class57 or a fundamental right.
5 8
Under the intermediate standard of scrutiny, the classification must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives. 59 The statute in question fulfilled the
first part of the test as the Court recognized that the state interest in promot-
ing the welfare of illegitimate children through adoption is an important
governmental objective.60 But the statute failed the second part of the test
because the Court found that the gender classification was not substantially
related to the articulated state interest.
The Court gave three reasons for the statute's failure to meet the second
part of the test. First, a state cannot assume in all cases that an unmarried
mother has a closer relationship with her child than a putative father, and,
therefore, her interest in her child is more important so that only her consent
is merited in adoption proceedings. 6 1 The relationship that Caban had with
his children refuted this assumption as the Court recognized that his rela-
tionship with the children was "fully comparable" to the mother's relation-
ship with the children.
62
Second, there is no basis for assuming that putative fathers would con-
sent to adoption any less frequently than unmarried mothers thereby hinder-
54. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
55. The Court avoided the substantive due process issue of whether parental rights could
be terminated absent a fitness hearing by claiming that since the statute was struck down on
equal protection grounds, it was unnecessary to reach the substantive due process issue. Id at
1769 n.16.
56. Beginning with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court has applied a higher level
of scrutiny in gender discrimination cases than the traditional rational relation test although not
as high a level of scrutiny as strict scrutiny demands. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward" In Search of Evolving Doctrite on a
Changing Court.- A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1.
58. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621. For the classifications that the Court
has found suspect and the rights that the Court has held to be fundamental, see note 53 supra.
59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190.
60. 99 S. Ct. at 1767.
61. Id at 1766-67.
62. Id at 1766.
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ing the important state interest of promoting adoption of illegitimate
children.
63
Third, even if it might be difficult to locate and identify a putative fa-
ther at birth, possibly justifying a distinction between unmarried mothers
and putative fathers, this problem could decrease after infancy. 64 Allevia-
tion of this problem would require a carefully tailored statute which distin-
guishes between putative fathers like Caban who have manifested an interest
in their children and disinterested fathers.
65
Therefore, the Court concluded that the statute could not stand as it
was an "overbroad generalization" which the Court has repeatedly struck
down in gender discrimination cases.
66
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Stewart also filed a dissenting opinion stat-
ing that his reasons for dissenting were similar to those expressed by Justice
Stevens. 67 Both Justices viewed the classification as a permissible gender
classification based on the rationale that unmarried mothers and fathers are
not similarly situated in the majority of adoption proceedings. 68 Although
the majority avoided the substantive due process issue, both Justice Stewart
and Justice Stevens addressed this issue indicating that the statute did not
violate any constitutionally protected interest that Caban may have had in
his children.
69
63. Id at 1768.
64. Id
65. The Court stated that the equal protection clause would not be violated if a state did
not require the consent of a putative father who had never "come forward to participate in the
rearing of his child." Id at 1768. The Court added that for fathers like Caban, who had partic-
ipated in his children's rearing, "a State should have no difficulty in identifying the father even
of children born out of wedlock." Id at 1769. Therefore, a distinction between Caban-type
fathers and unmarried mothers could not be justified.
66. Id at 1769.
67. Id (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68. The reasons given by Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens to support their contention
that unmarried mothers and putative fathers are not similarly situated in the majority of adop-
tion proceedings stemmed from the biological relationship of the mother and child. Both Jus-
tices premised their arguments on the fact that the majority of adoptions involve newborns and
infants-not older children as in Caba=. Id at 1771 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 1774 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Stewart gave the following reasons: the unmarried mother bears the child, can
always be identified, and is the custodian of the child (absent state intervention) whereas most
putative fathers are unknown, unavailable, or uninterested. Id at 1771-72 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). Stewart conceded that Caban was similarly situated to an unmarried mother because he
had established a paternal relationship with his children. He agreed with Justice Steven's argu-
ment, however, that the statute did not violate equal protection because Caban had failed to
bear his burden of proof of showing that the statute's "unjust applications are sufficiently nu-
merous and serious to render it invalid." Id at 1777 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, "[tihe
mere fact that an otherwise valid general classification appears arbitrary in an isolated case is
not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire rule." Id at 1778 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
The reasons advanced by Justice Stevens were substantially the same as those given by
Justice Stewart. Justice Stevens summarized his reasons by concluding that "it is virtually inev-
itable that from conception through infancy the mother will constantly be faced with decisions
about how best to care for the child, whereas it is much less certain that the father will be
confronted with comparable problems." Id at 1775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 1770-71 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 1779-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. Limited Rights for the Putative Father
Two facets of Caban are of particular importance in understanding the
limited protection afforded to putative fathers. First, Caban illustrates that
Stanley did not declare the interest of a putative father in his child to be a
fundamental right; therefore, Stanley is not a substantive due process case.
Second, Caban extends the rights of putative fathers to include equal protec-
tion under the laws with unmarried mothers, but not without limitations.
Caban confirms that Stanley is limited to procedural due process. If the
Court had wanted to declare that the putative father's interest in his child
was fundamental, Caban provided an ideal opportunity to do so. The
Court's reluctance to address the substantive due process issue of whether a
putative father's parental rights could be terminated without showing him to
be unfit or without his consent, strongly implies that the Court is not going
to elevate a putative father's interest in his child to the status of a fundamen-
tal right.
70
In Quilloin the putative father's relationship with his child did not merit
declaring that the putative father had substantive rights equal to all other
parents. Caban, in contrast, had assumed all the fatherly duties that a mar-
ried father is expected to assume. He had shouldered the significant respon-
sibility for his children which the Quilloin Court found to be so important.
He regularly supported his children; he had actual custody of them both by
himself and with their mother; and he participated in their upbringing as
part of a defacto family. 7' He also acknowledged his paternity and wanted
to assume full parental obligations by adopting his children. 72 He was
found to be a fit parent. The only characteristic distinguishing Caban from
married fathers was that he had never married the children's mother.
In spite of all these factors, the Court refused to address the substantive
due process issue, dismissing it in a footnote as unnecessary to reach because
the statute in question was struck down on equal protection grounds.
73 If
the Court had addressed this issue and granted Caban the same substantive
rights that all other parents have under New York law, 74 this would have
created a fundamental right in putative fathers to their children. Since the
Court did not do so, it implicitly stated that the rights of putative fathers are
not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as the rights of all
other parents. This proposition is founded on the same considerations that
led to limiting Stanley to procedural rights and limiting a putative father,
such as Quilloin, to a hearing on the child's best interests.
70. For a similar view even before Quitloin and Caban were decided, see Comment, The
Emerging Constitutional Protection of tht Puative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581,
1592-97 (1972).
71. 99 S. Ct. at 1763.
72. Id at 1763-64.
73. Id at 1769. But see the dissenting opinions of Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens.
Both Justices thought it was necessary to address the substantive due process issue. Id at 1770-
71 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 1779-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Under New York law, the consent of married parents and unmarried mothers is re-
quired unless unfit. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 11 l(l)(b)-(c), (2)(a)-(e) (McKinney 1977). This
statute implicitly recognizes that a parent has a fundamental right to his or her child since
parental rights can only be terminated with consent or by a finding of unfitness.
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Moreover, in an adoption proceeding there are competing interests at
stake which must be balanced-those of the child and those of his parents.
7 5
By granting putative fathers the same rights as all other parents, but with no
guarantee that they would assume the responsibilities that other parents as-
sume, the Court would be giving the putative father an unqualified right to
block an adoption, absent unfitness, even though the adoption might be in
the child's best interest. The Court was unwilling to allow a putative father
to have the rights of parenthood without also assuming the responsibilities of
parenthood. This reasoning represents a careful balancing of the competing
interests at stake.
The second area of Caban's importance in determining the boundaries
of a putative father's rights rests in the equal protection holding of the case.
The majority decided the case solely on equal protection grounds holding
that a state cannot constitutionally require the consent of an unmarried
mother, but not the consent of a putative father, in an adoption proceed-
ing.
76
Thus, Caban extended the limited nature of a putative father's rights in
adoption proceedings to include the same rights given to an unmarried
mother.77 The Caban Court did not declare the putative father's interest in
his children to be a fundamental right because strict scrutiny was not ap-
plied to the gender classification. 78 The functional effect, however, of the
Court's holding is to give a putative father, who has assumed parental obli-
gations and responsibilities, a fundamental right in his children since the
adoption statute recognizes this right in the unmarried mother. 79 A father
like Caban cannot have his parental rights terminated without his consent,
absent unfitness.
The Court failed to specifically define what factors were essential in the
putative father and child relationship before the putative father would be
entitled to equal protection. The Court indicated that the putative father
was not entitled to equal protection if he had not participated in the child's
rearing.80 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, viewed the majority
holding as quite narrow, limited to those adoption proceedings involving an
older child where the putative father has participated in the rearing of the
child and has admitted his paternity.8 '
Until the Court gives more explicit guidelines, courts will be struggling
to apply Caban to their adoption statutes which may result in confusion and
75. Seegenerally Disanto & Podolski, supra note 30, at 212-19.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
77. The extension, however, is not an unqualified extension to all putative fathers. See text
accompanying note 80 infta. Therefore, it may properly be viewed as a limited extension of the
rights of putative fathers as developed in Stanley and Quilloin.
78. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four Justices (Brennan, Douglas, Mar-
shall, and White) found sex to be a suspect class, but this position has never been adopted by the
Court as a majority.
79. See note 74 supra.
80. 99S. Ct. at 1768.
81. Id at 1777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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misapplication. 2 For example, how should a court handle the case of a pu-
tative father and a newborn infant?8 3 The putative father has not yet had
time to participate in the rearing of the child, but does this mean that he is
not entitled to the same rights as an unmarried mother? What if he had
assumed all of the parental duties that a father of a newborn infant normally
assumes?
8 4
As a consequence of the Court's equal protection holding, adoption stat-
utes will have to be more carefully tailored to meet the intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny to which they will be subjected. They must provide a
mechanism which distinguishes between those putative fathers who have
"manifested a significant paternal interest" 85 in their children and those pu-
tative fathers who have not. Otherwise, such statutes will be unconstitu-
tional under Caban.
CONCLUSION
The last seven years have witnessed the emergence of a new constitu-
tionally protected interest-that of the putative father in custody and adop-
tion proceedings. Stanley left open broad parameters for the development of
this right. The Court narrowed these limits considerably in Quilloin and
Caban resulting in a narrow reading of Stanley as a procedural due process
case requiring notice and a hearing before termination of parental rights.
Quilloin teaches that the content of the hearing will depend on the na-
ture of the relationship between the putative father and his child. Quilloin
also illustrates that a state may constitutionally distinguish between married
and putative fathers.
putative fathers in adoption proceedings as are accorded to unmarried
mothers, but the limits of this extension are uncertain. Caban also strongly
suggests that the Court is not willing to equate the rights of a putative father
with those of all other parents by giving the putative father a fundamental
right in his children.
These cases leave many issues open which the courts will be attempting
to resolve. For example, what constitutes significant paternal interest?
When has a putative father shouldered significant responsibility comparable
to that of a married father? Are the same standards applied to infants as to
older children? If not, what are the standards for infants?
One conclusion is certain. More litigation can be expected in this area
that will serve to further delineate the boundaries of a putative father's
rights. The outer boundaries of this right have been fairly well drawn by
82. Confusion reminiscent of Stanley seems inevitable. See generally Freeman, Remodeling
Adopttin Statutes After Stanley v. Illinois, 15 J. FAm. L. 385 (1977).
83. The position of the four dissenting Justices is clear. Caban would not apply to newborn
infants. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
84. Ifa putative father acknowledged his paternity at birth, paid for all expenses related to
the infant, and wanted to adopt the child or have custody of the child, the majority in Caban
would probably extend equal protection to this father because he had assumed significant re-
sponsibility for the child.
85. 99 S. Ct. at 1769.
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Stanloy, QuXloin, and Caban. What remains is a drawing of lines within these




THE RIGHTS OF LANDLORDS IN TENANTS' PERSONAL
PROPERTY
The Colorado Court of Appeals, in Christensen v. Hoover,I filled a void in
Colorado case law by holding that an evicting landlord is not liable for dam-
ages occurring to a tenant's personal property in the process of removal and
storage. The decision was basically twofold. First, the court held that the
landlord was an "involuntary bailee" and, as such, should not be liable un-
less he willfully, maliciously, or through gross negligence caused the damage.
Second, it was found that a professional mover that the landlord engaged to
remove and store the property was an independent contractor, thereby re-
leasing the landlord from any imputed negligence. The Colorado Supreme
Court has granted certiorari.
2
It is the thesis of this note that while the court in Christensen reached the
right result, the opinion was cryptic and conclusory. The decision left some
key issues unanswered and, as a precedent, has little guidance value for land-
lords and tenants. To what standard of care is a landlord held in respect to
the personal property of an evicted tenant? May the landlord seize and have
a lien upon the tenant's property? Although a determination of the latter
issue is implicit in the former, whether a landlord's lien exists is an issue
complex enough to merit separate treatment. Accordingly, the landlord's
standard of care is examined in detail within the facts of Chrzstensen, while
the landlord's lien is dealt with more tangentially.
THE FACTS
The plaintiff was a tenant in a house owned by the defendants, the
Hoovers. In December, 1976, the defendants commenced a forcible entry
and detainer action to regain possession of the house.3 Judgment was en-
tered for the Hoovers and a writ of restitution was issued. On the same day
of the judgment Mr. Hoover contracted with one Mr. Slatten, a professional
mover, to move and store the plaintiffs personal property. Messrs. Hoover
and Slatten and a deputy sheriff arrived at the premises and posted the writ.
Slatten removed all of the plaintiffs property and placed it in a storage facil-
ity where the plaintiff reclaimed it some two months later. The plaintiff
then brought an action alleging that her property had been damaged by
Slatten and the Hoovers when the property was removed or stored.
4
1. - Colo. App. -, 608 P.2d 372 (1979).
2. Id
3. Landlords in Colorado are by the forcible entry and detainer statute provided with a
procedure whereby tenants at sufferance and others can be removed from the premises and the
landlord restored to possession. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-1 15(t)(1973). In addition, although
there is a modern trend against the enforcement of private summary remedies which entail
force, see 6 A.L.R. 3d 177 (1966), the lease agreement may provide the landlord with the in-
dependent right to enter and remove the tenant and his effects using whatever reasonable force
necessary to effect the removal. Goshen v. People, 22 Colo. 270, 44 P. 503 (1896).
4. 608 P.2d at 374.
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The trial court found that $1,025 damage occurred to the plaintiff's
property in the process of being removed, transported, and stored, and that
the Hoovers had employed Slatten as their agent. The court further found
that the Hoovers and Slatten owed the plaintiff a duty of due care in the
removal and storage of the property, and that this duty had been breached.
Accordingly, a money judgment was entered jointly and severally against
Slatten and the Hoovers. 5 On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court in its determination of Slatten's liability, while it re-
versed the lower court's finding that the Hoovers were liable.
6
I. THE MOVER AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
The first and perhaps easiest issue before the court of appeals was
whether Slatten had acted as the Hoovers' agent or as an independent con-
tractor. The rule controlling the court's decision was set out in Dumont v.
TeeIs 7: Does the employer retain or have the right to control the person as to
all details of the work, or does the discretion rest solely with the person so
engaged?" The court found that Slatten and his employees had retained
total control over how the goods were removed, transported, and stored and
was, therefore, an independent contractor-not an employee or agent of the
Hoovers. Accordingly, Slatten's negligence could not be imputed to the
Hoovers.9 Further, although the issue was neither defined nor expressly dis-
posed of, persons who engage independent contractors have a duty to exer-
cise reasonable care in selecting the contractor.10 The court did hold,
however out of context, that the Hoovers, "by employing a professional
mover, without having any reason to believe that the mover would act irre-
sponsibly, cannot be accused of negligence .... ,l Setting the trend for
the rest of the opinion, the court liee iet:cu LI.L .. 11 ..L Cc U1 WAUL....
showing the basis for its conclusion.
II. A BASIS FOR LANDLORD'S LIABILITY
A. Introduction
The central issue before the court of appeals was whether the landlords
were independently liable as bailees or upon some other theory based upon
the landlord-tenant relationship. In keeping with the tenor of the rest of the
opinion, the court's reasoning here was brief and without support. The court
determined that the tenant, by failing to surrender the premises,
placed the landlord in the position of having to take possession and
remove the tenant's effects so that he might regain his, the land-
lord's premises. The landlord, then, as an involuntary bailee,
should not be forced to bear the risk of damage to the tenant's
5. Id
6. Id
7. 128 Colo. 395, 262 P.2d 734 (1953).
8. Id at 397, 262 P.2d at 735.
9. 608 P.2d at 374 (citing Western Stock Center v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 578 P.2d
1045 (1978)).
10. Western Stock Center v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 376, 578 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1978).
11. 608 P.2d at 374.
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property unless he maliciously or wilfully or through gross negligence
causes that damage.12
The court cited no other authority for this proposition than Days . Hal,13 a
1946 New York decision. Days is a short per curiam affirmance with no
recital of facts which in turn cites Ide o. Finn,' 4 an appellate division case
replete with citations but short on any firm holdings. The question becomes,
therefore, whether there is any authority in Days, Ide, or elsewhere to support
the court's finding of such a low standard of care for landlords. Specifically,
was there a bailment created when the Hoovers had the tenant's property
removed, and, if so, were they liable? Secondly, in the absence of a bail-
ment, is a landlord independently liable for damage to an evicted tenant's
personal property? In other words, to what standard of care must a landlord
conform in removing a tenant's personal property? The issue of bailment is
dealt with first.
B. Bailment
A bailment is a delivery of personal property by one person to another
in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, express or implied, that the
property will be returned or accounted for when the specific purpose has
been accomplished or when the bailor reclaims the property.' 5 While deliv-
ery can be constructive by, for example, simply taking possession, 16 the crea-
tion of a bailment requires that possession and control over the subject
property pass to the bailee.
17
A formal creation of a bailment between the parties is not necessary.
Where a person comes into lawful possession of the personal property of an-
other, even though there is no meeting of the minds between the property's
owner and its possessor, the possessor will become a constructive bailee when
justice so requires.' 8 Such bailments are known as constructive or involun-
tary bailments,' 9 and the law imposes upon the recipient the duties and obli-
gations of a bailee. 20 In the facts of Christensen there appears to have been a
constructive bailment between Slatten and the plaintiff. Slatten came into
possession of the property through the legal process of a forcible entry and
detainer action. Further, if it is assumed that the Hoovers retained control
over the property while it was in storage, there well could have been a bailor-
bailee relationship between the plaintiff and the Hoovers. 2' However, a
12. Id (emphasis supplied).
13. 67 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
14. 196 A.D. 304, 187 N.Y.S. 202 (1921).
15. Mayer v. Sampson, 157 Colo. 278, 281, 402 P.2d 185, 187 (1965); Simons v. First Nat'l
Bank of Denver, 30 Colo. App. 260, 262, 491 P.2d 602, 603 (1971).
16. Theobald v. Satterthwaite, 30 Wash. 2d 92, 190 P.2d 714 (1948).
17. Rocky Mountain Bridge Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 543 P.2d 1288 (Colo. App.
1975).
18. Loomis v. Imperial Motors, Inc., 88 Idaho 74, 78, 396 P.2d 467, 469 (1964).
19. Copelin v. Berlin Dye Works & Laundry Co., 168 Cal. 715, 721, 144 P. 961,963 (1914);
Grice v. Berkner, 148 Minn. 64, 180 N.W. 923 (1921).
20. 148 Minn. 64,180 N.W. 923 (1921); see Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 So. 2d 172
(1943).
21. See generally Rocky Mountain Bridge Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 543 P.2d 1288,
1290 (Colo. App. 1975).
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finding of a bailment is not per se determinative of the issues of duty or
negligence.
The standard of care imposed upon a particular bailee depends upon
the classification into which the bailment falls. The modern test is whether
the bailment was gratuitous or for compensation. 22 The fundamental prin-
ciple is the premise that upon the bailee whose labors or efforts are to go
unrewarded should rest most lightly the obligation of care. 23 If the bailment
is for hire or otherwise for the benefit of the bailee the standard of care for
either is the same:2 4 ordinary care-"that degree of care which an ordinary,
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances." '25 However, if
the bailment is gratuitous, the bailee is held merely to a standard of slight
care.26 Therefore, such a bailee is liable only for gross negligence 27 or for
willful acts. 28 No matter how the bailment is characterized, if it is shown
that items are delivered to a bailee in good condition and he returns them in
a damaged condition, a presumption of negligence arises. The bailee then
would have the burden of going forward to rebut that presumption 29 by
showing that he met the particular standard of care imposed upon him.
30
Generally, a constructive trustee will receive nothing from the owner of
the property and has no right to recover anything from the owner for what
he does in caring for the property. 31 It is plain here that unlike Slatten, the
Hoovers received no compensation for having the property stored. In fact,
the Hoovers themselves paid for the property's storage.32 Further, it appears
that the Hoovers had no right to seize and have a lien upon the tenant's
property. The trial and appellate court opinions make no reference to any
lien reserved to Hoover in the lease, nor is the renter of a house provided
with a lien in Colorado's landlord lien statute. 33 Therefore, by having the
property stored, the Hoovers could hope to derive no bceefit. flune as-
sumed bailment-the property could not be held for security, nor would
they have a right to compensation for storage expenses. 34 Accordingly, it
seems fair to assert that the property was stored for the purpose of its safe-
22. Loomis v. Imperial Motors, Inc., 88 Idaho 74, 78, 396 P.2d 467, 469 (1964).
23. Id
24. Johnson v. Willey, 142 Colo. 512, 513, 351 P.2d 840, 841 (1960).
25. Michigan Stove Co. v. Pueblo Hardware Co., 51 Colo. 160, 165, 116 P. 340, 342 (1911).
26. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Paramount Fur Serv., Inc., 168 Ohio St. 431, 437, 156
N.E.2d 121, 126 (1959); 96 A.L.R. 909 (1935).
27. Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976) (concurring opinion); Pettinelli
Motors, Inc. v. Morreale, 39 Misc. 2d 813, 242 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1963); see Carico v. Fidelity Inv.
Co., 5 Colo. App. 56, 37 P. 29 (1894).
28. 168 Ohio St. at 438, 156 N.E.2d at 126.
29. Chabot v. Williams Chevrolet Co., 30 Colo. App. 277, 491 P.2d 612 (1971) (citing
Hipps v. Hennig, 167 Colo. 358, 447 P.2d 700 (1968)).
30. See Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 610 (1891); Johnson v. Willey, 142 Colo. 512, 515,
351 P.2d 840, 842 (1960).
31. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Paramount Fur Serv., Inc., 168 Ohio St. 431, 437, 156
N.E.2d 121, 126 (1959).
32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Christensen v. Hoover, 9 CoLo. LAw. 356 (Colo.
App. 1980) (No. 78-664), cert. granted, No. 80SC46 (March 17, 1980).
33. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3) (1973). See text accompanying notes 50-57 infra.
34. 168 Ohio St. at 438, 156 N.E.2d at 126; Grice v. Berkner, 148 Minn. 64, 180 N.W. 923
(1921); see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-109 (Supp. 1978). Ide v. Finn did find, however, that
there was an implied covenant on the part of the tenant to reimburse the landlord for any
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keeping in a place where it could be and was reclaimed by the plaintiff. As
bailments for safekeeping are usually embraced within the gratuitous bail-
ment classification,3 5 it seems clear that the Hoovers were gratuitous bailees.
Finally, although it could be argued that the bailment, assuming it ex-
isted, was for the Hoovers' sole benefit or even for the mutual benefit of the
Hoovers and the plaintiff, such a construction seems strained. The bailments
ordinarily encompassed under the mutual benefit label (and thus for recom-
pense) are those in which the bailee receives his compensation in the profits
of the business to which the bailment is an incident, such as where a store-
keeper's customer lays aside his clothes while trying on new ones,36 or where
goods are furnished to a person or an association for exhibition to the pub-
lic. 3 7
Thus, although it is not clear how, the court in Chritensen seems to have
reached the right result on the bailment issue. The Hoovers were indeed
gratuitous, involuntary bailees and should therefore be held to a minimal
standard of care. Mr. Slatten, on the other hand, received compensation
and was appropriately held to a higher standard of ordinary care.
C. An Independent Baszs
Implicity raised but never disposed of in the opinion was whether, re-
gardless of the existence of a bailment between the landlord and tenant, the
landlord is independently liable for damages which occur to an evicted ten-
ant's personal property in the process of removal. The court in Chrs-tensen
relied on Days v. Ha138 wherein is set out a "willful and wanton" standard,
39
but it is not very clear under what circumstances such a standard is to be
imposed. Recall that in a normal forcible entry and detainer (f.e.d.) action,
a sheriff is issued a writ of restitution,4° and it is his duty not only to remove
the overstaying tenant, but also the tenant's personal property and effects.
4 1
As a practical matter, however, it may be the landlord himself or his servant
who removes the property, either alone or with the assistance of the sheriff.
As for acts of the sheriff, a landlord generally is not liable for the man-
ner in which the sheriff executes the writ unless either the landlord has di-
rected its execution 42 or the writ is irregular, unauthorized, or void.43 Mere
participation with the sheriff is not treated as direction. One case cited with
approval in Ide held that a landlord in a dispossess action who, at the consta-
expenses incurred in removing the property from the premises. 196 A.D. at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at
209.
35. Slack v. Bryan, 299 Ky. 132, 184 S.W.2d 873 (1945); Acme Ribbon Mills, Inc. v. City
of New York, 30 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1941), af'd 266 A.D. 656, 41 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1943).
36. 1 A.L.R.2d 802 (1948).
37. Kay County Free Fair Ass'n v. Martin, 190 Okla. 225, 122 P.2d 393 (1942); see Johnson
v. Willey, 142 Colo. 512, 351 P.2d 840 (1960)..
38. 67 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
39. Id at 239.
40. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-115(1) (1973). See note 3 supra.
41. Miller v. White, 80 Ill. 580 (1875); Ide v. Finn, 196 A.D. 304, 187 N.Y.S. 202 (1921).
See note 3 supra.
42. 196 A.D. at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at 209 (citing with approval Jansen v. Bernard, 12 N.Y.
Wkly. Dig. 499); see Rosenfield v. Barnett, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 64 S.W. 944 (1901).
43. 196 A.D. at 314-15, 187 N.Y.S. at 210.
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ble's request, helped remove the tenant's property to a sidewalk during a
rainstorm was not liable unless he acted maliciously or willfully.4 4 This lan-
guage was perhaps the basis for the holding offDays.
If a directing landlord is to be held "liable for the unlawful acts of the
constable," 4 5 to what standard of care is the landlord held? To begin, the
sheriff or constable himself is held to a fairly low standard:
an officer armed with such a writ [of restitution] can enter forcibly,
in order to execute it . . . and .. . it is his duty to remove
whatever chattels or property may be in the house, doing as little
damage as possible-no more than is necessary to effect the pur-
pose, and which would be the natural consequence of a hasty re-
moval. By the writ, the landlord is to be put in full possession...
of the premises only, divested of such property as may be found
therein. Should the officer wantonly injure the chattel property, he
would be liable to the extent of the injury.
46
Since the negligence of the sheriff is sought to be imputed to the landlord,
47
it seems reasonable to hold the landlord to the sheriffs standard of care:
some degree of care in excess of wantonness. There are additional reasons to
impose a relatively low standard on the landlord. First, it is primarily the
duty of the tenant to remove his own property. 48 Second, it is the duty of a
tenant whose personal property has been removed under a writ of restitution
to use his best efforts to protect it from damage. 49 Given these duties, it is
the view of this writer that even if the landlord alone removes the property,
in a legal entry with reasonable notice to the tenant, it is equitable to require
of the landlord only that he not willfully or maliciously damage the tenant's
property. While this issue has not been clearly determined in any decision,
especially in Christensen, a lower standard of care for an evicting landlord
seems reasonable and fair. It will be up to the Colorado Supreme Court,
however, to make this determination.
III. THE LANDLORD'S LIEN
As Christensen illustrates, in any eviction proceeding there is raised the
question of what rights and responsibilities a landlord has in the tenant's
personal property. Although it was not broached in the Christensen opinion,
the landlord's lien is a central right in the landlord-tenant relationship. A
determination of the existence of a landlord's lien is crucial to fully assess the
rights and obligations of the parties in the tenant's personal property. The
significance of a finding of a landlord's lien extends beyond the mere fact
that the landlord would then have the rent obligation secured in his favor.
Should the landlord seize the tenant's personal property to enforce the lien, a
44. Id (citing Higenbothem v. Lowenbein, 28 How. Prac. 221 (1864), "The law does not
[in dispossess actions] recognize the state of the weather." .1d at 223). Ide had previously cau-
tioned, however, that property's removal to the street and alley "could only be justified under
the warrant." Id at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at 208.
45. Id at 314, 187 N.Y.S. at 210.
46. Miller v. White, 80 11. 580, 584 (1875) (emphasis supplied); see 56 A.L.R. 1039 (1928).
47. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
48. 196 A.D. at 313, 187 N.Y.S. at 208.
49. Przybylski v. Remus, 207 Il. App. 106, 108 (1917).
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bailment would be created. Moreover, since the landlord would obviously
derive some benefit out of the bailment, he would not be a gratuitous bailee.
His standard of care toward the property would therefore be considerably
higher than if he had simply had the chattels carried away and stored to be
freely reclaimed by the tenant. The following. section is intended to survey
this very important lien.
At common law, a landlord had no lien upon any property of his tenant
as security for rent. However, the landlord did have the right to distress 5° or
seize the tenant's personal property found on the demised premises and hold
it without sale until the rent was paid.5 1 To the extent that the landlord
actually seized the goods and was in possession of the goods, he acquired a
peculiar right in the distressed property which was in the nature of secur-
ity.52 This right to distress has never existed in the State of Colorado.53
While the first legislature of the territory of Colorado adopted the com-
mon law of England, it limited its adoption to laws "of a general nature, and
all acts and statutes of the British Parliament made in aid of or to supply the
defects of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First."'54 Herr
v. Johnson5 5 found that a landlord's right of distraint under the English law
did not arise until after the fourth year of the reign of James J.56 Accord-
ingly, to determine whether a landlord has the right to distress or have a lien
upon a tenant's personal property, one must look to the lease agreement
between the parties5 7 or any statutory provision.
Colorado landlords and innkeepers have been provided with a statutory
lien upon their tenants' personal property found on the premises for the
amount of any unpaid board, lodging, or rent, as well as for any reasonable
costs incurred in enforcing the lien, not including legal expenses. 58 The
landlord lien encompasses household furniture, appliances, and other per-
sonal property. Certain items, such as cooking utensils, necessary clothing,
and the tenants' personal effects, are excluded. The landlord may peaceably
enter the premises and seize any property subject to the lien.
59
50. Morgan v. Campbell, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 381, 391 (1874).
51. 62 A.L.R. 1106, 1107 (1929),
52. Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U.S. 631, 638 (1912).
53. Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 18 P. 342 (1888).
54. 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws (codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 2-4-211 (1973)).
55. 11 Colo. 393, 18 P. 342 (1888).
56. Id at 395, 18 P. at 343.
57. A.B.R. Distrib., Inc. v. Sterling Properties, 161 Colo. 460, 423 P.2d 1 (1967); Illinois
Bldg. Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 401, 15 P.2d 699, 702 (1932). Illinozs Bldg. Co. suggested
that while a landlord's lien reserved in the lease agreement was to be recognized and enforced, it
was to be treated as a chattel mortgage and as such controlled by the provisions of Colorado's
chattel mortgage act as to recordation. Id, 15 P.2d at 702. However, the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) now stipulates that its secured transactions provisions do not apply to landlord's
liens. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-104(b) (Supp. 1978).
58. CoIL. REv. STAT. § 38-20-101 to -116 (Supp. 1978).
59. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3) (1973), in relevant part, provides:
(3)(a) Any person who rents furnished or unfurnished rooms or apartments for the
housekeeping purposes of his tenants, as well as the keeper of a trailer court who rents
trailer space, shall have a lien upon the tenant's personal property that is then on or in
the rental premises. The value of the lien shall be for the amount of unpaid board,
lodging, or rent, and for reasonable costs incurred in enforcing the lien, not including
attorney fees. The lien shall be upon the household furniture, goods, appliances, and
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As any statutory creation of a right in landlords to distress or to impose
a lien is in derogation of Colorado's common law, it must be strictly con-
strued.60 For example, in Morse v. Mornson,6 1 an innkeepers lien provision
that "[t]he keeper of any hotel, tavern or boarding house, or any person who
rents furnished or unfurnished rooms, shall have a lien upon the baggage
and furniture of his or her patrons . ."62 was denied application to a lessor
of an office who sought to impose a lien on the lessee's office equipment and
furniture. 63 Accordingly, in the absence of an agreement, if a particular
landlord-tenant relationship has not been provided for the statute, the land-
lord has no right to seize and have a lien upon the tenant's chattels.
While the landlord's lien statute appears to be an outgrowth of the Eng-
lish common law of distraint, it differs in a very important respect-it gives
the lienor the right to sell the seized property. The statute provides a
mandatory procedure for the sale and disposal of goods seized and on which
a statutory lien is given.64 Thirty days after the charges for which a lien
arises under the statute become due and payable, the lienor "may file a fore-
closure action in the county, superior, or district court of the county or city
and county in which the contract or agreement between the lienholder and
the owner of the property was signed or entered into."65 If the lienholder
does not commence a judicial action to foreclose the lien within sixty days
after the charges become due and payable, the lien will terminate.66 Provid-
ing the lienor receives a judgment, he may sell the property at a public auc-
tion after giving ten days prior notice. Such notice may be given by
publication, or, under some circumstances, by mail to the chattel owner's
"usual place of abode."' 67
('n2,lrb'q Inncllnrei lien Rtntittf e n t 1-_.t -- Mabyncnttt:n]n
sofar as it creates a right in the landlord to seize a tenant's property without
other personal property of the tenant and members of his household then being upon
the rental premises, but exclusive of small kitchen appliances, cooking utensils, beds,
bedding, necessary wearing apparel, personal or business records and documents, and
the personal effects of the tenant and the members of his household.
(b) In the event the tenant has vacated the premises, the landlord shall allow
the tenant and members of his household access to the premises at any reasonable time
and in a reasonable manner to remove any property not covered by the lien.
(c) In the event the tenant has not vacated the premises, the landlord or his
agent may enter upon the premises at any reasonable time for the purpose of asserting
the lien and, in a reasonable manner and peaceably, the landlord may assert dominion
over the personal property covered by the lien. Assertion of the lien provided in this
section in a manner which substantially interferes with the tenant's right to reasonably
occupy and enjoy the premises is unlawful and shall cause forfeiture of the lien and
shall give rise to an action for damages.
60. See McKee Livestock Co. v. Menzel, 70 Colo. 308, 310, 201 P. 52, 53 (1921); Scanlan v.
LaCoste, 59 Colo. 449, 149 P. 835 (1915).
61. 16 Colo. App. 449, 66 P. 169 (1901).
62. Id at 170.
63. Id at 169.
64. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107 (Supp. 1978). A tenant has a cause of action against
his landlord-lienor who does not follow this procedure; however, an exception is made for aban-
doned property. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(3) (Supp. 1978).
65. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(1) (Supp. 1978).
66. Id
67. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-109(1) (Supp. 1978).
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a prior hearing.68 As there is no common law right of landlords in Colorado
to seize the tenant's property, 69 any such action under a state-created right
could be viewed as state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The right to a prior hearing at-
taches to the deprivation of property interests encompassed within the
fourteenth amendment's protection. 70 Although the tenant could institute a
replevin or trespass action for damages or for the return of the goods and
ultimately prevail, 7' and despite the fact that the tenant could prevail at the
hearing provided for under Colorado law, 72 even a "temporary, nonfinal
deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in terms of the Four-
teenth Amendment. '73 The "Court has not . . . embraced the general
proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."
'74
The tenant's personal property upon which the landlord holds a lien
will not always be valuable enough to warrant the expense of a foreclosure
action and sale. After a tenant in arrears has left or been forcibly removed
from the premises, 75 he may have left behind personal property that is essen-
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3)(c) (1973).
69. Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 395, 18 P. 342, 343 (1888).
70. A possessory interest in chattels is within the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
71. Wilde v. Rawles, 13 Colo. 583, 22 P. 897 (1889); Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531, 131 P.
386 (1913).
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-20-108 (Supp. 1978).
73. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972); see Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 339 (1969).
The Fuentes Court held that by not providing for prior notice and a "meaningful" opportu-
nity to be heard prior to the property's seizure, the prejudgment replevin statutes of Florida and
Pennsylvania violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments in that they worked a deprivation
without due process of law. 407 U.S. at 96. While the statutes involved in Fuentes and Sniadach
can be distinguished from Colorado's in that they involved the actions of constables, court
clerks, and other agents of the state, a Colorado landlord would have, in the absence of an
agreement, no right to seize a tenant's property without the state statute. In Hall v. Garson, 468
F.2d. 845 (5th Cir. 1972), the court, citing Fuentes and Sntadach, struck down Texas's landlord
lien statute which was very similar to Colorado's. Specifically, the court found that because the
statute clothed "the apartment owner with the clear statutory authority to enter" and seize the
property, the landlord's action became that of the state. 468 F.2d at 848. See Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1945).
Although the Court has permitted prehearing seizures in "extraordinary situations," Bod-
die v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971), "[t]hese situations, however, must be truly unu-
sual" and necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest which
demands very prompt action. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91. To illustrate, summary seizure of
property has been permitted to collect the internal revenue of the United States, Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931), and to meet the exigencies of a national war effort,
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1922).
Finally, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1941), Congress has created a cause of action against any
person who "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State,"
deprives another of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws .. " A Colorado tenant's cause of action under this section seems clear: under the aegis
of a state-created right, a landlord has deprived the tenant of the possession of his property
without the procedural due process recognized in Fuentes. In Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Fla. 1972), it was held that a landlord who summarily evicted a tenant and seized his
property as permitted under Florida's landlord lien statute acted under "color of state law"
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, given the dim view taken of statutes
providing for summary landlord action, a Colorado landlord would be well-advised to provide
for a separate lien in the lease agreement.
74. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
75. CoL. REV. STAT. § 13-40-101 (1973); see note 3 supra.
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tially worthless. Furthermore, by seizing the tenant's property pursuant to
the landlord's lien statute, 76 the landlord may find himself in possession of
chattels of little resale value. Under these circumstances, or even if the land-
lord finds himself in the possession of valuable property, the landlord is not
required to commence an action to foreclose his lien if the property has been
abandoned.
77
Property is presumed to be abandoned if its owner has failed to contact
the lienholder "for a period of not less than thirty days"7 8 and the lienholder
has no reason to believe that the property owner does not intend to abandon
his chattels. 79 Here the statute seems to leave the means of disposal to the
discretion of the landlord: "[a]t least fifteen days prior to sell'ng or otherwise
disposing of abandoned property, the lienholder shall notify the owner of the
proposed manner and date of disposition ... "80 Therefore, a landlord will
likely be within his rights to dispose of abandoned property by informal sale
or even destruction. Furthermore, the landlord can dispose of abandoned
property at his convenience as the sixty-day limit relates only to the com-
mencement of required foreclosure proceedings for nonabandoned prop-
erty.8 1 Finally, as to both contractual and statutory liens on property, it is
axiomatic that the lienor, subject only to the sixty-day limit where applica-
ble,8 2 may simply retain the property until the tenant pays the debt upon
which the lien is based. Such payment will extinguish the lien,8 3 and termi-
nate the landlord's right to retain the property.
84
A landlord seeking to foreclose or otherwise enforce a statutory or con-
tractual lien upon a tenant's chattels should be aware of some of the issues
concerning the priority of competing lienholders in the same property. Colo-
rado's landlord lien provisions are silent as to priorities8 5 and there is not an
overabundance of Colorado case law on the subject. However, at least in
other jurisdictions, a landlord's lien is superior to other liens, including judg-
ments acquired upon the property subsequent to its being brought upon the
premises, and it may ordinarily be enforced against all but prior liens and
bona fide purchases without notice.86 For example, a statutory lien was held
76. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(3)(c) (1973).
77. CoL. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(3) (Supp. 1978).
78. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-106 (Supp. 1978).
79. Id For purposes of the lien and the right to dispose of the abandoned property, it
probably is not necessary that the personal property have been left behind by a tenant in ar-
rears. A former tenant, by abandoning property on the premises, becomes a tenant at suffer-
ance and such property thereby is subject to the landlord's lien. Cabre v. Brown, 355 So.2d 846,
847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
80. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-20-116(2) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied).
81. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(3) (Supp. 1978).
82. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-107(1) (Supp. 1978).
83. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(2) (1973).
84. See gnerally Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949); Henson v.
Henson, 151 Tenn. 137, 149, 268 S.W. 378, 381 (1921).
85. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-20-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1978) does, however, stipulate priority for
agistor's liens.
86. See Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.), cert. detied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968);
Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Boymann, 155 N.J. Super. 120, 382 A.2d 437 (1977); In re
Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project, 31 A.D.2d 895, 297 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969).
Statutory liens, Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 695, 21 So.2d 361, 364 (1945), as well as
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superior to a chattel mortgage given by the tenant in certain commercial
showcases and fixtures after this property was brought upon the premises.
87
Analogously, a contractual lien is normally inferior to the rights of the ten-
ant's prior conditional vendor of the subject chattel. 88 The result could be
less predictable, however, if the prior party's security interest was not prop-
erly perfected.8 9
Because the Uniform Commercial Code provisions on secured transac-
tions as adopted in Colorado do not apply to landlord's liens (apparently of
any kind) 9° the priorities between a prior party with an unperfected security
interest and the landlord-lienor are unclear.9 ' Illinois Building Co. v. Patter-
son, 92 however, offers an interesting parallel in resolving priorities between a
prior conditional vendor and a landlord. Unlike today where security inter-
ests are governed by Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code,93 when
Illinois Building Co. was decided (1932) a conditional vendor had to conform
with the recordation and other provisions of Colorado's chattel mortgage
act. 94 The court held that by clothing the tenant with indicia of ownership
in the chattels, the conditional vendor will be denied the right to assert his
ownership to the landlord. The court reasoned that because the vendor had
not given notice of his ownership by proper recordation, the landlord should
be entitled to the protection and priority given to creditors who have relied
to their detriment upon a conditional vendee's apparent ownership.9 5 For
purposes of the Code's application in a priority dispute with a landlord's
lien, it is significant that the court in Illinois Building Co. treated the landlord
as a creditor insofar as the Code stipulates that unperfected security interests
are inferior to persons who become "lien creditors" without knowledge of the
security interest.96 A "lien creditor" is defined to be a "creditor who has
acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like
... .- 0 This language clearly suggests that a landlord who seizes a ten-
ant's property without knowledge of a prior unperfected interest in that
property would have a lien superior to any such prior lien. Accordingly,
while this section is a cursory examination of priorities, a landlord at first
blush would have a substantial position from which to challenge a prior un-
perfected interest in the property seized by the landlord, and would be well-
advised in most situations to seize the property before unknown prior inter-
ests can be perfected.
contractual liens, A.B.R. Distrib., Inc. v. Sterling Properties, 161 Colo. 460, 423 P.2d 1 (1967),
are superior to judgments.
87. Dewar v. Hagans, 61 Ariz. 201, 146 P.2d 208 (1944); see Beall v. White, 94 U.S. 382,
386 (1876).
88. Beebe v. Fouse, 27 N.M. 194, 198, 199 P. 364, 366 (1921).
89. See Illinois Bldg. Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 399, 15 P.2d 699, 702 (1932); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 4-9-301 (1973).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-104(b) (Supp. 1978).
91. Ste d. § 4-9-312 (1973).
92. 91 Colo. 391, 15 P.2d 699 (1932).
93. CLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-102 (1973).
94. Illinois Bldg. Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 399, 15 P.2d 699, 702 (1932).
95. Id at 405, 15 P.2d at 705.
96. CLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-301(l) (1973).
97. Id. § 4-9301(3).
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CONCLUSION
This note surveys the central issues that relate to a tenant's personalty.
Most of the propositions set forth here rest upon decisions from jurisdictions
other than Colorado. These cases, while largely of an early vintage and
without the binding effect of Colorado holdings, do provide an adequate
source of precedent to define this area of landlord-tenant law in Colorado.
The rights and duties of landlords and tenants in tenants' personal
property have yet to be clearly defined in Colorado, or, for that matter, in
any other jurisdiction. The Chr'stensen v. Hoover opinion, as it now stands,
does little to clarify this uncertainty. While the opinion suggests more issues
than it settles, in all fairness it does serve as a convenient portal to further
inquiry by the Colorado Supreme Court. Hopefully the court will take ad-
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